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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how two of New Zealand's largest primary producer 
industries negotiated their relationship with the highly controversial practice of 
genetic modification. This was in an effort to maintain their dominance in export 
markets, at a time when genetically modified foods were on the one hand regarded as 
a possible liability in the marketplace, and on the other hand offered the apparent 
potential for innovation and economic gain. 
The two case studies featured in this thesis-the dairy industry and the 
kiwifruit industry-both earn significant export incomes and are seen as national 
icons as well as major institutions for New Zealand. However, these two industries 
take differing positions in the debate about genetic modification. The kiwifruit 
industry has urged extreme caution while the dairy industry has argued for rapid 
involvement in genetic modification. 
The research takes a critical-interpretive perspective on the two cases. The 
study is both issue- and case-driven, and uses a combination of rhetorical criticism 
and discourse analysis to examine the social construction of meanings about genetic 
modification. The research focus is on the intersection of public relations and 
organisational communication, including issues management, and especially on the 
ways in which rhetoric is used as a means of managing multiple organisational 
identities. 
The research findings indicate that the positioning of these two industries on 
genetic modification is largely market-driven. The differences in their policies result 
from contrasting industry products, industry markets, and industry cultures. The 
values and values-related tensions, expressed explicitly and implicitly in the research 
data, indicate that there is a dynamic interplay between the rationalities used by the 
industries to justify their positioning on genetic modification and the multiple 
identities that need to be managed by each industry. In the kiwifruit industry, 
environmental concerns are highlighted by an emphasis on 'soft' pest management 
and organic production, and kiwifruit become a luxury raw product sold mainly to 
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markets in Europe and Japan. In the dairy industry, commodity milk products 
compete on the basis of low-cost, efficient production, and the major markets are in 
South East Asia and Latin America. 
This thesis contributes to recent work on corporate identity and organisational 
communication. Significantly, it demonstrates how the blurring of boundaries 
between internal and external organisational communication has increased the need 
for a more complex understanding of how organisations manage multiple 
organisational identities, particularly where broader socio-political issues, including 
national identities and international markets, are concerned. 
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This thesis examines how two of New Zealand's largest primary producer 
industries, the dairy industry and the kiwifruit industry, negotiated their relationship 
with the highly controversial practice of genetic modification (GM)1• The thesis aims 
to describe, analyse, and critique the principal features of these two exemplars of 
corporate/organisational discourse in New Zealand's GM debate, using a 
combination of rhetorical criticism and discourse analysis to examine the social 
construction of meanings about GM. 
The term GM is generally given to technologies that alter the genetic make-
up of an organism, whether within a species (isogenic), or cross-species (transgenic). 
These technologies developed following the groundbreaking research of Crick and 
Watson in genetic science, in the 1950s, identifying the molecular structure of DNA. 
GM is then a 'biotechnology,' derived from the biological sciences. 
Rapid developments have taken place in both genetic and genomic sciences 
and there is the potential for the resulting technologies, whose implications have not 
been fully researched or understood, to have far-reaching social, environmental, and 
economic effects. GM is thus a biotechnology that is the subject of intense debate. It 
is contested scientifically, economically, and in terms of the environment and public 
health, both in New Zealand and internationally. 
1 The terms 'genetic modification' (GM) and 'genetic engineering' (GE) are used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis, and are not intended to privilege a particular set of meanings. 'Genetic 
engineering' is a term widely used in much of the literature, particularly in Europe and in New 
Zealand prior to the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification in 2000. Since the Royal 
Commission, 'genetic modification' has become the more commonly used term in New Zealand. 
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In 2000, the New Zealand Government set up a Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification to facilitate wider understanding of the contested nature of the 
issues, and to inform Government policy on GM. The Commission reported in 2001, 
and in 2002, the New Zealand Government identified biotechnology as one of three 
key strategic economic development areas for New Zealand (Growing an innovative 
New Zealand, 2002). Biotechnology was defined in the associated biotechnology 
strategy document as: 
... a broad term for a group of technologies that are based on applying biological 
processes. It involves the use of living things or their derivatives to solve problems 
and make products. (Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, 2002, p. 7) 
GM was further distinguished in this strategy as an aspect of "modem" 
biotechnology: "A range of techniques from DNA technology, molecular and cellular 
biochemistry through to gene technology" (Ministry of Research, Science and 
Technology, 2002, p. 7). GM was contrasted with "traditional" biotechnologies such 
as fermentation applications, like cheese and bread-making, and existing animal and 
plant breeding techniques. 
The Rationale for the Study 
The research design of this study, and the decision to look at the GM debate 
from an industry perspective, stemmed from the findings of my Masters' dissertation 
(Henderson, 2001). This suggested there was significant concern within sectors of 
the New Zealand public that large corporations might be driving decision-making 
about GM for self-interested commercial gain (Henderson, 2001; Henderson & 
Weaver, 2003). Given this concern, and the lack of previous research focusing on 
industry perspectives of GM, this study focuses on the ways in which New Zealand 
industries both affect and effect the social construction of the GM debate. 
A large number of organisations, 117 in all, including a number of industry 
organisations, made submissions to the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
in 2000, with a range of positions represented. At the time I was deciding on the 
focus for this study, the Royal Commission had not made its final recommendations, 
and the groups presenting submissions arguing that New Zealand should invest 
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significantly in GM technologies included Crown Research Institutes, some 
universities, and many large primary production industries in New Zealand. The 
largest of these industries, the dairy industry, argued strongly in favour of GM. 
In contrast, the majority of groups presenting submissions arguing against the 
commercial development of GM in New Zealand included activist environmental 
groups (for example, Greenpeace); religious groups (for example, Anglican, Catholic 
and Jewish groups); Maori groups; and small groups representing, for example, 
organic crop certification, and the protection of birds and animals; the kiwifruit 
industry seemed to be a lone industry voice taking such a cautious position. 
From the outset of this study, I was interested in why two primary production 
industries with a number of common features, the dairy and kiwifruit industries, 
should take positions on GM that seemed to be diametrically opposed. Both 
industries are prominent in the New Zealand business environment and represent 
significant export income to New Zealand; both have formed large farmer/grower 
cooperatives with single marketing platforms, and collectively represent a large 
interest group of New Zealanders. In addition, both industries seem to rely heavily on 
marketing their products using brand imagery that focuses on positioning these 
products as healthy and natural, and on New Zealand's status as a 'clean, green' 
environment. The sizes of the kiwifruit and dairy industries, their importance to the 
New Zealand economy, and the somewhat iconic ways in which images of kiwifruit 
and dairy products have come to symbolise New Zealand culture and identity, both 
nationally and internationally, suggest that these industries have the potential to 
significantly influence public policy on GM. These similarities and differences 
suggested to me that aspects of identity might provide a useful lens with which to 
explore these industry perspectives of GM. 
The study explores how the industries' positions on GM and their associated 
identity management and issues management practices are negotiated with 
stakeholders at the levels of policy development, research, production, manufacture, 
and marketing. In particular, the study compares and contrasts the position of each 
industry-expressed in formal messages, such as corporate public relations 
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campaigns and policy statements-and the differing understandings of industry 
members2 within each industry group, evident in the texts of interviews. That is, 
within each industry, the study compares and contrasts participants' comments and 
the meanings negotiated by the industry groups and produced collectively, noting 
paradoxes or ambiguous viewpoints, any changes or ambivalent meanings 
represented over the period of the research, and possible relevant social or 
ideological contexts. The study thus explores the ways in which particular meanings 
legitimated and defined issues about GM for the kiwifruit and dairy industries, and 
how these industry positions contributed to the wider political debate and public 
policy-making process in New Zealand. The research, then, is issue- and case-driven, 
and highlights key points in the GM debate during the period from July 2000, when 
the Royal Commission was set up, to October 2003, when the New Zealand 
Government lifted a moratorium on commercial applications for GM field trials. 
Of concern from the start of this study were the values held by these two 
industries. My discursive orientation toward values means that I am not concerned 
with assessing the foundational or core values of these industry organisations but 
focus instead on the ways in which the industries represent specific practical values 
(such as consumer concerns, or safety) and, in a broad sense, the importance of being 
'values-based'. Each industry organisation inevitably takes values-based positions, in 
terms of their chosen practices and with respect to public policy on GM, given the 
controversy over GM both in New Zealand and internationally. 
At the same time, the two industries negotiate multiple identities at the level 
of specific industry group, industry, and nation which invoke particular values about, 
for example, acceptable agricultural or horticultural practice, best business practice, 
2 'Industry members' refers to all stakeholders internal to the industry concerned. The term includes 
growers/farmers, supplier organisations, and manufacturing employees, as well as administrative staff 
in the corporate industry organisations. However, not all kiwifruit industry members, for example 
packhouse/suppliers, are employees of ZESPRI, the kiwifruit industry organisation. 
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and appropriate public policy in the context of GM. The linking of industry identity 
with the '100% Pure' image of New Zealand, for example, would suggest a symbolic 
alliance with other groups concerned about the environmental impacts of GM. The 
study focuses on identity as both an act or process and a state of belonging (Cheney, 
1983a) and on possible strategies of identification such as establishing rapport or 
common ground, identification through antithesis (what the organisation is not), or 
the transcendent use of the term 'we' (see Burke, 1973). 
This organisational communication research project takes a discursive 
approach to explore how values function in the rhetorical positioning of these two 
industries in relation to GM issues. It draws on literature at the intersection of 
organisational communication and public relations, including issues management, 
and especially on the ways in which rhetoric is used as a means of managing multiple 
organisational identities (Cheney & Christensen, 2001b). In their issues management 
communication, organisations frequently highlight different values, invoking 
different identities, for specific stakeholder groups or audiences. For example, in 
relation to GM, primary industry organisations might focus on technical benefits, 
such as the possible reduction in spraying for pests and diseases, in their 
communication to their producers/growers. This would invoke a pragmatic, 
operational industry identity and privilege a cost-benefit approach to the issues. 
The primary research question for this thesis then centres on the negotiation 
of 'values and values-related tensions' in the messages and discourses of these 
industries: 
What explicit and implicit values, and values-related tensions, are evident in 
the organisational communication of the kiwifruit and dairy industries, as they 
contribute to the social construction of issues surrounding genetically modified foods 
and crops in New Zealand? 
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As the study progressed, it became apparent that the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries presented various logics or rationales for their positioning in relation to 
GM, as they negotiated with both the specific values represented in GM discourses 
and the function of values themselves in the GM debate. In making its submission to 
the Royal Commission, each industry drew on particular rationalities to argue for its 
own strategic positioning on GM. For example, the dairy industry drew on economic 
and technical/scientific rationalities, while the kiwifruit industry drew on economic 
and environmental rationalities. At the same time, each industry had to defend its 
chosen position to diverse stakeholders, including industry members, international 
consumers, and other interest groups concerned about GM issues in New Zealand. 
Each industry's representation of its strategic positioning on GM negotiated multiple 
forms of rationality to foster the identification of these diverse stakeholders with the 
industry position. Thus, I found it necessary to introduce rationality as an important 
though secondary concept in my literature review and analysis. 
Rationality involves the connections between means (that is policies or 
processes) and ends (that is outcomes, often stated in terms of values), and Weber 
(1978) introduced the idea that rationalities can be multiple and contingent rather 
than singular and fixed. Rationality is thus relevant to this study on two levels: both 
in terms of the logics presented by the two industries in their policies on GM, and, at 
a meta-level, in terms of their negotiation of what is 'rational' in the debate and how 
this implicates their identity and image. The theoretical framework developed in this 
study thus provides a fresh way of looking at the social construction of meanings 
about GM. For instance, debate about GM can be seen as a rhetorical and discursive 
battle for identity evident in the positioning of organisations as they seek to influence 
public knowledge, public opinion, and public policy. 
Indeed, the debate about GM in New Zealand is firmly set within a political 
context (Ashwell & Olsson, 2004; Hager, 2002; Rogers-Hayden, 2004; Rogers-
Hayden & Hindmarsh, 2002; Weaver & Motion, 2002), and Government policy 
positions GM as providing potential economic advantages for New Zealand, 
following the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
in 2001. 
The New Zealand Government's public discussion paper The New Zealand 
Biotechnology Strategy, in 2002, recognised both the pace of research and the need 
for careful deliberation of the issues: 
Developments in biotechnology move swiftly. We will need to work hard to keep 
abreast because those developments will bring great opportunities. They can also 
carry risks. It is important that a balanced approach to biotechnology is taken so that 
our economic, social, environmental and cultural values are given equal 
consideration. That is why we have developed this strategy. (Ministry of Research, 
Science and Technology, 2002, p.3) 
However, the sense of strategic urgency evident in this statement means that policy 
may be implemented before sufficient research has been completed to understand the 
values, assumptions, and beliefs upon which the policy is built, and the breadth of the 
possible implications. An examination of the range of meanings constructed in the 
debate about GM issues is then as important as a scientific understanding of the new 
technologies. 
It is therefore crucial that locally-based research informs public policy and 
debate about GM in New Zealand; although, to date, few qualitative research 
projects have been completed. Public opinion surveys have attempted to define 
attitudes to GM but projects that will contribute to an understanding of the processes 
involved in the construction of the debate are as yet largely incomplete and need to 
follow up the outcomes of the Royal Commission. 
One of the key features of this project is its originality. No other research that 
I am aware of has completed a detailed case study of primary industries important to 
New Zealand export earnings, and the ways in which these industries participate in 
and influence the GM debate. The study is comprehensive; its comparative 
examination of two industries taking different positions on GM explores multiple 
forms of data, including documents, interviews, and focus groups with industry 
members. This enables a consideration of organisational identity and the 
representation of social values at a variety of levels, focusing on different stakeholder 
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groups within each industry, the industry organisations, and aspects of New 
Zealand's national and international identity. 
This study may assist these industries in developing future decision-making 
and communication practices in the GM debate. It should also contribute to the 
growing body of knowledge that informs New Zealand policy on developing 
sustainable business opportunities, and contribute towards a theoretical 
understanding of the ways in which the GM debate in New Zealand is politically, 
economically, culturally, and socially constructed. My concern with how values, 
identities, and rationalities are expressed and function in the communication of the 
kiwifruit and dairy industries furthers work on the interrelations of these three 
foundational concepts as they function in discourse. For example, the expression of a 
dominant market rationality, arguing that the structure and conditions of the market 
requires certain policies, focuses attention on particular values, suggests certain 
identities in alignment with other business and governmental positions, and is 
represented as a 'rational' choice alongside other explicitly value-based positions 
such as those offered in the context of the environmental movement. The final 
section in this chapter outlines the organisation of the remainder of the thesis. 
Preview of Thesis Chapters 
The second chapter-The New Zealand context for GM: Issues and key 
parties-describes the historical development of GM issues in New Zealand, 
including key moments in the debate, recent New Zealand legislation, the role of the 
Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, the development of a policy direction, 
and events leading up to the lifting of the moratorium on applications for commercial 
field trials. This chapter also briefly introduces contexts for understanding the issues, 
including the prevalent political, economic, scientific, and environmental parameters 
of the GM debate. Finally, the two case study industries are introduced and their GM 
policies are summarised. 
Chapter Three-Literature Review: Theoretical perspectives of genetic 
modification issues - building a theoretical framework based on identiry management 
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and rationality-describes and critiques previous approaches to GM research, and 
introduces the theoretical framework for the data analysis. It highlights the 
advantages of focusing on the intersection of organisational communication and 
public relations, particularly in terms of issues management and the role of rhetoric 
in identity management. This includes the ways in which interest groups seek to 
influence multiple stakeholders and publics in an attempt to influence public policy, 
the rationalities they draw on to achieve this, and the ways in which activism/social 
movements influence which issues become significant in the public domain. 
The next chapter, Chapter Four, introduces the methodology for the study and 
explains the ontological and epistemological basis for the critical-interpretive 
approach taken in this research. It discusses the combination of rhetorical criticism 
and critical discourse analysis used in examining the data, before explaining in detail 
the methods of data collection and analysis. 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven present the findings of the study, and each 
chapter is structured around a specific research question. Chapter Five presents a 
rhetorical and discourse analysis of dairy and kiwifruit industry policy on GM, 
Chapter Six focuses on the interplay of organisational identity and image evident in 
industry policy on GM, and Chapter Seven discusses the rationalities evident in the 
kiwifruit and dairy industries' issues management strategies through an examination 
of their engagement with key stakeholder groups. 
The final chapter, Chapter Eight, draws together the conclusions from these 
findings, considers the theoretical implications of the study, and makes practical 
recommendations both for further research and for the dairy and kiwifruit industries' 
continuing negotiation with GM issues. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT FOR GENETIC 
MODIFICATION: ISSUES AND KEY PARTIES 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the background to events associated with the GM debate 
in New Zealand. The first section briefly explains the historical development of GM 
issues in New Zealand through a timeline of key moments in the debate, including 
recent legislation, the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, the 
announcement of Government policy on the technology, the general election in 2002, 
and the lifting of the moratorium on applications for GM commercial field trials in 
2003. 
In the second section, after a brief summary of the history of GM research, 
the New Zealand political and economic contexts for understanding GM issues are 
discussed, identifying concerns about potential environmental and cultural impacts, 
and potential scientific and economic benefits. 
The final section of the chapter introduces the two case study industries: the 
New Zealand kiwifruit industry and dairy industry, and summarises their respective 
policies on GM. 
A Timeline of Key Moments in the GM Debate in New Zealand 
The following timeline identifies recent key events in the historical 
development of GM issues in New Zealand, and briefly explains the implications of 
each event. 
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A Timeline of Key Moments in the GM Debate in New Zealand 
Key moments in relation to GM issues Event Implications 
June 1996 The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms The HSNO Act provides a system for managing 
Act (HSNO Act) is introduced risks from hazardous substances and new 
organisms (including GMOs) in New Zealand. 
It came into force for new organisms from July 
1998. 
November 1998 Alliance MP Phillida Bunkle introduces a Growing public concern about GM is widely 
private members' bill calling for the labelling reported in the media. 
of GM foods. 
14 December 1998 The Green party launch a Safe Food campaign 
highlighting their policy to keep New Zealand 
'GE free.' 
1998/1999 Jeanette Fitzsimons, co-leader of the Green GM becomes a major election issue. 
party, argues for a Royal Commission to 
explore issues related to GM. 
Evidence of NZ involvement in GM emerges: 
(i) 'Mis'-perception that Lincoln 
experiments are inserting toad genes 
into potatoes 
(ii) King Salmon GM experiments create 
PR crisis 
(iii) AgResearch trials begin to insert 
human genes into dairy cattle 
(iv) Monsanto application to plant GM 
canola in NZ 
10 February 1999 The Green Party launch a campaign for 'GE-
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Free' zones to be established in New Zealand. 
May 1999 Alliance MP Phillida Bunkle introduces a Continuing pressure is put on the Government 
private members' bill calling for a commission to address GM issues. 
of enquiry into GM and a moratorium on the 
sale of GM foods. 
5 October 1999 Jeanette Fitzsimons presents a petition to 
Parliament signed by 91,000 New Zealanders, 
calling for a commission of enquirv. 
27 November 1999 The general election results in a new Labour- The Labour party defeats the National party 
led Government. after nine years in opposition and forms a 
coalition government with the Green Party. 
29 January 2000 The United Nations Cartagena Protocol on The Protocol seeks to protect biological 
Biosafety-a supplementary agreement to the diversity from the potential risks posed by 
Convention on Biological Diversity-is living modified organisms resulting from 
adopted in Montreal, Canada modem biotechnology. It establishes the 
'precautionary principle.' 
17 April 2000 The Government announces plans for a Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification. 
24May2000 New Zealand signs the Cartagena Protocol. The Cartagena Protocol was ratified on 24 
February 2005 and came into force on 25 May 
2005 
July 2000 The Royal Commission on Genetic This represents an opportunity for 'interest 
Modification commences. groups' to make both written and oral 
submissions to the Commission, and for the 
general public to make written submissions. 
December 2000 The Australia New Zealand Food Standards Australia and New Zealand are amongst the 
Council (ANZFSC), now called Food Standards first countries in the world to implement GM 
Australia New Zealand (FSANZ), agrees to a food labelling requirements. 
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new labelling regime for genetically modified The standard 1.5.2 came into effect on 7 
(GM) foods. December 2001, but there was a 'stock-in-
trade' provision until 7 December 2002. 
27 July 2001 Report of Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification. 
October 2001 Government announces policy on GM. The policy advocates a precautionary approach 
that: 
(i) Allows for contained research 
(ii) Establishes a Bioethics Council (Toi 
Te Taiao) 
(iii) Sets up a two year constraint period, 
or moratorium, on GM applications 
for commercial field trials 
February 2002 Government announces the policy 'Growing an The 'Growth and Innovation Framework' (GIF) 
Innovative New Zealand.' has three major strands: 
(i) Biotechnology 
(ii) Information and Communication 
Technology 
(iii) Creative Industries. 
April 2002 New Zealand Food Safety Authority 
compliance project on GM food labelling 
begins 
July 2002 The Law Commission report on liability issues The Law Commission said it could not advise 
associated with GM is released. on new law until the Government decides to 
what extent those undertaking GM research 
should be held accountable. 
19 September 2002 The general election results in a continuing A minority coalition government is established 
Labour-led Government. between Labour, the Progressive Coalition, and 
United Future parties. 
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October 2002 The New Zealand Biotechnology Strategy is 
published. 
11 September 2003 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety enters into As of 11 May 2005, 119 statements of 
force after 50 statements of ratification have ratification have now been lodged with the 
been received. United Nations including nations from Africa; 
the Asia/Pacific; Latin America/Caribbean; and 
Central, Eastern, and Western Europe; but 
excluding the United States. 
29 October 2003 The moratorium on GM applications for 
commercial field trials ends. 
30 October 2003 An amendment to the HSNO Act, introduced in This allows for a new category of release called 
the New Organisms and Other Matters Bill, "conditional release". The Environmental Risk 
becomes law. Management Authority (ERMA), the body 
responsible for assessing applications under 
HSNO, can place controls on the use of GMOs 
approved for conditional release - for example 
special security fencing for animals, or 
requiring that a GM plant flowers at a different 
time from conventional crops of the same 
species. 
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Contexts for Understanding the Issues 
The Development of GM Technologies 
In the mid 1950s, James Watson and Francis Crick at the Cavendish 
Laboratory, in Cambridge, England identified the double helix molecular structure of 
DNA. By the mid-1960s individual chromosomes could be identified through 
patterning the different ratios of the four base nucleotides G, A, T, and C, the paired 
sub-divisions of DNA that exist in different ratios in each individual gene. 
The process of gene mapping was initially slow, with only 50 genes mapped 
to specific chromosomes by 1973 (Rifkin, 1999). Yet, Stanley Cohen of Stanford 
University and Herbert Boyer of the University of California developed and patented 
the first cloning technique in 1975, and in 1983, Ralph Brinster of the University of 
Pennsylvania Veterinary School succeeded in inserting human growth hormone 
genes into mouse embryos (Rifkin, 1999). The Human Genome Project was launched 
in 1990. This international project involved 18 countries each investigating the 
sequencing of different segments of DNA (Enriquez & Goldberg, 2000; Rifkin, 
1999). With the development of new computer sequencing programmes, this project 
was completed, well ahead of time, in June 2000, and mapping of many other plants 
and organisms is now also complete (Enriquez & Goldberg, 2000; King, 2000). 
Internationally, initial concerns about GM centred particularly on the ethics 
of cloning. In 1991, PPL Therapeutics, a biotechnology company in Edinburgh, 
created a transgenic1 sheep, 'Tracy', which produced a human protein in her milk. In 
1997, two sheep were cloned from embryo cells, and 'Dolly' was cloned from adult 
cells at the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh, in 1998 (Ho, 1999). The potential to 
manipulate the genetic code of life forms now creates ongoing new possibilities for 
the prevention and treatment of disease, and potentially dramatic changes to 
1 The term 'transgenic' refers to an alteration to the genetic make up of an organism through 
transferring genes across species; the term 'isogenic' refers to the same process occuring within 
species. 
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agriculture, horticulture, forestry, and fisheries, with additional concerns about the 
consequent potential risks and benefits. 
The rapid escalation of developments in GM science and technology has left 
little time for debate of the implications, with commercial development often rushed 
to market before the development, for example, of legal frameworks for the 
technology. GM crops made their commercial debut in the USA and Canada in the 
mid-1990s (Nash, 2000), well before any widespread discussion or analysis of their 
implications, because of the desire to immediately capitalise on possible benefits. 
Consequently, it was primarily from a commercial perspective that GM was initially 
understood and promoted by the science and business communities (Oram, 2000). 
A number of international agreements, to which New Zealand is a party, have 
wide implications for the development of GM, for example, the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety, the Earth Summit and World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT), and the Trade-Related aspects 
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement. Yet, agreements setting up international 
frameworks for decision-making regarding GM (for example, by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations) are still in the development stage. 
Increasingly, however, various aspects of GM are debated. First, the science 
itself is contested; GM techniques are described controversially as either accurate 
and precise (Conner, 2000) or imperfect and lacking in control (Ho, 1999). Scientists 
debate whether new GM organisms are biologically unstable or stable, whether GM 
presents a radical departure from other selective breeding techniques, and whether 
the new genetic characteristics of GM organisms are retained by future generations 
(see, for example, Davis, 1991; Reiss & Straughan, 1996; Rifkin, 1999). 
Second, the risks to the environment are debated: the risk that GM products 
will contaminate other organisms through horizontal gene transfer, the risk that GM 
crops will self multiply uncontrollably, and the risk of loss of biodiversity (see, for 
example, Allan, Adam & Carter, 2000; Hindmarsh, Lawrence & Norton, 1998; 
Shiva, 1997). Environmental discourses provide a powerful alternative to scientific 
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and technological representations of GM. On 22 May 1992, the United Nations 
Conference at Nairobi wrote the text for the Convention on Biological Diversity, to 
protect international biodiversity. This was signed on 29 December 1993 by 168 
member countries, not including the USA (Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2000). The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, recommending that environmental 
policy should endorse the 'precautionary principle,' was finally agreed to and signed 
on 29 January 2000 by many member nations party to the Convention, but was not 
signed by New Zealand until 24 May 2000 in Nairobi because of New Zealand 
concerns about the possible effect on free trade agreements with the USA. 
Third, the economic benefits of GM are contested. Arguments that GM will 
allow the world's hungry peoples to be fed are countered by arguments that suggest 
the problem of world hunger is one of unequal distribution rather than undersupply; 
and arguments that GM crops provide increased yields are also contested (see, for 
example, Campbell, 2000; Fox, 1992; Shiva, 2000). 
Fourth, there is debate over the cultural impact of GM. Socio-political 
concerns provide another perspective on GM technology discourses, with arguments 
that transnational companies, and governments in the wealthy, capitalist 'North' are 
using GM to exploit nations in the impoverished 'South,' whose cultural and political 
concerns are being marginalised (Ho, 1999; Rifkin, 1999; Shiva, 1997, 2000). It is 
argued that traditional sustainable agricultural practices are being undermined by 
monoculture cropping, by the use of 'terminator' seeds by large corporations, and by 
the use of GM crops resistant to disease or sprays (see, for example, Evans, 2000; 
Jansen & Vellema, 2004; Shiva, 2000). Shiva (1997), additionally, argued that the 
patenting of new GM life-forms is biopiracy-the colonisation of life-and that 
traditional knowledge systems are being usurped; changing the patterns, for example, 
of indigenous agriculture and the ability of poor nations to produce traditional food 
crops (see also Hindmarsh & Hindmarsh, 2002). Shiva argued that the enclosure of 
land, forests, and rivers for private commercial gain reduces biodiversity and 
marginalises indigenous peoples' traditional cultural beliefs about the relationships 
between life-forms. 
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Internationally, nations can take multiple and sometimes different stances on 
GM. Conceptualisations of, for example, 'progress,' 'life,' and 'spirituality' reflect 
particular value-sysems that underly a specific worldview or ideology. 
Considerations of 'public good,' such as developing new medical techniques using 
GM technologies, and the consequent prioritisation of resource distribution, may 
then become problematic. Although democratic systems within Western societies 
such as New Zealand presuppose that all citizens have the right to be involved in 
discussion and decision-making related to public policy, such opportunities have not 
always been created. 
Industrialised and affluent nations with traditions of positivist scientific 
research are largely at the forefront of GM technology development, yet the USA, 
Europe, and Japan, for example, differ markedly in their concerns about the resulting 
issues. As Dutton (1999) reported, European markets and consumers display more 
opposition to GM products than their US counterparts, and biotechnology companies 
still suggest that more education, and lower prices may help sway public acceptance 
of GM products. Rogers (1998) and Mitchell (1999), however, pointed out that as a 
result of highly criticised advertising campaigns by companies like Monsanto, and 
because of previous recent food scares, European publics are learning that facts about 
GM are particularly elusive, that a more important factor is developing trust in 
biotechnology companies. 
The New Zealand Research Context 
Prior to 1998, GM research was largely unregulated in New Zealand, with 
biotechnology research concentrated in seven universities, eleven research 
organisations, two producer boards, and ten individual companies (Marsh, 2000). 
Since 2002, the New Zealand Government has actively promoted biotechnology as 
part of its Growth and Innovation Framework. Biotechnology is a fast-growing 
industry in New Zealand, with nearly 50% of the 42 main biotechnology companies 
being created since 2000 (Cooper, 2003). The New Zealand Government has 
declared a commitment to biotechnology as part of the development of a knowledge 
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economy, listing biotechnology as one of three strands in the Growth and Innovation 
Framework, together with information and communication technologies, and the 
creative industries (Growing an Innovative New Zealand, 2002). The resulting New 
Zealand Biotechnology Taskforce aims to grow the number of biotechnology 
companies in New Zealand five-fold to more than 200, and the number of 
biotechnology organisations to over 1,000 (Biotechnology Taskforce, 2003). 
As major exporters of primary produce to international markets, the kiwifruit 
and dairy industries' ability to access, and sell competitively to, those markets and 
provide economic returns to their owner/shareholders is paramount. However, given 
the contested nature of GM public policy in New Zealand, the political environment 
is also of crucial concern to each industry. Ultimately, decisions which will impact 
on both industries about if and how GM research and development will take place in 
New Zealand are political ones. 
The New Zealand Political Economy 
From the mid 1980s, the New Zealand political economy favoured a neo-
liberal, free-market economic agenda with public service organisations expected to 
compete on equal footing with private business. The State Owned Enterprises, 
including Crown Research Institutes (CRl's), created as a result of government free-
market policies, were required to operate with commercial objectives. This 
deregulation minimised the role played by politicians and interest groups in 
economic decisions, and resulted in increased power for the business sector (Kelsey, 
1997). Both the fourth Labour Government and the following National Government 
were in favour of reducing state interference in markets (Simpson, 1994). In this 
environment, industries could operate largely autonomously, and the regulatory 
environment and legislation related to GM was expected to facilitate commercial 
research and development (personal conversation, Paul Atkinson, Research Director, 
AgResearch, January 23, 2003). 
Phillida Bunkle, Alliance MP, and Jeanette Fitzsimons, co-leader of the 
Green Party, placed considerable pressure on both the National government (from 
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1997 to 1999) and the Labour-led government (following the 1999 election) to 
acknowledge concerns about the possible impact of GM on the environment. Bunkle 
attempted three times to introduce a food labelling bill as well as putting forward a 
private member's bill to set up a commission of inquiry into GM. All were 
unsuccessful. 
Toe Green Party launched its policy on Safe Food and Genetic Engineering 
on 14 December 1998, a campaign for Genetic Engineering Free Zones on 10 
February 1999, and presented a GE petition to Parliament on 5 October 1999. Both 
the Alliance and Green Parties were concerned at possible ecological risks to New 
Zealand's unique biodiversity. 
However, it was three experimental research programmes involving GM, in 
1999, that first really captured media and public attention. Experiments involving the 
'mis'-perception that toad genes were being inserted into potatoes, GM salmon, and 
the insertion of human genes into dairy cattle put GM issues firmly on the public 
agenda. The election campaigns in 1999 then created opportunities for political 
debate on legislative and public policy issues related to GM. Given that the 
Government required an electoral mandate for controversial public policy, 
Fitzsimons spearheaded a further deliberate campaign to raise New Zealanders' 
awareness of GM (Fitzsimons, 1999, October 5). Following the election, the Labour-
led Government operated as a minority coalition, supported by the Green Party 
which gained five seats in Parliament. This indicated significant support for Green 
Party policies on maintaining biodiversity and environmental sustainability, and 
keeping New Zealand GM free (Dann, 2000). On 17 April 2000, the minority Labour 
government bowed to the political pressure of the Green and Alliance Parties and 
initiated a Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, to commence in July 2000 
(Fitzsimons, 2000, Aprill 7). 
The New Zealand Regulatory Environment for GM 
In New Zealand, the regulatory environment for the development of GM 
products was considered, prior to the Royal Commission, to be one of the strictest in 
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the world. For example, it was blamed in many of the submissions to the Royal 
Commission for the potential loss of research scientists overseas, and seen as a 
barrier to maintaining research capability and a position at the forefront of cutting 
edge biotechnology research. This was perceived as adversely affecting New 
Zealand's primary production (Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, 2001). 
The introduction of the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 
(HSNO) in 1996, and the creation of the Environmental Risk Management Authority 
(ERMA) on 29 July, 1998, had tightened the New Zealand regulatory environment, 
and demonstrated growing awareness by the National Government of the need to 
acknowledge public concerns and support for alternative GM discourses. All GM 
research and field trials have to be approved by ERMA, although critics have stated 
that ERMA has no powers to enforce this, and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry (MAF), the enforcement agency, has few resources to do so (Fitzsimons, 
1998, December 14). An ammendment to the HSNO Act in October 2003 went some 
way toward addressing these concerns. 
However, a report by the New Zealand Law Commission (2002) on liability 
issues associated with GM found that, "Current statute and common law will not 
ensure that all damage that could potentially be caused by GMOs will be 
compensated. It is unlikely that any liability regime could guarantee this" (para. 143). 
Toe Law Commission concluded that such decisions involved ethical and spiritual 
dimensions that were beyond the mandate of the legal system and required further 
widespread debate. Following this report, insurance companies may be equally 
unwilling to cover organisations for liability related to GM in New Zealand (Berry, 
2003). 
The New Zealand Royal Commission on Genetic Modification 
Toe focus and terms of the Royal Commission required a report on: 
... the strategic options available to enable New Zealand to address, now and in the 
future, genetic modification, genetically modified organism;, and products; and 
:in.y_ch~ges considered desirable to the current legislative, regulatory, policy, or 
1.DStitutional arrangements for addressing, in New Zealand, genetic modification, 
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genetically modified organisms, and products. (Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification, 2000) 
Although the Commission ostensibly invited public comment: ''We welcome you 
most warmly to participate in this important debate which impacts upon the future of 
all New Zealanders, our environment and its life forms" (Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification, 2000), there were concerns that the timeframe for written 
public submissions and debate was too short (Fitzsimons, 2000, April 17). There 
were additional concerns that no ecologist was represented on the Commission 
(Jeanette Fitzsimons, co-leader of the Green Party, personal interview, 2000, 
September 28). 
Additionally, media reports at the time of the Royal Commission indicated 
that expert witnesses, making submissions as 'interested persons,' believed lay 
publics' views are frequently based on subjective moral values and should play no 
role in the ethical decisions to be made ("Public opinion not a good GM guide," 
2000). Scientists frequently argue that morality and ethics are subjective and 
therefore play no role in discussion about GM science (Rifkin, 1999, p. 102). 
The Royal Commission was presented to the public as an opportunity for 
consultation, with the implication that there were choices to be made about 
proceeding with GM and that both the voice of 'interested persons' and the voice of 
individual members of the general public were important (Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification, 2000). In fact, Rogers-Hayden and Hindmarsh (2002) argued 
that the way in which the Commission was set up, the processes and templates used 
in the collection of submissions, and the context of the analysis all favoured 
reductionist, modernist perspectives. They argued that the Commission marginalised 
the holistic worldviews in the submissions of environmental groups, and favoured 
submissions that privileged the role of science. 
The main recommendation of the Royal Commission in its report, on 27 July 
2001, was to 'l)reserve opportunities" (Royal Commission, 2001, p. 2), that is the co-
existence of all forms of agriculture, as well as opportunities for possible health, 
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medical, and other research benefits from GM. The report recommended limited 
commercial field trials of GM crops. 
The Labour Government announced its GM policy on 27 October 2001, 
based on the Royal Commission report, seeking to control the political middle 
ground by allowing carefully controlled field trials for research purposes, while 
placing a moratorium on applications for the release of GMOs into the New Zealand 
environment for two years. The policy attempted to appease scientific and business 
concerns that New Zealand would be left behind in the internationally competitive 
arena of teclmology and product development. At the same time, it addressed Green 
Party and Alliance concerns that outside the laboratory GM represents unacceptable 
environmental risks (Clark, 2001). 
The political nature of GM issues was again apparent in attempts to influence 
public opinion during the 2002 general election. GM became a major election issue 
when journalist Nicky Hager claimed that the New Zealand government had 
attempted to cover up the contamination of corn from imported GM corn seed, in a 
political crisis termed 'Corngate' (Hager, 2002; Taylor, 2003). However, at the 
election the Green Party's support declined. Labour again formed a coalition 
government but this time in conjunction with two new minor parties: a politically 
conservative Christian party, United Future, which gained unexpected rapid support 
during two televised political debates prior to the election, and the Progressive Party, 
a break-away group from the Alliance Party, led by long-term Labour stalwart, Jim 
Anderton. 
Although there was a further groundswell of public protest and media 
comment at the time the moratorium on applications for the release of GM material 
was lifted on 29 October 2003, by May 2005 only three applications for field trials 
have been approved, with strict controls, by ERMA. The Forest Research Institute 
has approval for GM trees (ERMA, 2000), AgResearch has approval for field trials 
involving GM cattle (ERMA, 2001), and Crop and Food Research has approval for 
GM onions (ERMA, 2003). Media comment on GM has dramatically reduced, and 
public campaigns voicing concerns over GM issues have quieted. While 
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biotechnology and GM research and development continues, in the absence of 
specific events to trigger concerns, it may be that at the election in 2005, the Green 
Party will fail to regain the momentum of their campaign to minimise the 
development and impact of GM in New Zealand. 
The New Zealand Economic Context 
The economic value of GM to New Zealand has been hotly contested. 
Saunders and Catagay (2001) have commented that New Zealand is likely to have 
higher economic returns from "low or zero GM food production" since with current 
technologies and conswner preferences, there is a trend for trade to be moving away 
from countries producing GM food (p. 13). However, a Ministry for the Environment 
report in New Zealand, in 2003, looked at the economic value of New Zealand's 
'clean, green' image and whether this would be affected by a decision to proceed 
with GM on a commercial level (Business and Economic Research Limited (BERL), 
2003). The report was touted by the Government as evidence of support for GM 
policy, with a projected small increase in gross domestic product (GDP) forecast 
over ten years; however, this interpretation of the report's fmdings sparked intense 
controversy ("GE release will lift earnings", 2003; Stock, 2003). The Green Party 
and the Sustainability Council of New Zealand commented that the figures could be 
interpreted differently, depending on the projected scenario; for example, depending 
on market demand, returns to farmers might vary between a projected 5.1 % increase 
and a projected 43% decrease in earnings. Overall, the report inconclusively 
indicated possible effects on GDP varying between a drop of 2.4% and a rise of 
2.5%. 
Another report by Knight, Holdsworth, and Mather (2003) looked at 
perceptions of European food distributors related to New Zealand's image and 
GMOs. It concluded that New Zealand has a ''very highly rated country image in 
relation to food safety and food quality" (p. 4), but that factors involving confidence 
and trust are more important than a diffuse 'clean, green' image. There were defmite 
negative perceptions of GM meat, milk and pasture grasses, and ambiguous reactions 
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to the possibility of GM crops contaminating non-GM crops. However, keeping New 
Zealand 'GE free' was not seen as of paramount importance. The report additionally 
commented that although organic products are still in high demand in Europe, they 
may increasingly be sought from European sources, rather than places such as New 
Zealand. As the New Zealand government has developed, and sought support for, its 
biotechnology strategy, a number of reports and discussion papers have explored 
public perceptions of biotechnology and GM (ERMA, 2002; Gamble & Gunson, 
2002; Harsant & Kalafatelis, 2001; Hipkins, Stockwell, Bolstad & Baker, 2002; 
Ministry of Research, Science, and Technology, 2002; Network Communications, 
2002; Smith & Montgomery, 2001). These reports concluded overall that the New 
Zealand general public would like more information about GM, and see more 
advantages in the health benefits of the technology than in GM food, agriculture, or 
horticulture. Indeed, there was an indication, of moderate concern in relation to food 
safety issues, with one third of consumers, particularly Maori and women, checking 
the labelling of food carefully or preferring to buy food labelled as 'organic' or 'GE 
free' (Gamble & Gunson, 2002). 
As a result of public concerns, strategies related to New Zealand policy on 
GM have been the subject of much debate. The New Zealand Association of Crown 
Research Institutes (ACRI) asserted prior to the report of the Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification that, "Genetic technology has the potential to lift New 
Zealand's economic performance and quality of life during the 21 st century'' (ACRI, 
2000, p. 5). However, a Crop and Food Research Institute report (Christey & 
Woodfield, 2001) that claimed it is possible for GM crops and GE-free crops to 
coexist, given detailed guidelines and protocols, has been contested by organic 
growers (Chamberlain, 2001). Other reports in New Zealand have demonstrated an 
increase in the local market for organic produce (Campbell & Ritchie, 2002) and 
suggested that more farmers would support development of the organic sector (37% ), 
with a smaller number interested in using gene technology (21 %) (Cook, Fairweather 
& Campbell, 2003). 
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Bi-cultural Contexts for GM in New Zealand 
As a bi-cultural nation, New Zealand needs to consider the values of both 
Maori and Pakeha (New Zealanders of European descent). Although Maori are 
reluctant to assume that they can speak for all iwi (tribes), common concerns about 
GM relate to the need to acknowledge the Treaty of Waitangi commitments held by 
the Crown towards Maori, the impact of GM on Maori knowledge and resources, the 
socio-economic impacts of GM on Maori, and the need to protect New Zealand's 
unique flora and fauna. There are specific concerns that GM violates important 
Maori cultural traditions and knowledge involving whakapapa (genealogy and the 
belief that all things in nature are connected), mauri (life force), and rangatiratanga 
(the right of Maori people to control their own destiny) (Jackson, 2001; New Zealand 
Maori Council, 2000; Tipene-Matua, 2000a; 2000b). 
A discussion paper prepared jointly by a working party of ERMA and the iwi 
Nga Kaihautu (ERMA, 2002) also raised concerns that although approaches are 
being explored to include Maori spiritual and cultural dimensions in the decision-
making processes related to HSNO, there is insufficient discussion as to whether the 
HSNO Act itself provides a satisfactory framework for a discussion of Maori issues 
related to GM. 
The New Zealand Government established a Bioethics Council (Toi te Taiao) 
in December 2002 with the aim of "enhancing New Zealand's understanding of the 
cultural, ethical and spiritual aspects of biotechnology, and ensuring that the use of 
biotechnology has regard for New Zealanders' values" (Toi te Taiao, 2005). 
However, since Toi te Taiao has no decision-making powers, and technical 
assessments of GM risk are made by ERMA, the continued separation of technical 
and socio-political issues associated with GM is increasingly problematic in New 
Zealand. 
It is clear, then, that the political, economic, and regulatory contexts for GM 
research and development in New Zealand create the potential for intense public 
debate about GM issues. Consequently, organisations and interest groups with an 
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interest in GM take strategic positions on the issues in an attempt to influence public 
policy decision-making. 
First, as a nation with heavy reliance on agricultural and horticultural 
produce, both internally and for the export market, from an economic perspective, 
New Zealand must decide whether to support continued industrial development of 
food production. This involves competing in 'cutting edge' new technologies, such 
as GM, which can facilitate selling in bulk at low prices. One alternative is to 
promote organic food production, trading on the existing tourism marketing of New 
Zealand as clean, green, and nuclear free (Tourism New Zealand, 2005), since many 
European retail food chains like Marks & Spencer and Sainsburys now refuse to 
stock GM products. Denmark, for example, has already set itself the goal of being 
completely organic by 2020 (Oram, 2000). 
Second, from a political perspective, as citizens and consumers, New 
Zealanders have a democratic right to know what is in their food and to debate 
policies that lead to the regulation of food production. At the same time current New 
Zealand free-trade policies make this problematic, since regulations may be deemed 
as trade barriers (James, 2000; Beston, 2003). 
Third, many New Zealanders are increasingly concerned about environmental 
issues and see this island nation, far from the industrialised cities of Europe and 
North America as a potential GE-free haven, where the relatively unpolluted 
environment might become, for example, a seed bank for the rest of the world. 
The following section of this chapter introduces the two case study industries 
explored in this study, the kiwifruit and the dairy industries, to provide further 
background for the analysis of the organisational communication about GM by these 
two industries. 
The Case Study Organisations 
The Kiwifruit Industry: ZESPRI 
At the time of the study, the kiwifruit industry comprised independent 
growers and packhouse/supplier groups (some of which were owned by growers), as 
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well as a marketing company ZESPRI International, and research company ZESPRI 
Innovation, wholly owned by growers as part of the ZESPRI Group Limited2• 
Kiwifruit New Zealand is the umbrella group of growers that licences ZESPRI 
International and ZESPRI Innovation on behalf of growers. New Zealand Kiwifruit 
Growers Incorporated (NZKGI) is the grower representative body. No kiwifruit 
grown in New Zealand are marketed or sold internationally independently of 
ZESPRI. 
The following historical detail is taken from the centennial edition of the 
Kiwifruit Journal of New Zealand, edited by Wehby, and published in 2004. The 
development of, and support for, an integrated marketing identity for the kiwifruit 
industry took place following a significant downturn in kiwifruit sales internationally 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which caused the industry much 'soul-searching' 
(Wehby, 2004). In the late 1980s, kiwifruit were sold by independent growers to 
international markets through the Kiwifruit Marketing Authority, via several 
independent groups of exporters. Increasing competition from kiwifruit grown 
elsewhere in the world, for example in France, Italy, and Chile, began to erode the 
market advantage held by kiwifruit from New Zealand and to overtake New Zealand 
production, and there was fierce competition between the seven New Zealand 
exporters for international market access (Wehby, 2004). 
The decision to move to 'single-desk' marketing was made in 1988 with the 
formation of the Kiwifruit Marketing Board because growers wanted total control 
over all aspects of the industry. This decision was hotly debated with Government, 
and hard-won, since the prospect of a regulated industry sat uncomfortably in the 
neo-liberal political climate at that time (Wehby, 2004). Government policies of this 
period favoured competition in industry and were suspicious of the power and 
inefficiency of monolithic producer boards (Kelsey, 1997). 
2 In this study, the term 'ZESPRI' is used to refer to the executive management groups in the kiwifruit 
industry. 
28 
Although, by 1992/1993, the kiwifruit industry returns to growers were the 
worst they had ever been, slowly the industry began to tum around with the 
increasing introduction of industry-wide initiatives. In 1997, the ZESPRI brand was 
developed and the marketing group ZESPRI International was separated from the 
industry management group, Kiwifruit New Zealand. The legislation which 
corporatised the kiwifruit industry was introduced in 2000, making shares in the 
newly formed ZESPRI Group Limited available solely to New Zealand kiwifruit 
growers. Under the leadership originally of Kiwifruit New Zealand, and later under 
the separate companies, ZESPRI International and ZESPRI Innovation, licensed by 
Kiwifruit New Zealand, timely and innovative systems have been set up on an 
industry-wide basis, in response to information derived from marketing and scientific 
research by ZESPRI International and ZESPRI Innovation. ZESPRI International 
continues to be a leading kiwifruit pioneer, owned by more than 2500 owner-
producers, but ZESPRI Innovation has been restructured and research and 
development is now contracted to HortR.esearch 
The main kiwifruit crop grown in New Zealand is a variety called Hayward, 
marketed as ZESPRI Green fruit. A new cultivar, ZESPRI Gold, has now been 
developed and was first exported in 1998. ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit comprised only 
3.53% of the total 65.1 million trays produced in the 2003/2004 season (ZESPRI 
Annual Report 2003/2004), but the voice of organic growers, and the commitment to 
organic production, has always been strong. Past Chairman Doug Voss, for example, 
was an organic grower. 
The KiwiGreen integrated pest management system was progressively 
implemented from 1992 to 1997, along with the development of the wider ZESPRI 
System These initiatives, together with Taste ZESPRI introduced in 2002, have all 
contributed to a very strong marketing identity for the industry within New Zealand, 
and a highly successful brand identity internationally (Webby, 2004). 
Recent economic research by Dr Warren Hughes of the University of 
Waikato describes the kiwifruit industry in the following terms: 
As a 1:°8jor player in the ~OP [Bay of Plenty] economy, ZESPRI has been a driving 
force m the recent surge m growth throughout the region, but especially in the 
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Western BOP region. The profitability of the kiwifruit industry, and associated 
development of the supporting industries in agricultural services, engineering, road 
freight, packing and cool-store sectors has enabled the region to support fast 
population and employment growth with associated spin-offs for the region's 
construction sectors. (ZESPRI, 2004, September 14) 
The industry generates revenues of $1.84 billion annually, contributing more than 
$520 million to the regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Dr Hughes' research 
concluded that: 
... on a national basis, dairying (including processing) is currently slightly more 
profitable per worker than kiwifruit ... [but] kiwifruit is currently much more 
profitable per worker for the New Zealand economy than the meat industry. 
(ZESPRI, 2004, September 14) 
Kiwifruit are the largest New Zealand horticultural export with sales of $911 million 
for the year ended 31 March, 2004. This is expected to increase to $1 billion for the 
year ended 31 March, 2005, with 17 million more trays produced than last year 
(ZESPRI, 2004, December 21). Overall, the kiwifruit industry is a $5 billion business 
contributing $2 billion to New Zealand's GDP, and providing direct and indirect 
employment to over 26,300 of New Zealand's workforce. 
ZESPRI currently enjoys a position as the world's leading kiwifruit brand. 
This luxury product is sold to lucrative markets, with major sales being in Europe 
and Japan. ZESPRI Green kiwifruit earned NZ$414 million in Europe in the 
2003/2004 season, compared to NZ$168.6 million in Japan, NZ$50.8 million in East 
Asia, and NZ$23.2 million in North America (ZESPRI Annual Report 2003/2004). 
There have been some concerns about competition from Chilean and Italian fruit sold 
in the opposite season to New Zealand kiwifruit. However, ZESPRI is currently 
moving to year-round marketing of kiwifruit by licencing the growing of kiwifruit 
off-shore in the northern hemisphere. 
ZESPRI is a member of the Sustainable Business Network (SBN) in New 
Zealand, a forum for businesses interested in sustainable development that prioritises 
economic growth, social equity, and environmental management. The Network's 
commitment to the environment aims to, "go beyond compliance through the 
adoption of proactive strategies to restore and enhance the environment in which we 
live, work and play" (SBN, 2005). 
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The Kiwifruit Industry Policy on GM. 
The kiwifruit industry policy on GM was developed from recommendations 
from ZESPRI Innovation scientists and ZESPRI International marketing specialists. 
The industry has decided not to use any GM practices in its kiwifruit production and 
supply because of the current sensitivity of its major markets-Japan and Europe 
particularly-to GM food. This is despite the fact that no evidence is thought by the 
kiwifruit industry to exist at this time that suggests that GM foods might be less safe 
than conventional foods. However, the industry envisages no demonstrable 
advantages in developing GM food products for the foreseeable future, and indeed 
significant potential disadvantages, such as the alienation of current markets. 
Because of this international market sensitivity, the kiwifruit industry 
believes that any New Zealand involvement in the commercial production of GM 
crops and foods would adversely affect the industry's access to international markets. 
After the report of the Royal Commission in July 2001, the industry urged that New 
Zealand retain a moratorium on all applications for commercial field trials of GM 
products, until market perceptions changed. 
The kiwifruit industry appreciates that other industries might have different 
positions, and might perceive GM to be advantageous. Despite believing that the 
outcomes of GM science and technology are uncertain, the industry has no problems 
with the science or technology per se. It is happy for other industries to proceed with 
research at a laboratory/contained level or for specific health applications of GM. 
However, the kiwifruit industry itself has decided only to use genomic research to 
aid in identifying genetic attributes that might speed up its 'natural' breeding 
programme. 
The Dairy Industry: NZDB/Fonte"a 
Although this study uses the term 'the dairy industry,' it in fact focuses on the 
largest of the dairy co-operatives, now called Fonterra. On June 18, 2001 
shareholders voted to merge the two largest dairy companies, New Zealand Dairy 
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Group and Kiwi Dairies with the industry marketing organisation, the New Zealand 
Dairy Board (NZDB)3. These two companies comprised over 95% of the dairy 
industry, but two small companies chose to remain independent: Tatua Co-operative 
Dairy Company and Westland Co-operative Dairy Company. This study does not 
include data from these very small, independent dairy co-operatives, since they did 
not take an active role in debate about GM. 
The merger, it was argued, would result in economies of scale, and reduce 
competition between the two main companies (New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi). 
It would ensure the new company could establish and maintain global brands, rather 
than being relegated internationally to being a supplier of commodities to other 
manufacturing businesses. The new company was envisaged as being primarily a 
global ingredients business. The merger resulted in the formation of a new industry 
organisation, the Fonterra Co-operative Group (Fonterra). This new company is co-
operatively owned by nearly 14,000 New Zealand supplier shareholders (dairy 
farmers) and is governed by a Board of Directors and a Shareholders' Council. 
Fonterra comprises three operating divisions, New Zealand Milk Products (NZMP), 
the global ingredients business, New Zealand Milk (NZ Milk), the global consumer 
goods company, and Fonterra Enterprises, new businesses that comprise the research 
and development arm of the organisation, including ViaLactia Biosciences 
(ViaLactia). 
ViaLactia is a commercially-focused biotechnology company, fully owned by 
the NZDB and later Fonterra, established in July, 1999. It conducts research based on 
identifying, discovering and commercialising biotechnology products for the dairy 
industry. Its aim is described as, "to consolidate and drive the industry's investment 
in biotechnology and the associated intellectual property" (ViaLactia, 2002). Initially 
research focused on exploring GM options on three levels involving bovine, forage, 
3 The term 'NZDB' is used to refer to the dairy industry executive management group prior to the 
merger in 2001, and the term 'Fonterra' refers to the executive management group following the 
merger. 
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and microbe genomes. It has developed alliances to this effect with AgResearch 
(Grant, 2002), Orion Genomics (Lakey, Martin & Lents, 2001), and Livestock 
Improvement (Fonterra, 2002, September 16). However, since June 2004, Fonterra 
has cut the ViaLactia budget by 40%, and research is now focused on understanding 
relevant genomes to improve dairy production and efficiency at the bovine and 
pasture levels. Toe research in this study examined the dairy industry positioning on 
GM over the timeframe of the merger, that is during the last year of the existence of 
the NZDB, when the merger was being planned, through to the first two years after 
the formation of Fonterra. 
Fonterra has over $11 billion in assets, operates in 120 countries, and 
employs over 20,000 people, worldwide, with over 10,000 employees in New 
Zealand. It has 29 manufacturing sites in New Zealand and 35 manufacturing sites in 
other countries. Fonterra has revenues of over NZ$14 billion a year, earns over 20% 
of New Zealand's export income, and generates 7% of its total GDP (Fonterra, 2001, 
August 27). Fonterra currently exports over 95% of its product. 
Fonterra is one of the world's top ten dairy companies and contributes 
approximately 31 % of the international dairy trade (MarketNew Zealand, 2004). It 
has joint ventures with other international companies including Nestle, Arla, and 
Dairy Farmers of America. Up to 80% ofFonterra's business is commodity products. 
As Craig Norgate, then CEO of Fonterra commented in a speech to the Dexcel 
Ruakura Dairy Farmers' Conference in 2002: 
High-quality bulk ingredients will remain the core of the business in the foreseeable 
future. We have a competitive advantage in that business, because our on-farm 
productivity is second to none and because of our experiences in large-scale milk 
procurement, processing, management, and logistics. (Norgate, 2002, May 15) 
Major markets for Fonterra are the United Kingdom, South East Asia, and Latin 
America, with emerging markets in China, Middle Eastern countries, and the USA 
However, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, together with export subsidies paid to 
producers in other countries currently impact heavily on New Zealand dairy exports 
(MarketNew Zealand, 2004). The top export products are milk powder, cheese, 
casein, and butter respectively, and the industry exports NZ$7.06 billion worth of 
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products, approximately 23% by value of all New Zealand exports. However, NZ 
Mille has an additional portfolio of 96 consumer brands which sell to over 30 
countries. The main consumer brands are Anchor, Anlene, Chesdale, Fem, Fernleaf, 
Mainland, Peters, Soprole, Tararua, and Tip-Top (MarketNewZealand, 2004). 
New markets are currently developing for organic dairy products. In October, 
2004, there were just 17 certified organic dairy fanns in New Zealand, but the market 
is expected to support up to 250 certified organic dairy fanns in the future (Rodale 
Institute, 2003). Recent media reports indicate that Fonterra is actively encouraging 
dairy farmers to convert to organic production, aiming for 17 ,OOO tonnes of organic 
milk by 2009, to add $58 million a year to the company revenue (Sherrill", 2005). 
Fonterra's business strategy in late 2002 was described as involving seven 
themes: 
... to retain our ability to produce dairy products at the lowest-cost possible, ... to 
be the smartest player in globally traded dairy markets [this meant monitoring what 
products to produce, at what price and at what time of year to maximise the value of 
returns], ... to build broader and deeper relationships with customers, ... to develop 
innovative specialty dairy products, ... [to] better exploit the health and nutritional 
benefits of milk, ... [to] push further, harder, into the rapidly growing global 
foodservice sector, ... [to recognise that] major markets will be increasingly 
important. (Norgate, 2002, September 12) 
Fonterra seeks to maintain its position as a global leader in dairying. It is a member 
of the New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development,4 whose mission 
statement aims to ''provide business leadership as a catalyst for change toward 
sustainable development, and to promote eco-efficiency, innovation and responsible 
entrepreneurship" (NZBCSD, 2005). 
4 The New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development (NZBCSD) has slightly different 
aims from the Sustainable Business Network (SBN). Allen (2004) described the NZBCSD as 
embodying 'weak' sustainability, whereas the SBN embodies 'strong' sustainability. 'Weak' 
sustainability is based on nee-classical capitalist theory; aggregated capital, including human and 
natural resources, nrust be maintained intact over time to maintain production; whereas 'strong' 
sustainability is founded in ecological economics, arguing that certain properties of the physical 
envircmnent must be sustained and the total stock of capital must remain constant over time. 
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The Dairy Industry Policy on GM. 
The dairy industry policy on GM was formulated after a major strategic 
planning exercise was carried out by consultants McKenzie, McKenzie & Co. in 
1998; this was led by the NZDB and the two major dairy companies at that time, 
Kiwi Co-operative Dairies and the New Zealand Dairy Group. A major concern was 
identified regarding the dairy industry productivity: milk production costs in New 
Zealand were rising and at the same time, the cost of producing milk in many 
competitor countries was falling. This meant that New Zealand was slipping behind 
its competitors in the international market place. 
The strategic plan which followed resulted in recommendations aimed at 
increasing productivity. One of these was to form a single industry entity for 
marketing and manufacturing purposes, and this led to the formation of Fonterra, and 
the merger of the main dairy companies in New Zealand and the NZDB in 2001. A 
second initiative recognised that some of New Zealand's competitors were involved 
in biotechnology research, which was expected to result in a further decrease in their 
productivity costs, for example, in the USA, by using GM feed stuffs. Biotechnology 
was seen as an important research area for the New Zealand dairy industry, first, to 
create knowledge and understanding-to ensure that the industry could understand 
what its competitors were doing, to develop intellectual property in the area of 
biotechnology related to dairying, and to have the potential to use similar techniques 
themselves if that was required in the future. Second, biotechnology was thought to 
provide a possible means of increasing New Zealand dairy productivity. Third, 
biotechnology was thought to provide a possible means of developing new value-
added products that might mean the industry was less dependent on competing in the 
more volatile commodity milk products market. 
In the middle of 1999, a working group from the industry and the scientific 
conununity recommended to the Dairy Board that a research company subsidiary be 
established, which eventually became ViaLactia The stated purpose was: 
[To] urgently pursue bio~echnolog.y ..... What we meant there by biotechnology was 
to understand the geno1D1c underpmmng of what was happening in plants and the 
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cow and in bacteria. (personal conversation, Kevin Marshall, CEO ViaLactia, 
September 6, 2002) 
The research was to allow for both the improvement of conventional breeding of 
cows and the opportunity to use GM in the future. 
The platform for the dairy industry positioning on GM was grounded firmly 
in the need to be competitive with other global dairy producers, and to preserve the 
opportunity for GM to be used in dairy production and research However, it was 
also recognised at the time the policy was established that GM would only be used if 
it was acceptable to the end consumers of New Zealand dairy products. 
To ensure that this new initiative in biotechnology research was understood 
and supported by the wider industry there was a strategic initiative to ''pursue 
proactive communications" (personal conversation, Kevin Marshall, CEO ViaLactia, 
September 6, 2002). This resulted in communication campaigns within the dairy 
industry and statements which contributed to the wider public debate about GM. 
These campaigns argued that New Zealand needed to preserve the opportunity for 
GM to be developed commercially, and that the related legislative and regulatory 
framework should be made less stringent to facilitate this. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised the historical development of GM technology 
and outlined the contexts for GM research and development in New Zealand to 
highlight the main issues that have come to surround this technology. It has also 
introduced the kiwifruit and dairy industries that form the basis for this study. 
Chapter Three next presents an overview of the GM issue-specific literature, and 
then discusses the theoretical framework for the analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF 
GENETIC MODIFICATION ISSUES - BUILDING A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON IDENTITY 
MANAGEMENT AND RATIONALITY 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the key theoretical perspectives for this study. The 
first two sections look at issue-specific literature related to GM and biotechnology, to 
examine how GM issues have been analysed. Since the major focus of this study is 
on communication about GM, the emphasis is on research examining how GM has 
been talked about and represented. The major discourses associated with GM are first 
examined, and the main theoretical perspectives from which these have been 
understood are discussed and critiqued. At the same time additional theoretical 
perspectives that might usefully extend understanding of GM issues are highlighted. 
Further literature analyses GM issues from the perspectives of media and 
public relations. The second section of this chapter discusses research examining 
how GM has been represented, and the rhetorical strategies employed in the 
construction of the issues. These two sections set a context for the later analysis in 
this study of the kiwifruit and dairy industries' communication practices in relation 
to GM. 
The third section of this chapter presents a case for the theoretical 
propositions and concepts central to the analysis in this thesis. It examines in detail 
the theoretical underpinnings of aspects of organisational identity and identity 
management, and aspects of rationality relevant to this study. Organisations draw on 
particular discourses to create and maintain their organisational identity, and 
participate in a political environment where social movements, lobby groups, and 
activist groups may influence public policy. In doing so, they use rhetorical strategies 
to manage meanings about public policy issues in their organisational 
communication. 
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The final section of this chapter summarises arguments for a research 
approach that integrates organisational communication and public relations research 
perspectives on identity and identity management, and highlights the 
interrelationships between organisational identities, rationalities, and values to 
achieve a complex understanding of organisational communication about the 
controversial issue of GM. 
Discourses of GM 
As Alvesson (2004) has commented, the term 'discourse' is used in multiple 
ways in communication literature. For example, it may refer both to the details of 
spoken and written language texts in situated local contexts, and, in a Foucauldian 
sense, to the broader structures of language that constitute particular "regimes of 
truth" (Foucault, 1991, p. 73). Discourse is defined here as the language inherent in 
symbolic systems, institutional structures, and social rules and practices that 
constitutes forms of power which privilege specific interests and marginalise others 
(Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1988; Livesey, 2002). For example, a Western medical 
discourse comprises a specific technical vocabulary and a hierarchy of professional 
positions such as nurse, physiotherapist, general practitioner, and specialist 
physician. It additionally constitutes particular styles of patient/professional and 
professional/professional interaction that suggest differentials in power privileging 
the expertise of medical specialists. Although GM discourses are often represented as 
polarised, as pro- and anti-GM, the GM literature is wide-ranging, drawing on 
multiple values, and reflecting multiple discourses from different theoretical research 
perspectives. 
Scientific perspectives of GM have represented the promise of the 
groundbreaking science of genomics, following Crick and Watson's discovery of the 
structure of recombinant DNA (Davis, 1991; Lyon, & Gomer, 1996; Watson, 2003). 
This created excitement in the scientific world that has resulted in large-scale 
collaborative international research, for example, the Human Genome Project 
(Enriquez & Goldberg, 2000). Yet, such scientific developments have led to 
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technological outcomes which have been highly controversial. Biotechnology 
involves developing useful biological products for markets, the commercialisation of 
biological science (Aldridge 1996; Ho, 1999). Considerable research supports GM 
biotechnologies, citing the economic and health benefits to be accrued from these. 
This might be expected if such research is funded by scientific, corporate, and 
government interests that stand to gain financially from continuing developments in 
GM. However, a growing body of literature critiques these arguments, presenting 
alternative socio-political, cultural, and environmental science perspectives. For 
example, Ho (1999) suggested that the commercialisation of science has 
compromised the integrity of many scientists, and raised multiple issues in relation to 
GM and the environment, health, and agriculture. Rifkin (1999), similarly, provided 
a comprehensive social critique of the multiple impacts of GM on society, while 
Shiva's (1997, 2000) socio-political critique identified a variety of specific cultural 
issues related to GM. This section examines discourses of technology, risk, 
knowledge, and public perception in relation to GM. 
Discourses of Technology and GM 
One of the most prevalent GM discourses constructs GM as a 'cutting edge' 
technology that represents 'progress' and will bring consequent benefits to society on 
a number of levels. GM is frequently discussed from the perspective of technological 
determinism-technologies are considered to be inevitable developments that in tum 
dictate or heavily influence other aspects of society's 'progress.' In one form of this 
view, technological development is seen as largely or wholly positive. Such research 
assumes that the natural world can be vastly improved upon by man-made 
technologies, with an emphasis on control and engineering (see for example, Davis, 
1991; Enriquez & Goldberg, 2000; Mannion, 1999; Oram, 2000). Considerable GM 
literature focuses on the technologies themselves and the strictly instrumental 
perspectives of those who are commercially interested, including governments, 
scientists and corporate businesses, and presenting the benefits (and risks) of GM 
technologies (for a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Uzogara, 2000). 
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Such instrumental research approaches often privilege the economic 
advantages of GM foods and crops for corporate business and consumers. For 
example, that GM crops may generate higher yields for lower production costs than 
conventionally-grown crops (Krueger, 2001). This literature draws on neo-liberal 
free-market economic discourses-that is, a preference for a 'laissez-faire' approach 
to government, with minimum regulation, facilitating autonomy for business and 
other major institutions to operate in a free-market environment. Such GM 
discourses argue for the economic advantages to producers, including new markets, 
the possible reduction in the use of pesticides, improved crop yields, and the 
resistance of crops to disease (see, for example, Conner, 2000; Hazelhurst, 2003; 
Krueger, 2001; Watson, 2000). For consumers, the benefits are represented as longer 
shelf-life of foods, improved nutritional quality, and an increased quantity of food 
that can provide cheaper prices and the possibility of feeding the world's hungry 
(see, for example, Braun, 2002; Conway & Toeniessen, 1999; Johnston, 1999; Nash, 
2000; Paarlberg, 2000). Benefits are also argued in terms of health, because of the 
possible commercial development of new medicines, nutraceuticals, and functional 
foods (Berridge, 2000; Braun, 2002; Elliot, 2000; Katan & de Roos, 2004 ). 
However, taking a more critical cultural/economic perspective, Campbell 
(2000) debunked the economic argument that GM technology will 'feed the world,' 
pointing out that problems of world hunger are ones of power and distribution rather 
than supply and demand. Campbell argued that developed countries are trying to 
reduce food production in the developed world by subsidies, food 'mountains', and 
free-market policies: 
People are hungry ... not because food isn't cheap and plentiful enough, but because 
these people have no means by which to even contemplate participating in the global 
food system. They are poor, they are resourceless, they have no access to land, they 
don't have the basic entitlements required to feed themselves. (2000, p. 33) 
It is somewhat contradictory, then, to be promoting GM technologies as being 
capable of increasing production. 
Instrumental research identifying potential risks from GM technologies is 
also prevalent. Researchers have commented on possible changes in the nutritional 
quality of foods, potential toxicity in foods, and the development of allergies (Butler, 
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2000; Kedgley, 2000; Marks & Kalaitzandonakes, 2001). MacKenzie (1999), for 
example, argued that GM foods require an improved system of testing for toxicity 
and long-term effects. Health concerns have also been raised that resistance will 
develop to antibiotics, and that new viruses and toxins will be created (Butler, 2000; 
"How safe is safe?" 1999). Such risk concerns are informed by scientific research but 
are identified as largely consumer-driven (Hazelhurst, 2003; Nielsen, Thierfelder & 
Robinson, 2003). 
The literature indicates that the scientific findings about GM technologies are 
contested as much as the possible economic benefits. For example, researchers argue 
that GM provides benefits for the environment in terms of reduced use of chemical 
pesticides and fertilisers, and bioremediation (Conway & Toeniessen, 1999; 
Johnstone, 1999; Krueger, 2001; Watson, 2000). Conner (2000) also argued that GM 
technology is very precise, and that safety issues are no different from those raised 
by traditional cultivation methods. Yet, scientific researchers equally report concerns 
that GM is a random process, resulting in unstable genes (Ho, 1999; McKenzie, 
1999), and that GM crops will contaminate other crops as well as the environment, 
and may result in 'super-weeds' which require the increased use of new pesticides 
(Allen, 2000; Braun, 2002; Concar & Coghlan, 1999). 
The scientifically contested impacts of GM technologies provide the basis for 
critical comment on associated discourses of sustainability and the conflict between 
environmental interests and trade/business interests. Work in progress is exploring 
issues of sustainability in relation to GM from the perspective of how concepts of 
'nature' affect stakeholder approaches to biotechnology and sustainable development 
(Elmes, forthcoming), how sustainability discourses facilitate the legitimation of 
scientists' GM research (Motion & Doolin, forthcoming), and how the ambiguity 
inherent in discussions about sustainability assists stakeholders in their positioning 
on controversial biotechnologies (Davenport & Leitch, forthcoming). 
Muller (2004) pointed out that one of the underlying objectives of the 
Cartagena Biosafety Protocol was to address issues of sustainability, and the conflict 
between environmental interests and trade benefits, through the establishment of the 
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'precautionary principle'. Yet, countries that privilege ecological and socioeconomic 
factors may be seen as contravening WTO regulations, because the Protocol is 
contradictory when trade and environmental interests clash (Muller, 2004). Muller's 
critical socio-economic assessment of the Protocol argued that it does not set 
international standards by which to assess environmental impacts. Szerszynski, Lash 
and Wynne (1996) also critiqued the Bruntland Report for continuing to polarise 
debate about sustainability issues. They argued that although the Bruntland Report 
suggested that the instrumental rationales of mainstream science might be modified, 
it generated deterministic predictions for the management of sustainability issues that 
relied on the use of technologies that were equally instrumental. The resulting 
preference for technocratic environmental management, they argued, still tended to 
reify environmental problems, despite the mention of social scientific approaches. 
Szerszynski et al. suggested that reactions to the Bruntland Report have resulted in a 
divide between culture/nature that polarises modernist and anti-modernist approaches 
to sustainability issues. Moore (2001) additionally discussed current attempts by the 
USA to declare that moratoriums on GM products, and strict labelling regimes for 
such products, are illegal under the terms of WTO agreements. He pointed out that 
this may affect not only the food business relationships between Europe, Japan, and 
other nations with strict regulatory environments such as New Zealand, but extend to 
wider international and trade relations. Such critiques highlight the tendency for 
business interests to negate the wider impacts and risks associated with GM policies. 
Beck (1992) has argued that business and technical/scientific perspectives of 
risk are increasingly privileged as a result of the continuing industrialisation of 
society. If rationality is defined as the links between means and ends, "between the 
premises of an argument and a logical or reasonable conclusion" (Cheney, 
Christensen, Zorn & Ganesh, 2004, p. 41), rationality can be seen as comprising 
logics or arguments and as an over-arching discourse. As Cheney et al. suggested, in 
Western cultures, being 'rational' is usually equated with being 'reasonable' and 
'systematic', as opposed to being 'irrational,' 'unpredictable,' 'intuitive,' and 
'emotional'. Latour (1993) pointed out that technical/scientific rationalities 
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frequently represent political and social concerns as myth or superstition, and 
separate these concerns from scientific and technical approaches to issues. Such 
instrumental rationalities privilege means over ends and marginalise traditional 
beliefs based on religion and metaphysics (Macey, 2000). They take the realist 
perspective that all knowledge is based on the objective experience of phenomena, 
and must be empirically verifiable to support the development of theoretical models 
which 'explain' attributes of the physical world (Brown, 2001; Latour, 1987, 2004; 
Segerstrale, 2000). From such perspectives, the 'facts' generated by GM research are 
represented as 'truths' that form the basis for decision-making about the use of new 
technologies. 
These instrumental scientific perspectives have been extensively critiqued for 
assuming that science is neutral and failing to recognise that scientific discourses are 
themselves political in a debate sometimes termed 'the science wars' (Brown, 2001; 
Kitcher, 2001; Latour, 1993, 2004; Nelkin, 1984, 1995; Segerstrale, 2000; Wa 
Mwachofi, 1998). Rifkin (1999) critiqued many scientists' attempts to control 
'nature' through GM and, like Ho (1999), noted the failure of such perspectives to 
consider the ecological and social implications of GM. Yet, Ehrlich and Ehrlich 
(1998) argued that many scientists are concerned about environmental issues. Scott 
and Carr (2003), for example, used cultural theory to analyse scientists' views on 
GM, and found that scientists take strongly polarised positions both for and against 
GM that depend on plural rationalities generated by diverse conceptualisations of 
'nature'. Scientists seeing 'nature' as capricious or vulnerable argued that it cannot or 
should not be controlled by GM, while other scientists seeing 'nature' as resilient, 
justified the benefits of GM technologies. 
In a similar political economy critique of technological determinism and 
biotechnology, Levidow (1998) argued that, "the neo-liberal framework of risk-
benefit analysis ... offers us a free consumer choice to buy safe genetic fixes" (p. 
224). He suggested that technology is a means of reification, a way of treating 
something as concrete which is not. Levidow argued that biotechnology reifies 
agriculture, that talking about the efficiency of biotechnology reduces it to a 
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discussion of the attributes of the technology, commoditising nature in terms of 
quantifiable outputs (ends), through the use of a neutral technical tool (process). He 
suggested that the socio-political nature of the means of production becomes 
divorced from the commodities which are produced. Biotechnology, Levidow (1998) 
suggested, is constructed as value-free, rather than being seen as determined by 
social purposes, and creates the conditions for its own functioning through self-
defining propositions. 
Chapman (2004) additionally argued that technology can be seen as "world-
building" rather than deterministic. Chapman' s critique of technology built on 
Arendt's feminist philosophical framework to suggest that there are limits to the 
appropriateness of instrumental reasoning. She argued that such reasoning is 
appropriate for discussions about production, through work, but not about the end 
product, the world: ''The world should not be judged instrumentally, but in terms of 
whether it provides a place for human action" (p. 59). Chapman, therefore, argued 
against the prevailing dominant framework of risk assessment in the consideration of 
technological developments such as GM, calling for a much wider appreciation of 
the impacts of technology. Like discourses of technology, discourses of risk reflect 
similarly diverse theoretical perspectives that impact on the approaches taken to GM. 
These discourses of risk are discussed in the next section. 
Discourses of Risk and GM 
As Wilkins (2001) suggested different understandings of risk-risk 
assessment, risk perception, and risk communication-draw on a variety of distinct 
theoretical approaches, including some that are solely technically focused and some 
that take account of diverse values. 
Technical Risk Assessment. 
Risk assessment in relation to GM is frequently represented in the literature 
as being technically or scientifically based. Tait (2001) defined scientifically-based 
theoretical perspectives of risk as "quantification of probabilities and outcomes, the 
development of quantitative models and the use of cost benefit analysis as a basis for 
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scientifically rational decision making" (p. 187). Burke (2004) commented that 
technocratic assessment of risk attempts to assess the statistical probability of harm, 
sometimes through a numerical value expressed as a negative power of ten (p. 27), 
and Wilkins (2001) defined risk assessment as "the strictly mathematical likelihood 
that a particular mechanism or system will malfunction within certain use 
parameters" (p. 164). 
Wilkins, (2001), like Perrow (1984), pointed out that such risk methodologies 
are efficient for 'normal accidents' such as engineering malfunctions in mechanical 
equipment, but that the rules of probability on which this assessment depends 
become less reliable in instances such as GM, when the data set is built on limited 
experience or involves emerging knowledge, when the system is particularly 
complex (like living systems), and the system is 'tightly coupled' with variables that 
are highly dependent on each other. 
Such narrowly defined technical understandings of GM risk are evident in 
Radin' s (2004) discussion of risk assessment, and his arguments that GM research 
provides the answers to questions such as "What can go wrong? How likely is it? 
How bad would it be?" (p. 2). They are also evident in Pires-O'Brien's (2000) 
scientific discussion of GM crops and foods as being no different from other 
historical food production, therefore involving no greater risk. However, the 
commercialisation of science is blamed for cutting the timeframes for GM research 
and product development. The speed with which novel GM foods and crops might be 
introduced makes commercial GM technologies highly attractive to agribusiness. In 
some instances, it is argued that science serves industry needs such that the 
time frames for research are compromised by commercial imperatives (''The public is 
right", 2004). Ho (1999) also critiqued scientific and technical assessments that 
assume that GM risk can be managed, commenting, ''The absence of evidence is too 
often taken to be evidence of absence" (p. 42). These critiques suggest that it is the 
uncertainties associated with GM that are as much a risk as those that can be 
calculated. 
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Nelkin (2001), similarly, critiqued the narrow definition of risk, which was 
adopted by scientists after the 1975 Asilomar Conference to allow continuing 
research on technical applications of GM. She argued that the focus on potential 
harms to health excluded wider issues surrounding the misuse of the technology, 
moral concerns about GM, and the possible conflict of interest created by 
commercialisation of GM research. Heller (2001) additionally argued that 
technical/scientific assessments of risk often provide a hegemonic frame for debate: a 
"set of statistically calculable, insurable harms assumed necessary for social 
progress" (p. 25). Similarly, in New Zealand, Roberts, Benton, Satterfield and 
Benton (2004) critiqued effects-based risk assessment and risk management 
legislation for failing to weigh cultural concerns, and intangible expressions of risk 
that acknowledge Maori spiritual values. 
The major critiques of technical risk assessment thus suggest that this 
approach fails to consider the diverse values that are represented in other social and 
cultural understandings of risk. 
Risk Perception. 
Although Blaine and Powell (2001) identified risk perception and risk 
communication as important parameters in the GM debate, they still privileged 
technical scientific assessments of risk by their assumption that science should take a 
leadership role in incorporating public perceptions into policy development on agri-
food technologies, such as GM. In contrast, Wilkins' (2001) social science 
perspective acknowledged that, "Lay rationality, far from being inferior to scientific 
expertise, works with what scholars have termed an expanded vocabulary of risk that 
includes questions of culture, history and ethics" (p. 169; see also Juanillo, 2001). 
Wilkins' social constructionist approach identified additional political and cultural 
measures of public understandings of GM risk, for example, in terms of 
unfamiliarity, the potential for catastrophe, uncontrollability, and unfairness. Glasner 
and Rothman (2001) similarly called for further ethical studies of GM risk 
perception, noting that these have tended to be focused on medical applications, 
rather than on the wider context of the globalised impacts of GM. 
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Boholm's (1998) comprehensive review of studies of risk perception, 
concluded that further research needs to be more qualitatively rich and theoretically 
complex, arguing that much of the existing research is simplistically empirical, and 
descriptive of known factual and objectively observable phenomena. Boholm 
critiqued the lack of cultural theorisation in many studies, commenting that such 
studies fit within a psychometric paradigm. This review suggested that lay publics do 
not rely only on statistical or probability calculations of risk. It looked at how 
perceptions of risk might vary from country to country, at media representations, and 
social background factors-such as gender, marginality, poverty, and occupation. (A 
full discussion of the literature focusing on public perceptions of GM forms the basis 
for the last section on GM discourses in this chapter.) 
In contrast to technical approaches to risk assessment, and the largely 
instrumental approaches to risk perception, a growing number of studies take a social 
constructionist approach to risk-that is a relativist position that recognises the social 
and cultural influences on understandings of risk, and the importance of risk 
communication. 
Risk Communication. 
Studies in risk communication frequently theorise GM risk discourses as 
socially constructed. By this they mean that understandings of GM risk are 
subjectively constructed in meaning according to the situated context of the GM 
issues represented. For example, a patient suffering from diabetes who uses insulin 
derived using GM techniques might see GM technologies involving animals as less 
risk to the animal than an animal rights activist who has no similar, chronic medical 
condition. Palfreman (2001) called for risk communication to take account of the role 
of intermediaries in amplifying or minimising risk, while Palmlund (1992) argued for 
emotions to be treated as legitimately as facts-for a critical approach that critiques 
dominant relations of power, rather than the focus being onfanctional risk 
management or risk communication. Palmlund argued that: 
Statements about risk serve the social function of creating separation and distance, 
bonding and unity. Their meaning on the surface deals with defining and comparing 
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risk, with communicating and persuading. On another level their meaning concerns 
changing or preserving the prevailing social order." (1992, p. 202). 
Palmlund theorised risk as social interaction-a political process where the control of 
reality is at stake. 
Taking a similar perspective, Tait (2001) argued that the 'precautionary 
principle' in the Cartagena Protocol recognised that risks could no longer simply be 
assessed after firm evidence of harm (a reactive model). Science-based regulatory 
systems (common in the USA) were therefore modified in Europe, from purely 
technical, interest-based methods of assessing risk to include values-based 
assessment. Tait noted that concerns about environmental risks of GM are related to 
socio-political conditions associated with biotechnology which preclude technical 
assessment. The oft-used metaphor of Frankenfoods, Tait argued, defines an interest-
based risk discourse when in fact risk discourses are values-based: 
The underlying issues in the public debate are more about the Faustian bargain we 
have made, putting science, technology and the industries that increasingly control 
them in charge of world food production systems, with major impacts on the 
livelihoods of rural communities and on rural landscapes, and with no effective 
democratic oversight or control of their activities. (Tait, 2001, p. 185) 
Tait suggested that the introduction of the 'precautionary principle' has allowed 
values-based discourses to have an increasing role in debate about GM. 
In a somewhat similar vein, Davenport and Leitch (2004), taking a 
stakeholder perspective of risk management, theorised that organisations may 
primarily assess risk associated with GM from an interest-based (outcome) or 
identity-based (rule-generated) perspective, or both, depending on the impact of the 
issue. Davenport and Leitch's 'Issue-Impact-Action' model suggested that the issue 
triggers perception of a threat by stakeholders to their interests, or identity, or a 
mixture of both. They argued that: 
When interest-based stakeholders feel their interests are being threatened by the 
actions of identity-based stakeholders in response to an issue, they may also mobilize 
as identity-based stakeholders. (Davenport & Leitch, 2004, p. 4) 
However, Davenport and Leitch's research was more functionally oriented than 
critical, recommending different approaches to stakeholder conflict resolution. It 
focused on the role of the GM issue in mobilising stakeholder responses, rather than 
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on discussing how different aspects of identity and interest might be implicated in 
stak:eho lder actions. 
Perri 6' s (2005) research perspective again focused on the plurality and 
contextualisation of social constructions of risk, rather than seeing risk as an 
independent variable to be quantified or managed. He argued that people can have 
different understandings of the same problem (risk) without negating the idea that 
there is a common problem about which they disagree. Perri 6 based his theoretical 
understanding of risk on neo-Durkheimian institutional theory developed by Douglas 
(1986). This suggests that conceptual understanding is shaped in content and style by 
patterns of knowledge in social organisation, by the way institutions 'think'. Perri 6 
modified Douglas and Wildavsky's (1982) grid model to explain how people can 
move between sense-making frames. He suggested that: 
The selection of concepts, ... their salience and relevance, the affect attached to 
them are all powerfully shaped ... by crucial features of social organization. (6, 
2005, p. 98) 
He concluded that plural perspectives of risk are limited to the social bases that 
underpin how risk is framed. 
As Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) pointed out, there is no objective, value-
free method for assessing risk because each risk is associated with values and 
uncertainties. Organisational groups and cultures highlight different risks, depending 
on the type of organisation they belong to, their values, and worldviews. Since risks 
are socially selected and assessed, Douglas and Wildavsky argued, the choice of 
public policy to deal with risk is essentially political; for example, decisions about 
what evidence should count, and who should make decisions. From this critical 
perspective, risk can be seen as a product of know ledge and consent. As Douglas and 
Wildavsky explained: 
Each culture rests upon its own ideas of what ought to be nonnal or natural ... 
Debates about new technologies put into question the old perceptions of the natural 
and normal. (1982, p. 35). 
They argued that our perceptions about 'nature' are part of our social system-fears 
about pollution of 'nature' are tied up in our social values, and we fear change 
because it would disrupt our social system Our understanding of 'nature'-what is 
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natural-is then what mainstream political thought sees as natural, and increasing 
scientific knowledge only increases the range of uncertainty; it does not eliminate 
risk, only find new boundaries for its assessment (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). We 
often label things as 'natural' when we cannot do anything about them; if they are 
normal and beyond our control, they are 'naturalised', and this excuses us for taking 
responsibility or action. 
If our idea of 'nature' is a human cultural construction, this throws into doubt 
the tendency of environmentalism to use 'nature' as a source of moral authority 
(Cronon, 1996). Cronon argued that 'nature' is a contested terrain, variously 
constructed as naive reality-the essence of something; a moral imperative-the way 
nature ought to be; Eden-a pristine paradise; an artifice or cultural construction; a 
virtual reality; a commodity; or demonic-earthquakes, disasters, and floods (1996, 
p. 51). The construction of 'nature' as a moral imperative, is, for example, used by 
GM interest groups such as the 'GE-Free' coalition and Mothers Against Genetic 
Engineering (MAdGE) in New Zealand (GE FREE NZ Ours for the picking! 2001). 
MAdGE and the 'GE-Free' coalition suggested that the impact of GM on the 
environment would be to create 'natural' forces that would be 'out of control,' that is 
to alter 'natural' environmental processes, for example, the potential destruction of 
monarch butterflies, and the creation of 'super weeds'. 
Social constructionist and critical approaches to GM risk thus consider the 
multiple understandings of risk derived from different value systems, which draw on 
the particular knowledge discourses privileged by different social, cultural, and 
political groups. The ways in which discourses of knowledge have been discussed in 
relation to GM are further explored in the next section. 
Discourses of Knowledge and GM 
One economic discourse of GM suggests that knowledge can be owned and 
commercialised. With the establishment of the TRIPS agreement by the WTO in 
1994, member countries of the WTO recognised the importance of intellectual 
property rights on trade liberalisation. Critical research discussing government, 
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scientific, and corporate discourses of GM in these countries highlights the power 
relations created by the assumption that GM knowledge can be owned and 
commercialised. For example, in referring to GM, Muller (2004) represented TRIPS 
as an "infrastructure of accumulation, which is founded on knowledge control" (p. 
16). 
Worthy (1998) explored the different positions taken by Western industrial 
nations and developing nations with respect to the TRIPS agreement. He found that 
Western nations saw the agreement as "a means of promoting technological 
development by offering inventors and others the chance to gain rewards for their 
labours" whereas developing countries "considered that the purpose of intellectual 
property was to reinforce the economic power of the Western industrial nations and 
transfer wealth from the poorer countries to the richer ones" (Worthy, 1998, p. 3). 
Western nations thus saw GM knowledge from an instrumental economic 
perspective, whereas the non-West critiqued the hegemony implicit in such economic 
constructions. 
Critical, political economy perspectives additionally represent the 
commercialisation of GM as the commodification' of 'life' (Berlan, 1989; Glasner & 
Rothman, 2001; Ho, 1999; Shiva, 1997, 2000). This has raised concerns about, for 
example, "the fate of the small farmer, and the global homogenization of culture by 
multinational capitalism" (Heller, 2001, p. 27). Murcott (2001) additionally 
suggested that when talking and thinking about food, we think too often primarily 
about its consumption (demand) rather than looking critically at the context of its 
provision (production and supply), and Adam (2000a) pointed out that socio-
environmental analyses of GM foods highlight the need for a "temporal gaze" that 
1 Desmond ( 1995) defined commodification as involving one or more of" ... the appropriation of the 
subject's life force or energy and the replacement of this by non-human technology; the colonization 
of use value by exchange value; the tendency for a veil to be drawn over the origins of products; and 
finally the pursuit of a fundamentally reductive logic, including processes of objectification, 
dissembling and reassembling" (p. 722-723). 
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focuses on the implicit constructions of time represented in GM discourses. For 
example, Adam suggested that GM food production privileges time-saving, profit-
making production efficiency, rather than the reproductive and regenerative 
capacities of the land. 
In their critical study of global capitalism, Hutton and Giddens (2000) noted 
that, in a globalised world, the commercialisation of knowledge resulting in 
innovations such as GM foods is not contained within regional and national contexts. 
They argued that commoditisation is "the process by which capitalism tries to tum 
every relationship into a commercial exchange" (p. 17, see also Aune, 2001 ). In this 
neo-liberal political economy environment, science technologies, such as GM, are 
expected to participate in a free-marketplace of ideas and knowledge, as well as 
products. 
Arguing from a socio-political perspective, for example, Shiva (1997, 2000) 
critiqued GM as constructed within a capitalist paradigm that she termed "biopiracy" 
(p. 5). Shiva (1997) suggested that patenting and monoculture cropping devalue 
many forms of knowledge and cultural systems, imposing Western values and 
interests. These are upheld by trade agreements such as the GA TT agreement and the 
TRIPS agreement. Shiva argued that the common rights of peoples, including the 
right to work in traditional ways on their own lands, have been usurped by the 
private rights of multinationals seeking profit. Shiva (1997) argued that biodiversity 
is a "local common resource" (p. 67) and suggested that GM patents on forms of life 
represent the ultimate colonisation of life itself, enclosing the "creativity inherent to 
living systems that reproduce and multiply in self-organized freedom" (p. 7). She 
argued that ecological problems arise from applying an engineering paradigm to life. 
The potential loss of biodiversity, both locally and globally, resulting from GM food 
production, has been widely discussed (see also, for example, Christie, 1998; Ehrlich 
& Ehrlich, 1998; Ho, 1999; Rifkin, 1999; Shiva, 2000). 
From this cultural and political economy perspective, Shiva (2000) and Ho 
(1999) also argued that the rich corporate businesses of the North control the 
international economy, and exploit nations of the South, through promoting GM, 
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monopoly agriculture and the patenting of seeds, and free trade demands. Shiva 
(2000) maintained that the enclosure of the agricultural 'commons' changed 
traditional relationships with the land, sea, rivers, and forests, and threatened the 
poor, women, farmers, and the Third World (p. 113). A specific example of this was 
discussed by Hindmarsh and Hindmarsh (2002) in their review of the development of 
multinational interests in Asia and GM rice production. They concluded that 
insufficient research has privileged local knowledge, in terms of consultation with 
local peoples and exploring the potential of traditional farming methods, and that this 
will be at the expense of the developing countries concerned, and to the financial 
advantage of the multinationals of the North. Glasner and Rothman (2001) pointed 
out that the demise of the nation state means that global entities (such as the WTO) 
have taken over aspects of traditionally national communication, culture, and 
economy. Much of what was previously defined as an aspect of 'nature', they 
argued, is now transformed into forms of "codified information" (Glasner & 
Rothman, 2001, p. 256). 
Kurian and Munshi (2003) noted that development theorists often marginalise 
or ignore environmental contexts for human existence, while environmentalists often 
marginalise or ignore "the centrality of humans" in discussions of environmentalism2 
(p. 146). They drew on Plumwood's (1993, 1995) theoretical perspectives of feminist 
ecology, to argue that culturally determined discourses-predominantly Western and 
neo-colonial-are anthropocentric, limiting the debate about GM in favour of human 
issues: 
It is these dominant cultural pulls and pushes that marginalize the Other, leading to a 
decimation of not only numerous biological species of plants and animals by the 
creation of high-yielding hybrid varieties, but also a trampling of minority cultures 
and their languages, food habits and ways of doing things by a universalized T-shirt-
jeans-fast-food-digital-television culture. (Kurian & Munshi, 2003, p. 158) 
2 Merchant (1992, 2000, 2003) argued for a similar radical ecological perspective that 
challenges the belief that people are free to exploit nature and to exploit others in society. 
She advocated a world view where humans are in partnership with nature, recognising that 
meanings associated with nature are a social construction that changes over time. 
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In polarising the arguments, such discourses marginalise the 'Other'-meaning both 
other cultures and the non-human environment. 
Critical approaches to GM research that focus on discourses of knowledge 
have thus explored how representations of GM marginalise the 'Other'; that is both 
other cultures, and the environment. The final section of this discussion of GM 
discourses examines literature focusing on public knowledge and public attitudes 
about GM in order to show how research has attempted to examine multiple 
understandings of GM. 
Discourses of Public Perception, Dialogue, and GM 
The existence of a considerable body of research centred on public 
perceptions of biotechnology and GM demonstrates both that there is concern that 
lay perceptions are marginalised, and that groups with a vested interest in developing 
GM-such as governments, scientists, and corporate business-are highly concerned 
about public distrust of the technology. This concern about the public distrust of GM 
is understandable since the continuing commercial development of GM products 
depends on public support (Nielsen, Thierfelder & Robinson, 2003). In Western 
cultures, these groups frequently take a neo-liberal public choice/rational choice 
perspective that suggests that in a free-market, consumers should decide the worth of 
GM. Yet, such groups also seek to ensure that consumer attitudes to GM are 
favourable. Phillips and Corkindale (2002), for example, suggested that innovative 
GM products need to be more actively marketed to consumers, rather than relying on 
the concept of substantial equivalence to non-GM foods. 
In New Zealand, there has been a decline in favourable attitudes towards 
science, and concern about government, scientific, and corporate agendas, both 
specifically in relation to GM (Henderson & Weaver, 2003; James, 2003) and 
internationally as a result of, for example, food scares like BSE in Europe (Adam, 
2000b) and environmental issues like the dismantling of the Brent Spar oil rig 
(Hansen, 2000). 
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In the next three sub-sections, I first examine literature reporting on consumer 
perceptions of GM risks and benefits from an instrumental perspective. Second, I 
look at the literature that seeks to understand consumer and public perceptions of 
GM, and third, I discuss recent calls for more dialogue about GM with wider publics. 
Consumer Perceptions of GM Risks and Benefits. 
Research reporting on public perceptions of GM takes a number of different 
perspectives. Attempts are made to quantify the extent of public support for 
biotechnology and particular applications of GM, as one basis for arguments for or 
against continued development. Gaskell, Allum, Bauer, Jackson, Howard & Lindsey 
(2003) found that, in the UK, rather than being generally risk averse people 
distinguish between different technologies, and in recent years there has been a shift 
towards a more positive response to biotechnology. They suggested that the public 
are possibly more concerned about GM foods than GM crops (food safety rather than 
environmental safety). Eurobarometer reports, however, also suggest that despite an 
increasing optimism about biotechnology in general, support for GM food and crops 
has simply stabilised across Europe. The majority of Europeans do not want GM 
food and support for GM crops is variable (Gaskell, Allum & Stares, 2003). 
Additionally, largely instrumental research seeks to determine whether 
publics place more emphasis on the potential benefits or risks of GM, with 
ambivalent findings. Some research demonstrates that consumers are risk-averse in 
relation to GM foods, and that risk perception is more important to consumers than 
benefit perception (Gaskell, Allum, Wagner, Kronberger, Torgersen, Hampel & 
Bardes, 2004; Moon & Balasubramanian, 2001; Rowe, 2004). However, other 
research indicates that consumers are more influenced by the potential benefits of 
GM foods (Prewer, Howard & Shepherd, 1995, 1996) and that supermarkets in the 
UK could successfully sell GM foods (Moon & Balasubramanian, 2003). Miles and 
Prewer ( 2000) additionally attempted to identify the specific concerns associated 
with particular food hazards ( BSE, GM, high fat diets, pesticide residues in food, 
and salmonella). They found that although health concerns were common to all food 
hazards, most hazards had other unique concerns, for example, animal welfare 
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concerns were associated particularly with BSE. However, concerns about pesticide 
residues and GM foods had similar risk profiles, with some indication that benefits 
such as cheaper food and less wastage offset risks such as unknown long-term effects 
and adverse effects on nature and the food chain. 
Concern about the low level of support for GM has prompted more 
qualitative interpretive research aimed at understanding the underlying factors in 
public perceptions of GM, which recognises the need for reflexivity, pays attention 
to context, and seeks multiple understandings of phenomena. Fischhoff and 
Fischhoff (2001) concluded that people distinguish among biotechnologies, and have 
different means of evaluating them. They have different, strongly-held views, despite 
recognising their own limited knowledge. Research findings have also indicated, for 
example, that source credibility and trust are important determinants of consumer 
support for GM products (Prewer, Howard, Hedderley & Shepherd, 1999; James, 
2003; Hornig-Priest, 2001), and that perceptions of the accountability of government, 
industry, and the regulatory process are important in determining peoples' 
knowledge and attitudes to applications of GM in plants (Irani, Sinclair & O'Malley, 
2002). Research additionally demonstrated that negative consumer attitudes towards 
GM are embedded in other attitudes towards nature, technology, and alienation from 
the marketplace, and, therefore, not easily changed (Prewer, Scholderer & Bredahl, 
2003; Glick, 2001; Grunert, Bredahl & Scholderer, 2003). 
In other research exploring changes in GM risk perception in Europe, 
Gaskell, Allum, Bauer, Jackson, Howard and Lindsy, (2003) found that three factors 
contributed to risk assessment: questions about moral hazards-is it right?-
democratic hazards-who is funding and controlling it?-and uncertainties-are 
consequences yet unknown? They suggested that trust seems to have increased, 
particularly for consumer groups, doctors, and farmers, since the debate has focused 
more strongly on the human genome, and activism against field trials may have 
alienated some publics, particularly those sympathetic to the recent tribulations of 
farmers. The discrepancies in international support for GM have also prompted 
research aimed at understanding, for example, why US and European Union (EU) 
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policies on GM foods are quite different from each other. For example, Paarlberg 
(2000) pitched the debate about the benefits and risks of GM as a conflict between "a 
cautious, consumer-driven Europe against aggressive American industry" (p. 24). 
Andersou and Jackson (2003) suggested that US farmers would benefit more from 
widespread acceptance of GM crops than EU farmers would, particularly if the USA 
is an early adopter, because of the greater cost of compliance in densely populated 
and heavily legislated Europe, and the higher levels of trust by US markets in 
regulatory bodies. Laget and Cantley ( 2001) explained that Europe, like the USA 
invests heavily in biotechnology research but that the regulatory environment is far 
more stringent in Europe, where food production is regulated throughout the entire 
system including farming, manufacturing, distribution, and retailing. In the USA, 
where regulation is primarily concerned only with the end consumer product, issues 
surrounding GM food production are represented by government as a trade issue. 
However, Laget and Cantley (2001) argued that despite the differences in US and 
European public opinion about GM, the differences between the two countries at a 
scientific level are minimal, and the differing regulatory and legislative environments 
are the subject of working groups, including lawyers, consumer representatives, 
farmers, environmentalists, scientists, industrialists, and ethicists aiming to "work out 
a common understanding of the definition of risk and how to regulate risk" (p. 42). 
The ambivalent findings of this research literature are thus inconclusive as to 
the relative importance of risks and benefits in determining attitudes to GM foods 
and crops. They indicate that public perceptions about GM are based on multiple 
understandings of the issues; although there is some consistency in the importance 
attributed to trust in the institutions engaged in GM research and development. 
Scientific Autonomy, Trust, and the 'Deficit Model' of Scientific 
Understanding. 
Considerable research focuses on discourses of public understanding of 
science, and the history of public concerns about GM has been traced back to the 
time of the discovery of DNA in the early 1970s. Weiner (2001), a science historian 
who attended the Asilomar Conference in 1975, described the concern of biologists 
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at the time that the public's fears could lead to political interference, which would 
threaten funding and mean that scientists would lose scientific autonomy and control 
over research choices. Weiner commented that, at the conference, the "recombinant 
DNA issue was defined as a technical problem to be solved by technical means" 
(2001, p. 211); larger ethical issues were excluded. Although various public bodies 
argued for legislation to enforce guidelines for research, scientists argued that they 
had overstated the risks and eventually no legislation was passed (Weiner, 2001). 
Wade (1984) predicted that the early public trust in scientists evident after the 
Asilomar Conference would dissipate, as public debate about the ethics of 
biotechnology increased. 
Yet, given the ideological dominance of scientific rationalism in the Western 
world, pro-GM scientific perspectives are still frequently privileged over lay 
understandings of controversial policies and public issues, and scientists have largely 
retained autonomy over their research. One discourse of science constructs public 
understanding and public knowledge of science according to a 'deficit model' which 
assumes that lay publics do not understand the scientific 'facts' about GM. There are 
arguments that if publics were given more information, they would understand the 
facts, then the issues would not be contested and concerns would disappear (Dutton, 
1999; Johnstone, 1999). 
Rabino (1994), for example, reported that German scientists perceived that 
negative public perceptions and strict government regulations governing GM might 
restrict their competitive edge in the field. He called for German scientists to "make a 
long-term commitment to communication and education about all aspects of their 
field" (p. 365). Research has called for "enhanced" risk communication between 
biotechnology industries and the public on the role of biotechnology in food (Wohl, 
1998, p. 387), and discussion of GM technologies in crops and food has frequently 
focused on explaining GM in positivist scientific terms (Aldridge, 1996) or on 
strategies to educate consumers more effectively (Wansink & Kim, 2001). 
However, Prewer, Hunt, Brennan, Kuznesof, Ness and Ritson (2003) found 
that scientific experts believing in the 'deficit model' of science perceived the 
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general public as unable to conceptualise uncertainties associated with risk 
management processes. Hines (2001), for example, commented that publics want to 
know scientific 'truths', but that scientific processes and the fragmentary, evolving 
nature of scientific knowledge are not well understood, resulting in a lack of trust of 
scientists. Prewer, Howard, Hedderley and Shepherd (1999) similarly found that 
credibility and trust in source institutions are important determinants of public 
responses to information about GM. 
Blaine and Powell (2001) acknowledged that the leadership role of science 
might be challenged with more public education about new agri-food technologies. 
Yet Glick (1997) suggested that biotechnology industries' pro-active stance in 
addressing the issues in the USA has resulted in greater public acceptance, despite 
public appreciation of both potential benefits and potential harms. Weiner critiqued 
scientists' "dogma of inevitability" (2001, p. 217), calling for increased public 
participation to address social justice concerns, and effects on health and 
environmental safety. Calls for public participation in discussion of GM issues and 
the role of communication and dialogue in determining attitudes towards GM are still 
then somewhat ambivalently reported in the literature. 
Public Dialogue and Participation in Decision-making about GM. 
Marks (2001) commented that many scientists, industry, farmers, regulators, 
and policy makers were caught "off guard" by the negative European public reaction 
to GM (p. 152), because they continue to privilege technical and economic cost-
benefit analysis of GM risks. Greenberg and Graham (2000) additionally reported 
growing confusion among US consumers at the proliferation of new food 
technologies, and recommended improved regulation and labelling of foods, 
particularly to clarify the disease-fighting properties of new foods, by increasing the 
level of disclosure of information to the public. They suggested that a common 
vocabulary of terms is needed, and that public information might be effectively 
provided through question/answer forums via the Internet. However, Scholderer and 
Prewer (2003) more recently found that technology driven information strategies in 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, and the UK have often decreased consumer preferences 
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for GM foods; they advocated "engaging consumers in the debate about innovation 
processes rather than attempting to align their views with those held by expert 
communities" (p. 125). 
Increasingly, critical research perspectives focus on the politics of knowledge 
in debate and decision-making. In Germany, Bora (1998) pointed out that the 
Genetic Engineering Act (1990) originally provided for citizen participation at public 
hearings. However, since a 1994 amendment, decisions on release can now only be 
made from written submissions. Bora's discussion theorised the difficulties in 
creating a practicable system for public participation which at the same time meets 
political expectations for participation. He concluded that decisions about how to 
deal with disputes about values remain unanswered and deserve further investigation. 
Harvey (2004) commenting on the GM debate in the UK, suggested that 
technical and propositional (political and ethical) matters should be separated but 
concurrent in the debate about GM, because members of the public are out-
manoeuvred by scientists on technical matters. In a similar critical vein, Rogers-
Hayden and Hindmarsh (2002) critiqued the Royal Commission on Genetic 
Modification in New Zealand. They suggested that the processes of the Commission 
privileged modernist scientific perspectives, marginalising the submissions of 
eenvironmentalists and the general public. Harvey (2004) suggested that the issue is 
partly one of problem definition; technical matters should feed into the wider debate 
and political decision making but not be the basis for that decision making. Yet, as 
J uanillo (2001) pointed out, the historical status accorded to science in defining 
knowledge is increasingly challenged by public perceptions about the risks of 
agricultural biotechnology, such that public opinion may "overwhelm the voice of 
science and become the principle basis for regulatory and policy decisions on 
agricultural biotechnology" (p. 1246). Juanillo advocated continuing dialogue 
between scientists and technical experts and the public, to appreciate the role of 
biotechnology in society and the social and cultural meanings attached to 
biotechnology. 
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There are increasing calls, then, for more public dialogue about GM, rather 
than simply the communication of more information (Braun, 2002; Ellahi, 1994; 
Gregory, 2003; Nelson, 2001; Reiss & Straughan, 1996). Tannen (1998), like Isaacs 
(1999), contrasted dialogue with debate and discussion, arguing that discussion seeks 
closure and fosters competition, while debate obscures overlaps in thinking, obscures 
complexity in research, implies only one framework can be applied, takes sides, and 
prevents paradigm shifts. This theoretical position suggests that constructing 
communication about GM as debate contributes to the polarisation of opposing 
positions on GM issues, narrowing discussion to a competition for the 'best' solution 
or public policy position, Such debate may occur between interest groups working 
within different theoretical paradigms, taking, for instance, scientific or socio-
political approaches to the issues. In contrast, Isaacs (1999) defined dialogue in 
terms of relationships, as shared inquiry that not only solves problems, but dissolves 
them: "the intention of dialogue is to reach new understanding and, in doing so, to 
form a totally new basis from which to think and act" (p. 19). Dialogue, it is argued 
has the potential to inform GM policy through a consideration of multi-disciplinary 
approaches which more effectively respond to the complexity of the issues involved 
in the research and development of GM science and technologies. That is dialogue 
may facilitate approaches which address the concerns of, for example, business 
interests, scientific researchers, environmental groups, and consumer groups to find 
new solutions to problems surrounding the implementation of GM technologies. 
Studies investigating possible models of dialogue-based decision-making are 
ongoing, and examples include citizens' juries and consensus fora, as suggested by 
Rose (2000) in relation to GM health issues. Recent research funded by the Ministry 
of Science, Research and Technology in New Zealand is currently exploring ways in 
which dialogue can be facilitated in the biotechnology/GM debate (Cronin & 
Jackson, 2004; Roper, Zorn & Weaver, 2004). 
This discussion of research exploring the different discourses associated with 
GM has demonstrated how such research contributes to theoretical understandings of 
the practical issues that arise from the new technology. GM discourses that privilege 
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economic and technical/scientific perspectives of GM technologies are increasingly 
contested, as are technical assessments of GM risk. Socio-political critiques of GM 
discourses equally take a political economy perspective that examines how the 
commercialisation of GM marginalises the 'Other'. In Western nations, there are 
increasing calls for dialogue that fosters public participation in decision-making 
about GM and acknowledges the diverse understandings of GM that represent 
multiple value systems. 
Further literature considers how meanings about GM are rhetorically 
constructed to understand the role of persuasion and influence in the construction of 
contested GM issues. Katz (2001), for example, argued for.more rhetorical and 
qualitative analysis of communication about GM. The next section discusses 
literature exploring media representations, and public relations and issues 
management campaigns in the context of GM. 
Rhetorical Representations of GM 
Media Representations 
Media coverage of GM is of interest because of media's possible role in 
mediating understandings of GM issues. The literature discussing media 
representations of GM covers three distinct fields: the impact of media institutions 
and practices on coverage of GM issues, the impact of media coverage of GM on 
public understanding and attitudes to GM, and analyses of the actual rhetoric 
involved in media coverage. 
Media Institutions and GM. 
A number of researchers have highlighted the role of the structure and 
traditions of news media institutions in coverage of GM and biotechnology. An 
interpretive study by Logan (2001), for example commented that GM articles may be 
assigned to particular news 'beats '-routine areas that journalists normally cover-
emphasising specific aspects of the issues. Logan argued that food biotechnology 
news has often been represented as an agriculture, food, or business story, and called 
for more coverage by science journalists. In contrast, Schenk and Sonje (2000) found 
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that journalists tend to report GM issues, largely from science perspectives, and 
positively, regardless of their own interest or expertise in the subject. Journalists' 
representations of GM were influenced by their positive perceptions of the scientific 
and social competence of their extensive natural science networks, a largely 
homogenous group of GM supporters. Yet, surprisingly, Schenk and Sonje noted that 
journalists still considered themselves "neutral conveyors" of information to the 
general public (p. 342). 
Ten Eyck and Willimen's (2004) extended survey of journalism practices in 
relation to three food technologies, milk pasteurisation, food irradiation, and 
biotechnology, indicated a consistent journalism style, with similar experts quoted, 
similar underlying cultural resources, and similar storylines. Recurrent themes relied 
on frames of progress, highlighting benefits in terms of production efficiency, health 
benefits, and safer food; frames of consumer choice and consent, highlighting 
concerns about food sources and processing, and food taste; and frames related to 
legislation governing health and safety. Ten Eyck and Willimin theorised that 
journalists' interpretive frames both reflect and help to shape societal values about 
food technologies, and that these centre on the safety, flavour, origin, and handling of 
food. 
Other research also emphasises the media's agenda-setting role. Palfreman 
(2001), for example, discussed the role of journalists as risk amplifiers and risk 
minimisers in the agricultural biotechnology debate. He found that journalists may 
'sharpen' risk findings about agricultural biotechnology, and may 'level' the caveats 
in a report (Palfreman, 2001, p. 175). Similarly, in the GM debate in Europe and the 
USA, Marks and Kalaitzandonakes (2001) found that media frames such as biosafety 
and food safety were emphasised at different points in time, depending on concurrent 
events and risk management controversies. 
Hornig-Priest (1994, 1995) suggested that information subsidies from 
scientific institutions (both research/universities and industry) may be more 
influential on journalists than information subsidies from other sources. Media then 
may over-represent the rationalist perspective of these institutions, framing their 
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accounts as the need to educate lay publics. Hornig-Priest (1995) criticised media 
accounts of biotechnology for being one-sidedly concerned with potential benefits, 
for example, for research institutions, or industries' economic bottom line, and 
argued for information equity and much broader debate. She commented that media 
influence results from the long-term framing of multiple issues surrounding science 
and risk, and theorised that media frames thus limited the terms of the public debate 
to science development issues (Hornig-Priest, 1994). Hornig-Priest's (2001) study of 
media coverage of the cloning of Dolly the sheep, however, indicated a shift in 
mainstream newspaper coverage to include ethical considerations of GM. 
Nelkin (2001) also commented on the agenda-setting role of media, in acting 
as brokers between scientists and the public. She noted that the "extravagant 
headlines and promotional hype" (p. 200) used by media to report on gene therapy, 
and frequent reference to the genetic basis for behaviour was evidence of a bias 
towards biological determinism, and indicated journalists' tendency to cite a 
provocative theory as fact. Yet, she commented, journalists have also warned about 
the commercial drivers of biotechnology research, and report on commercial 
applications of the technology with growing cynicism. 
News values also provide the theoretical perspective for Motion and 
Weaver's (2005b) critical analysis of media relations by the environmental activist 
group Greenpeace. Motion and Weaver noted that organisations such as Greenpeace 
have often succeeded in commanding media attention but have not always been 
successful in "claiming or securing legitimacy" in the resulting media coverage 
(2005b, p. 3). Their account of how Greenpeace attempted to mobilise consumer 
pressure by creating common knowledge about GM food in the New Zealand debate, 
indicated that media relations can be theorised as an epistemic struggle for 
credibility. Greenpeace had to understand and manage news values in order to 
balance their ability as an activist group to set agenda issues with their ability to 
establish the critical knowledge and dominant frame for those issues. 
This literature suggests that media tend to privilege scientific perspectives of 
GM; that although there is some indication that media present critiques of such 
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perspectives, alternative viewpoints still struggle to gain credibility in media 
coverage of GM issues. 
Media Coverage and Public Understanding of GM. 
Hornig-Priest has contributed a significant body of interpretive research 
focusing on media influences on public knowledge and understanding about 
biotechnology. Her early work looked at audience and reader responses to science 
and technology stories, highlighting lay concerns about the impacts, control, and 
possible misuse of science and technology (Hornig, 1990, 1992). Hornig's (1993) 
analysis of lay perspectives of technological risk (that included GM) indicated that 
lay understandings went beyond numerical probability assessments. They were not 
'misinterpretations' but resulted from "an expanded vocabulary of risk" based on 
social context and included ethical issues relating to the implementation and 
regulation of the technology (Hornig, 1993, p. 95). Hornig-Priest and Gillespie 
(2000) additionally commented that opposition in Europe and the USA to food 
biotechnology is often blamed on media accounts. They argued, however, that 
experts debate the issues, so public opposition cannot be attributed to poor 
understanding of the issues or "sensationalistic media accounts," particularly when 
media are more likely to over-represent mainstream stakeholder perspectives of the 
potential benefits of biotechnology (Hornig-Priest & Gillespie, 2000, p. 529). They 
raised important issues related to the ethics of objectivity in scientific journalism. 
In a further study, Hornig-Priest (2001) noted that public opposition to 
biotechnology is less the result of misunderstanding or media representations of risk 
than a lack of faith in key regulatory, science, agriculture, and biotechnology 
institutions. From the perspective of media effects theory, she argued that, rather than 
a 'magic bullet'-that is an immediate and direct effect on public attitudes-media 
create a 'cultivation' effect that contributes to the social construction of reality, 
(Hornig-Priest, 2001, p. 105). In this sense, "cultivation analysis" is an attempt to 
assess the contribution of common and repetitive features of media representations· of 
phenomena to public perceptions and knowledge over a period of time (Gerbner, 
Mowlana & Schiller, 1996, p. 30). However, Hornig-Priest cautioned that while trust 
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in institutions is important, it cannot be marketed, and suggested a watchdog role for 
science journalism that stresses "the public service obligation of the scientific 
community" (Hornig-Priest, 2001, p. 108). 
The Rhetoric of Media Representations. 
Studies of the rhetoric of media representations of GM demonstrate the range 
of strategies used to create persuasive appeals, and have argued, for example, for 
serious consideration of the contribution that entertainment (fiction) makes to public 
perceptions about GM (Gerke & Ruhrmann, 2003; Henderson 2001). Media often 
draw on fictional representations of GM, such as Gattaca, and Frankenstein-for 
example, in the use of the term 'Frankenfoods' (Douglas, 2000; Tait, 2001)-to 
highlight particular storylines about current issues. Henderson (2001) found that the 
general public drew on fictional representations of GM from entertainment media to 
highlight their own concerns and understandings of the issues. They viewed science 
fiction as a worthwhile source of information, since it presented a way of dealing 
with issues that were seemingly insurmountable. Henderson suggested that science 
fiction may assist in shaping understanding of future technologies, and ideologies in 
science fiction may legitimate particular GM discourses. Gorke and Ruhrmann 
(2003) additionally suggested that news media and entertainment may be 
complementary in their contributions to public communication about GM, while 
Hornig-Priest (1995) noted that the blurred distinctions between fact and fiction in 
docudramas and tabloid news indicate that science fiction may provide a social 
context for the interpretation of news about GM. 
In a more critical study of media representations of the GM debate in New 
Zealand at the time of the general election in 2002, Ashwell and Olsson (2004) found 
that although public policy on GM was ostensibly the focus of debate, issues of 
political party credibility were in fact the main drivers of the rhetorical strategies in 
media comment on GM. They argued that the Government rhetoric of deliberation, 
balance, and partnership in managing the implementation of GM, combined with Act 
Party rhetoric constructing the Green Party as eco-terrorists, focused less on the 
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issues of the debate than on issues of the election. This highlighted the values and 
roles of the main political parties, rather than values associated with GM. 
Critical media research by Adam (2000a), from the perspective of the sociology of 
'time,' additionally suggested that media arguments about GM issues are "time-
blind" (p. 130). She argued that media reports ignored or negated time issues, and 
called for timescape analysis that examines how time enters our system of values. 
For example, Adam argued that the social construction of time is evident in phrases 
like 'time is money' and 'speed is of the essence' that may be used to support 
arguments for the rapid adoption of GM technology, and reflect neo-liberal 
managerialist discourses. Such managerialist discourses emphasise growth, 
productivity, quality, and continuous improvement in a fiercely competitive, market-
driven environment, and, it is argued, prioritise profit at the expense of other values 
(Capelli, Bassi, Katz, Knoke, Osterman, & Useem, 1997; Henderson, 2003). Time, 
Adam ar6ued, provides a context for social analysis of the values associated with 
GM in terms, for example, of timeframes, temporality, tempo, timing, duration, and 
sequence. 
Although it is not comprehensive, this literature suggests that media rhetoric 
draws on a limited variety of strategies to represent GM. In addition to favouring 
scientific perspectives of the issues, media construct GM in terms of fictional and 
political 'stories', and may privilege managerialist rhetoric. 
The final section of this discussion of the GM-specific literature examines 
how particular interest groups have attempted to influence debate about GM issues. 
This includes a discussion of reputation management, public relations and issues 
management campaigns, and activist campaigns in relation to GM. 
Public Relations, Issues Management and GM 
GM issues are not only debated in the media, they are communicated through 
public relations activities and controlled media, as interest groups including 
government, industry, and activist groups attempt to influence debate about GM 
issues. Rakow (1989) argued that organisations, institutions, and interest groups 
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control information, competition for resources is not equal, and experts have taken 
over the role of deciding the direction of social reform. As Leitch and Neilson (2001) 
also noted, 'expert' organisations have opportunities to lobby government, 
government advisory bodies, and regulatory authorities directly. They act as 
consultants, conduct research, and provide reports which impact directly on 
government decision making about public policy. Decision-making on public issues 
may then reflect the opinion of the most influential and involve a re-shaping of the 
'truth' through the shaping of the majority public opinion (Carey 1995) and the 
provision of 'information subsidies' (Gandy, 1992). Gandy suggested that powerful 
social actors can provide information to support their claims through intermediaries 
such as the media, scholars, and scientists. Such information is often presented as in 
the public interest and may frame initiatives in ways that reduce the perceived value 
of alternatives. 
Reputation management. 
Research examining reputation management in biotechnology companies 
confirms the importance accorded to source credibility in establishing consumer trust 
in GM (Prewer, Howard, Hedderley & Shepherd, 1999; James, 2003; Hornig-Priest, 
2001), but is largely instrumental in approach, examining industry initiatives from a 
functional rather than a critical perspective. Kato and Macer's (2002) interpretive 
study found that biotechnology companies were concerned about possibly distorted 
views of the industry in the media, and were therefore keen to provide information to 
the public, but not all companies were as ready to address bioethics issues within the 
industry, for example, by setting up bioethics committees or educating their 
employees about bioethics issues. 
Instrumental approaches to reputation research recommend particular 
reputation management strategies for biotechnology companies. Moon and Piper 
(2001), for example, constructed reputation management as risk management for 
biotechnology companies, noting companies' responsibilities to identify the 
organisation's values and stakeholder expectations, and to encourage responsible 
business practice by expecting minimum standards of behaviour from employees. 
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Gurau and McLaren's (2003) study noted the dual role of company websites in 
marketing and public relations; that is, in presenting a particular series of images to 
consumers and establishing particular identifications of employees and other 
stakeholders. They recommended the projection of a positive corporate image which 
at the same time presented the possible risks associated with the biotechnology. 
Grupp and Gaines-Ross (2002) noted that biotechnology companies' focus changes 
as they move from research and development into production. They recommended 
that companies build and manage corporate reputation at every stage of the industry 
value chain, by being sensitive to, and responding to, shifting perceptions within and 
outside the industry, at the level of CEO, senior management, sales and marketing, 
research, and product development. 
Although such studies often seek to maintain the influence of corporate 
business, this literature suggests an awareness of the role of values, both values 
within the organisation and values held by key publics, in determining corporate 
reputation in biotechnology companies. 
Public Relations and Issues Management Campaigns. 
The significance of public relations campaigns in influencing debate about 
GM issues is evident in literature discussing public relations initiatives by both 
supporters of GM and activists concerned about GM. Indeed, Partch (2000) 
described consumer activist demonstrations at US supermarkets calling for testing 
and labelling of GM foods as "the public relations disaster of all time" for GM 
science (p. 98). 
The strategies used by biotechnology industries to promote their GM product 
development effectively are the subject of increasing research and comment aimed at 
recommending best practice public relations for biotechnology companies. Jones 
(2000), for example, highlighted attempts by high-profile pro-GM supporters in 
public institutions and government roles in the UK and USA to foster support for 
GM foods by attacking the thriving organic food industry, in an attempt to counter 
increasing public suspicion of GM foods. In contrast, Kilman (2000) commented that 
a similar advertising campaign by the US biotechnology industry used soft-focus 
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pictures to illustrate the benefits of biotechnology. However, he suggested that this 
campaign still risked alienating consumers because it was funded by biotech 
companies deemed to have a vested interest in GM. Another study by Monbiot 
(1999) critiqued the efforts of the UK Government and scientific community to 
convince consumers of the safety of GM foods. Monbiot suggested that the flaw in 
biotechnology companies' public relations campaigns was their reliance on negative 
claims. For example, the campaigns represented GM as not affecting human health 
or the environment, rather than citing positive benefits. This, he argued, compounded 
consumers' negative perceptions of GM. 
Other analysis of GM public relations campaigns takes an interpretive or 
critical perspective, rather than an instrumental perspective, both of biotechnology 
companies and other interest groups participating in public debate. Weaver and 
Motion's (2002) critical public relations case study of the King Salmon company, in 
New Zealand, suggested that the public relations practices of corporate businesses 
and governments are political strategies, underpinned by neo-liberal ideologies, in an 
attempt to influence consumer perceptions. Weaver and Motion commented: 
In a neo-liberal political economy, public relations may be used to promote wealth 
creation as a public interest priority above and beyond the public's right to be 
informed about the possible negative consequences of wealth creation initiatives. 
(Weaver & Motion, 2002, p. 325) 
However, in this particular case, Weaver and Motion commented that media 
coverage of the events eventually increased public knowledge, public debate was 
enhanced, and the need for more democratic decision-making practices about GM 
was highlighted. 
In another critical analysis, this time of the public relations initiatives of a 
science/industry front group in New Zealand-the Life Sciences Network (LSN)-
campaigning for commercial development of GM, Motion and Weaver (2005a) 
suggested that public relations practitioners play the role of discourse technologists. 
In doing so, they shape 'regimes of truth'-particular taken-for-granted meanings 
that privilege the institutions, rules, and practices of the organisation in a struggle for 
legitimation and power. Motion and Weaver commented that a key strategy in the 
LSN campaign was articulation, disarticulation, and rearticulation-the linking of 
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ideas that had no previous connection-to encourage acceptance of ideas that might 
otherwise have been rejected. For example, the possibility of establishing GE-free 
zones in New Zealand, advocated as freedom of choice by anti-GE groups, was 
rearticulated by the LSN in an information kit for farmers as requiring 'border 
control' that would restrict farmer's choice of crop (Motion & Weaver, 2005a, p. 
62). 
As a major biotechnology organisation actively promoting the benefits of 
commercial GM crops, Monsanto's public relations strategies aimed at gaining 
acceptance for GM technologies have also gained significant attention, and generated 
considerable critique. Researchers have critiqued Monsanto, for example, for its 
mixed messages in purporting to support sustainability despite its wholesale 
endorsement of biotechnology (Frankel, 2001), and its failure to take note of public 
attitudes towards new technologies (Vellema, 2004). Pelaez and Schmidt (2004), also 
described the successful actions of a state in Brazil, Rio Grande do Sul, to block the 
introduction of Monsanto GM soy to Brazil. The state used arguments based on the 
'precautionary principle' to successfully mobilise organised resistance, despite the 
fact that at a federal level, Brazil supported the introduction of GMOs. Pelaez and 
Schmidt described Monsanto as overconfident, and commented that Monsanto was 
inexperienced in dealing with resistance because of the relatively easy acceptance of 
its products in Canada and North America. Bruno (1998) critiqued Monsanto's 
public relations strategies as "greenwash3"-that is corporate environmental 
advertising or political campaigns designed to position the company positively in 
terms of the environment (p. 287). Bruno pointed out, for example, that Monsanto 
3 'Greenwash' is the term given to a strategy that evolved as a backlash to the environmental 
movement. It describes organisations' attempts to position themselves as philanthropic, and interested 
in protecting the environment, when in reality they may simply re-define the issues in ways more 
favourable to the organisation. To avoid being directly associated with such persuasive attempts at 
influencing public opinion, organisations may, additionally, set up 'think tanks'-the support of 
scholars with compatible ideas in research--or 'front groups'-private interest groups posing as 
public interest groups (Beder, 1997; Bruno, 1998; Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1998; Rowell, 1996). 
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promoted their environmental stance as "Responsible Care," (1998, p. 289), 
redefining environmental pollution in terms of the need to self-regulate and recycle. 
They positioned GM crops as "GE-improved", as progress, and as the future way to 
feed the world (Bruno, 1998, p. 292). 
Further critique of the potential impact of a multinational corporation's public 
relations activities is provided by Durham's (2005) case study of Aventis 
CropScience. Durham's research is a critical exploration of the functional public 
relations strategies A ventis used in relation to GM corn production. Durham took a 
post-structural perspective, using Giddens' theory of structuration to argue for a 
dialogue-based approach to public relations, rather than seeing public relations as a 
"terrain of struggle" (2005, p. 43). Durham explored the power invested in the 
structuring contexts of public relations in relation to A ventis' cover-up of the global 
contamination of corn by the GM hybrid, StarLink. He argued that Aventis' 
functional public relations approach meant that communication practices were 'top-
down' and prevented effective communication with farmers to ensure the segregation 
of the GM corn from other crops. This resulted in StarLink corn being mixed with 
normal corn after harvest, thus contaminating the global supply of corn. Durham's 
case study seeks to theorise public relations in a way that will enable corporations 
such as A ventis to participate more effectively as social actors involved in change 
and social debate about controversial issues, instead of assuming a self-interested, 
dominant perspective. He suggested that structuration theory provides a theoretical 
bridge between postpositivist, interpretive, and critical perspectives of public 
relations. 
The potential impact of controlled media on the course of GM debate was 
also evident in New Zealand. Hager (2002), an investigative journalist, initiated a 
significant campaign to discredit Government policy on GM, with the publication of 
a book immediately before the 2002 general election. Hager exposed Government 
attempts to cover up the GM contamination of corn seed imported into New Zealand 
at the time of the Royal Commission in 2000. He argued that the Government 
initially planned to pull out the planted seeds and destroy them, but that over a period 
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of weeks this opportunity to act with integrity and build public trust was lost. Hager 
pointed out that as farmers were not told of the contamination, organic farmers had 
no opportunity to ensure there were buffer zones between these crops and their own. 
New Zealand has strict biosecurity border controls because of its reliance on 
primary production, and has implemented a regulatory framework for GM that has 
been described as one of the tightest in the world ("Scientists' big fears vanish", 
2001). Hager argued that the Government changed the acceptable contamination 
threshold from zero tolerance to 0.5% (in line with the US standard) and then 
reported that contamination was detected in negligible quantities, if at all, at this 
level. By May 2002, however, this threshold had again been recommended to be zero 
tolerance within the technical limits of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
surveillance. 
Hager argued that because the contamination occurred while the Royal 
Commission was sitting, the cover up was to prevent embarrassment and to avoid 
affecting the hearing. He suggested that the Prime Minister, Helen Clark, wanted to 
keep business groups happy because of business concerns about her economic 
leadership at the end of her first year in Government. 
These critiques of public relations and issues management strategies by 
biotechnology companies and governments involved in GM indicate the strategies 
used to influence public attitudes and foster support for GM, and the ways in which 
such interest groups struggle for legitimation and power. However, although they 
comment on the political nature of the campaigns, they do not examine specifically 
how such public relations activities seek to influence public policy about GM. 
Activist Campaigns and the Role of Social Movements. 
At a political level, activist campaigns and social movements have the 
potential to influence which issues become significant in the public domain (Castells, 
1997; Reisner, 2001). Social movements transform alternative discourses into action 
and have the potential to create dialogue that will change existing social values by 
resisting taken-for-granted social meanings about controversial issues. For example, 
the mobilisation of consumer campaigns against GM (Henderson, 2005), and the role 
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of some supermarkets in banning the sale of GM products in Europe (Collins, 2003, 
August 23) indicate the extent to which activist groups and social movements now 
set the context within which biotechnology stakeholders must negotiate their 
positions on GM. 
As Reisner (2001) argued: 
Genetic engineering in agriculture touches on the core concerns of many different 
types of [social] movements: protecting human health, protecting the environment, 
and the dangers of monopoly capital controlling a public good such as food. (p. 
1389) 
Reisner suggested that the narratives of social movements set frames used to 
interpret the issues, defining the problem, suggesting a solution, and legitimating 
action. She explored the breadth of social movement resistance to GM in the USA 
among very different social movements such as environmental groups, anti-corporate 
groups, science-based groups, worker-based groups, animal rights groups, and 
identity movements. Reisner found that GM in agriculture was a "unifying" narrative 
resonating with a wide variety of movement groups. Groups were likely to draw on 
arguments typical of other groups, adopting them as their own, and making the 
possibility of joint action more likely. 
Henderson's (2005) interpretive study explored the diverse identities 
represented in the rhetoric of a grassroots, activist campaign against GM in New 
Zealand. In this campaign, electronic communication technologies played an integral 
role in facilitating the organisation of the campaign, the sharing of information, and 
the repositioning of the discourse (see Kent & Taylor, 1998; Taylor, Kent & White, 
2001; Roper, 2002 for examples of other campaigns supported by electronic 
communication). Henderson (2005) argued that the campaign represented a site of 
resistance to normalised political and economic discourses in New Zealand. It 
effectively contested the dominant discourses about GM through the construction 
and management of multiple national and political identities to create overlapping 
'zones of meaning' (Heath, 1997) for multiple publics in the debate. 
Anderson (2000) similarly characterised "new social movements" (NSMs) as 
"organised forms of collective action representing a broad mobilisation of interests 
around a specific goal" (p. 93). She suggested that NSMs have access to formal 
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channels of influence through lobbying, increasingly have staff with public relations 
backgrounds, but at the same time are composed of grassroots activists outside of 
formal political structures and exist as informal, relatively unstructured, networks. 
Like Castells (1997), Anderson emphasised the focus of NSMs on collective identity 
and lifesiyle politics, as well as direct action, arguing that NSMs provide new 
sources of identity through the establishment of informal networks alongside more 
established pressure groups. 
This discussion of literature examining rhetorical representations of GM has 
highlighted how media representations mediate understanding of GM issues. It has 
also indicated some of the strategies used in public relations efforts to influence GM 
debate, and has suggested that the public relations initiatives of biotechnology 
companies and governments privilege self-interested instrumental perspectives of 
GM. These pro-GM perspectives marginalise the values and participation of lay 
publics in debate about GM; although, there is evidence to suggest that the activism 
of groups against GM, and social movements such as environmentalism, may have 
influenced which issues become significant in the public domain. 
The first section of this chapter additionally examined different theoretical 
perspectives of GM, ranging from functionalist, to interpretive and critical analysis 
of GM issues. It highlighted the range of different socially constructed meanings 
about GM that result from the underlying discourses, and the ways in which these 
have been represented. Yet, there are few critical studies of corporate GM discourses, 
of how meanings about GM are negotiated; and how interest groups attempt to exert 
influence on public attitudes and particularly on public policy. As yet, there are no 
studies that do justice to the complexity of strategic positioning about GM. It seems 
that despite calls for public dialogue about GM in New Zealand, finding ways for 
both key interest groups and lay publics to participate equally in dialogue about GM, 
in ways that acknowledge the validity of both technical issues and other value 
systems, is still problematic. The second section of this chapter presents a case for 
including additional theoretical propositions drawn from the literature on identity and 
rationality in the analysis in this study. 
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Theorising Identity and Rationality 
This section of the chapter examines how theoretical perspectives of 
organisational identity, identity management, and rationality have been explored, to 
demonstrate how focusing on the interplay of aspects of identity and rationality can 
facilitate a theoretical understanding of how organisations use rhetorical strategies to 
manage meanings about controversial public issues. 
The section begins with a brief historical overview of the development of 
identity-related perspectives in organisational communication and public relations, 
and the limitations imposed by the separate research traditions developed within 
organisational communication, public relations, and marketing (Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001a). This sets the foundation for a discussion of the strategic role of 
rhetoric in identity management, and recent theoretical understandings of 
organisational communication that blur the boundaries of internal and external 
communication. Finally, theoretical perspectives of rationality are discussed in the 
context of identity, sense-making, strategic decision-making, and positioning. 
Organisational Identity, Image, and Identity Management 
Theoretical understandings of organisational identity and image have 
developed historically from individual perspectives rooted in psychology, to 
functional approaches viewing an organisation as having a single integrated 
organisational culture or identity, and recent poststructural and postmodem 
perspectives that theorise organisations as a collective of dynamic, multiple, often 
paradoxical or ambiguous identities. Given the vastness of the literature on 
organisational identity, the next sub-section only briefly discusses examples of 
different theoretical perspectives that highlight diverse representations of 
organisational identity respectively as an enduring character, as dynamic, and as 
political. Such perspectives provide alternative ways of theorising about 
organisational identity and image. 
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Enduring, Dynamic, and Political Perspectives of Collective Identity and 
Organisational Culture. 
Early theoretical perspectives on organisational identity drew on 
psychological approaches to theory distinguishing between 'I' and 'me' to theorise 
identity and image. For Mead (2004), 'I'/ identity was the organisational response to 
the attitudes of others, while 'me' /image was the organised set of attitudes assumed 
by the organisation. So 'I' /identity was conceived as dynamic and uncertain, 
responding to a situation with all of the attitudes of 'me' but still contributing 
something unique in that context. However, neither concept addressed the 
construction of organisational images by external stakeholders. 
Like Mead, Albert and Whetten (2004) theorised organisational identity as 
formed through interaction with others, but they referred to both the self-reflective 
identity of an organisation and the identity ascribed to the organisation by others as 
'identity.' Albert and Whetten conceived of organisational identity as the essence of 
an organisation-the distinctive features which endure over time in the context of a 
goal or purpose. This perspective failed to account for the dynamic nature of identity 
and image. Yet, Albert and Whetten defined identity as a political and strategic act, 
and considered that there could be multiple equally valid statements of organisational 
identity depending on which stakeholders defined the identity. 
The term organisational culture is sometimes also used to theorise collective, 
self-reflective perceptions of organisational identity. However, Schein's (1985) 
assumption of an integrated culture, a single essence or understanding that unifies all 
members of an organisation, is again overly simplistic. Argyris and Schon (1978, 
cited in Schein, 1985), more usefully, suggested three levels of organisational culture 
to distinguish between employees' underlying assumptions, espoused values, and 
actual behaviour, particularly in relation to levels of participation and empowerment. 
They argued that individuals may simultaneously hold views that represent multiple, 
distinct constructions of reality, despite a belief that they share a common 
organisational culture. This is consistent with three possible styles of organisational 
culture described by Meyerson (1991): an integration perspective-strong integrated 
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cultures where members share consistent values, a differentiation perspective-
different subcultures exist within organisations, and a fragmentation perspective-
ambiguity is the norm and consensus and dissensus co-exist dynamically (p. 131). A 
core set of ideologies, sub-values, inconsistencies, and conflicts may then coexist in 
organisations, representing, for example, the dynamic tensions that exist as 
organisational sub-groups balance multiple managerial and individual values. If 
organisational culture is defined as, "A system of meaning that guides the 
construction of reality in a social community" (Cheney, Christensen, Zorn & Ganesh, 
2004), organisational members appropriate and commit to that culture through 
processes of identification with multiple organisational value-premises (Cheney, 
1983b). 
Ashforth and Mael's (2004) representation of organisational identity, based 
on social identity theory, suggested that social identification with an organisation, or 
with sub-units within an organisation, occurs simply through the manipulation of 
myths and symbols or logos. They recognised that individuals may identify with 
others in similar distinctive social categories, such as organisational membership, 
religious affiliation, or age, but not internalise or share all of the same values. 
Implicitly, then, multiple identifications are possible. However, this theoretical 
understanding is again a rei.fication of organisational identity (see also Keller, 1998). 
Mackenzie (1978) traced the history of the word 'identity' to explore 
theoretical understandings of collective identity in an attempt to answer the question: 
"In what context do 'I' properly use the word 'we'?" (p. 12). He noted 'identity' has 
privileged various understandings in different time periods, drawing variously on 
discourses prevalent at the time of Aristotle, medieval Christianity, the 
Enlightenment, existentialism, and modem bureaucracy. These understandings 
include: 'shared identity,' meaning 'the same as'; three persons who are one, the 
divine trinity; enduring consciousness; the equation a= a; the isolation of a unique 
individual, nihilism, and alienation; and the identity tag, file, DNA, or passport. 
Meanings associated with 'identity' have thus shifted over time from 'personal 
identity' to 'identification with' to 'a common sense of identity.' Mackenzie noted 
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that, more recently, understandings of personal identity suggest people shape their 
own identities within the constraints of birth, upbringing, and experience, and 
cultural influences shape both collective identity and personal identity. 
Mackenzie (1978) concluded that the concept of 'we' is political, involving a 
dialectical tension between individual and social identities. 'I' is linked to 'we' 
through the process 'identification with' when it is possible to realise a "common 
purpose" (p. 109). Communication-the exchange of symbols-can be used to share 
values, to persuade, and to exert power. To say 'we', as in the collective identity of 
an organisation, is then a dynamic rhetorical device to indicate shared meaning-
shared interests, shared space, shared intent-and shared identity (Mackenzie, 1978, 
p.165). 
Within the organisational communication literature, the term image is often 
used to describe a temporary perception of the organisation that is very specifically 
situated in time and space. Yet, as Dutton and Dukerich (1991) have shown, 
organisational members may be highly motivated to maintain or restore the 
organisation's image, and may seek to be actively involved in decision-making, 
especially when issues are seen as important (see also Dutton, Dukerich & Harquail, 
1994). 
Organisational communication perspectives of identity thus alternatively 
represent the enduring or dynamic character of an organisation that is socially 
constructed over time. Organisational identity is frequently represented in terms of 
organisational culture, and multiple identities are recognised as co-existing 
dependent on the different values held by stakeholders, and their consequent 
identification with the organisation. Indeed, tensions may exist between the 
individual and social identities of organisational members, and the construction of 
organisational identity is thus seen as a political act. In the organisational 
communication literature, however, identification is largely considered in relation to 
organisational members, rather than to external stakeholders. The next section 
explores theoretical perspectives of identity and image within public relations and 
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marketing literature which take greater account of the construction of organisational 
images by external stakeholders. 
Perspectives of Corporate Identity, Corporate Image, and the Corporate 
Brand. 
Within the public relations and marketing literature, there is a particular focus 
on representations of the organisation to external stakeholders, and on perceptions of 
the organisation by external stakeholders. This includes a conceptualisation of the 
'corporate brand'; that is a particular package of values and images developed by the 
organisation to represent and promote both the organisation and its products or 
services. The term 'corporate identity' was first used by Margulies in the 1950s to 
distinguish his graphic design depicting a visual identity which could stand in the 
place of the organisation, representing its values (Olins, 1994). Olins (1989) 
conceptualised three styles of corporate identity, monolithic-where one name and a 
single visual style are used consistently, endorsed-where a group of activities or 
companies are given a group name and identity, and branded-where a company has 
a series of brands which may be unrelated to each other or to the organisation. (p. 
115). Olins' (1994) conception of corporate identity encompassed not only visual 
imagery, but products, services, buildings, and organisational behaviour. The term 
'identity' then acknowledged the increasing complexity that large organisations face 
in managing their identity but, like other early public relations theory, it represents an 
instrumental approach to identity that privileges managerial perspectives. 
The term 'image, as in organisational communication theory,' also originally 
drew on psychological theory, and was used by Boulding (1956) to refer to 
perceptions of an organisation by society. Commonly, then, in public relations 
literature, 'image' may refer to the perception of an organisation by publics and 
'identity' to the more enduring visual communication and behaviour projected by the 
organisation, the vehicle by which the organisation's vision, or essence, of itself can 
be understood (Chajet, 1989; Grunig & Hunt, 1984; Grunig, 1993; Meech, 1996; 
Selame & Selame,1988; Selame, 1997). 
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As in the organisational communication literature, 'image' is conceptualised 
as fleeting; van Riel (1995), suggested images of an organisation held by 
stakeholders may change over time: "People form a picture of an object by means of 
chains of or networks of associations, which are built up over a period of time as a 
result of slowly accumulating stimuli" (p. 75). In this sense, the image of the 
organisation can be said to dynamic, and must be managed over time. Fombrun 
(1996) discussed this in terms of corporate reputation, which he defined as the 
strategic manipulation of identity through corporate practices of image making and 
identity shaping. Fombrun defended this reification of corporate reputation by 
suggesting that there is a net reputation even when fragmented images are held by 
different groups. However, this seems to be largely because of his functional 
approach and a desire to measure the success of reputation management. 
Public relations and marketing perspectives focus on the enduring qualities of 
organisational and brand identities. Although, they recognise the dynamic nature of 
stakeholder images of the organisation, their largely instrumental perspective 
highlights external stakeholder perceptions, and fails to acknowledge the dynamic 
nature of internal stakeholder identities. 
However, conceptualisations of identity and image in organisational 
communication, public relations, and marketing communication more recently focus 
on the interrelationships between aspects of identity and image, and between internal 
and external communication. This recognises that regardless of the terms used, both 
'identity' and 'image' describe the identification of organisational stakeholders with 
organisational values in some way. An examination of the communication processes 
involved in the management of values can highlight the rhetorical and discursive 
construction of meaning by multiple stakeholders, and the strategic nature of identity 
management evident, for example, in organisations' positioning on public policy 
issues. Theoretical perspectives of strategic identity management need to account for 
communication occurring both within and external to the organisation, and conceive 
of identity on multiple levels, including individual, small group, organisational, and 
inter-organisational levels to do justice to the complexity of the processes involved. 
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Theorising the Links between Identity and Image, and Internal and External 
Communication 
This section examines the increasing focus on the communication processes 
linking aspects of organisational identity and image. Van Riel's (1995) functional 
model of the corporate strategy/corporate identity/ corporate image triad emphasised 
the strategic importance of communication in relation to corporate identity. Van 
Riel, like Gorb (1992), Jeffkins (1994), Meech (1996), Moffitt (1994), and Williams 
and Moffitt (1997), acknowledged that different publics may hold a range of images 
of an organisation, images which will also be in a continuous state of evolution. 
However, van Riel focused not only on how external communication influences 
identity and image but on the role of internal audiences in influencing corporate 
identity. He argued that organisations could strategically harmonise all internal and 
external communication by focusing on "common starting points" (CSPs), central 
values used to underpin all aspects of public relations or marketing communication 
(p. 128). 
Stuart's (1999) model of identity also attempted to integrate internal and 
external organisational communication. Her understandings of image, identity, 
culture, a..T1d reputation built on work by Abratt (1989), Dowling (1993), and 
Kennedy (1977), and described corporate personality in terms of core values 
contributing to corporate strategy, which is then translated through both internal and 
external communication as corporate identity. 
Stuart suggested that stakeholders and publics perceive this identity to be the 
organisation's image(s), which over time consolidates to form the organisation's 
reputation, and she defined corporate personality, strategy, and identity as falling 
within the broader category "organizational culture" (1999, p. 206). Stuart's 
interpretive model recognised the role of both organisational values and 
environmental influences on identity and image, and accounted for multiple publics 
and for changes in image over time, but did not adequately account for Moffitt's 
(1994) findings that audiences or publics may be comfortable with simultaneously 
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holding multiple and even contradictory images of the same organisation. 
As Leitch and Motion (1999) pointed out, theories of corporate identity are 
changing from the functionally-oriented monolithic consistency, preferred by Olins 
(1994), to theories that take account of postmodem perspectives, which suggest that 
knowledge and understanding is relative, that there is no single meaning or truth. 
Audiences or publics may then be comfortable with holding multiple and even 
contradictory images of the same organisation (Moffitt, 1994). Leitch and Motion 
built on van Riel's (1995) concept of CSPs to emphasise the plurality of possible 
meanings in a meaning-centred view of corporate identity, rather than a message-
centred view (p. 194), accounting for Moffitt's (1994) notion of multiplicity within 
the corporate identity mix. An organisation, Leitch and Motion argued, may then 
successfully maintain concurrent multiple images as long as each of these images is 
consistent with the CSPs of the organisation's strategic communication, and the 
organisational identity may have multiple facets as long as these are internally 
logically co-ordinated and consistent. Several perceptions of organisational identity 
may then be articulated together as demonstrated by Leitch and Motion's (2000) 
study of the co-branding of the All Blacks and Adidas in 1999, which relied heavily 
on the association of Adidas with perceptions of national identity and the accepted 
status of New Zealand rugby as a quasi-national religion. 
Linstead and Grafton-Small (1992) also argued for a postmodem approach to 
understandings of organisational culture, drawing on the work of Derrida and 
Foucault to conceptualise the plurality of organisational culture and focus on culture 
as discourse. Usefully, they distinguished between corporate culture-the culture 
constructed by management and imposed on the organisation; organisational 
culture-recognising the organic creativity of organisational members enacting the 
organisational culture; and the cultural organisation. The latter concept recognised 
that cultural processes from both within and outside the organisation impact on 
organisational members, rather than defining culture simply as a product of the 
organisation. This theoretical perspective argued that fragmented, multiple, and 
constantly negotiated images and identities exist within an organisation. Both Leitch 
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and Motion (1999) and Linstead and Grafton-Small (1992) usefully draw attention to 
the discourses underpinning aspects of organisational identity but their work is 
limited by their separate respective public relations and organisational 
communication perspectives. 
Balmer (2001) attempted to cut through the 'fog' of multiple terms and 
multiple definitions in relation to organisational identity and image in a move to 
integrate theoretical understandings from the perspectives of marketing, 
organisational communication, and public relations. However, Balmer struggled to 
synthesise the vast disarray of meanings associated with much of the identity and 
image te1minology. He distinguished between actual identity, communicated identity, 
conceived identity, ideal identity, and desired identity; although, the term actual 
identity might be contested epistemologically, and seems to suggest a realist 
ontology at odds with the other terms used. However, importantly, his 
comprehensive article does recognise the multidisciplinary foundations of identity 
concepts, the existence of multiple identities, and the contributions that functionalist, 
interpretive, and postmodem perspectives have very obviously made to the 
discussion of corporate identity. Balmer's definition of business identity integrates 
many of the important concepts of earlier theorists (for example, Abratt, 1989; 
Dowling,. 1993; Kennedy, 1977; Stuart, 1999). He defined "business identity" as the 
summation of these identities: 
An organisation's identity is a summation of those tangible and intangible elements 
that make any corporate entity distinct. It is shaped by the actions of corporate 
founders and leaders, by tradition and the environment. At its core is the mix of 
employees' values which are expressed in terms of their affinities to corporate, 
professional, national and other identities. It is multidisciplinary in scope and is a 
melding of strategy, structure, communication and culture. It is manifested through 
multifarious communications channels encapsulating product and organisational 
performance, employee communication and behaviour, controlled communication 
and stakeholder and network discourse. (Balmer, 2001, p. 280) 
Despite recognising the multiple ways in which conceptualisations of identity and 
image might be inherent in organisational behaviour, however, Balmer prescribed 
these as categories, rather than recognising that they may exist simultaneously in 
multiple forms, and did not recognise that each identity may be dynamic and 
mutually inform each other. The concept of an 'actual' identity is problematic; the 
84 
'communicated' identity may not be consistent over time and place; and there may 
be multiple groups contributing to a 'conceived' identity, a 'desired' identity and an 
'ideal' identity, as well as multiple images of the organisation held by publics. 
Ultimately, Balmer's theoretical understanding assumes an essentialist view 
of identity. It still privileges a functional marketing perspective and prioritises the 
role of senior managers in developing a brand identity; surprisingly, he 
underestimates the role played by stakeholders and publics in informing an 
organisation's identity. This highlighting of brand identity narrows the contribution 
of this important work. 
As Gioia, Schultz, and Corley (2004) have argued, previous 
conceptualisations of identity have failed to keep up with or account for the changing 
nature of organisations. In responding to the paradox that increasingly organisations 
need a sense of stability through maintaining a consistent identity, but need to 
respond to changing environments by changing their identity (Cheney & Christensen, 
2001a), Gioia et al. concluded that identity and image are both dynamic and 
interrelated, allowing the organisation to be adaptive in times of intense change. 
Gioia et al. distinguished multiple aspects of image and identity: construed external 
image, projected image, desired future image, corporate identity, transient 
impression, and reputation, explaining that: 
Organizational identity forms the basis for the development and projection of 
images, which are then received by outsiders, given their own interpretations, fed 
back to the organization in modified form, and subsequently affect insiders' 
perception of their own identity. (Gioia et al., 2004, p. 366) 
In these terms, both identity and image are conceptualised as dynamically constituted 
in organisational behaviour and communicative action, rather than being reified, 
prescriptive, and measurable. Social meanings associated with the identity and image 
of organisations can then be said to be socially constructed. This conceptualisation 
introduces the possibility of strategic responsiveness, where organisational members 
collectively manage the identity and projected image of the organisation. Gioia et al. 
(2004) argued that the instability of identity and image can be positively adaptive for 
the organisation as it copes with a changing environment. They defined 
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organisatonal identity as "a negotiated, interactive, reflexive concept that, at its 
essence, amounts to an organizational work-in-progress" (p. 369). 
Hatch and Schultz (2004) similarly discuss organisational identity as both 
constitutive of organisational culture and image, and constituted by that culture and 
image. Their model effectively focuses on the processes in organisational identity 
and image formation. They argued that when there is a discrepancy between the 
meanings associated with identity and image, the organisation is motivated to 
respond by changing the identity in some way, through processes of self-reflection 
and mirroring. Hatch and Schultz's model represents identity as an interplay between 
the organisational culture and the organisational image: 
At any moment, identity is the immediate result of conversation between 
organizational (cultural) self-expressions and mirrored stakeholder images, 
recognizing, however, that whatever is claimed by members or other stakeholders 
about an organizational identity will soon be taken up by processes of impressing 
and reflecting which feed back into further mirroring and expressing processes. This 
is how organizational identity is continually created, sustained and changed. (Hatch 
& Schultz, 2004, p. 390) 
The authors' argument for the management of this process through a continuous 
conversation between organisational members and external stakeholders emphasises 
relationship-building, echoing the recent emphasis on relationships and dialogue 
called for in public relations (see for example, Botan, 1997; Cheney & Christensen, 
2001b; Grunig, 2000; Taylor, Kent & White, 2001). 
While hinting at an awareness of the increasingly complex communication 
environment, Hatch and Schultz's (2004) model, however, still fails to theorise 
adequately the influences on the multiplicity of identities and images that may exist 
simultaneously in the organisation and external to the organisation (see Cheney, 
1991; Leitch & Neilson, 2001; Linstead & Grafton-Small, 1992; and Moffitt, 1994). 
Increasingly, theoretical perspectives on identity and image focus on the 
dynamic and multiple organisational identities and images that result from the 
multiplicity of meanings held by stakeholders; and the strategic and adaptive nature 
of the interplay between identity, image, and culture is emphasised. This interplay of 
organisational identity and image is effectively theorised as involving the 
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management of multiple identities and identifications as discussed in the next 
section. 
The Role of Rhetoric and the Management of Multiple Identities 
Cheney (1991) usefully elaborated on how organisational identity may be 
linked to theoretical understandings of communication. He described the nature of 
organisational rhetoric as the management of multiple identities, both individual and 
collective, and suggested that "similarity and difference mutually implicate one 
another, exist in ongoing dialectical tension, and provide the formative context for 
what we call our 'identity"' (1991, p. 13). In organisations, collective identity refers 
to shared interests; individuals seek to belong-to identify-as a way of coping with 
the divisions within society. As Cheney (1991) argued: 
Much of what organizations do is rhetorical. Further, much of contemporary 
rhetorical practice is organizational, within complex organizational settings. Thus, 
organizational and rhetorical theory converge. The nature of organizational rhetoric 
is ... the management of multiple identities, both individual and collective. (p. 2). 
For individuals and organisations, then, identity is a unique combination of socially 
constituted aspects of identity that may sometimes be conflicting (see also Burke, 
1973; Mackenzie, 1978). 
Scott, Corman and Cheney (1998) further theorised the duality of 
identification in terms of Giddens' (1984) structuration theory. According to 
Giddens, institutions can be represented as a duality whereby the elements of the 
system (rules and resources) are at the same time the means by which the system is 
reproduced and exists as a structure. Three elements: signification, domination, and 
legitimation govern the ways in which structures are continued or transformed, and 
communication is integral to each of these processes. Broadly speaking, these three 
terms refer to the creation of texts and coding; power and resource allocation by 
institutions; and social sanction, or normative regulation by legal institutions. 
Scott, Corman and Cheney (1998) argued that identification may then be both 
a process of belonging or attachment to an organisation and an outcome of that 
process: a set of rules or structures that represent the identity of the organisation and 
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a way of organising. Identity may also involve representation, how organisations 
present a/ace to publics and stakeholders. Identity is thus conceived as the 
construction of a series of multiple positions, constantly negotiated through 
identification occurring within social interaction in the dynamic structure of the 
organisation. Individuals may hold multiple, possibly competing, identities of an 
organisation depending on their different organisational roles, involving multiple 
processes of identification (Scott, Corman, & Cheney, 1998). The identity of an 
organisation may be in a constant state of negotiation rather than existing as a stable 
entity. Larson and Pepper's (2003) case study of organisational change management 
drew on Scott, Corman & Cheney's (1998) model to theorise the sensemaking 
processes by which organisational members accounted for operational changes. They 
found that organisational members used eight different communicative tactics, 
creating multiple identifications to manage the change process. 
In line with this perspective, Cheney and Christensen (2001a) discussed the 
role of communication in organisations as "a set of processes through which 
organizations create, negotiate and manage meanings" (p. 234). They pointed out 
that the recent managerial orientation of organisations is concerned with satisfying 
target audiences-with building relationships-and that an organisation's audiences 
and stakeholders are increasingly located both within and outside the formal 
boundaries of the organisation. Internal stakeholders have become part of the 
general audience for the organisation, and public relations activities directly affect 
the strategic communication of the organisation. Organisations may have employees 
who are also consumers of their products and services, and they may have external 
stakeholders (for example students at a university) who are also part of the 
organisational community (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a). 
Furthermore, Cheney and Christensen (2001a) suggested that as marketing 
discourses have become normalised, the marketing orientation of organisations, as 
well as being a relatively reactive process which looks to satisfy the needs and wants 
of the customer, sets out to be seen as participatory, responsive, and democratic so 
that the concept of citizen is conflated with that of consumer. Advertising, too, 
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frequently highlights social issues to increase the identification of audience members 
with products and services. For example, television advertisements for pain relief in 
New Zealand use images that reinforce current discourses related to health-a social 
issue-highlighting the importance of exercise to well-being, by depicting sports 
injuries requiring pain relief, rather than, for example, over-tiredness or stress. In this 
sense, organisational communication, public relations, and marketing now share an 
expectation of two way communication. The organisation marketing a product as a 
remedy for pain relief is responding to public discourses surrounding health, and 
participating in a public conversation with consumers and other health professionals 
which encourages consumers/citizens to take responsibility for their own health. 
At the same time, organisations find it increasingly difficult to maintain a 
distinctly different identity in an increasingly complex and cluttered communication 
environment (Cheney & Vibbert, 1987; Cheney & Christensen, 2001a). Cheney and 
Christensen (2001a) argued that organisations may draw on common values, for 
example, freedom or environmental risk management, but must make them 
distinctively their own; more communication seems necessary but more 
communication also exacerbates the problem so that the interdependence of symbols 
in the communication environment may limit the meaning of the actual message 
conveyed. Furthermore, "communication is continuously challenged and the 
conditions for communication are in constant change" so the need for flexibility in 
responding to the needs of the consumer may mean that it is hard to maintain an 
established identity (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 242). 
Christensen and Askegaard (2001) argued that this may mean that advertising 
and pubhc relations activities help legitimate the organisation for its internal 
stakeholders. Although organisations may seek feedback from their publics, they 
may fall into the trap of auto-communication. This involves communication 
becoming self-referential such that "the communicator (person or group) recognizes 
itself, chiefly in terms of how it wants to be seen by others" (Cheney & Christensen, 
2001a, p. 247). Cheney and Christensen suggested that organisations may become 
insensitive to some areas of information, and effectively create the opinion they seek. 
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They argued that being proactive then involves being at the forefront in responding 
to the market that organisations not only expect but have helped to create, as they 
communicate to maintain their own sense-making and identity. 
In such situations, organisations have been critiqued for misrepresenting 
information to publics (Baker & Martinson, 2001), using strategic ambiguity 
(Eisenberg, 1984) to mask risk situations (IBmer & Sellnow, 1997), or omitting 
important information that does not support their own organisational arguments, and 
failing to make the sources of their information transparent (Nelson, 1994). Cheney 
and Vibbert (1987) pointed out that organisations increasingly act in a political 
manner but need to communicate politically without being identified as political 
groups in the discourse to avoid being seen as self-interested. When they attempt to 
achieve this by defining public policy issues as social issues, this may mean 
managing both a political identity and a traditional non-political identity. 
Cheney and Christensen (2001a) argued that organisational identity and 
image are shaped by organisational communication, public relations, and marketing 
activities, requiring a conceptualisation of communication that transcends these 
theoretical barriers: 
We see communication as a metaconcept that refers broadly to constructions and 
deconstructions of meaning at many different levels, including not only explicit 
communication campaigns but also the strategic planning process, the process of 
monitoring and analyzing issues, and corporate efforts to comply with changing 
norms and standards of social responsibility. (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 239) 
In fact, as Christensen and Cheney (2005) pointed out, there is a trend for 
organisations to increasingly manage all their corporate and strategic communication 
(and their internal communication) as one in the practice of 'integrated marketing 
communication'. Christensen and Cheney (2005) suggested that this may create a 
tension with an organisation's stated practice of being responsive to consumers, 
because organisations tend to privilege their own vision of the organisation and, in a 
globalised world, to increasingly deliver one homogenised brand globally, regardless 
of local differences. Despite a marketing orientation, organisations may fail to 
consider that audiences' reception of this corporate/brand identity may not be as they 
believe it to be. Christensen and Cheney (2005) suggested a further tension may exist 
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internally with an organisation's oft stated privileging of managerial perspectives 
that suggest efficiency is created, for example, through autonomous teams, a flatter 
organisational structure rather than a hierarchical one. In fact, as Christensen and 
Cheney argued, such integrated communication suggests increasing attempts to 
control both employees and external images by the organisation. 
These theoretical perspectives on the role of communication in the 
management of multiple identities facilitate complex understandings of how 
organisations manage the dynamic organisational communication environment. In 
highlighting the blurred boundaries between 'internal' and 'external' communication, 
they emphasise the strategic nature of organisational communication and the links 
between organisational decision-making, strategic planning, specific communication 
campaigns, and the management of controversial issues. 
The next section of this chapter discusses how such theoretical perspectives 
can be further augmented by examining the interplay of identity and rationality 
evident when organisations strategically position and enact policy on public issues. 
Issues Management and Strategic Positioning: The Interrelationships between 
Identity and Rationality 
In this section,-! make no attempt to survey the diverse literature on issues 
management and rationality. Instead, I focus on the particular theoretical 
perspectives and research literature that inform the theoretical framework for this 
study. The literature on issues management examines the priorities accorded to 
policies in relation to particular issues, how these priorities are justified, and the 
discourses that underpin the strategic decision-making of interest groups. This 
section highlights particular theories of issues management, sensemaking, decision-
making and rationality which contribute to an understanding of the interrelationships 
between identity and rationality in the strategic positioning of organisations on 
controversial issues. 
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Strategic Issues Management. 
Issues management and values advocacy have evolved from earlier publicity-
and propaganda-oriented styles of communication in the 1920s and 1930s. Since the 
1960s and 1970s, when public relations increasingly became part of government and 
business strategy, organisations have moved away from a dependence on public 
media to an emphasis on controlled media, and increasingly present a business story 
in an attempt to influence their operating environment. Heath (1997), defined issues 
management as: 
... the strategic use of issues analysis and strategic responses to help organizations 
make adaptations needed to achieve harmony and foster mutual interests with the 
communities in which they operate (p. 3). For an issue to exist, we need at least two 
parties with different points of view regarding how an issue should be resolved. (p. 
44). 
Traditional perspectives of issues management prioritise a functional approach 
arguing for the anticipation of issues and the resolution of conflict, preferably, before 
a problem acquires the status of a critical, current, or even a potential issue (J.E. 
Grunig, 1992, Pratt, 2001). Crable and Vibbert (1983) argued for "catalytic" issues 
management strategies to set the agenda for public discourse before issues arise (p. 
9). However, significant issues may also be defined by an organisation's publics or 
audiences (Crable & Vibbert, 1985) and involve reactive communication strategies. 
Cheney and Vibbert (1987) implied that both pro-active and reactive issues 
management may be appropriate; they pointed out that issues are: 
... focal points in public discourse that never get 'solved' in the sense of absolute 
termination of discussion, but they do become 'resolved' or 'managed' ... While 
issues can always be linked either implicitly or explicitly to values, occasionally 
values are at issue themselves. (p. 175) 
When ongoing values are at issue, either an organisation or its publics may initiate 
further 'discussion'. 
Heath (1997) acknowledged the difficulty of communicating successfully 
with multiple publics if there is no shared understanding or "zone of meaning". By 
this Heath meant: 
... the shared information and opinion that members of organizations and publics 
understand and hold dear. Zones are expressions of the meaning, the interpretation 
and judgement, groups and publics believe to be true representations ofreality. 
Through their zones, groups and publics view reality. (1997, p. 192) 
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Heath (1997) suggested that zones of meaning may be established through focusing 
on/act, values, and policy, and suggested that the key elements of any issues 
management campaign will include: differentiation, establishing unique attributes or 
positions on an issue; association, establishing positive attributes or positions by 
alignment with existing positive attributes; identity, creating a persona characteristic 
of the organization; and goodwill, establishing that policies benefit others (p. 203). 
However, despite the emphasis on shared zones of meaning, the campaign elements 
advocated by Heath appear to privilege the facts, values, and policy constructed by 
organisational members, rather than seeing issues management as a dynamic process 
of interaction between organisational members and publics. 
In contrast, Sethi (1977) explicitly linked organisational communication 
strategies and substantive organisational action to the values held by stakeholders. 
He theorised the discrepancy between business performance and societal 
expectations created by business actions or changing stakeholder expectations as a 
"legitimacy gap" (Sethi, 1977, p. 58). Sethi suggested three ways to reduce this gap: 
changing public perception of business performance through education and 
information, changing the symbols used to describe business performance, or 
changing business performance to align it with society's expectations. 
In issues management communication, organisations often use competing 
rhetorical strategies that emphasise particular values and marginalise their 
opponents' values (Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994; Crable & Vibbert, 1983; Heath, 1997; 
Kuhn, 1997; Smith & Eisenberg, 1987). As Kuhn (1997) suggested, a rhetorical 
perspective of issues management allows an examination of the process of 
influence-the struggle over meanings-including the "characteristics of the rhetor 
and relationships to the rhetor's audiences ... [and] the use of symbols to create 
identification" (p. 192). 
As Cheney and Frenette (1993) pointed out, corporate organisations may 
perform a legitimation function creating "diffuse mass loyalty, and sanctifying the 
existing social order" by establishing particular value premises, for example, 
production growth and efficiency, as "common sense" (p. 68). They argued that 
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organisations use processes of identification to establish a set of values which serve 
as the foundational premises from which other argumentative communication can 
result. The resulting "unreflective cooperation" (Cheney & Frenette, 1993, p. 55) 
often results in hegemonic support for the status quo, that favours the organisation. 
Organisations may position themselves as major spokespersons on public 
values, and engage in epideictic values advocacy-a way of arguing that focuses on 
increasing the intensity of values already held by publics, so that these key values 
withstand conflict with other values (Crable & Vibbert, 1983). Organisations then 
seek to enhance their own image and deflect criticism by being associated with goals, 
products, and activities which echo commonly-held cultural values (Cheney & 
Vibbert, 1987; Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994). This strategy often helps to keep values 
important to an organisation visible in the public arena. 
The rhetoric used by an organisation in its issues management may impact 
not only on specific bounded messages to external publics but also on the daily 
working life of the organisation. Recent research suggests that organisations need to 
focus their issues management strategies as much for internal audiences as for 
external audiences (Tilson & Stacks, 1997). Cheney & Lair (2005), for example, 
argued that organisations are constituted by rhetoric in the sense that rhetoric plays a 
part in persuasion and identification at both a micro and a macro level in 
organisations, in the process of organising, as well as in the management of issues. 
An examination of an organisation's rhetorical positioning in issues 
management communication thus involves discussion of the discursive, strategic 
premises for that positioning; that is, how values are represented and expressed as the 
organisation attempts to influence both internal and external stakeholders. 
Sensemaking and Strategic Positioning. 
Yet, the role of values in organisational decision-making is problematic 
(Conrad, 1993). As Conrad argued, individual, organisational, and societal values 
mutually influence each other, and may be markedly and uncritically aligned. 
However, they may equally be so differentiated that organisations mobilise a range 
of strategies to manage the resulting issues. Ginzel, Kramer and Sutton (2004) 
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described organisational impression management as sensemaking: "A process of 
reciprocal influence in which the presence of the organizational audience affects both 
the initial attempts to explain an organization's actions or performance, as well as 
ongoing attempts to resolve interpretive conflicts" (p. 225). 
Weick (1979, 1995, 2001) viewed language as constituting organisational 
actions through processes of collective and retrospective sensemaking which 
purposively reduces equivocality and ambiguity in the organisational environment. 
Weick (1979) noted that an ambivalent stance makes adaptive sense for 
organisations; both believing in and doubting past experience ensures a flexibility of 
response that may prevent the establishment of privileged ways of viewing 
experiences, and maintains multiple possibilities for future actions. He argued that 
there may retrospectively be many competing explanations for actions, and suggested 
we make sense of actions that create value and meaning through language; so people 
act out values, groups act out identities, and organisations act out their purposes 
(Weick, 2001). 
However, Ginzel, Kramer and Sutton (2004) suggested that audiences may 
challenge the truthfulness of management accounts if they are inconsistent or 
misleading, or if audiences hold diverse values making a single acceptable 
management account problematic. They argued that audiences have power: that "an 
organization's image represents a collaborative social construction between an 
organization's top management and the multiple actors who comprise the 
organizational audiences" (Ginzel, Kramer & Sutton, 2004, p. 242). 
In a major study on the influences on health care public policy in the USA, 
Conrad & Mclntush (2003) noted that interest groups may sustain policy monopolies 
through the strategic management of three factors: "the cultivation of images of 
expertise, the structure of public policymaking, and the articulation of a supporting 
ideology" (p. 410). This implies that interest groups need legitimation for the values 
inherent in their identity management and their institutional role in public 
policymaking, and additionally need a compatible discourse environment. 
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Conrad and Mclntush explained the importance of rhetoric in framing issues: 
"All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some 
kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the 
mobilization of bias" (2003, p. 406). They emphasised that organisational rhetors can 
use strategic ambiguity (see also Eisenberg, 1984; Ulmer & Sellnow, 1997) to 
reconcile ambivalences in policy-for example, the role of citizens can be 
ambiguous, constructed in terms of individual choice or individual rights: "Policy is 
a web of dilemmas and paradoxes, enigmas that are constructed, revised, and 
reconstructed through symbolic processes" (Conrad & Mclntush, 2003, p. 409). Such 
ambiguity may enable the development of ad hoe forms of decision making that rely 
more on retrospective rationalisation of decisions than on the definition of problems 
and the attachment of solutions. 
Conrad and Mclntush (2003) suggested that power elites may find it 
threatening to negotiate public policy development in public; sometimes keeping 
issues off the public policy agenda is as important as getting them implemented. 
Interest groups may act to block proposals from being implemented, because it 
threatens their interests, as well as exerting pressure through insider lobbying. As 
Cheney and Vibbert (1987) commented, organisations may then communicate 
politically without being identified as political groups in the discourse. However, 
Conrad and Mclntush argued that even if other interest groups succeed in making 
policy issues public, elites can still contest the policy agenda and divert conflict to 
other issues. 
Conrad and Mclntush's (2003) study highlights how an organisation's 
rationalisation of its priorities, and implicitly its identities, might impact on its 
strategic positioning on a particular issue. It suggests that organisations often 
rationalise their strategic positioning retrospectively to reconcile ambivalences 
created by the management of multiple priorities. 
Rationality and Decision-making. 
Rationality can be defined as the connection between ends and means in 
motivated action (Giddens, 1972). Since the time of Aristotle, the term 'rational' has 
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been associated with actions that demonstrate a sensible, systematic approach to 
achieving a goal, and the ability to reflect on those actions (Cheney, Christensen, 
Zorn & Ganesh, 2004). The organisational communication literature draws strongly 
on concepts of rationality derived from the work of Max Weber, in particular 
Weberian and neo-Weberian perspectives that distinguish between formal or means-
centred rationality, and substantive or ends-oriented rationality (Giddens, 1972; 
Weber, 1978). Means-centred rationality is also described as 'purposive' or 
'instrumental' and often privileges technical perspectives that involve the precise 
calculation of specific means to achieve a given objective. In contrast, substantive 
rationality is more concerned with the values associated with particular goals 
(Giddens, 1972; Weber, 1978). Despite suggesting that technical/instrumental 
rationalities would progressively tend to dominate industrialised society, and result in 
increasing bureaucratisation, Weber (1978) suggested that actions rarely demonstrate 
fully purposive rationality. Weber thus introduced the idea of multiple rationalities, 
showing how dominant types pervade organisational practice. 
As Simon (1976) pointed out, decision-making involves the selection of an 
alternative from several other alternatives and rarely simply involves "factual 
proposithms" (p. 46). The rationalities for decision-making involve a series or 
hierarchy of means selected for various ends and involve a web of interconnections 
rather than a linear means-end chain. Simon commented that means may have 
multiple ends, involving different values, means may be ends in themselves, and 
ends may be means to new ends. It is therefore hard to separate formal rationality 
(based on factual information) from substantive rationality (based on values). In the 
case of GM, for example, growing GM crops (a technical means or process) may 
increase crop yields (the end or objective). However, this end is not value-free, since 
improved crop yields may themselves be the means to a goal of efficiency that 
privileges the financial returns of GM crops (and economic values) over their impact 
on local biodiversity (and environmental values). 'Objective' decisions may then rest 
on the prior value assumptions that are made. Simon (1976) defined rationality as 
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"concerned with the selection of preferred behavior alternatives in terms of some 
system of values whereby the consequences of behavior can be evaluated" (p. 75). 
Simon (1976) argued that organisational decision-making is based on 
multiple decisional premises. Objectives form the basis for value premises for 
organisational decisions, and factual premises believed to be true for any given 
objective are associated with means (Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). Simon thus argued 
that organisational value premises provide a frame of reference for organisational 
decisions. Organisational members make decisions, or accept organisational 
decisions, through processes of identification which lead to the prioritisation of one 
alternative over another; and decisions may be made as a result of multiple 
identifications with value premises at an individual or personal level, at a group or 
organisational level, or because they are socially desirable (Cheney, 1983b, Simon, 
1976; Tompkins & Cheney, 1985). An individual or a group may then literally 'see' 
the alternatives most closely associated with their identifications, and may fail to 
'see' other equally valid alternatives. For example, a conventional farmer might 'see' 
GM crops as a way of reducing the use of pesticides, while an organic farmer might 
'see' GM crops as disrupting the natural life-cycle of the soil. 
Karpik (1978) suggested that organisations demonstrate a range of "logics of 
action" (p. 46) as a way of establishing principles for action that acknowledge the 
similarities and differences between the multiple forms of rationality of multiple 
individuals or groups. He suggested that disparate objectives may be re-constructed 
in terms of a common logic of action-a 'quasi' analysis-that may unite groups 
with divergent visions and preferences. Karpik proposed that organisations draw on 
seven different logics of action: adaptive, prestige, technical, production, 
profitablility, puissance, and innovative; and that organisational strategies "are 
defined by the association of an area of activity, a logic of action, and a level of 
reference" (1978, p. 49). An organisation involved in the production of GM foods 
might then draw on a production logic of action in relation to its economic success in 
the international marketplace, or a technical logic of action in relation to its need to 
audit its manufacturing process to satisfy the demands of risk-averse consumers. In 
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each case, such logics may foster identification with this strategy by disparate 
organisational stakeholders. 
However, Hindess (1987) critiqued Weber for defining rationality in terms of 
individual behaviour, arguing that the social relationships inherent in organisational 
decision-making make this problematic. Hindess suggested that Weber's location of 
rational and irrational behaviour at the level of the individual fails to recognise that 
rationality may be dependent on the discursive environment. Particular discourses, 
such as neo-liberal discourses that privilege values associated with the efficiencies of 
the free-market, may, for example, be normalised to the extent that an individual 
assumes her decisional premises about business efficiency are value-free. The 
discursive environment may then construct what is seen as rational as a master-
premise. 
Albrow (1987) additionally argued for an extension of Weberian theories of 
rationality, suggesting that value-premises may become increasingly systematised, 
becoming both more general in principle and more specific in their application such 
that, "It b the system as a whole that is rational" (Albrow, 1987, p. 171). Albrow 
suggested that this facilitates the purposive ordering of complex situations but 
commented that the resultant increasing systematisation of knowledge means that 
formal rationality is becoming embedded in institutional life. Such systematisation 
has the potential to usurp individual freedom when it is enshrined in state-regulated 
institutions. In this vein, it might be argued that ERMA in New Zealand privileges 
particular knowledge systems in approving applications for the release of GMOs into 
the environment. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) drew on cultural theory to suggest that 
organisations adopt styles of decision-making consistent with their organisational 
structure, and may be analysed as hierarchical, individualist, or border/sectarian 
organisations (p. 101). They suggested that hierarchies-for example, many 
corporate organisations-often limit their framework for decisions and tend to work 
with known processes; a very bounded rationality. Hierarchical organisations may 
have multiple goals, rationalise decisions after the event, and have long timeframes 
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reflecting their history and perceived future. In contrast, Douglas and Wildavsky 
(1982) suggested that individualist organisations-for example, supporting a free 
market-work to maintain the exchange system. Their time frames tend to be 
shorter, more opportunistic, and more future-oriented, but not necessarily more risk-
oriented because current market values determine decisions. However, Douglas and 
Wildavsky argued that particular values, such as, "human goodness," "equality," and 
"purity of heart and mind", which they identified as "sectarian"-typical of social 
movements and voluntary organisations-are increasingly prevalent in Western 
societies (1982, p. 10). For these groups, Douglas and Wildavsky suggested: 
Nature in the wild, uncorrupted by social artifice, equivalent to a society without 
social distinction, is their preferred emblem of godliness and symbol of 
unworldliness. (1982, p. 11) 
In the rationalities associated with these values, the associated dangers, "worldliness" 
and "conspiracy," are often seen as linked with corporate organisations and corporate 
power. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) suggested that organisations make strategic 
assumptions: "patterns of shared values and beliefs, which are part of the everyday 
justifications sustaining each type of organisation" (p. 139), based on the cultural 
assumptions implicit in their organisational structure. Douglas (1986) argued further 
that institutions to a large extent determine how we think, our knowledge, and our 
conceptions of what is 'natural' in the sense of what is justice: 
Each kind of community is a thought world, expressed in its own thought style, 
penetrating the minds of its members, defining their experience, and setting the poles 
of their moral understanding. (p. 128) 
So individuals make decisions that are influenced by the values of the multiple 
networks and institutions which they identify with. 
Organisational communication perspectives on participation in decision-
making suggest that recent managerialist values have favoured the importance of 
individualist approaches, establishing self-managing teams, for example, with flatter, 
rather than hierarchical, management structures in attempts to increase motivation, 
innovation, and efficiency (Capelli, Bassi & Katz, et al., 1997; Deetz, 1995; 
Hammer, 1999; Stohl & Cheney, 2001). It might be expected that such organisations, 
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and those based on cooperative styles of management, will involve organisational 
members in communication and decision-making about important issues more than 
organisations with strictly hierarchical management structures. However, as Stohl 
and Cheney (2001) explained, there may be clashes between ideals and practice in 
terms of worker participation in organisational decision-making. 
Indeed, as Cheney (1999) has demonstrated in his comprehensive study of the 
Mondragon cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain, even well-established 
cooperatives are subject to increasing external pressures as they compete in global 
markets, with a consequent possible reduction in the level of member participation in 
strategic planning, debate, and decision-making. Who gets to speak in an 
organisation will thus be dependent to some extent on the management structure. The 
'marketisation' of cooperatively owned industries refers to a trend in discourse for 
the discussion of values to become increasingly ritualised in terms of a market 
justification, with ambiguous meanings which subordinate other social values-such 
as employee participation-to external concerns, such as how to serve the customer 
better or compete in the marketplace. As Cheney (1999) argued, ethical reflection 
may be abandoned and decision making is then increasingly the prerogative of an 
executive group within the organisation. 
In the case of decision-making and strategic positioning related to risk, Beck 
(1996) argued that where pre-industrial societies were "societies of catastrophe," and 
industrial societies were societies of "calculable risk," currently society negates its 
own principles of rationality because risks are now incalculable (Beck, 1996, p. 40). 
Beck (1992) argued that reflexive modernisation-the questioning engendered by 
scientific industrialisation-has created a risk society. Risks can no longer be 
quantified in time or space, and no one can be held accountable (Beck, 1992). Instead 
of factory based, occupational hazards in industry, we now have irreversible, less 
visible, global, environmental risks, not limited in space or time or to particular 
occupational groups (Beck, 1996). As Beck commented: 
In the risk society, the recognition of the unpredictability of the threats provoked by 
techno-industrial development necessitates self-reflection on the foundations of 
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social cohesion and the examination of prevailing conventions and foundations of 
'rationality.' (Beck, 1994, p. 8) 
So the categories of risk now being articulated question the instrumental rationality 
of modernity but arise from the organisation of a society dependent on that system of 
rationality. There is conflict over the foundations of rationality and of the industrial 
society; and uncertainty becomes dominant. However, Beck (1994) suggested that 
new rationalities may emerge when different communicative codes are assembled 
together, juxtaposing different realities and sub-rationalities to bring new 
perspectives to problem issues. 
As a consequence of the risk society, Jones (2002) suggested that, 
''Traditional institutions: government, business, science, etc. face a crisis in their 
legitimacy. The individual reassesses, and critically questions these institutions of 
society" (p. 50). Jones argued that legitimacy increasingly centres around the 
individual, or a collectivity of individuals, in public opinion. This facilitates the 
emergence of the "sovereign" consumer and consumer activism (Jones, 2002, p. 51). 
Jones commented that issues provide a complex interplay of identities for 
individuals, constituted through their association with multiple networks and groups 
and sustained by shared discourse arenas. 
This discussion of theoretical perspectives of issues management, strategic 
decision-making, and rationality, suggests that new understandings of controversial 
public policy issues may result from examining the value-premises, identities, and 
rationalities expressed by key interest groups seeking to influence public policy 
decisions. 
The Theoretical Framework for the Thesis 
The final section of this chapter draws together particular concepts from this 
literature review to identify the main theoretical propositions that are central to this 
study. It summarises arguments for a research approach that integrates organisational 
communication and public relations research perspectives on identity, and highlights 
the interrelationships between organisational values, identities, and rationalities, as 
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an effective way of understanding the complexity of organisational communication 
about GM in the kiwifruit and dairy industries in New Zealand. 
First, it is evident from the review of issue-specific literature in relation to 
GM that critical studies of the role of industries in contributing to this particular 
public policy debate are at present under represented. Research discussing current 
debate about GM issues has often been functionally-oriented, conducted from the 
perspectives of government, science, and business interest groups who seek 
legitimation for the commercial development of GM, and marginalise the values and 
participation of lay publics. Such research focuses particularly on the benefits and 
risks of GM perceived by consumer groups, and aims to increase the understanding 
and support of these groups for GM. Despite calls for public dialogue about GM, 
finding ways for both key interest groups and lay publics to participate equally in 
such dialogue, in ways that acknowledge the validity of both technical issues and 
other value systems, is still problematic. 
Second, there is a growing body of more critical research focusing on the 
strategies used in public relations efforts to influence the direction of GM debate, and 
on media representations of GM issues; however, the focus has largely been on the 
political nature of the campaigns at a discursive level. There is little discussion from 
an organisational communication perspective of specifically how and why the 
rhetorical and discursive positioning of particular interest groups is constructed as 
they seek to influence public policy about GM. 
I suggest, in this study, that a theoretical perspective examining the role of 
communication in the management of multiple identities facilitates complex 
understandings of how organisations rhetorically construct meanings about 
controversial public issues. It is increasingly recognised that the boundaries between 
internal and external organisational communication have become blurred, such that 
aspects of identity and image need to be simultaneously considered from the multiple 
perspectives of all organisational stakeholders. It is also argued that it is unrealistic to 
separate theoretical understandings of organisational communication, public 
relations, and marketing, especially since concepts of identity and image are evident 
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in each theoretical discipline. A detailed study of the ways in which organisations 
rhetorically manage multiple identities, needs to draw on conceptual understandings 
at the intersection of these theoretical fields. 
In this study, I take the perspective that organisational identity and image are 
dynamic, not static, and that individuals and organisations may simultaneously 
negotiate multiple, possibly conflicting organisational identities or images. 
Organisational stakeholders may, additionally, hold multiple conflicting positions on 
an issue. These multiple positions result from stakeholders' identification with the 
different value-premises espoused by the individuals, groups, and networks they 
associate with, and may exist in tension with each other. They consequently result in 
the use of multiple rationalities to justify an organisation's strategic positioning on 
controversial issues. 
I suggest that how an organisation rationalises the multiple priorities of its 
stakeholders may thus be linked to how it manages its multiple identities and images. 
Organisational identities may be both constituted by and constitutive of 
organisational culture and structures, and may determine which organisational voices 
contribute to strategic decision-making. Additionally, organisations often rationalise 
their strategic positioning retrospectively to reconcile ambivalences created by the 
management of multiple priorities and identities. A communication perspective of 
strategic positioning on controversial socio-political issues thus demands 
consideration of the explicit and implicit value-premises inherent in the positioning, 
and the processes used to manage that positioning. Identity, rationality, and values 
are thus three reference points that provide a useful lens with which to examine an 
organisation's strategic positioning, as it negotiates with controversial public policy 
issues. 
Since organisations frequently seek to influence the direction of public policy 
debate, an understanding of how issues are negotiated requires an examination of the 
rhetorical strategies of influence used by interest groups in the context of the 
negotiated meanings about the issues evident in the wider socio-political and 
economic discursive environment. An examination of an organisation's rhetorical 
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positioning in issues management communication thus involves discussion of the 
strategic foundational premises for that positioning; that is, the value-premises 
expressed by the organisation in its attempts to influence both internal and external 
stakeholders. The values-related tensions evident in the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries' social construction of the GM debate can then be usefully explored 
through a consideration of the multiple ways in which identification occurs as 
organisations rationalise their positioning on GM, and negotiate their relationships 
with multiple stakeholders. 
The methodology chosen for this study of the kiwifruit and dairy industries is 
a combination of rhetorical criticism and critical discourse analysis, focusing on the 
social construction of meanings associated with GM. The following chapter explains 




METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
Introduction 
This chapter explains the epistemological foundations of the research, the 
theoretical rationale for the methods of data collection and analysis, and the design of 
the study. The first section outlines my personal, political stance on GM and the 
tensions this posed for the research investigation, and then develops the philosophy 
of method and methodological stance, including a discussion of rhetorical criticism 
and discourse analysis. The second section of this chapter explains the research 
design, including the rationale for the selection of the two case study industries, and 
the decision to access information from spokespeople with different functional 
involvement in the industries. The choice of a combination of document analysis, 
and interviews and focus groups with key spokespeople is also explained. The third 
section of this chapter describes the limitations and scope of the data collection, 
including the timeframes for the data collection and analysis, and explains the 
specific steps taken in the data collection. In the final section, the methods of data 
analysis, based on a combination of rhetorical criticism and critical discourse 
analysis, are described in detail. 
Philosophy of Method 
Reflections on my Personal Stance on GM 
In line with the poststructuralist critical-interpretive position that I take in this 
thesis I adopt a reflexive stance both in my methodology and my personal stance on 
GM. Reflexivity is the conscious, critical questioning of the researcher's own role 
and the way that the self is created in the field, as well as the impact of the 
researcher's role on the participants and the participants' impact on the researcher 
(Calas & Smircich, 1999; Fine, Weiss, Weseen, & Wong, 2000; Richardson, 2000; 
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Tolich & Davidson, 1999; Wellman, 1994). Interpretive research recognises the need 
for reflexivity, to represent both the researcher's voice and the participants' voices: 
If knowledge of the social (as opposed to the physical) world resides in meaning-
making mechanisms of the social, mental, and linguistic worlds that individuals 
inhabit, then knowledge cannot be separate from the knower, but rather is rooted in 
his or her mental or linguistic designations of that world. (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 
176) 
To this end, in this chapter I describe my research 'journey' in an informal, first-
person, descriptive style, in acknowledgement that alternative styles of writing 
(rather than the traditional third person format of a thesis) bring new understanding 
to the context and process of research (Richardson, 2000). I explain the major 
influences on this personal stance, and the implications these had for my research. 
First, I acknowledge particular attitudes towards the sciences. Even though I 
studied physics, maths, and chemistry in senior high school, by the time I completed 
my undergraduate degree in psychology, I found the emphasis on objective 
experimental methods in these sciences, at the time, rather sterile. I felt that they 
failed to account sufficiently for the complexity of human behaviour and the 
outcomes of social interaction. Consequently, I find that I am at heart critical of 
narrow scientific framing of GM. 
Second, I acknowledge influences on my methodological approach. My BA 
honours dissertation was a literature survey exploring the relationship between 
language and the development of thinking, focusing particularly on the development 
of language in deaf children, so I had an early interest in the role of language in 
structuring thinking and meaning, and chose a qualitative approach to understand the 
myriad ways in which complex phenomenon might be related. I still prefer to 
conduct qualitative rather than quantitative research. 
Third, I hold strong environmental values. I grew up in the industrial north of 
England, where my mother had to take in the washing if it rained because it got 
covered in black soot, and the buildings all looked like the inside of a chimney. New 
Zealand, in contrast, truly seemed like an unpolluted, environmental paradise when I 
arrived here, in 1970, so I am always particularly aware of the impacts of technology 
on the environment. 
107 
Fourth, I believe that we should always question whether new technologies 
are necessary at all. I worked briefly as a clinical psychologist in a mental health 
crisis unit where patients were so heavily sedated that any thoughtful discussion 
about the issues they were grappling with was impossible. Since this experience, I 
am wary of excessive medical intervention, preferring approaches which, where 
possible, work to balance physical, emotional, and spiritual needs. For me, GM 
technologies may represent a largely unnecessary interventionist approach to health, 
nutrition, and environmental issues. 
My personal stance on GM is, then, one of extreme caution. I don't mistrust 
the science; I believe that the understanding that comes from the genetic sciences has 
the potential for positive outcomes. But, I believe that positivist scientific research 
methods fail to represent all the implications of genetic science or to acknowledge 
the interconnections between ecological systems and social systems. I have a strong 
mistrust of the motives of some scientists and industries that develop technologies, 
and believe that profit motives too often take precedence over a consideration of 
environmental and human interests. 
I have tried to maintain an open-minded stance in this research to ensure that 
I engage with all aspects of the data collected, but I am aware that my personal 
experiences have contributed significantly to the framing of my initial research 
questions and to the philosophical stance I have taken in defining my research 
methodology. I am also aware that my research impacted on the research 
participants. In focus groups and interviews, participants often thanked me for giving 
them an opportunity to think about GM issues; one participant commented 
specifically that she would encourage further discussion among her staff. These 
participants made it profoundly clear to me that I have to acknowledge my own voice 
in this research, as well as their voices. 
The Primary Research Question 
Although personal experiences obviously influenced my approach to this 
study, the research design, and the decision to look at the GM debate from an 
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industry perspective, stemmed from an interest in why two such seemingly similar 
industries took such contrasting positions on the commercial release of GM in New 
Zealand. The main driver of the research methodology, then, was the desire to 
understand and explain how aspects of organisational identity are implicated in the 
positioning of the kiwifruit and dairy industries in relation to GM issues, through 
exploring the underlying value-systems. Specifically, the primary research question 
is: 
What explicit and implicit values, and values-related tensions, are evident in the 
organisational communication of the kiwifruit and dairy industries, as they 
contribute to the social construction of issues surrounding GM foods and crops in 
New Zealand? 
The following sub-sections of this chapter discuss each of the theoretical 
paradigms and perspectives that have informed the methodologies used to investigate 
this research question, and explain the specific understanding of each that has 
contributed to the ontological and epistemological positions taken in this study. 
The Interpretivist Paradigm 
In a playful, provocative essay about the nature of interpretivist research, 
Cheney (2000) presented 17 meanings for the term 'interpretivism' to demonstrate 
the diversity of possible research directions within this paradigm. He commented that 
the interpretive paradigm considers multiple voices and may focus on several 
possible areas of research: the social actor, the researcher, the situation, the 'text,' 
and the research process itself. 
An interpretive approach to enquiry seeks to capture the detail of participants' 
understanding of a situation, and the possible plurality of interpretations likely to be 
shown. Interpretive research emphasises the value of thick description to effectively 
represent the complex conceptual structures evident in data and the meanings 
embedded in symbolic actions; it recognises the importance of culture as a context 
for action. As Geertz (1973) commented: 
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Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take 
culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental 
science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. (Geertz, 1973, 
p.5) 
As Heracleous (2004) argued, interpretive research seeks understanding of an actor's 
frame of reference and for this reason focuses particularly on "in depth 
understanding of actors' first order interpretations" (p.187). In contrast, positivist 
traditions, Heracleous suggested, privilege explanation-"the search for causal, law-
like deterministic regularities" (p. 175). 
However, interpretivists themselves may differ in their ontological and 
epistemological research foundations. Potter (1996) described an ontological 
continuum ranging from idealism to materialism to demonstrate the range of 
ontological positions in terms of belief in an objective reality or a subjective reality. 
Within this continuum, interpretivists working within a modernist or post-positivist 
paradigm believe in materialism-the objectivity of knowledge. Researchers using 
traditional ethnographic methods, for example, try to step outside of their own 
reflexivity and accurately represent objective reality-what is going on in the field-
from their empirical data, as represented subjectively by their participants (see, for 
example, van Maanen's (1988) discussion of realist tales). Yet, Berger and Luckman 
(1967) critiqued modernist and post-positivist epistemological approaches as 
reifications arguing that language provides the possibility of abstractions through the 
use of symbols, but also provides the possibility of bringing symbols back as 
reifications, so that the dialectic between man and his world is lost and the 
interpretation of the world is seen as fact. They defined reification as: 
The apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something other 
than human products - such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or 
manifestations of divine will. (Berger & Luckman, 1967, p. 106) 
Reification, they argued, may take place on a variety of levels; for example, a whole 
society/religion, an institution such as marriage, or a 'role' such as husband/father 
may be accepted as 'fact' instead of being seen as social constructions of reality. For 
instance, a husband may be seen as the family breadwinner, and the possibility of a 
father being the primary care-giver for children and remaining out of paid 
employment while the wife becomes the breadwinner may be inconceivable. 
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In contrast to modernist approaches, interpretivists working within a 
poststructuralist or postmodem paradigm take ontological positions closer to 
idealism or relativism-that is, knowledge is relative depending on the subjectivity 
of the knower. Towards this end of the ontological continuum, Potter (1996) 
described ideographic idealism as: 
A belief that there is something that exists apart from the individual, but because that 
something can never be experienced objectively (outside the limits and influence of 
one's own perceptions) it is pointless to grant it a materialistic ontological status. (p. 
37-38) 
Potter (1996) additionally described an epistemological continuum ranging from 
constructivism (pure subjectivity) to realism (pure objectivity) to reflect the different 
ways in which researchers might find out about the world: 
Constructivists believe that scholarly inquiry is conducted from within a global 
perspective or world view that shapes the process of research. They reject the logical 
postivist view of an objectively real world, believing instead that the world is 
subjectively constructed by the meanings that people assign to observations. (Potter, 
1996, p. 40) 
Social constructivism, involves a rejection of objective empiricism, and sees no 
reality other than that dependent on meanings constructed in language. As Schwandt 
(2000) commented: "Constructivism means that human beings do not find or 
discover knowledge so much as we construct or invent it" (p. 197). 
Berger and Luckman (1967) provided an early understanding of an 
intermediate position between realism and constructivism, of the ways in which 
reality may be socially constructed. They defined reality as something that has "a 
being independent of our own volition" (p. 13) but distinguished the social relativity 
of reality-that what is real to one person may not be to another. For example, the 
associated concept of historicity suggests that perspectives on events are dependent 
on the historical context in which they are reported. 
Berger and Luckman defined the social construction of reality as "the 
relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises" 
(1967, p. 16). They argued that a sociology of knowledge must therefore deal with 
everyone's reality-common-sense knowledge-not just philosophical and 
theoretical enquiry about the nature of knowledge. Although Berger and Luckman 
believed that an objective reality exists, they commented that society is built on 
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activities that are underpinned by subjective understandings of reality founded in 
language. 
In Orr's (1978) definition of social constructionism, knowledge is more 
clearly underpinned by values, as seen through consensually validated symbols: 
Groups create and sustain their versions of reality through symbolic interaction; that 
is, consensually validated symbols define reality and truth for validating 
communities. Knowledge is, therefore, rooted within socially derived symbolic 
structures. Rhetoric as symbolic advocacy is a constituent element in the social 
construction of reality; even a scientific community's version of reality depends 
upon rhetoric. (p. 263) 
Orr argued that we have to conceive of an objective reality as the basis for multiple 
interpretations of reality which are created in meaning by rhetoric. 
Potter (1996) described an intermediate position between pure subjectivity 
and pure objectivity as intersubjectivity, where people may share perspectives that 
have been shaped by similar social norms, values, and goals, such that they co-create 
reality in meaning: the researcher and the research participants together create 
understanding. From this viewpoint, researchers are never able to be purely objective 
but neither are they limited to pure subjectivity. However, in Orr's (1978) view, 
ontological intersubjectivity is equated with constructivism, where "reality and truth 
are rooted solely in human authority" (p. 264). He argued that this position precludes 
the possibility of criticism; if every reality is different, others' experiences of 
meaning can never be sufficiently known to critique them. Orr also critiqued 
intersubjectivist definitions of 'truth' as simply "agreement" (1978, p. 267). By 
definition, he argued, if there is no objective truth, there can be no agreement. 
However, Orr (1978) argued that reality is still always elusive in his 
alternative concept of critical rationality: 
Reality is conceptually organised, and interpreted through communication; but 
whatever versions of reality result from this process are partial and contingent before 
that reality which eludes our understanding (p. 274). 
Some researchers have pointed out that modernist (the idea that there is an objective 
reality to be communicated) and poststructuralist interpretive approaches (the idea 
that reality is socially constructed in meaning through communication) have much in 
common. Richards (2001), for example, suggested that issues of indexicality 
(situated context) and reflexivity are integral to both ethnomethodology and 
112 
poststructuralism, even though the traditions of ethnomethodology derive from 
modernism and scientism, and the traditions of poststructuralism derive from 
hermeneutic interpretivism. In the case of both methodological positions, the concept 
of a hermeneutic circle is useful, this means that there is constant movement between 
the detail of an investigation and consideration of the whole study, that there are no 
clear beginning or end points (Potter, 1996, p. 30). This provides a way of working 
at a micro level, with situated local understandings, and at a macro level, with, for 
example, whole cultural or social systems, to establish how each mutually implicates 
the other (Geertz, 1973, Potter, 1996). 
Schwandt (2000) also commented that post-positivist philosophical 
hermeneutics and social constructivist interpretive positions are in some ways closely 
aligned. In philosophical hermeneutics: 
Understanding is something that is produced in that dialogue, not something 
reproduced by an interpreter ... meaning is negotiated mutually in the act of 
interpretation; it is not simply discovered. (Schwandt, 2000, p. 195) 
Although social constructivists, Schwandt suggested, might use the word constructed 
instead of negotiated. 
Critics of interpretivism suggest that interpretivism is only useful in 
determining subjective, situated understandings. Yet, as Heracleous (2004) argued, 
inductive generalisations and understandings can be inferred from an interpretivist 
approach, because it allows for an awareness of the constitutive role of language in 
ordering our world, for example at the level of both rhetoric and discourse. He 
commented that: 
Language, in this perspective, creates conditioned (rather than universal) rationalities 
as widespread ways of thinking within particular social systems, which become 
elements of those systems' realities. (Heracleous, 2004, p. 178) 
Cheney (2000) also critiqued interpretivism for its "parochialism" (p. 34), suggesting 
that by being so closely involved with the multiplicities and pluralities of the 
research situation, researchers may fail to see other important aspects (for example, 
the workings of power). They may introduce additional particular meanings derived 
from dominant discourses, may overestimate their own interpretations, or fail to 
make much-needed value judgements. 
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Cheney (2000) suggested that a number of questions need to be kept in mind 
while conducting interpretive research. Such questions include the limitations of the 
interpretation, the losses and gains in achieving only a fleeting and situated 
understanding, and the need to consider the actual physical constraints and constants 
that impact on a particular situation. A mitigating approach to such problems, 
Cheney suggested, is to consider paradigm integration, whether paradigms can work 
together, sequentially, or in parallel. 
Mindful of Cheney's (2000) critique, in this study I overlay this interpretive 
approach with a poststructural critical perspective. I take a social constructionist 
approach, one of perspectivism without relativism, similar to that of Orr (1978). This 
suggests that we are continually seeking to redefine knowledge and truth, and 
recognises the importance of language in the production of meaning. This 
interpretive approach is particularly relevant for a study of industry meanings 
surrounding GM issues, since the contested nature of the issues means that 
'knowledge' and 'truth' about GM are defined by these industries in their 
organisational communication. 
The Implications of a Poststructural Critical-Interpretive Approach 
In a general sense, critical theory can be used to refer to a range of theories 
which take a critical view of society or seek to explain the emergence of particular 
versions of knowledge (Calhoun, 1995; Hardt, 1992; Macey, 2000). They focus on 
issues of power and on explicit judgements of values, and seek to challenge 
established practices and institutions (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000). In this study, where 
the social construction of meanings about GM is a contested site, values are an 
inescapable part of the context in which the kiwifruit and dairy industries do 
business, and may be underpinned by particular institutional structures and 
discourses. 
Critical theory also refers more specifically to the major focus of the 
Frankfurt School, particularly the writings of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas 
(Calhoun, 1995; Hardt, 1992; Macey, 2000). It involves the critique of ideologies-
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that is a system of thinking that defines the worldview or collective beliefs and 
attitudes of a particular group in society-what is normally taken for granted. Van 
Dijk (1995) defined ideologies as: 
... basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of social groups, 
constituted by relevant selections of sociocultural values, and organized by an 
ideological schema that represents the self-definition of a group. (p. 248) 
As Mumby (2000) commented, critical perspectives aim to understand, explain, and 
critique the political and ideological limits placed on social actors as they participate 
in "meaningful dialogue communities" (p. 72). 
Critical theory draws on a number of separate traditions, including 
hermeneutic understanding, Marxian social theory and neo-Weberian analyses of 
rationality, and Freudian discursive intervention and psychoanalysis (Calhoun, 1995; 
Hardt, 1992; Mumby, 2004). That is it focuses on the conditions under which we 
understand things (linguistically, historically, and dialectically), how social 
dominance is constructed and maintained, and how taken-for-granted assumptions 
are often hidden from organisational members, in a process of discursive "closure" 
(Deetz & Kersten, 1983, p. 153). As Mumby commented, "Organizations are 
conceived as political sites where various organizational actors and groups struggle 
to 'fix' meaning in ways that will serve their particular interests" (2004, p. 237). 
Particular critical approaches will rely on different combinations of these traditions, 
and may focus on ideological critique and/or analysing sites of power and resistance 
(Deetz, 2005; Mumby, 2004). 
Poststructuralism is a critical approach that challenges the relative certainties 
of modernist structuralist models. Where theoretical postmodemism is ontologically 
sceptical and pessimistic about the possibility of social transformation in an 
increasingly fragmented world (see Boje & Dennehy, 1994; Calas & Smircich, 1999; 
Nicholson & Seidman, 1995), poststructuralism acknowledges the possibility of 
contingent affirmative action: progress that is redefined through deconstruction and 
the liberation of marginalised 'others', while recognising the problems with absolute 
standards and with essentialised meanings: 
Poststructuralism is, in general, a critique of Western epistemology as a system of 
exclusions ... 'The border' and 'borderlands', both as geography and as metaphor, 
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have become productive spaces, rather than dividing lines, for theorizing 
complicated subjectivities and social relations in response to dominant ideologies. 
(Calas & Smircich, 1999, p. 661-662) 
A poststructuralist perspective considers that when meaning is stabilised in a 
particular social context a system of power relations is evident (Calas & Smircich, 
1999). Poststructuralist approaches then destabilise meaning and involve, for 
example, the close reading and deconstruction of texts such that what is unsaid or 
understated becomes a focus for analysis. 
However, Cheney (2000) warned that critical analysis can be guilty of 
arrogance: "The critic always knows best" (p. 35). Value-based comments, 
attributions of power, and continuous questioning of the situation can sometimes 
bring the research itself into question; the analysis can be said to be monolithic and 
can mean that the researcher becomes distanced from the situation. Calas and 
Smircich (1999) argued, similarly, that researchers have a moral responsibility to be 
conscious of how they sustain power relations as they write, and to work towards 
opening up texts in this way. 
In tum, Mumby (2004) argued that critical research can become too 
theoretical and should remain grounded in practical, everyday issues. A critical-
interpretive perspective focuses particularly on practical and emancipatory interests. 
It seeks to challenge accepted viewpoints and critique ideologies in a self-conscious 
way to expose the ideological controls which are unobtrusive and unquestioned, both 
in terms of social systems (at a macro level) and in terms of individual action (at a 
micro level) (Macey, 2000; Mumby, 2000). Indeed, Deetz and Kersten (1983) 
suggested that critical organisational communication research should look at 
understanding on three levels: the social forces that shape organisations (a macro 
level), the organisation in its wider context in society and whose interests are served 
(a meso level), and coercive conditions and how these are maintained (a micro level). 
A Bricolage of Approaches 
In this study, I take up these challenges and use a poststructural critical-
interpretive approach; that is, I overlay my social constructionist interpretive 
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approach with a critical perspective, informed by poststructural rather than modernist 
understandings, ensuring a methodology relevant for this particular research. This 
combination of approaches can be described as a montage or bricolage of research 
methodologies (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). As Denzin and Lincoln commented, "A 
research design describes a flexible set of guidelines that connect theoretical 
paradigms first to strategies of inquiry and second to methods for collecting 
empirical material" (2000, p. 22). Deetz (2001) argued similarly that researchers 
should move between perspectives, rather than being purist, taking aspects of each to 
create the most relevant approach for each piece of research. 
In this social constructionist interpretive approach, I explore the multiple 
meanings associated with GM, which are continuously negotiated. 
Epistemologically, I seek to understand the localised and contextualised meanings 
contained in subjective experiences, and see language as the major way of 
constructing our world in meaning. At the level of deep structure, I consider the 
ideologies and value systems explicitly and implicitly represented in the 
communication of the kiwifruit and dairy industries about GM issues, adding a 
poststructural critical perspective but, importantly, I additionally explore how these 
values systems are structured and maintained in the particular situational contexts of 
these two industry organisations. My focus in this study, then, is particularly on 
critically evaluating the communication processes of influence used by the kiwifruit 
and dairy industries as they negotiate their relationships with the practice of GM, 
rather than issues of dominance and exclusion for particular industry groups. To 
achieve this, I draw on the traditions of both rhetorical criticism and critical 
discourse analysis. 
Comparing and Contrasting Rhetorical Criticism and Critical Discourse Analysis 
Rhetorical criticism and critical discourse analysis (CDA) have emerged as 
two separate but related and complementary methods of data analysis, based on two 
distinct interpretive research traditions, with different emphases (Cheney, 2000; 
Livesey, 2002; Putnam & Fairhurst; 2001, Fairhurst & Putnam, 2004). Rhetorical 
117 
analysis developed from the insights of the ancient Greeks; it focuses on persuasion, 
and is more common in the North American tradition of rhetorical studies (Cheney, 
2000, June 27). Aristotelian rhetoric was defined as "the faculty of observing in the 
particular case the available means of persuasion" (Foss, Foss & Trapp, 1991, p. 4 ). 
Rhetorical criticism highlights the ways in which discourse exists as both a field for, 
and expression of, the intentions of communicators. CDA is more commonly 
associated with European research traditions. It focuses on power and highlights the 
role of power and ideology in social institutions (Livesey, 2002). As Ryan and 
Bernard (2000) noted, the linguistic tradition (highlighted in rhetorical criticism) 
makes text the object of analysis itself, while the sociological tradition (highlighted 
in CDA) sees text as a "window into human experience" (p. 769). 
Both approaches to analysis, however, draw on the rhetorical tum in 
twentieth century theory in the social sciences, and are concerned with how language 
shapes everyday meanings (Livesey, 2002). As Livesey (2002) concluded: 
A rhetorical approach offers techniques by which to analyze features of language in 
detail and consider its immediate, often polarizing, effects in specific controversies. 
The Foucauldian [CDA] perspective, on the other hand, helps the researcher to 
understand the implications of local struggles and conflicts in terms of change at the 
social and institutional level. (p. 141) 
The advantage of rhetorical criticism is its focus on the actual construction of 
language in texts. This ensures the analysis keeps very close to participants' own 
understandings, focuses on the suasory elements of texts, and allows for the 
evaluation of the rhetorical elements used. Its limitations lie in its restriction to a 
micro-level focus, and its relative neglect of the material context of the rhetoric. 
CDA has the advantage of focusing at the macro level of society on the wider 
situated assumptions within which text is embedded, but can be guilty of making a 
priori assumptions in terms of power ( over-determination), and of over-interpretation 
of texts (Cheney, 2000, June 27). 
Organisations are increasingly conceptualised as having permeable 
boundaries and the management of meaning by an organisation can, then, impact on 
internal and external organisational outcomes at a micro level and contribute to 
macro level discourses and the production of societal trends (Cheney & Lair, 2005). 
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The struggle within New Zealand to define the terms of the debate about GM is, in 
these terms, a rhetorically contested site of power. A combination of rhetorical 
criticism and critical discourse analysis is thus very appropriate for this study. I 
therefore explore each method of analysis in more detail in the following sections. 
Rhetorical Criticism. 
In this study, 'rhetoric' is taken to mean the symbol systems constructed to 
create the reality of a specific situation (see Burke, 1966, 1973; Cheney & Tompkins, 
1988; Livesey, 2002). Rhetoric is used as a means of persuasion and influence by, for 
and within organisations (Cheney & McMillan, 1990), as well as by individuals. It 
involves the use of symbolic resources when there are multiple possible outcomes 
that can be influenced through persuasive means (Cheney & Lair, 2005; Rybacki & 
Rybacki, 1991); although, as Foss (1996) pointed out, rhetoric can also be an 
invitation to understanding or a means of self-discovery. Cheney, Christensen, 
Conrad and Lair (2004) emphasised the strategic nature of rhetoric in both specific 
campaigns and wider debate. They suggested that organisational rhetoric may both 
draw on prevalent social meanings to gain support for and legitimise particular 
policies, and work to reinforce those social meanings. 
The rhetorical analysis in this study draws strongly on Burke's theories of 
identification (see, for example, Burke, 1969). Burke suggested that identification 
occurs in our attempts to overcome our separateness as individuals, through the use 
of symbols in a complex dialectic where there is both commonality and difference 
that express, for example, interests and values (Burke, 1969; Livesey, 2002). 
Rhetoric, then, is understood as the use of language (symbols) to unite people or 
induce cooperation; it is purposive, has motive, and involves symbolic action 
(Livesey, 2002; Rybacki & Rybacki, 1991). Burke's conceptualisation of rhetoric 
and identification means that rhetoric involves self-persuasion, as well as the 
persuasion of others; the individual cannot be separated from the social: ''The so-
called 'I' is merely a unique combination of partially conflicting corporate 'We's"' 
(Cheney & Tompkins, 1983, p. 126). 
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Persuasion then takes place through identification, through 
consubstantiation, choosing to see something the same as something else, or 
recognising an association between two things. The concept of identification also 
recognises processes of alienation or dissociation. When you identify with someone, 
you are still uniquely yourself, not exactly the same, so identification involves 
sameness and difference. A rhetorical act is then a strategy for identification or 
persuasion; it provides an orientation to a situation and help in adjusting to it (Burke, 
1969; Foss, 2004; Foss et al., 1991). 
Identification functions in three ways: directly, as a means to an end, or 
persuasion; by antithesis, what something is not; and at an unconscious level, 
identification with the style or wider concepts embodied in the rhetoric (Foss et al., 
1991). Rhetoric implies conscious planning-purpose and intent-but this 
conceptualisation of identification also allows for unconscious motivations and the 
unconscious effects of rhetoric. 
Rybacki and Rybacki (1991) and Foss et al. (1991) noted other important 
facets of Burkean theory in rhetorical analysis. For example, symbols are used to 
recognise positions in social hierarchies, to persuade people to join or change 
positions in a hierarchy; though it is recognised that people have the ability to accept 
or reject the social order or hierarchy. As Cheney, Garvin-Doxas and Torrens (1999) 
argued, the concept of 'hierarchy' is important because it indicates how people and 
parts of the world are linked symbolically through language use; like Douglas 
(1986), Burke believed that we contribute to the creation of order by the symbolic 
process of categorising or naming things, creating ways of knowing. 
Foss et al. (1991) commented that 'hierarchy' also demonstrates division. It 
means that things outside the hierarchy are imbued with mystery, and that people 
within a hierarchy view things from a particular framework, through the mystery of 
that hierarchy. Burke described such worldviews embodied in rhetoric as terministic 
screens (Burke, 1966; Foss, 2004; Livesey, 2002). Mystery may encourage 
obedience, and mean that differences cease to matter, as well as being a source of 
persuasion-uniting those with differences (Foss et al., 1991), and Cheney et al. 
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(1999) termed this Burke's "implicit theory of power" (p. 148). As Livesey (2002) 
noted, words become meaningful in context but are continuously negotiated rather 
than fixed in meaning. 
Rhetorical criticism, then, involves both analysis and evaluation of rhetorical 
strategies, to appreciate why particular symbols become meaningful, and why one 
symbol is chosen over another (Rybacki & Rybacki, 1991). It facilitates an 
understanding of rhetors' motives and attempts to influence others' beliefs and 
perceptions (Foss, 1996). Cheney and Lair (2005) defined rhetorical criticism as, 
"the description, interpretation, analysis, and critique of organized persuasion-and 
by extension, identification" (p. 60). 
Critical Discourse Analysis. 
In contrast to rhetorical criticism, (CDA) is a critical discourse of suspicion 
(Mumby, 2004). Mumby described CDA as a "perspective that focuses on the 
relationships among discourse, ideology and deep-structure relations of power" (p. 
251). CDA explores the relationships between discursive practices and texts, and 
wider social and cultural practices to make explicit the ways that power, dominance, 
and inequality are maintained and extended through ideology and discourse (Livesey, 
2002; van Dijk, 1995). 
CDA draws strongly on the work of Foucault, and emphasises that language 
constitutes knowledge, subject identity, and social relationships. For Foucault, 
discourse includes not just language but symbolic systems, institutional structures, 
social rules and practices (Fairclough, 1992; Foucault, 1988; Livesey, 2002). In his 
later work on genealogy, Foucault was particularly concerned with forms of power. 
He described the circular link between knowledge and power as a "regime of truth" 
(Foucault, 1991, p. 73; Livesey, 2002; p. 123) or a "truth game" (Foucault, 1988, p. 
18) which privileges specific interests and marginalises others. Van Dijk (1995) 
concluded that the meanings associated with discourse derive from their underlying 
ideologies, and as Heracleous (2004) argued, CDA emphasises the legitimating 
function of discursive sensemaking: 
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[CDA] aims to demystify situations and perceptions that may be viewed as 'natural', 
but that have in effect been discursively constructed over time by groups in power 
aiming to skew social reality and institutional arrangements to their own advantage. 
(Heracleous. 2004, p. 186) 
CDA, then, examines the role of ideology in sustaining power through discourse. 
Ideologies are evaluative, organised, and define how individuals and groups perceive 
and interpret social reality (Foucault, 1991). The process of articulation has been 
suggested as one way in which this occurs: 
Articulation links this practice to that effect, this text to that meaning, this meaning 
to that reality, this experience to those politics. And these links are themselves 
articulated into larger structures. (Slack, 1996, p. 115, citing Grossberg, 1992) 
Ideologies, then, have a number of possible functions: to legitimate existing orders of 
social reality; to mask contradictions in the existing orders; to 'mystify' existing 
orders through cover-up, reification, or alienation; and to control, creating a 
consensus of what should be (Deetz & Kersten, 1983, p. 164). 
Proponents of CDA emphasise that it is not prescriptive in method and must 
be individually tailored to the social issue in question (Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 
2001). The resulting analysis can only ever be partial, since it involves the selection 
of which discourses and social structures are relevant (van Dijk, 2001). Fairclough 
conceptualised discourse analysis as three-dimensional, analysing any instance of 
discourse simultaneously as a piece of text, a discursive practice, and a social 
practice. Fairclough (1992) suggested that discourses display a number of features 
including manifest intertextuality-where texts are overtly articulated in particular 
ways with other texts, colonisation-where one discourse language transforms 
another (p. 117), interdiscursivity-where different types of discursive formations 
and practices may be linked together, and textual transformations-where the style 
of writing of a piece of text might be changed (1992, p. 133). 
Van Dijk (2001) identified three similar levels of CDA analysis, describing 
these as global meanings-the ideological basis of discourse which has to be 
inferred, local meanings-the selection of words that explicitly or implicitly indicate 
mental models and shared beliefs, and structures of text and talk-the forms and 
genres that create mental models (p. 102). Van Dijk (1995) suggested that CDA may 
focus on word meanings; foregrounding and backgrounding of topics; allegations, 
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suggestions, and allusions; assumptions and taken-for-granted meanings; level of 
completeness of description; and the use of strategic language. CDA may also 
involve searching for themes derived from key-words, clusters of words that have 
related characteristics, a related underlying construct, or are related causally or 
hierarchically (Boyatzis, 1998). 
Interestingly, at the level of text, the specific steps in data analysis for both 
CDA and rhetorical criticism begin to converge. For example, rhetorical strategies 
can also be identified from close analysis of the persistent patterns which pervade 
texts. Foss (2004) described rhetorical 'cluster' criticism as identifying the key terms 
in a text on the basis of frequency or intensity and then checking what terms 
congregate around those key terms either because of close proximity, or connected 
by cause and effect. 
Heracleous and Barrett (2001) developed a specific discourse analysis 
methodology based on rhetoric and hermeneutics, to complement interpretive and 
critical perspectives on discourse. They conceptualised two inter-related levels of 
analysis focusing on the subjective meanings understood through social actors' 
interpretive schemes, and the rules and resources which actors draw on. They 
suggested that discourses exhibit structural properties that are implicit, textual, trans-
temporal, and trans-situational. Themes in communicative actions can influence 
structures over the long term, which then re-influence communicative actions. 
Heracleous and Barrett (2001) argued that analysis needs to go beyond the 
actual communicative action and look at the values and beliefs underlying these, 
which influence them over time, and which constitute deeper structures. Their 
analysis searched for central themes, patterns in data, ordering of themes, use of 
enthymemes 1, interrelations of themes, and other rhetorical strategies such as 
metaphor, and iconicity. As Heracleous and Barrett (2001) explained: 
1 Enthymemes are rhetorical forms of argument which express comparison or similarity. However, 
unlike logical syllogisms, one or more of the premises of an enthymeme is taken for granted or 
assumed. 
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Identification and analysis of enthymemes and particularly their unstated and 
assumed premises, therefore, can enable researchers to uncover the taken-for-granted 
values and beliefs of actors in a particular social context. These values and beliefs 
are in effect structures of legitimation that underlie agents' interpretations and 
(communicative) actions and that are in practice inseparable from considerations of 
language and power, as structuration theory emphasizes. (p. 762) 
A combination of rhetorical criticism and CDA, similar to that used by Heracleous 
and Barrett, is used in this study. 
The Research Design 
Research Questions and Data Collection Choices 
The research design, and the decision to look at an industry 
perspective of the GM debate, as explained in Chapter One, stemmed originally from 
my concern that large corporations might be driving decision-making about GM for 
self-interested commercial gain. Yet, paradoxically, the dairy industry and the 
kiwifruit industry take differing positions in the debate about the commercial release 
of GM in New Zealand; although, both industries share some similar aspects of 
identity. As primary producers earning significant export incomes, both are seen as 
national icons as well as major institutions for New Zealand, and comprise 
cooperative export marketing organisations owned by growers/farmers. Additionally, 
both industries use imagery positioning their products as healthy and natural, and 
draw on New Zealand's status as a nation with a clean, green environment. 
A comparison of the GM position communicated by each of these two 
industries thus became the basis for the first specific research question: 
Research Question 1. How do the kiwifruit and dairy industries express and explain 
their respective strategic positions, in relation to the genetic modification of foods, to 
both internal and external stakeholders? 
This research question focuses on the rhetoric used in representing industry 
positions on GM, and how this is linked to wider organisational values and strategies. 
It considers the rhetorical arguments used to justify the respective industry positions, 
and the wider discourses, values, and assumptions evident in these arguments. The 
chief data sources include each industry's submission to the Royal Commission, 
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mission statements, strategic planning documents, media releases, newsletters, 
brochures, and websites, as well as accounts from interview participants, as detailed 
later in this chapter. 
Within any one organisation or industry, and within the myriad of interest 
groups in the GM debate, a wide range of values may be represented, some of which 
may be shared by several interest groups. Individuals may belong to more than one 
interest group, potentially with conflicting GM positions. For example, organic dairy 
farmers may share some values with the wider dairy industry and some values with 
organic interest groups like Bio-gro New Zealand. Kiwifruit growers with concerns 
about the use and impact of chemical sprays on crops may share some values with 
the wider kiwifruit industry and some values with, for example, the research 
institutes whose research seeks to reduce the number of sprays required on crops. In 
de-regulated, cooperative-based industries, such as the kiwifruit and dairy industries, 
it is additionally interesting to investigate how decisions are made and communicated 
about GM issues, and whose values are represented. 
An exploration of identity on multiple levels is then relevant to this study, 
including the industry sub-group level, the wider industry organisation level, and a 
national level. For this reason, the research design identifies spokespersons with 
different functional involvement in each industry, and at different levels within each 
industry, including research, management, manufacturing and distribution, and 
production. This focus forms the basis for the second research question. 
Research Question 2. How are the kiwifruit industry and dairy industry policies on 
genetic modification related to aspects of each industry's organisational identity? 
This research question examines how each industry's position on GM 'sits' in 
the context of aspects of identity and organisational culture. The focus is an 
exploration of the interests, values, objectives, and tactics exemplified in the 
organisational communication and public relations communication strategies in these 
industries. The chief data sources are the accounts of industry members given in 
interviews and focus groups. 
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Given the complexity of the GM debate in New Zealand and the wide range 
of other groups represented, these industry positions do not exist in isolation, and 
need to be contextualised within the wider debate. In this study, I therefore note the 
extent to which the kiwifruit and dairy industries engage with key interest groups that 
take an active part in the GM debate; which groups they align their GM positioning 
with, and which they critique. For example, in the research interviews industry 
members referred to the two specific Crown Research Institutes most closely aligned 
with their industries-AgResearch and HortResearch-and Greenpeace New 
Zealand, the 'GE-Free' coalition (a coalition of anti-GE groups that emerged after 
the report of the Royal Commission), the Life Sciences Network (LSN), and Mothers 
Against Genetic Engineering (MAdGE). 
An exploration of how the two industries engage with and manage their 
involvement in debate about GM became the basis for the third research question. 
Research Question 3. How do the kiwifruit and dairy industries engage with 
stakeholders and key interest groups that take an active part in the debate about 
genetic modification? 
This research question focuses on the rationalities used in the issues 
management communication by the kiwifruit industry and the dairy industry, in 
attempting to influence public policy in relation to GM in crops and foods. It 
considers how these strategies are related to other organisational communication and 
identity management practices, the implications for the industries concerned, and the 
implications for public policy decision making. The chief data sources include 
formal industry communication about GM to both internal and external key 
stakeholders in the form of submissions, reports, articles, speeches, media releases, 
and websites; and informal communication about GM in the form of interviews and 
focus groups. These are again detailed later in this chapter. Background data sources 
include communication about GM from identifiable representatives of key interest 
groups, including government, lobby groups, and research institutes, in the form of 
reports, speeches, media releases, and websites, as well as interviews with key 
interest groups members. 
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The next section explains the relevance of a case study approach for this 
research. 
The Case Study Methodology 
Case studies are bounded systems that are both the process and the product of 
research enquiry (Stake, 2000). Yin (1984) described a case study as an empirical 
investigation of "a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context," using 
"multiple sources of evidence," when "the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident" (p. 23). As Stake (2000) noted, case study research 
involves choices about participants and events, and where and how these will be 
observed. This may include: 
1. The nature of the case; 
2. The case's historical background; 
3. The physical setting; 
4. Other contexts (e.g., economic, political, legal, and aesthetic); 
5. Other cases through which this case is recognized; 
6. Those informants through whom the case can be known. (p. 438-439) 
Stake (2000) distinguished between three types of case study: intrinsic-to 
understand a particular case for its own sake, instrumental-to understand a 
particular case to provide insight into an issue, and collective-to investigate a 
phenomenon or question using several case studies as an illustration or focus (p. 
437). According to Yin's (1984) research design matrix, case study research can 
involve a single case or multiple case design, and an embedded approach-with 
multiple units of analysis related to specific projects or events in an organisation, or a 
holistic approach-with a single unit of analysis, for example, looking at the 
response of the whole organisation. 
In this study, the research can be described as both intrinsic and instrumental 
with a multiple case design and an embedded approach: the position of the kiwifruit 
and dairy industries on GM is interesting for its own sake, but the research will 
additionally provide some new insights into GM issues. The case study compares the 
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kiwifruit and dairy industries on three levels: in relation to a critical incident, 
processes, and issues (Patton, 2002). It compares the critical incident-the people 
involved, the organisational structure, the background to the organisation and the two 
industry settings in relation to the introduction of GM technology; it compares the 
processes-the communication, decision-making, and strategic positioning on GM, 
and whether the GM issues are the same for both industries. 
As empirical studies, case studies present particular ethical issues for the 
researcher; as Stake (2000) reminded: "Issues of observation and reportage should be 
discussed in advance. Limits to access should be suggested and agreements heeded" 
(p. 447). There is a possible need to protect, for example, the anonymity and the 
confidentiality of participants' responses. However, Yin (1984) recommended as 
much disclosure of identity of the case, organisation, and the individual participants 
as possible, to ensure the credibility of the research findings, to encourage further 
contextualisation or further research, and to facilitate comparison with other case 
studies. 
Case studies may involve a variety of data collection methods, including 
observation, document analysis, interviews, and focus groups. The following section 
discusses the rationale for the qualitative data collection methods chosen for this case 
study. 
Qualitative Methodologies and the Choice of Semi-structured Interviews and 
Focus Groups 
The qualitative, interpretive approach in this study presents an opportunity to 
explore the kiwifruit and dairy industries' situated involvement in GM issues and 
recognises that participants' own understandings of the world are important. Denzin 
and Lincoln (1994) likened qualitative research to: 
... a starting point, a springboard for new thought and new work, work that is fresh 
and sensitive and that blurs the boundaries of our disciplines, but always sharpens 
our understanding of the larger human project. (p. xi) 
Unlike quantitative research, which tends to focus on developing specific premises 
from probabilities derived from the study of large numbers of randomly selected 
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cases, qualitative research is largely inductive, committed to idiographic, situated 
research, which focuses on the specifics of particular cases. 
However, qualitative approaches to research which emphasise the existence 
of multiple understandings preclude the establishment of absolute criteria for judging 
reliability or validity (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). 
Issues of Reliability, Validity, and Objectivity. 
Issues of reliability, validity, and objectivity were important in positivist and 
post-positivist paradigms as means of establishing the rigour of the data collected. 
More recently, terms like credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability replace these positivist terms (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). In 
poststructural critical and interpretive paradigms, these positivist issues have been 
replaced by issues of voice, reflexivity, and textual representation to ensure that 
systems of data collection and data control maintain a rigorous approach but allow 
for transformation, emancipation, and change for marginalised groups (Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000). Lincoln and Guba (2000) recommended discussing validity in terms of 
authenticity, such that research is fair (all stakeholder views are represented), has 
ontological and educative authenticity (raising the level of awareness of participants 
and those around them for some social purpose), and has catalytic and tactical 
authenticity (facilitates an action outcome) (p. 180-181). 
Similarly, triangulation is used in positivist methodologies as "a process of 
using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation or interpretation" (Stake, 2000, p. 443). It can also be used in qualitative 
interpretive methodologies as a process of "identifying different ways the 
phenomenon is being seen" (Stake, 2000, p. 444). Triangulation is, then, a way of 
adding depth and richness to our understanding of data and in qualitative 
poststructuralist and interpretive approaches, this may involve resistance: exposing 
hidden assumptions, paradoxes, repressions, and marginalisations (Lincoln & Guba, 
2000, p. 181). 
Triangulation can comprise any or all of the following: data triangulation, 
investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, or methodological triangulation 
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(J anesick, 1998). However, Richardson (2000) recognised that struggling to present 
multi-voiced texts that question taken-for-granted truths is a huge challenge, 
particularly, for critical researchers. Richardson's conceptualisation of 
"crystallisation" (p. 934) is perhaps more appropriate than the term triangulation to 
indicate the multi-faceted sites, methods, and ways of writing about research which 
may contribute to new concepts of rigour and validity. 
In this study, the methods of data collection include organisational 
documents, as well as interviews and focus groups with kiwifruit and dairy industry 
participants who have functionally diverse roles in the industries, and work at 
different hierarchical levels in the industry organisation. Attitudes do not necessarily 
have stable meanings that are shared widely or have universal acceptance. Opinions 
and beliefs may be relational, depending on social context, on the interactivity of a 
situation, and on the level of trust between participants, or between the participant 
and researcher (Brunt & Jardin, 1987; Waterton & Wynne, 1999). Interviews and 
focus groups provide rich qualitative data for the analysis of attitudes and beliefs. I 
chose semi-structured interviews and focus groups as methods of data collection 
suitable for the in-depth case-study approach of this research, and the combination of 
critical and interpretive approaches to analysis adds additional depth to the 
understanding of the data. In this way, the study aims to explore multiple, wide-
ranging understandings of the kiwifruit and dairy industries' positioning on GM. 
The following two sections further discuss the advantages and limitations of 
semi-structured interviews and focus groups. 
The Choice of Semi-structured Interviews. 
The major advantage of long, semi-structured interviews with participants is 
that they enable the researcher "to see and experience the world as they [participants] 
do themselves" (McCracken, 1988, p. 9). Semi-structured interviews avoid 
establishing any a priori categorisation of the data which might limit the field of 
research (as in a structured interview with fixed questions) but at the same time 
ensure that the issues under investigation are covered within the conversations 
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(Fontana & Frey, 2000). In this situation, participants are more likely to feel free to 
establish their own meanings about the issues discussed. 
As Fontana and Frey (2000) commented, the nature of the interviewing 
process can impact on the outcomes of the interview: "Interviews are not neutral 
tools of data gathering but active interactions between two (or more) people leading 
to negotiated, contextually based results" (p. 646). Particularly when interview topics 
relate to sensitive or controversial topics, there is always the possibility that 
participants may provide responses that they think the interviewer may want to hear, 
or may choose not to disclose certain information (Fontana & Frey, 2000). 
McCracken (1988) commented that, in this context, interviewing needs to be as little 
directive as possible using moderately scheduled open-ended questions, and 
following up on questions with active listening. Commonly, a "funnel" approach to 
questioning is used, such that the interview begins with general questions and later 
moves to more specific questions (Morgan, 1997, p. 41). 
Indeed, managing the relationship with the interviewee, deciding how to 
present oneself as an interviewer, and gaining the trust of the participants is an issue 
for the researcher, (Fontana & Frey, 2000; McCracken, 1988). Gaining access to 
participants for interviews may also be an issue, particularly since the disadvantages 
of interviews are the length of time needed, and concerns about respecting the 
privacy of participants (McCracken, 1988). 
Increasingly, researchers are encouraged to be reflexive, making the 
researcher 'visible' to the participants-that is, acknowledging a personal viewpoint 
and answering questions, being involved, and being reflexive about the 'voice' used 
to analyse, interpret, and write up the research (Fontana & Frey, 2000; McCracken, 
1988; Van Maanen, 1988). 
As Gubrium and Holstein (2001) pointed out, the traditional view of an 
interview where passive interview participants provide information to an objective 
interviewer has evolved to one recognising that interviewers and interviewees 
actively co-construct versions of reality. The research design, questioning and 
interpretation of data by the interviewer, and the interviewee's sensemaking of his or 
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her experience both contribute to the overall research analysis as "research 
collaborators" (Gubrium & Holstein, 2001, p. 20). This enables a consideration of 
the multiple influences on the interviewee's standpoint or voice. 
In this study, interviews were chosen as 'accounts' of industry understandings 
of issues provided by the participants in a particular organisational context 
(Tompkins & Cheney, 1983). Accounts are examples of retrospective comment by 
those involved in a particular decision making event (Harre & Secord, 1972; Scott & 
Lyman, 1968), in which the organisational participants analyse conscious decisions 
made between alternatives on the basis of the premises for those decisions and their 
organisational identification (Tompkins & Cheney, 1983). Building on the work of 
Simon (1976) and Burke (1966), Tompkins and Cheney (1983) suggested that as we 
monitor our own actions, we can comment on our performances in anticipation of an 
event, while it is occurring, and retrospectively. Interview accounts indicate the 
social meanings given to the actions of participants themselves or others in the 
organisation, and are usually given as a justification for the decision or action. 
Interviewees' identification with particular alternatives limits the options for 
their analysis, and if they identify with the organisation this may ensure that 
decisions are in line with the organisation's values. In a research interview, 
participants negotiate their accounts with the researcher in the context of the specific 
research study (Tompkins & Cheney, 1983). 
The Choice of Focus Groups. 
Kreps (1994) defined a focus group as occurring when, "A facilitator leads a 
relatively open, yet directed, conversation among a small group of respondents about 
a specific topic" (p. 180). Focus groups are increasingly used as 'stand-alone' 
methods of data collection, particularly in mass media and communication research, 
in contrast to their original supplementary use in quantitative methodologies (Lunt, 
1996). The advantages of focus groups, it is argued, centre on their ability to generate 
diverse discussion, through the synergy of the group interaction, resulting in the 
collection of large volumes of rich data in a relatively short timeframe (Kreps, 1994; 
Lunt, 1996; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990; Waterton & Wynne, 1999). New insights 
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may be expressed by group members as a result of the dynamics of the group 
discussion (Fontana & Frey, 2000; Hansen, Cottle, Negrine & Newbold, 1998; 
Kitzinger & Farquhar, 1999), particularly when the focus of the research is to explore 
a specific set of issues, where the collective activity facilitates an investigation of 
how opinions are constructed and discussed within a specific cultural or social 
setting (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999; Waterton & Wynne, 1999). Focus groups are 
considered particularly effective when the research topic is controversial and the 
research purpose is to establish a wide range of meanings and interpretations 
(Fontana & Frey, 2000). By interacting with respondents, the moderator can ask for 
clarification, follow-up answers, and see non-verbal communication (Stewart & 
Shamdasani, 1990). As Lunt argued: 
Focus groups can reveal underlying cognitive or ideological premises that structure 
arguments, the ways in which various discourses rooted in particular contexts and 
given experiences are brought to bear on interpretations, the discursive construction 
of social identities, and so forth. (1996, p. 96) 
The active negotiated discussion in focus groups is said to reflect participants' own 
individual identities/identifications and meanings (Lunt, 1996; Waterton & Wynne, 
1999), and facilitates understanding of the process of negotiation-how meaning is 
socially constructed through "everyday talk" (Lunt, 1996, p. 85). For example, 
participants use their own language as opposed to that framed by formal interview 
questions (Morrison, 1998). The flow of participants' own thoughts is, where 
possible, uninterrupted, with participants able to qualify, elaborate on, or modify 
their own or others' statements. Focus groups can then be a catalyst for the 
expression of ideas developed beyond the level of abstraction common in everyday 
living. 
However, focus groups have, equally, been critiqued for generating 
idiosyncratic data which is difficult to analyse, and unable to be generalised to larger 
populations (Morrison, 1998; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990). Additionally, a number 
of factors may affect the 'natural' setting, including the specific environment chosen, 
and the demographics of the participants (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990). Participants 
often point out how unusual it would normally be to have such discussions; they are 
in fact structured events, and moderators may unwittingly provide cues for desirable 
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answers that lead to adjustments in participants' responses (Frey, 1994; Morrison, 
1998; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990). The group interaction may also limit individual 
responses, with some participants dominating the group, or may result in a false 
consensus-attitude polarisation-through either 'groupthink' or the development of 
attitude extremes (Carey, 1994; Lunt, 1996; Morgan, 1997; Morrison, 1998). 
Waterton and Wynne (1999) agreed that the context of the group is important, but 
argued that it should be noted rather than controlled. 
The research literature suggests that focus group participants should be 
selected on the basis of "purposive sampling" (Morrison, p. 198) such that they share 
characteristics relevant to the research topic (Kreps, 1994; Morrison, 1998), and a 
balance is attempted between participant interests and research interests (Lunt, 
1996). Hansen et al., (1998) further suggested that as well as choosing categories 
significant to the research issues, researchers might choose participants with 
specialist knowledge or concerns, or choose participants from a pre-existing 
grouping. While the first two selection methods ensure that the data collected will be 
relevant to the research questions, the third method may increase the trust between 
group members and the likelihood that natural conversations will occur. Participants 
may gain support from being in homogenous groups, or with friends. 
In the first sections of this chapter, I have discussed the theoretical rationale 
for the data collection-the methodology of the research. In the next section, I 
explain in detail the practical data collection methods used for this study. 
Data Gathering and Collection Methods 
The Scope and Limitations of the Data Collection 
For practical reasons, there had to be time limits for this investigation; 
although, debate about GM is ongoing in New Zealand, as it is internationally. I 
chose a number of key moments in the debate to provide a series of 'snapshots' at 
particular points in time and capture any changes in communication occurring during 
the time period. These key moments represent points at which the debate gained 
particularly widespread public and media attention, and when organisations and 
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interest groups were most involved in both internal and external communication 
about GM. 
The starting point for this investigation is the establishment of the Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification on 8 May, 2000 and the endpoint is the lifting 
of the moratorium on applications for commercial field trials of GM products on 29 
October, 2003. This time period represents an important period of public policy 
decision-making for New Zealand, from the point at which the debate first formally 
involved large sectors of the New Zealand community to the point at which 
government policy was finally established and implemented. Key moments in this 
time period comprise the publication of the report of the Royal Commission on 27 
July, 2001, the announcement of a Government policy direction in September 2001, 
the general election in July 2002, and the publication of the Government's 
Biotechnology Strategy document on 26 May, 2003. 
Since New Zealand is a bi cultural society, the perspectives of Maori as well 
as New Zealand Europeans (Pakeha or Tauiwi) are extremely important, and the 
cultural beliefs in New Zealand are diverse. Those of Pakeha may be based, for 
example, on the values of the original colonial settlers, predominantly from Europe, 
and may reflect individualist values typical of Western societies. In contrast, Maori 
cultural beliefs may be grounded, for example, in the collectivist values and spiritual 
beliefs evident in other Polynesian societies. Although the two cultures have equal 
legal rights, the basis for constitutional values, the Treaty of Waitangi (Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi), is highly contested ("Made in New Zealand," 2005). Yet under New 
Zealand law, the principles of the Treaty have to be respected in public policy 
decisions. 
A great deal of separate research exists regarding Maori perspectives on GM 
(see, for example, G. Roberts, 2000; R. M. Roberts, 2000; Roberts, Benton, 
Satterfield & Benton, 2004; Tipene-Matua, 2000a, 2000b). Culturally, such research 
is arguably best carried out by Maori researchers so that Maori retain control over 
their own development-this is known as tino rangatiratanga (Health Research 
Council of New Zealand, 1998). Additionally, Maori values were not highlighted in 
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the kiwifruit and dairy industries' positioning on GM. So, in this study, I only 
consider Maori perspectives where there has been specific comment in relation to 
Maori issues in the context of the kiwifruit and dairy industries' GM positioning. 
Since I did not specifically seek out Maori perspectives, Maori were not sought as 
participants in either focus groups or interviews. 
I chose a combination of document analysis, interviews with key 
spokespeople, and focus groups to capture the complexity of the ways in which the 
kiwifruit and dairy industries affect and effect the rhetorical and social discursive 
construction of GM in New Zealand. This ensured both formal (goal-oriented/pro-
active) and informal (reactive) contexts in which texts about GM have been produced 
were examined. It also facilitated an exploration of the industries' positioning on GM 
on multiple levels-including multiple texts and multiple functional viewpoints 
within each industry-as well as situating this communication within the discourses 
and institutionsin New Zealand society. The next sub-sections look specifically at 
the details of the document collection, and at the interview and focus group 
procedures. 
Document Collection 
In the context of organisational communication and public relations, 
documents such as media releases, annual reports, and positioning statements on 
websites, as well as formal submissions and written speeches, demonstrate the 
substantive content of an organisation's communication. They also demonstrate the 
means by which the communication has been rhetorically constructed and 
communicated to internal or external stakeholders and publics, and the strategic 
priorities accorded particular communication (see Cheney & Tompkins, 1988). The 
analysis of documents produced by organisations at key moments in the debate, then, 
allows for a consideration of both the implicit values about GM that might reflect the 
organisational culture/identity and the explicit values about GM represented in the 
corporate/business identity. The documents additionally provide an opportunity to 
examine how these values were expressed. 
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The specific documents chosen for analysis comprise all of the 
communication about GM that is publicly available, and which were produced at the 
key moments identified previously, as well as a number of documents accessed 
through industry contacts. These documents are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Documents analysed 
Industry Organisation/ Documents Specific Title Date 
Author 
Kiwifruit industry 
Kiwifruit New Zealand Media Release, Kiwifruit New March, 
published on Zealand says no to 1999 
ZESPRI website genetic 
modification 





Tony Marks, CEO, ZESPRI Witness Brief 2000 
International accompanying 
Submission 
Jane Lancaster New Zealand The genetic November/ 
Kiwifruit Journal modification December, 
debate and our 2000 
contribution to it. 
ZESPRI Innovation Kiwiflier Our position: No to November, 
GM - an update 2001 
fromZESPRI 
Innovation 
ZESPRI ZESPRI website 2001 
ZESPRI Annual Report 2001 
ZESPRI Annual Report 2002 
Sandy Hodge, ZESPRI Letter sent to 2003 
International anyone enquiring 
Communication Team about ZESPRI 
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Preparing for the Interviews and Focus Groups 
Before conducting the research interviews and focus groups, I ensured that I 
increased my own understanding of the background issues related to GM. I arranged 
to discuss GM with three scientists within the University of Waikato Science Faculty 
to ensure that I had a good understanding of the scientific processes and associated 
technologies involved. I also discussed the ethical issues related to GM with a staff 
member in the Philosophy Department of the University of Waikato, and I discussed 
marketing issues related to GM with a personal contact in a food manufacturing 
industry. 
Additionally, I carried out a pilot study, comprising five pilot interviews. I 
interviewed a former employee of the Dairy Marketing Board, a local farmer, a 
kiwifruit grower, a former employee of the Kiwifruit Marketing Board, and a science 
teacher, all of whom were personally known to me. These interviews were solely for 
the purpose of refining my research questions and interview schedule, to ensure that 
my final interviews and focus groups would be structured in a way that allowed the 
participants to speak comfortably about GM, to ensure that the questions could be 
easily understood, and to ensure that the data collected would be relevant to my 
research questions. 
I used a 'funnel' approach to questioning in preparing the interview and focus 
group schedules, beginning with broad questions and moving to more specific ones. 
Salient themes could then be identified by the participants before narrowing the 
discussion to specific details. Similar trigger questions were used for interview and 
focus group participants to ensure that a similar range of topics was covered and that 
there was some comparability of the data. The schedule of questions in each case 
aimed to ensure that participants' accounts would cover the broad areas of interest 
included in the research questions for the study; for example, focusing on values 
a,ssociated with GM, the relevance of GM for the organisation, and the 
communication practices related to GM. 
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Semi-structured Interviews 
I used semi-structured interviews to provide 'accounts' of each organisation's 
negotiation with the practices of GM over the time period of the research. I 
conducted interviews with spokespersons who had a particular involvement with GM 
in the organisation or interest group. This was to explore whether different values, or 
different aspects of identity, were privileged in the communication of spokespersons 
with different functional roles in each industry. It also enabled comment on the 
different communication practices used to engage with stakeholders within, and 
external to, the industry. 
I used a series of open-ended and broad-based questions to trigger in-depth 
conversations with interviewees. This allowed the individual interviewees to 
establish their own meanings and focus the direction of the responses, and minimised 
the possible impact of my values or expectations on the participants' comments. I 
encouraged interviewees to describe, and comment on, all aspects of communication 
about GM relevant to the organisation concerned, and tried to avoid openly taking a 
personal stance on GM issues in a way that might alter participants' responses. I also 
assured participants of the confidentiality of their responses so that they would feel 
free to comment. Quotations have not been attributed to individuals in a way that 
would identify the participants concerned. 
I approached participants either at the recommendation of the initial contact 
person in the industry, or because they were specifically mentioned as being able to 
provide a useful perspective on GM issues in relation to that particular industry. 
Additionally, I interviewed spokespersons from key interest groups to gain 
background information about their specific GM positioning so that I could better 
analyse references made to these groups in the kiwifruit industry and dairy industry 
member accounts. The accounts of the spokespersons in these background interviews 
do not themselves form part of the data analysed in this study. 
Interviewees are listed in Table 2. Generalised position descriptions have 
been given to indicate the special interest or functional expertise of the participant, 
but further protect their anonymity. 
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Table 2. Semi-structured Interviews 
Industry Or2anisations Interviewees 
Kiwifruit industry 
ZESPRI Innovation Innovation team members A, B, C, D, and E. 
ZESPRI International Communication spokespersons A and B 
Packhouse/Supplier Spokespersons A, B, and C. 
Kiwifruit NZ Spokesperson 
Dairy industry 






Dairy Factory manager 
NZDB Media spokesperson 
Dairy Workers' Union Spokesperson 
Back2round Interviews Interviewees 
Political parties Labour party spokesperson for Ministry for Science, 
Research and Technology 
National party GM spokesperson 
Green party GM spokesperson 
Alliance party GM spokesperson 
HortResearch Research Director 
AgResearch Research Director 
Greenpeace NZ GM spokesperson 
Life Sciences Network Spokesperson 
MAdGE Spokesperson 
I contacted interviewees within the dairy and kiwifruit industries through a 
liaison person within each industry, since I needed the support of the industry 
organisation to have access to staff and, if possible, to gain access to information not 
available in the public domain. In the case of the kiwifruit industry, very positive 
support for the data collection was given from the outset. Participants were both 
recommended by the liaison person, following discussion with the Director of the 
Innovation team, and identified by me as relevant staff names became apparent in 
other interviews. 
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In the case of the dairy industry, the data collection was somewhat delayed 
while the study was formally approved by the industry executive following an initial 
interview with the legal spokesperson for Fonterra. This more cautious approach to 
approving the research might have been because of the larger size of the dairy 
industry, or because the industry was in the midst of major re-structuring (as the 
NZDB and the two major dairy companies were merging to form a single 
organisation, Fonterra). Once a level of mutual trust had been established, however, 
participants were again identified by the liaison person within the industry and I 
identified further participants from comments made in initial interviews. 
Interviewees from other interest groups were contacted directly, individually, 
initially by email or telephone. 
The difficulties I experienced in gaining access to a number of interview 
participants seemed also to be related to the sensitive, political nature of the issues 
surrounding the controversial topic of GM, and concerns that information might be 
used to support a particular case for or against the introduction of GM. In a number 
of cases, before being able to arrange interviews with participants, I had to explain 
the nature of the project in detail, and I had to establish my own credibility. 
Participants were cautious about the contexts in which their comments might be 
quoted, and in several cases, interviews were obtained with the proviso that I could 
only use quotes after checking the attribution with the participant. Participants were 
concerned that their comments would be reported accurately, and without bias. This 
cautious approach to the research meant that I could not be wholly true to my desire 
for a reflexive approach to the research. I felt that I had to appear objective, and 
unbiased, rather than stating my personal stance, so that I maintained access to the 
research organisations. 
In the case of ZESPRI International, the industry organisation was 
particularly concerned about the sensitivity of the international market to issues 
surrounding GM and asked to check any articles (other than the actual PhD thesis) 
for accuracy of comments about ZESPRI before publication. 
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In the case of the dairy industry, the industry organisation (the newly formed 
Fonterra) was highly sensitive about both its own new organisational image and the 
market perceptions surrounding GM issues and initially requested that all research 
interviews should focus on the NZDB position and communication about GM (prior 
to the merger which created Fonterra). However, during the course of the research 
investigation, as further trust was established, and recognising the dynamic nature of 
the debate, an agreement was reached to attempt to bring the research up to date by 
including information about Fonterra's position on GM. 
I conducted all interviews face-to-face at the interviewee's office or a 
location of their choice to ensure that the interviewees were relaxed and in a familiar 
environment. The range of questions asked in the interviews is indicated on the 
Interview Schedule (see Appendix I), and included, for example, "How is GM 
relevant to your organisation?" These questions were a guide to ensure that similar 
topics were covered with each interviewee and were not all asked in the specific 
format indicated. In many cases, the interviewee covered a range of topics within one 
answer. For example, one participant's description of dairy industry communication 
strategies in relation to new developments in biotechnology also included comments 
about the international perceptions of the industry, and the viability of organic 
production methods. Overall, I attempted to create conversations with the 
interviewees so that, as far as possible, they set the parameters and direction of the 
interview, and used their own language for their answers. 
Most interviews lasted between one and two hours; although, the interview 
with the spokesperson from Kiwifruit New Zealand lasted only 15 minutes. This 
participant was particularly concise, and my encouragement for him to expand on 
topics was to no avail. All interviews were recorded in full on audiocassette, and 
later transcribed, and I also took additional note of interviewees' non-verbal 
communication; for example, any hesitancy or strong feelings expressed. 
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Focus Groups 
At the grower/farmer level within each industry, I aimed to capture the 
understanding of participants who did not necessarily have a role as spokespersons 
on GM and might not previously have specifically been asked to comment on the 
issues involved. All participants were growers/farmers in one of the two case study 
industries but they did not necessarily have any particular expertise or special 
knowledge in relation to GM issues. Each group was industry-specific. 
As primary producers, dairy farmers and kiwifruit growers were groups with 
specialist knowledge and concerns about each industry, significant to the research. I 
further distinguished particular groups within this producer category; for example, 
farmer groups were distinguished on the basis of the size of their farms, and whether 
they owned the farm or were sharemilking, while kiwifruit growers were 
distinguished on the basis of the specific kiwifruit crop grown, or geographical area. 
In each case this method of sampling was then purposive, and the selection of 
categories was determined by the possible relevance of these categories to the study. 
I chose focus groups as the method of data collection for the primary 
producer and grower groups within each industry to encourage participation and 
because focus groups might facilitate natural conversation about this controversial 
issue-albeit within the artificial situation of the focus group. Many participants 
initially commented that they might have little to contribute to a discussion about 
GM. So, focus groups were established where possible from already existing 
functional industry groups, and were a means of encouraging these individuals to 
participate in the study, a way of stimulating discussion (see Hansen et al., 1998; 
Morrison, 1998). As Lunt (1996) argued, focus groups prompt participants to speak 
from socially identified positions, facilitating the exploration of the complex 
relations between discourse, group, identity, and community. 
The accounts of participants again enabled an exploration of whether 
different values, or different aspects of identity, were privileged, this time by 
producers in the kiwifruit and dairy industries. They also enabled further comment 
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on the different communication practices used to engage with stakeholders within, 
and external to, the industry. 
Table 3. Focus Groups 
Initial Group Group contact Location of Number of 




Zespri ZespriGreen Fruitgrower' s University of Seven 
Innovation Federation Waikato 
team liaison member campus 
person 
ZespriGold Grower University of Eight 
Waikato 
campus 
ZespriOrganic Grower Community Six 
hall 








Small farms Farmer Community Five 
hall 
Organic farms Farmer Farmer's Four 
home 
Sharemilkers Sharemilker Farmer's Five 
home 
The focus group participants were informed beforehand that the project 
focused on GM since+ it was felt that knowledge of the issue concerned would not 
subject them to extra influences that might change their natural opinions. In fact, 
because the research involved no payment to the participants, it was felt that they 
would be more willing to volunteer if the research topic were known. Opportunities 
were created in the interviews and focus groups for participants to acknowledge any 
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occasion when there had been prior discussion related to GM and, indeed, 
participants were encouraged to provide information about such discussions. 
In the case of the kiwifruit industry, I contacted four participants in the 
ZESPRI Green kiwifruit grower focus group at a Fruitgrowers' Federation seminar 
on kiwifruit growing, and found additional participants through a snowballing 
technique (Krueger & Casey, 2000), where participants were asked to contact 
another possible participant, making seven participants in all. I contacted the initial 
participants in the ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit grower focus group through a contact 
person suggested by the ZESPRI Innovation Sustainability Team leader, again using 
a snowbQ.lling technique to form the final group of eight participants. These two 
focus groups were held on the local campus of the University of Waikato, which was 
conveniently located for all participants. I contacted the six participants in the 
ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit grower focus group through an existing organic growers' 
group and the focus group was held following the groups' regular meeting at the 
normal location for their meetings, in a local community meeting room. Each of 
these three grower groups was located in the Bay of Plenty, the main growing area 
for kiwifruit in New Zealand. A fourth group was located in Whangarei, Northland 
where there is a further concentration of kiwifruit growers. I contacted these eight 
participants through a packhouse representative and the focus group comprised 
volunteers who stayed for the discussion following a field-day organised by the 
packhouse on an orchard in Northland. 
In the case of the dairy industry, I first contacted the Chairperson of New 
Zealand Federated Farmers to discuss possible options for contacting dairy farmer 
participants. Following this discussion, I decided to select participants on the basis of 
four different categories of dairy farmer: organic dairy farmers, sharemilkers, 
farmers owning large dairy farms (over 300 cows), and farmers owning small dairy 
farms (circa 100 cows). The Chairperson advised that these four groups of farmers 
were well-represented within the Waikato, one of the largest dairy farming areas in 
New Zealand. Since this study makes no attempt to access a fully representative 
sample of dairy farmers from which to generalise the findings, but instead aims to 
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sample the range of meanings constructed about GM within the dairy farmer group, 
the focus groups were all held in the Waikato region. 
The Waikato branch of Federated Farmers invited me to their monthly 
meeting to present the research to members. From this meeting, I established contact 
people for each of the four dairy farmer categories explained above, who volunteered 
to contact up to eight other dairy farmers within the same category, again following a 
snowballing technique for contacting participants. Focus groups were subsequently 
held in Morrinsville (smaller farms), and in Tokoroa (larger farms), and two were 
held in Te Aroha (organic dairy farms and sharemilkers). 
The range of questions used in the focus groups is indicated on the Focus 
Group Inter-view Schedule (see Appendix II) and included, for example, "What future 
direction would you prefer for the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry in relation to 
GM?'' The questions on the schedule were again only a guide to ensure that similar 
topics were covered with each focus group and were not all asked in the specific 
format indicated. I attempted to create an atmosphere where the conversation 
between participants flowed naturally, with minimum intervention from me, so that, 
as far as possible, the participants set the parameters and direction of the discussion, 
and used their own language for their comments. Each focus group discussion lasted 
between one and two hours. All focus group discussions were recorded in full on 
audiocassette, and later transcribed, and field notes were also taken. I made a 
complete transcript of the tape available individually to the participants in each group 
for verification before the transcripts were analysed. 
Given the controversial nature of the GM issues involved, I was careful not to 
make comments to participants that might privilege my own opinions so that I 
minimised the impact I might have on the meanings constructed by participants 
about GM issues. At times, I had to be extremely careful not to join in the debate, 
particularly when discussion was one-sided or when my comment was specifically 
invited. 
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Timeframes for the Data Collection 
The timeframes for the data collection were to a large extent determined by 
the commitments of the industry participants, and my teaching commitments. 
Table 4. Timeframes for Data Collection 
Date Industry Contact Type of data 
established collection 
March 2002 Pilot interviews 
June 2002 - August 2003 Background 
interviews 
August 2002 Kiwifruit Liaison person 
industry 
September 2002 Dairy Liaison person 
industry 
August 2002 - March 2003 Kiwifruit Interviews 
industry 
September 2002 - Dairy Interviews 
November 2003 industry 
October/November 2003 Kiwifruit Focus groups 
industry 
February/March 2004 Dairy Focus groups 
industry 
The data collection process took place over an extended time frame that 
commenced in March 2002 with the pilot interviews aimed at confirming the 
research design. The first background interviews with different interest groups 
commenced in June 2002. Interviews with the industry participants commenced once 
a working relationship had been developed with a contact person within each 
industry, in August 2002 for the kiwifruit industry and in September 2002 for the 
dairy industry. The timeframes for these interviews depended very much on the 
availability of the personnel concerned, according to the production demands of each 
industry (including, for example, seasonal activity and staff commitments overseas). 
The timeframes for the dairy industry personnel proved particularly difficult; 
some staff who were involved in the strategic communication about GM at particular 
points in the research timeframe either left the organisation or moved to new 
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positions as the result of the intensive restructuring following the formation of 
Fonterra. Industry interviews were finally completed in November 2003. 
Focus groups were organised with growers and farmers following the 
individual interviews, with kiwifruit growers in October and November 2003, and 
with dairy farmers in February and March 2004. I made final contact with the main 
contact person in each industry before the completion of the data analysis to ensure 
that the analysis included the most recent perspective on GM issues for each of the 
industries concerned. 
The following section explains the steps taken in the analysis of the 
documents, and interview and focus group transcripts. 
Methods of Data Analysis 
Inductive and Deductive Analysis 
The critical-interpretive approach, taken in this study, meant that both 
inductive and deductive methods of data analysis were appropriate-that is methods 
which involve foregrounding the full range of detail in the data, and methods which 
involve looking for particular perspectives important to the research questions. 
In line with the interpretive perspective, my analysis attempted to keep close 
to the actual situated language used by the kiwifruit and dairy industries in their 
communication about GM, to ensure that industry members' and stakeholders' own 
meanings were captured. This represents an inductive approach to the analysis. In the 
course of the analysis, I realised that the rationalities evident in communication 
about GM were of particular relevance for this study. 
At the same time, the critical perspective meant that I paid particular attention 
to aspects of the data which indicate explicit or implicit value-related assumptions, 
relationships of power, or specific socio-political meanings. The study additionally 
takes the position that new understandings of industry perspectives on GM in New 
Zealand can be gained from an exploration of the role played by identity and identity 
management in industry positioning on GM. This represents a deductive approach to 
the analysis. 
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Steps in the Data Analysis 
I analysed the documents and interview and focus group transcripts in this 
study using a combination of techniques based on rhetorical criticism and CDA. In 
the case of rhetorical criticism, this involved drawing on Burke's theory of the index 
(Cheney & Tompkins, 1988), Foss's (2004) method of cluster criticism, and 
Heracleous & Barrett's (2001) combined rhetorical criticism and discourse analysis. 
In the case of CDA, this involved drawing on Fairclough's method of CDA and 
Heracleous & Barrett's (2001) combined methodology. 
I analysed all of the documents, interview transcripts, and focus group 
transcripts at the level of text-that is, I paid attention to the rhetorical features, for 
example, what was present and absent in the texts, what was highlighted, and what 
was implicit or assumed. I also analysed the three sets of data at the level of social 
practice-that is references to underlying value systems, institutions, ideologies and 
practices that indicated relative levels of power, taken-for-granted meanings, or 
particular socio-political tensions. I additionally analysed the documents in terms of 
the discursive practices-their production, consumption, and distribution, and noted 
references to the organisational discursive practices in relation to GM in the 
interview and focus group transcripts. 
Initially, I examined the full set of data for the kiwifruit and dairy industries 
separately for each industry, then I re-examined them to note comparisons and 
contrasts between the two industries. The detailed method of analysis of the 
documents, interview transcripts, and focus group transcripts is explained separately 
in the next sections. 
Document Analysis. 
I gave each document multiple close readings. At the level of text, phrases 
referring to GM, or where GM was implicit were initially highlighted, as were 
phrases referring to biotechnology. I particularly noted words that were treated as 
similar, words fostering ambiguity, words indicating antithesis, and words used in 
place of GM, such as metaphors, enthymemes, and similes. This involved 
recognising sameness and difference-strategies for identification or persuasion (see 
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Burke, 1969; Foss, 2004; Foss et al., 1991); or orientations towards GM. For 
example, in the dairy industry documents, the terms GM and biotechnology were 
confusingly sometimes used interchangeably. 
I then looked at the context of the references, what other phrases 
accompanied them, what came before and afterwards. This involved noting the 
beginnings and endings of texts, the presence or absence of words or phrases, 
relationships between words or phrases, recurrent ideas, words or phrases that were 
repeated, and words or phrases which were emphasised or clustered together. For 
example, in Lancaster's (2000) article in the Kiwifruit Journal, a scientific definition 
of GM was given first, but GM was also identified at other points in the article as a 
"market risk," and as likely to have "benefits" following long-term research and 
development (p. 24 ). 
Additionally, I noted references to names or titles within documents, the title 
of the document, and the first introductory sentences of the document, which might 
indicate the priority accorded to particular ideas, and the foregrounding and 
backgrounding of topics. For example, the ZESPRI media release about GM 
highlighted the importance of the Kiwi Green integrated pest management system 
(Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999). 
Given the focus for this study, I looked particularly for references to aspects 
of identity, at the level of the individual, industry groupings, the industry 
organisation, and national and international identities. For example, one dairy 
industry media statement on GM highlights the competitive identity of the industry 
internationally (Fonterra, 2001, September 14). 
At the level of discursive practice, I looked at the style and tone of writing, 
and the genre of the document, who it was intended for (audience), and how it was 
distributed. Finally, at the level of social practice, I looked for recurring themes, 
repeated use of words or phrases, and phrases suggesting particular emphasis, to 
examine possible underlying value-systems, discourses, and ideologies (see 
Fairclough, 1992). For example, all kiwifruit industry documents indicated strong 
environmental concerns. 
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Throughout, I checked whether the references to GM; 'the flavour' of the 
documents, and the substantive content; the style and genre, and distribution 
methods; and the underlying themes were consistent or different across texts. I also 
tried to note anything ambivalent, hesitant, not stated, implicit, hedged around, or 
paradoxical, that might indicate particular tensions in the communication. 
InteT'View Transcript Analysis. 
For the interview transcripts, the approach was similar, except that the 
schedule of questions ensured that topics of relevance to the study were covered. At 
the level of the text, I highlighted the interviewees' initial representations of GM, 
their expressions related to GM, and how GM was stated to be relevant to the 
industry/organisation. I again also highlighted phrases referring to biotechnology, or 
where GM was implicit, and looked at the context of the references, what other 
phrases accompanied them, and what came before and afterwards. For example, the 
legal spokesperson for the dairy industry represented GM as "extremely important 
for New Zealand" (NZDB/Fonterra legal spokesperson). 
In the same way, I highlighted how and when the following topics were 
covered in the interviews: issues considered important, the relevance of GM to the 
organisation, the position of the organisation on GM, comments about 
communication practices in relation to GM, and decision-making in relation to GM. 
Additionally, I noted comments about government policy on GM; the relevance of 
GM to the organisation internationally; and any comments on the public debate, 
public policy decision-making, and the Royal Commission. 
As for the document analysis, I noted any names or titles referred to, as well 
as any events, projects, positions, or documents considered significant by the 
interviewees. Given my interest in the organisational communication associated with 
GM, I also paid attention to any references to roles, hierarchies, and institutions that 
might indicate particular ways of knowing and understanding. I again looked for 
themes relevant to aspects of identity and also to identity management by the 
organisation. For example, the dairy factory manager focused particularly on 
technical processing issues associated with GM, but was also concerned about the 
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image of the factory in the local community. At the level of social practice, I looked 
for recuning themes, repeated use of words or phrases, and phrases suggesting 
particular emphasis to note possible underlying value-systems, discourses, and 
ideologies. 
For the interview transcripts, I checked whether the references to GM; the 
'flavour' of the interview, and the substantive content; and underlying themes were 
consistent or different across different interviewees, according to their functional role 
in the industry. 
Focus Group Transcript Analysis. 
The approach for the analysis of focus group transcripts followed a similar 
pattern to that of the interview transcripts. However, I noted throughout whether 
similar comments were made by all group members, whether one voice dominated, 
whether anyone was left out, and whether there were ambivalences, divergent 
opinions, arguments, or strongly held views. I paid attention to the cohesion of the 
group, the tendency to build on each others' viewpoints, and how the comments were 
created in the group discussion. For example, the organic dairy farmers' group was 
particularly cohesive, with no dissenting voices, but in the ZESPRI Green kiwifruit 
group, one participant was more in favour of developing GM technologies in the 
kiwifruit industry than the remainder of the group; yet he did not significantly change 
the attitudes of the other participants in the course of the discussion. 
The steps in the analysis were very si~lar to those in the interview 
transcripts. However, I noted in these transcripts whether the references to GM, the 
'flavour' of the discussion and the substantive content, and the underlying themes 
were consistent or different across different focus groups, according to the different 
affiliations of the group. 
Interpreting the Data. 
In this analysis, then, I took careful note of similarities and differences 
between the meanings attributed to aspects of GM issues by industry members with 
different functional responsibilities, or different positions within the industry 
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organisat10n, to see whether patterns of understanding (and identification) emerged 
for different industry groups within or between the dairy and kiwifruit industries. 
I mapped expressions and examples of key terms, phrases, concepts, and 
patterns of understanding onto a spreadsheet for each industry, in the participant or 
rhetor' s own words, together with a record of the document, interview or focus group 
where the example occurred. 
From this process, I was able to identify thematic elements that were 
rhetorically constructed within the texts that were common to a number of texts, or 
particularly highlighted. I was then able to identify any material and contextual 
assumpthns or implications associated with these elements. For example, reference 
to the difficulty in accessing international markets was linked with reference to the 
provision of quality products by kiwifruit participants. I thus developed a situated 
understanding of the participants' meanings. In each case, these references were 
mapped onto the relevant industry spreadsheet. 
From these understandings, I identified the specific rhetorical strategies used 
by each industry. For example, the kiwifruit industry highlighted the importance of 
environmental values in its positioning on GM, and this was consistent with being 
proactive in implementing EureGap auditing systems to ensure quality production 
met European standards. I was then able to identify the most important overall 
themes in each industry's communication about GM. For the kiwifruit industry, one 
important theme centred on 'integrity.' 
I then re-examined these rhetorical strategies and themes in terms of the 
overall discursive practices used in the communication, to explore the hierarchical 
relationships existing within each industry and between industry stakeholders. In 
further examination of the texts, I also identified the overall implicit social practices, 
and evaluated which discourses (and ideologies) were most commonly represented in 
the industry communication. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the methodological design of the research, and 
presented a theoretical rationale for the methods of data collection and analysis. 
Additionally, it has discussed the combination of rhetorical criticism and critical 
discourse analysis that underpin the data analysis and suggested why this form of 
analysis was chosen for this research. It has explained in detail the methods of data 
collection, and, finally, it has identified the specific steps undertaken in the data 
analysis in this particular study. 
The following three data analysis chapters are organised around each of the 
three research questions presented in this methodology chapter. A critical 
consideration of the implicit and explicit values and assumptions evident in the 
rhetorical strategies of the kiwifruit and dairy industries forms the basis for Chapter 
Five, the first of the data analysis chapters. Chapter Six highlights how aspects of 
identity \·..-ere represented in the texts. It considers the roles played by identity, 
identification, and identity management in the negotiation of the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries with issues and practices associated with GM. The third data analysis 
chapter, Chapter Seven, focuses on issues management, and the engagement of the 
kiwifruit and dairy industries with multiple stakeholders and other interest groups 
involved in the GM debate. It highlights the particular rationalities used by each 
industry organisation to justify their positioning and considers their attempts to 




A RHETORICAL AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRY 
POLICY ON GENETIC MODIFICATION 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the communication rhetoric of the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries in their positioning of GM policy; that is, the ways in which the policy is 
expressed and explained by the industries. The use of rhetoric involves "the uses of 
symbolic and non-symbolic resources for persuasion in instances where more than 
one outcome is possible and the outcome can be effected through persuasive means" 
(Cheney & Lair, 2005, p. 9). The rhetorical construction of texts that express industry 
policy on GM thus provides an indication of the meanings the industries attribute to 
GM, as they make sense of, and attempt to influence, the policy environment. 
The chapter considers the particular language and symbols used to represent 
the kiwifruit and dairy industry positions on GM; and how these are linked to 
organisational values and strategies, to values prevalent in New Zealand society, and 
to current discourses related to biotechnology and GM. It analyses what is present 
and absent in the two industries' GM communication, what has been highlighted, and 
what underlying concepts are implicit or assumed. The chapter identifies the range of 
rhetorical strategies employed by these industry organisations as they foster 
identification (see Burke, 1969) with their policies by different stakeholders. 
Given the disparate positions on GM taken by the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries, my particular focus is on the differences between the respective rhetorical 
positions and discursive strategies of each industry. A further interest is in whether 
GM policy is expressed consistently within each industry. Different rhetorical 
arguments may be presented to particular internal and external industry stakeholders 
if those stakeholders hold multiple, varied perspectives of GM. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the analysis combines both inductive and 
deductive methods. It focuses on themes which have been established inductively 
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from the data gathered on each industry and at the same time takes particular note of 
references to aspects of organisational identity and image, and references to current 
discourses of GM. The analysis focuses on a range of documents in which the 
industry policies on GM have been explicitly stated, or the industry position on GM 
issues has been implicitly referred to. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first two sections focus 
respectively on the New Zealand kiwifruit industry and the New Zealand dairy 
industry. Each of these sections first identifies the documents that were analysed, 
before exploring in depth how the industry position was rhetorically expressed and 
explained as the policy was established. The final section in this chapter discusses 
similarities and differences in the kiwifruit and dairy industry policies on GM. 
The Kiwifruit Industry Policy on GM 
Documents Selected for Analysis 
The documents analysed were written for a variety of audiences over the 
research time frame, as discussed in detail in Chapter Four. In order of publication, 
the first document analysed is a media statement issued by Kiwifruit New Zealand, 
published on the industry website in March 1999, as GM was becoming a public 
issue in New Zealand and the Green Party was calling for its public debate. This 
media statement entitled Kiwifruit New Zealand says no to genetic modification was 
a positioning statement relevant for multiple publics both internal and external to the 
industry, including both consumers1 in New Zealand and customers internationally. 
The second document is the submission and witness brief made to the Royal 
Commission by the ZESPRI Group on behalf of the kiwifruit industry. The primary 
1 In the following chapters, the term 'customers' is used to refer to the wholesalers and retailers to 
whom the industries sell their products, whereas the term 'consumers' refers to the final buyers of the 
product. In contrast, 'markets' is used when the industry engagement with stakeholders is general but 
product-related, and 'publics' is used when the engagement is general but a relationship is implied. 
'Audiences' refers to particular groups that receive specific messages. 
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audience for this thirty-one-page submission was the commissioners, but since all 
submissions were publicly available on the Commission's website, larger audiences 
included New Zealand citizens and consumers, and potentially international 
audiences, markets, and customers interested in the kiwifruit industry policy on GM. 
The third document is a four-page article written by Jane Lancaster for the 
New Zealand Kiwifruit Journal in November/December 2000, at the time that the 
Royal Commission was considering submissions. The title of the article, The Genetic 
Modification Debate and Our Contribution to it, indicates a more specific audience. 
The use of the pronoun "our" personalises this communication and suggests that the 
primary audience is the wider kiwifruit industry comprising, for example, Kiwifruit 
New Zealand, ZESPRI Innovation, ZESPRI International, suppliers, and growers. 
Publics associated in some way with fruit growing or with the kiwifruit industry, or 
those interested in the kiwifruit industry policy, might be expected to read the 
Kiwifruit Journal. 
The fourth document is a half-page article by the ZESPRI Innovation team 
published in November 2001 in the Kiwijlier, a monthly industry newsletter which 
focuses particularly on financial and market information for kiwifruit growers in 
New Zealand. In this article, the focus is on technical information supplied by the 
ZESPRI Innovation team. The title of the article, Our position: No to GM - an 
update from ZESPRI Innovation, again uses the personal pronoun "our" to 
demonstrate inclusiveness in the kiwifruit industry; the author of the article is 
identified as ZESPRI Innovation-technical experts; and the word "update" is 
indicative of previous sharing of information about GM policy. The update was 
timely given that the Royal Commission's report was made in July 2001, and 
Government policy was announced just prior to the publication of this article. 
The final document analysed in depth is a letter sent by ZESPRI International 
Communication staff to anyone enquiring about the ZESPRI policy on GM. This 
letter was made available to me by the ZESPRI Media Relations Adviser in 2003. 
The ZESPRI website (ZESPRI, 2001a), Annual Reports (ZESPRI, 2001b, 
2002b), the ZESPRI Brand video (ZESPRI, 2003a), and ZESPRI media information 
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kit (ZESPRI, 2003c) contained brief references or contextual information about GM 
and are also referred to in the analysis in this and subsequent chapters. 
While the overall GM policy is consistent throughout these documents, the 
rhetorical strategies change, drawing on a variety of discourses to emphasise 
different arguments for particular target publics, for instance growers and/or 
international customers. The kiwifruit industry positioning of GM policy is explored 
in the following document analysis. 
The Market Context of the Policy: The Primacy of the Customer and Consumer 
Both the formal communication about GM, expressed in kiwifruit industry 
documents, and the informal communication of industry members, recorded in 
interviews and focus groups, refer to the industry GM policy as largely market-
driven-that is, determined by the preferences of customers and consumers. In an 
industry reliant on international sales of primary produce, the importance accorded to 
the market is hardly surprising; after all, the economic benefits accruing to industry 
members are of major importance for business success. However, analysis of the 
social meanings implicit in the rhetorical construction of GM policy statements, and 
the arguments supporting the policy, contributes a more complex understanding of 
the organisational values represented. 
All of the documents outlining industry policy on GM refer to major 
international kiwifruit markets as GM risk-averse, such that consumers will not 
purchase GM foods. Indeed, the GM policy draws on neo-liberal political and 
economic discourses that emphasise rational choice theory and public choice theory. 
Rational choice theory argues that in a free-market consumers will make choices 
based on self-interest, using the instrumental rationality of cost/benefit analysis 
(Aune, 2001), and public choice theory further argues that public policy decisions 
should be made with the least possible violation of individual self-interest (Aune, 
2001; Devine, 1998). In this way 'consumers' become conflated with 'citizens' 
(Cheney & Christensen, 2001a; Devine, 2001). However, the kiwifruit industry 
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policy emphasis on market choice is contextualised differently in different 
documents. 
The submission and witness brief presented by ZESPRI to the Royal 
Commission in 2000, provides the most detailed explanation of the. industry position, 
and was referred to by the Communication Manager and by members of the 
Innovation team as the benchmark statement of GM policy. Submissions were 
required by the Commission to follow a specified template; therefore, the content, 
order and wording of the submission was to some extent constrained by this format 
(see Rogers-Hayden, 2004; Rogers-Hayden & Hindmarsh, 2002). However, the 
ZESPRI submission is notably shorter than many submissions made by other 
industry organisations and research institutes (for example, the dairy industry, 
AgResearch, and HortResearch submissions). A number of sections in the specified 
template were not completed, presumably because these sections were not considered 
relevant to the kiwifruit industry's argument or areas of expertise. The submission is 
notable for its single focus on market issues, and the repetition of key terms 
representing the importance of the markets. The sections left incomplete included, 
for example, international legal obligations; liability issues; intellectual property 
issues; responsibilities under the Treaty of W aitangi; global developments and 
issues; and areas of public interest such as human health, environmental matters, and 
cultural and ethical concerns. 
Interestingly, comments from an Innovation spokesperson involved in 
preparing the submission identified the deliberate simplicity of the ZESPRI policy as 
a rhetorical strategy that was less likely to be critiqued, and more likely to be 
understood unequivocally by international consumers. This spokesperson stated: 
It's important that we have a simple, clear statement of policy .... It was important 
to us that we influenced the Royal Commission ... but I don't know that we want to 
be out there banging a drum on a global basis because all banging drums does is 
draws more attention to potential flaws in your argument. (Innovation spokesperson 
D) 
This strategy of not drawing attention to the kiwifruit industry position on GM 
becomes increasingly evident and important in the data analysis. 
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The ZESPRI submission, then, has a single focus. It uses a market rationality 
to justify its position on economic grounds, in terms of the value of the kiwifruit 
industry to New Zealand and the potential loss of export earnings not only to the 
industry, but to New Zealand, if New Zealand develops GM food products 
commercially: 
Our marketing evidence is that the perception of GM status of New Zealand food 
production will influence the buying behaviour of consumers for all New Zealand 
products. Adverse consumer opinion caused by the perception of New Zealand as an 
exporter of GM foods could jeopardise a significant proportion of the kiwifruit 
industry's contribution to the national economy. (ZESPRI, 2000, Executive 
summary, 4.4) 
This rhetoric articulates (see Slack, 1996) the kiwifruit industry market identity with 
New Zealand's market identity to add to the industry argument. The iconic link 
between kiwifruit and their country of origin is also clearly identified as significant 
in international markets in the New Zealand Kiwifruit Journal article, where it is 
suggested that GM commercial production in New Zealand might adversely impact 
on sales of kiwifruit because of "guilt by association" (Lancaster, 2000, p. 24). 
The neo-liberal political and economic discourses drawn on by the kiwifruit 
industry GM policy are those that already dominate New Zealand's social culture 
(Dalziel, 2003; Devine, 1998, 2001; Kelsey, 1997; Scott, 1997). The kiwifruit 
industry policy is thus strategically positioned as politically credible, likely to find 
favour with Government because it is consistent with current Government policies, 
and likely to foster identification with the policy by industry stakeholders, because of 
business self-interest. By drawing on these normalised discourses, the policy is also 
strategically positioned to influence the attitudes of the voting public, and other 
corporate, industry, and science interest groups. 
As Albrow (1987) suggested, rationality can be clearly linked to the 
framework of knowledge and belief evident in the symbolic systems of a particular 
culture and time. The kiwifruit industry GM policy privileges an instrumental, 
market rationality that is purposive. It presumes that outcomes are logically 
predictable, and involve the methodical attainment of a goal through precisely 
calculated means (see Giddens, 1972; Simon, 1976). In this case, the submission 
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relies significantly on quoting statistics and surveys in support of the kiwifruit 
industry argument, with the goal of retaining their market share. For example, the 
submission quotes the dollar value, $700 million turnover per annum, and the 
employment value, 25,000 jobs, of kiwifruit exports to New Zealand (ZESPRI, 2000, 
Section B (c), summary). It also refers to both international consumer research and 
research carried out by ZESPRI marketing staff as evidence of consumer perceptions 
about GM. Considerable detail taken from a market survey carried out by ZESPRI 
marketing staff in Europe and Japan is presented in Tony Mark's witness brief to the 
Royal Commission, since the results demonstrated particular risk of GM products 
alienating the kiwifruit market in Europe. The survey asked the specific question: 
"Could a New Zealand Government policy permitting commercial quantities of GM 
crops to be grown in New Zealand adversely impact our existing global sales of 
kiwifruit" (Marks, 2000, Section B U) (iii).5). Further research is quoted in the 
second half of the letter explaining the kiwifruit industry GM policy. It cites the 
Business and Economic Research Ltd./ Agribusiness Economics Research Unit 
(BERUAERU) report, (BERLJAERU, 2003), and positions the kiwifruit industry 
policy "not to develop or market any GM product" as a "response to consumer and 
customer requirements" (Hodge, 2003, original emphasis). These documents thus 
rely on the credibility of the research, and the credibility of a market approach to 
decision-making about GM. 
Similarly, the Kiwifruit Journal article indicates that international market 
perceptions of GM were the main driver of the industry policy, and supports this 
argument with references to the ZESPRI survey, but it additionally quotes a 
Eurobarometer survey in 1997 and HortResearch survey in 2000 to demonstrate that 
markets are cautious about the benefits of GM foods. Lancaster also comments that 
global food retailing companies are avoiding purchasing GM products because of the 
uncertainty of consumer demand and the potential loss of consumer brand loyalty in 
intensely competitive markets. The article identifies government policy as "critical to 
prevent potential severe erosion of the New Zealand kiwifruit export market through 
barriers to market access from adverse consumer opinion" (Lancaster, 2000, p. 24), 
162 
calling for New Zealand's current status-as a country where there is no GM food 
production-to be maintained through Government policy. This can be seen as an 
attempt to rhetorically transform the instrumental rationality of the marketplace into 
the formal rationality of institutionalised government policy (see Albrow, 1987; 
Douglas, 1986; Lash, 1987). 
There is some tension evident in these arguments. The free-market rationality 
is used to justify the cost-benefits to the kiwifruit industry and to the New Zealand 
economy. However, the substantive evidence is based on the concerns of 
international kiwifruit markets, rather than the concerns of New Zealanders. As 
Aune (2001) argued, rational choice/public choice theory denies its own rhetoric and 
denigrates public debate-in this case, public debate in New Zealand about GM 
policy-by creating efficiency as the default norm and assuming that everything is to 
be decided on the basis of individual benefit. This denies the power of normative 
behaviour and the role of persuasion in creating this; it also denies the possibility of 
acting for the 'public good' (Aune, 2001), in this case, for New Zealand. Yet, the 
kiwifruit industry documents clearly intend to persuade their audiences in terms of 
the New Zealand public good, and draw on other discourses to add additional 
persuasive elements to support their position on GM. 
Words or paragraphs positioned first or last in a document, according to 
Cheney and Tompkins (1988), can be seen as a rhetorical strategy indicating the 
essence of an argument. Although the media statement giving the first public 
indication of kiwifruit industry GM policy is market-driven in that it comments at 
length on consumer concerns in international markets, the first paragraph clearly 
aligns the industry's caution over GM with its commitment to safeguarding the 
environment: 
Kiwifruit New Zealand has aligned its research and development policy with its 
strong industry environmental philosophy and production practices by rejecting any 
involvement in genetic engineering. (Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999, emphasis added) 
The statement thus draws on environmental discourses to facilitate identification 
with this anti-GM policy by consumers concerned about environmental issues. This 
is consistent with the industry commitment to sustainability-ZESPRI is a member 
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of the Sustainable Business Network-and acknowledges growing concerns about 
sustainability and environmental issues in New Zealand and internationally (Allen, 
2004; Elkington, 2001b; Hajer, 1997; Hart, 2001; Moser & Miller, 2001; Peterson, 
1997). 
In the following two paragraphs of this media statement, the food safety 
concerns of global consumers are also highlighted and articulated with not producing 
GM kiwifruit, for example: 
As part of our commitment to further strengthening food safety practices, Kiwifruit 
New Zealand has resolved not to fund research, include within its inventory, or 
market genetically modified kiwifruit (Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999). 
The kiwifruit industry sees the introduction of GM foods as a potential risk in losing 
market share because food safety is a major concern in Europe and Japan, major 
markets for New Zealand kiwifruit. In these countries the handling of food scares has 
created significant consumer distrust of both industry and government and frequently 
increased support for policies which minimise damage to the environment (Allan, 
Adam & Carter, 2000; Marks & Kalaitzandonakes, 2001; Murcott, 2001). 
The media statement can be seen as a tactic to reassure these major 
international markets that New Zealand kiwifruit are not GM, and to retain their 
trust. This was particularly important since, following the introduction of the brand 
name ZESPRI for New Zealand kiwifruit, and the release of the new fruit variety 
ZESPRI Gold in 1997, both international customers and New Zealand consumers 
were frequently concerned that the new cultivar was the result of GM. This concern 
was highlighted in two out of the four focus groups conducted with growers, and by 
one of the ZESPRI Communication spokespersons; for example, "We've had to state 
time and time and time again that it [ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit] is not genetically 
modified, there's no genetic engineering involved" (ZESPRI Communication 
spokesperson A). 
The kiwifruit industry documents thus demonstrate a complex construction of 
the market rationality for GM public policy decision-making. They prioritise a macro 
economic approach which privileges the economic value of New Zealand's primary 
production industries and draw on neo-liberal discourses emphasising public choice 
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and rational choice to highlight the importance of international customer perceptions. 
The historical value of New Zealand's primary produce exports is emphasised in the 
submission to the Royal Commission and in the article in the Kiwifruit Journal, 
arguing that GM policy should not be at the expense of existing successful export 
earnings. This rhetorical positioning suggests that market values are prioritised above 
other concerns, and when market values are taken for granted Cheney (1998, 2004) 
suggested that the market might be termed 'amoral'-that is, exempt from moral 
judgement. Yet, the kiwifruit industry additionally acknowledges food safety and 
environmental concerns that suggest some ambivalence about the primary role of a 
free-market approach to GM policy. 
During the period of this research investigation, the kiwifruit industry has 
achieved record returns in international markets and the New Zealand ZESPRI brand 
has become the kiwifruit market leader internationally. In the documents referring to 
the industry position on GM, this hard-won status is specifically identified, valued 
and respected, highlighting an overall theme associated with this trust and confidence 
that centres on the integrity of the industry. The importance of source credibility and 
trust in consumer attitudes to GM has been highlighted by considerable research 
(Prewer, Howard, Hedderley & Shepherd, 1999; James, 2003; Priest, 2001). This 
theme of integrity is apparent in three different contexts: managing the environment, 
managing the respect of stakeholders, and managing uncertainty and safety. These 
three themes will be discussed in the following three sub-sections of this chapter. 
Managing the Environment with Integrity 
The primary emphasis in the media statement on GM was, as discussed 
above, a concern for the environment, and the existing environmental integrity, 
reputation, and brand identity of the industry. Indeed the term "integrity" occurs four 
times in the closing paragraph of the statement, and is also linked with the terms 
"quality," "loyalty," and "safety": 
We work hard to ensure that all New Zealand grown kiwifruit meets consumer and 
customer demand for integrity and we would never jeopardise our position, or our 
reputation for quality and integrity. We also would not risk losing customer loyalty 
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and confidence in the integrity of the ZESPRI brand and system. In fact, we want the 
words environmental integrity and food safety to become synonymous with the 
ZESPRI brand system. (Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999, emphasis added) 
Environmental concerns are specifically referred to in five of the eight paragraphs in 
the media statement, including the lead paragraph, where the environmental 
philosophy and GM are explicitly linked. Environmental integrity is further defined 
through explanations of the Kiwi Green integrated pest management system, aligning 
sustainable management practices with "natural production technology options" to 
produce "high quality fruit with minimal residues while sustaining the natural 
environment" (Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999). The strong rhetorical emphasis on the 
environmental integrity of the industry indicates a strategy aimed at gaining the trust 
of audiences which include international customers and consumers with particular 
environmental concerns. The media statement was widely distributed through the 
ZESPRI website from March 31, 1999 until July 2001. 
Recent interviews conducted by New Zealand researchers with key suppliers 
and 'gatekeepers' to the European food sector, suggest that: 
Favourable perceptions of New Zealand as a country-of-origin for food products are 
dependent mainly on confidence and trust in production, hygiene and quality control 
standards, rather than diffuse images of 'clean, green' landscape. (Knight, 
Holdsworth, & Mather, 2003, p. 3) 
The implementation of the ZESPRI System by the kiwifruit industry, with its focus 
on transparency, trust, and accountability would seem to be a highly successful 
strategy in line with the findings of this report by Knight, Holdsworth and Mather. 
Currently, in 2005, the ZESPRI website omits mentioning GM at all, but in 
2001, it featured a similar general positioning statement about GM to the media 
statement: 
ZESPRI International has said no to genetic modification, acknowledging the 
importance of food safety to consumers. We are already acknowledged as a world 
leader in environmental integrity with the award winning KiwiGreen environmental 
pest management system. We have a policy which states that all export quality 
ZESPRI Kiwifruit must be grown using the KiwiGreen system which maps, 
monitors & measures the entire production process, producing a high quality fruit of 
minimal residues while sustaining the natural environment. (ZESPRI, 2001a) 
Here, the phrase "natural environment" used in conjunction with the phrase "maps, 
monitors & measures" draws on Western discourses of 'natural', which construct 
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nature (and science) as an objective reality (Latour, 2004) that can be technically 
managed (Hajer, 1997), in this case with "environmental integrity" (ZESPRI, 2001a). 
The first three paragraphs of the letter explaining the kiwifruit industry GM 
position again emphasise that the industry focuses on natural production practices-
as opposed to GM, which is thus implicitly positioned as 'un-natural'. 
One hundred percent of ZESPRI's kiwifruit have been grown under natural breeding 
programmes ... All of our kiwifruit are products of natural programmes using 
traditional propagation and growing methods - No genetic modification is involved. 
(Hodge, 2003, emphasis added) 
Here, traditional growing methods are implicitly constructed as safe (having 
integrity) in contrast with the implicit uncertainty of the outcomes of new GM 
technologies. This is a further appeal to familiar, trusted primary production 
practices, and historical constructions of New Zealand as an unpolluted, pastoral land 
of plenty (see Archives New Zealand, 2002; Mitchell, 1972). 'Natural' values are 
privileged, and 'natural' is constructed as a moral imperative, as an ideal, pristine, 
pastoral paradise (Cronon, 1996), without acknowledgement that concepts of nature 
may be politically and culturally constructed (see, for example, Cronon, 1996; 
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Hajer, 1997; Macnaghten & Urry, 1998). 
This moral imperative discourse of 'nature' is additionally implicit in rhetoric 
associated with international perceptions of New Zealand's 'clean, green' image. In 
the Kiwfruit Journal article, for example, it is articulated with both health and safety, 
and lifestyle, through use of the words "healthy, enjoyable food" and "safe," to 
strategically position this New Zealand identity as an imperative for GM policy: 
Kiwifruit are purchased and consumed because they are a healthy, enjoyable food. 
The image of New Zealand as clean and green and therefore perceived as safe is 
considered to be a benefit to kiwifruit sales particularly in Europe, but also in Japan. 
(Lancaster, 2000, p. 23) 
New Zealand's 'clean, green' image is explicitly linked with safety. Safety is then 
rhetorically attributed not only to the unadulterated 'naturalness' of the environment 
per se, but also to the integrity with which New Zealand (and the kiwifruit industry) 
manages its products and the environment. Implicit in this statement, is an 
assumption that New Zealand's 'clean, green' image would be damaged by 
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commercial GM food production, and that GM kiwifruit would consequently be 
perceived as a risk to the environment, rather than healthy and safe. 
New Zealand's 'clean, green' image has been discussed at length, and 
critiqued as a myth in the sense that New Zealand's environment is not as unpolluted 
as this image would suggest (Brown, 1997; Henderson 2005; True 2003; Weaver, 
2001). The potential importance of this traditional identity to New Zealand trade 
was, however, acknowledged in the commissioning of a report by the New Zealand 
Ministry for the Environment (BERIJAERU, 2003). Yet, the findings have been 
conflicting, indicating the complexity of possible impacts of GM on this New 
Zealand image (BERIJAERU, 2003; Knight, Holdsworth & Mather, 2003). 
A similar link to a 'clean, green' image is evident in the submission to the 
Royal Commission, where the term "food safety and environmental integrity" is 
explicitly used: 
The perception of New Zealand in the mind of many consumers is that of a "clean 
and green" environment with a high degree of food safety and environmental 
integrity. (ZESPRI, 2000, Executive summary, 4.4) 
Concerns for the environment are constructed by governments and corporate 
business in terms of discourses of sustainability and corporate social responsibility; 
that is by articulating business concerns with sustainable environmental practices, 
and sustainable social practices (Elkington, 2001a, 2001b; Frankel, 2001; Hajer, 
1997; Hediger, 1999; Moser & Miller, 2001). True (2003) has, additionally, argued 
that global interconnectedness makes image and reputation an important part of 
competitive advantage, and this means that industries have to take seriously both 
sustainability and a national identity based on environmental reputation. 
The ZESPRI submission commented that food retailers increasingly demand 
standards that monitor these concerns (ZESPRI, 2000, Section B (n).3), and the 
industry faces increasingly rigorous technical production specifications from 
European and Japanese retailers, with the introduction, for example, of regulatory 
systems such as Euregap by European customers. 
The highlighting of environmental concerns by the kiwifruit industry is then a 
somewhat self-interested strategy, articulating wider environmental and 
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sustainability discourses with economic arguments for caution on the commercial 
release of GM food products. The representation of the industry as having 
environmental integrity is designed to protect its own pragmatic interests in the 
marketplace. In the witness brief supporting the submission, there is a reference to 
crops being "suspended from sale, sometimes for years" in response to "errant 
growers or processes" (Marks, 2000, Section B (j) (iii) 2.). Considerable detail in the 
submission focuses on the increasing number of food retailers in both Europe and 
Japan who will not stock GM food products. 
In the next section of this chapter, the theme of integrity is used in slightly 
different terms. The rights of stakeholders to individual choice are respected, for 
example in terms of GM food labelling, and the respect of stakeholders is sought 
through the use, for example, of transparent information systems and production 
processes. 
Managing the Respect of Stakeholders - Integrity, Transparent Systems, Choice, 
and Diversity 
Integrity in this context, represents providing transparent, 'honest' systems 
for consumers and customers. This includes acknowledging consumer concerns 
about food safety, and adhering to the monitoring systems customers impose in the 
production of kiwifruit, for example, through the Kiwi Green pest management 
system and Euregap regulations. It also includes providing informed choice to 
consumers about GM products through the introduction and regulation of labelling. 
Labelling is a costly reality for industries struggling to comply with 
increasingly varied and demanding auditing, tracking, and tracing requirements 
imposed by international importing authorities. This was acknowledged by both the 
kiwifruit industry and the dairy industry members in focus groups and interviews in 
this study. However, the primacy of the market in determining kiwifruit industry 
policy on GM, and the industry reliance on arguments based on public choice theory, 
meant that moves to standardise the labelling of food products were seen very 
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positively, even possibly creating a change in consumer attitudes to be more 
supportive of GM products, and an eventual change in kiwifruit industry policy to 
use GM technologies. This emphasises the strength of the market rationality for the 
kiwifruit industry position. 
However, labelling is additionally constructed in terms of integrity. The 
ZESPRI submission argues that "the integrity of labelling is paramount" (ZESPRI, 
2000, Section B (h) 4, emphasis added), and Lancaster (2000) represents labelling as 
providing "full and honest disclosure at point of sale" (p. 24, emphasis added). The 
submission additionally explicitly links "respect" with "information and choice": 
In the introduction of new, and often misunderstood, technologies such as GM it is 
important that consumers are treated with respect and given information and choice. 
(ZESPRI, 2000, Section B (h) Summary) 
The linking of "misunderstood," "information," and "choice," is, however, an 
interesting tactic that enhances the industry credibility by rhetorically aligning the 
kiwifruit industry with other industries and corporate groups, whose pro-GM 
arguments draw on a 'deficit model' of scientific understanding (see Irwin & Wynne, 
1996), and assume that consumers have misunderstood GM issues but that if given 
more information they might be less risk-averse (Dutton, 1999; Hines, 2001; 
Johnstone, 1999). However, the ZESPRI argument ambiguously re-articulates this 
position, so that in the context of the ZESPRI position on GM, the implication is that 
information equally creates the choice not to support GM products. As Slack (1996) 
commented, articulation can be a strategic intervention that shapes a social context, 
and Eisenberg (1984) pointed out that strategic ambiguity can be a way for 
organisations to manage multiple and conflicting goals. 
The ZESPRI discussion of the importance of labelling is thus simultaneously 
constructed as likely to increase feedback to retailers that might reduce retailers' 
"precautionary avoidance strategies," "an essential step in the process of consumer 
acceptance" (ZESPRI, 2000, Section B (h) 4 ), and providing the choice not to 
consume GM foods. This indicates a middle ground position, rather than a radical 
position on GM; one that suggests the kiwifruit industry might change their GM 
policy should market acceptance of GM become widespread. The reference to 
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labelling as "an essential step in the process of consumer acceptance of this 
technology" is repeated in the Kiwifruit Journal article (Lancaster, 2000, p. 24), and 
there is an explicit comment that consumers could, in time, accept GM foods: 
We believe that adverse consumer opinion about GM will modify substantially in 
time and the technology will become more acceptable to consumers provided the 
technology is responsibly developed and real benefits are clearly communicated. 
(Lancaster, 2000, p. 24) 
Implicit in the use of the words "responsibly developed" is the belief that consumer 
trust of the technology is paramount, and will determine consumer acceptance, and 
this has been borne out by recent research (Frewer, Howard, Hedderley & Shepherd, 
1999; James, 2003; Hornig-Priest, 2001). However, Lancaster's comment on the 
need for "real benefits" suggests that perceived benefits are more important to 
consumers than perceived risks in determining consumer attitudes. Yet, although 
benefits to food producers have at this stage been more clearly communicated than 
benefits to consumers (Krueger, 2001), recent studies exploring consumer 
perceptions of GM demonstrate ambivalent findings on the relative importance of 
benefits and risks (Prewer, Howard & Shepherd, 1995, 1996; Gamble, Muggleston, 
Hedderley, Parminter, and Richardson-Harman, 2000; Gamble & Gunson, 2002; 
Gaskell, Allum, Wagner, Kronberger, Torgersen, Hampel & Bardes, 2004; Moon & 
Balasubramanian, 2001, 2003; Rowe, 2004). 
Certainly, food labelling may give consumers the power to avoid GM food 
products at the point of sale. Labelling of GM foods became mandatory in New 
Zealand with the introduction of Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) 
labelling requirements on December 7, 2000, through the Food Standard 1.5.2 -
foods produced using gene technology. Division 2 of this Standard specifies labelling 
and other information requirements for foods, including food additives and 
processing aids, produced using gene technology (FSANZ, 2005). 
However, labelling regulations in Australia/New Zealand do not address 
other GM regulatory issues. There is continuing international debate over the 
acceptable minimum percentage of contamination allowed by various nations in 
relation to the GM content in food products, and the lack of fully international food 
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labelling standards. In the most recent Codex Alimentarius Commission report, the 
Taskforce on labelling of GMOs noted: 
... that the issue of labelling of genetically modified organisms [was] under debate 
in many countries and in the Codex Committee on Food Labelling, therefore it 
agreed that it was premature to include a provision to this effect in the code. (Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 2004, Paragraph 11, 22, p. 9) 
It is interesting that this United Nations body, part of the World Health Organization, 
has failed to take a leadership role on the controversial issue of labelling GM foods. 
This emphasises the contested nature of the scientific and political economy issues 
surrounding GM. 
In this uncertain regulatory environment, the kiwiwfruit industry recognised 
that, globally, retailers-for example, Sainsburys and Tescos in Europe, and Jusco 
Co. Ltd. and Daiel Inc. in Japan-are extremely powerful and act as gatekeepers for 
the food industry (Lancaster, 2000, p. 23). And, in the submission, the conditions 
necessary for global retailing of GM foods are clearly stated: 
If food retailers can be assured of public confidence, food and environmental safety 
then technical standards will be adopted to reflect this and global retailing of GM 
food will occur. (ZESPRI, 2000, Section B (h).3.) 
However, there is no discussion of the potential difficulties inherent in reaching 
international agreement in identifying technical standards, or in having confidence 
that these have been rigorously implemented. Concerns about GM contamination of 
imported corn seed to New Zealand and bread dough from New Zealand imported 
into Japan, (Beston, 2002; Hager, 2002; Walsh, 2003), even though these were 
accidental, have highlighted the potential difficulties in reaching international 
agreement on specifications for GM food production and supply. In this dynamic 
context, the timeframes for any change in consumer and customer attitudes to GM 
foods are emphasised as uncertain: 
In the meantime consumer and retailer distrust and avoidance of GM food are 
increasing. It is difficult to predict how long this will continue. (ZESPRI, 2000, 
Section B U) (iii) 8) 
The emphasis on respect for the choices of consumer and customer stakeholders 
through providing transparent information systems positions the GM policy in terms 
relevant for international stakeholders. It again draws on current neo-liberal political 
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and economic discourses informed by rational choice theory and public choice theory 
that assumes that everything can be decided on the basis of individual benefit 
through rational calculations, and communication costs are framed as information 
transaction costs (Aune, 2001). 
The Kiwifruit Journal article introduces additional concerns for integrity in 
relation to New Zealand stakeholders. It identifies that credible research needs to be 
substantial and longitudinal to ensure that information about possible risks and 
benefits to both health and the environment, as well as to the economy, are clearly 
able to be identified. Decision making and analysis are implicitly represented as 
needing to fairly serve the interests of diverse interest groups in the kiwifruit industry 
and in New Zealand. 
This article also sets the context of the industry GM policy in terms of the 
current global debate, and the role that the kiwifruit industry took in making a 
submission to the Royal Commission.: 
There are issues from science, ethics, culture, business, and politics, which jostle for 
power and influence. Finding ways to even carry out this debate has not been easy. 
But there are encouraging signs of greater dialogue between these groups. 
(Lancaster, 2000, p. 22) 
The kiwifruit industry position on GM is implicitly represented as being part of a 
plurality of possible contested positions, but, interestingly, there is no attempt to 
declare that there is a 'right' decision to be made. This demonstrates a respect for 
diverse perspectives and for the complexity of the range of issues involved in making 
public policy decisions about GM (see Ho, 1999; Rifkin, 1999; Shiva, 1997, 2000). It 
reflects an approach to decision-making at a public policy level which acknowledges 
that the outcomes of the debate are unpredictable and echoes other calls for dialogue 
about GM issues (see Braun, 2002; Ellahi, 1994; Gregory, 2003; Juanillo, 2001; 
Nelson, 2001; Reiss & Straughan, 1996). However, this positioning may also be a 
strategy to ensure that the kiwifruit industry is not aligned with more radical interest 
groups who argue against the commercial release of GM in New Zealand, and it 
avoids a head-on confrontation with pro-GM government, industry, and science 
interest groups. 
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An emphasis on democratic debate and decision-making as a way of 
resolving the conflict of interests evident in debate about GM also draws on political 
discourses of democratic electoral rights to protect the right of the kiwifruit industry 
to take a cautious approach towards the introduction of GM to New Zealand. Yet, the 
need for transparent decision making on the part of policy makers is articulated with 
"the best scientific analysis of the risks and benefits of the new technology" 
(Lancaster, 2000, p. 22). This, paradoxically, predicates public policy decision 
making with an assumption that technical/scientific analysis of risks and benefits 
serves all interest groups equally, and should be prioritised over cultural, ethical, or 
spiritual concerns (see Latour, 2004). 
The kiwifruit industry policy then clearly indicates a middle ground position, 
demonstrating possible support for GM if consumer opinion changes, but the GM 
policy of caution draws on particular understandings of risk and uncertainty which 
deserve further discussion, and are explored in the next section. 
Uncertainty and Safety - Discourses of Risk, and GM Technology Outcomes 
The kiwifruit industry position on GM is represented as one of integrity, 
which responsibly recognises the uncertainties associated with the new technology 
by its cautious approach. This is evident in both the opening and closing paragraphs 
of the Kiwifruit Journal article. In the opening paragraph, Lancaster positions GM 
technologies as "new" and uncertain in outcome: 
Genetic knowledge has given us the means to intervene in life in ways that are quite 
new. We can change and reconstruct forms of life, we can manipulate and rearrange, 
and we do not yet know if there are any limits to that. (Lancaster, 2000, p. 22) 
The recognition of ongoing uncertainty is consistent with current discourses of risk 
that highlight the impossibility of quantifying risks associated with modem 
technologies (Adam, Beck & van Loon, 2000; Beck, 1992; Perrow, 1984). 
In the closing section of the article, this position is given scientific and 
economic credibility by the use of a sub-heading: "Is there a mainstream science 
view about safety of GM food?" (Lancaster, 2000, p. 25) which quotes a seven-point 
summary of the findings presented at an Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
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and Development (OECD) conference on "GM Food Safety: Facts, Uncertainties and 
Assessments". No specifically pro-GM evidence is presented. Four of these points 
focus on uncertainty associated with the outcomes of current research. A further 
point reassures the readers only through the absence of evidence, that there is no 
peer-reviewed scientific article indicating adverse effects on humans from eating GM 
foods; and the remaining two points focus on the need for consumer choice (through 
labelling) and open citizen engagement in decision making and discussion about 
GM. This scientific evidence does not highlight technical discourses of risk which 
suggest that risk can be assessed and managed (Burke, 2004, Tait, 2001; Wilkins, 
2001). 
However, the Kiwifruit Journal article equally suggests that the industry sees 
a positive future for GM science and technology: 
World initiatives currently underway such as food labelling legislation, improved 
food safety testing, and greater environmental risk understanding will provide more 
certainty about the technology. Substantial research over a long time-frame provides 
reliable information that will give assurance of the safety and benefits of GM 
technology. (Lancaster, 2000, p. 24) 
The rhetorical use of the active tense in the phrases "will provide and "will give," 
linked with "reliable information" suggests a confidence that brooks no alternative. 
This draws on discourses of technological determinism, and a conception of 
technology as progress, that risk can be managed, and that the natural world can be 
predicted and controlled (see Giddens, 1972; Lash, 1987; Latour, 1993, 2004; 
Levidow, 1998). There is some tension here then in the assurance that GM 
technologies will be safe and their construction in terms of uncertainty. This was 
echoed in some of the kiwifruit grower focus groups, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Six. 
Interestingly, no reference is made in the Kiwifruit Journal article or the 
ZESPRI submission to the details of possible environmental or health risks involved 
in producing or consuming GM foods. Neither is it suggested that consumers 
perceive particular risks, for example, allergic reactions, nor is there any detailed 
discussion of social or cultural issues associated with GM, or acknowledgement that 
risk may be culturally constructed (see Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, Shiva, 1997, 
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2000). This is in contrast to the arguments of other New Zealand interest groups that 
are against GM in crops and food (for example the 'GE-Free' coalition and 
MAdGE). 
The ZESPRI submission makes only two main recommendations, and these 
link research, uncertainty, and safety: First, "New Zealand should maintain its 
current GM free status for commercial food production until the uncertainties about 
the technology and its acceptance are better resolved" (ZESPRI, 2000, Executive 
summary, 4.6, emphasis added), and second, "Research about GM is necessary to 
reduce the uncertainties about the technology and to determine its food and 
environmental safety" (ZESPRI, 2000, Executive summary, 4.7, emphasis added). 
Despite the rhetoric of uncertainty then, there is a techncial construction of risk; an 
expectation that risks can be quantified and eventually controlled or resolved (see 
Beck, 2000; Latour, 2004). 
The message for broader consumption, however, is slightly different. As 
discussed above, the second paragraph of the earlier media statement issued in 1999 
represents not funding GM research as strengthening food safety, and clearly 
indicates that the kiwifruit industry will not be involved: 
No New Zealand commercial kiwifruit, either under evaluation or in commercial 
production, has ever been genetically modified ... As part of our commitment to 
further strengthening food safety practices, Kiwifruit New Zealand has resolved not 
to fund research, include within its inventory, or market genetically modified 
kiwifruit. (Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999) 
The overall rhetorical construction of the kiwifruit industry GM position argues that 
perceived uncertainties surrounding GM foods mean that current best practice in 
terms of food safety should not include GM food production. The rhetoric associated 
with current kiwifruit industry food safety practices then positions the industry as 
responsible, as having integrity. The possible loss of this integrity through 
association with GM is seen to be important to all stakeholders: international 
customers and consumers, as well as internal stakeholders, growers, and suppliers. 
Yet, the term 'uncertainty' featured in the closing paragraphs of the letter about GM 
policy again implies that, in the future, uncertainty and risk can be managed. It 
argues that New Zealand should curtail the release of GMOs into New Zealand until 
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risks are "better understood and stronger mitigating strategies have been developed" 
(Hodge, 2003). 
The construction of 'uncertainty' and 'risk' in ZESPRI documents in relation 
to GM is thus highly ambivalent. It demonstrates the tensions to be managed 
between a market rationality-and consumer conceptions of uncertainty- and a 
technical/scientific rationality-and technical constructions of risk. 
However, there is some recognition in this repetition of the key term 
'uncertainty' in conjunction with the strong acknowledgement of consumer concerns 
that these concerns are considered to be legitimate. The submission recommends that 
changes to the regulation and control of GM research are needed: that research 
"should be better facilitated by appropriate changes to legislation, and to regulatory 
and institutional arrangements" (ZESPRI, 2000, Section A2.2). Yet, no further detail 
suggesting the nature of these changes is given. While the marketing focus of the 
ZESPRI position is clearly supported by detailed evidence, the submission makes no 
substantive recommendations as to who might make technical assurances about food 
and environmental safety, or how such assurances might be measured; and what 
changes to regulatory and legislative requirements are needed, or appropriate time 
frames for this to occur. 
The kiwifruit industry position on the legislative and regulatory environment 
in New Zealand is thus, by omission, an example of strategic ambiguity (Eisenberg, 
1984) that mirrors its ambivalent position on risk and uncertainty. The industry 
position on labelling, would suggest a desire for a stringent regulatory framework; 
however, the neo-liberal framing of GM decision-making as market-driven, would 
suggest a desire that the research and development environment should be as free of 
legislative interventions as possible. Indeed, no clear recommendations are given for 
public policymaking. As Conrad and Mclntush (2003) commented: 
Ambiguity also allows actors to reconcile their own ambivalence and to develop 
effective rationalizations for supporting particular policies. But strategic ambiguity 
also means that public policymaking is more a loose collection of ideas competing 
for attention than a coherent decision structure (p. 408) 
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In sum then, integrity is associated, and articulated, with managing the environment 
responsibly, with managing the respect, trust, and diverse perspectives of multiple 
stakeholders, and with managing uncertainty. In association with the theme of 
integrity, mention has already been made of the meanings attributed by the kiwifruit 
industry to science, technology, and concepts of 'natural' in relation to GM policy. 
These understandings are to some extent held in tension with the meanings in 
positioning statements on GM that refer to innovation. 
Innovation and Competing Understandings of Technology and Science 
Despite the fact that the kiwifruit industry GM policy was developed on the 
joint recommendations of the ZESPRI International (marketing) group and the 
ZESPRI Innovation group, the major emphasis in the policy documents is on the 
perceptions of the kiwifruit markets rather than innovation as the main driver of GM 
policy. However, the rhetorical positioning of the policy indicates a tension: the need 
to be seen as both innovative and responsive to market concerns, particularly since 
other industries, such as the dairy industry, position 'innovation' as embracing GM. 
Other submissions to the Royal Commission, such as the dairy industry and 
the HortResearch submissions, make much of the importance for New Zealand to 
retain intellectual property rights in genomic research, and link keeping pace with 
other countries' research with being innovative-using technologies like GM 
because they are cutting edge and may provide a competitive advantage. Such links 
reflect a specific technologically deterministic viewpoint; that is, technological 
development represents progress, and is inevitable (Henwood, Wyatt, Miller & 
Senker, 2000; Ho, 1999; Levidow, 1998; Shiva, 1997). However, as discussed above, 
the ZESPRI submission designates market and consumer acceptance as the preferred 
driver of GM research. There is a brief acknowledgement in the ZESPRI submission 
that New Zealand needs to be involved in research "so that the country keeps pace 
with the rest of the world" (ZESPRI, 2000, Section B (h).5) but this statement is still 
contextualised in terms of the market, since it follows the statement, "Greater factual 
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information will be important for consumer acceptance" (ZESPRI, 2000, Section B 
(h).5). 
The second aspect of research considered in the ZESPRI submission is made 
under the heading Alternative uses for GM tools. The submission supports "low risk 
procedures in controlled laboratories" (ZESPRI, 2000, Section B (n).4) rather than 
commercial production of GM food. This is consistent with the reference earlier in 
this chapter to the kiwifruit industry's acceptance of genomic science as a diagnostic 
procedure but caution with regard to a commitment to the production of GM foods. 
We are continuing to explore with HortResearch ... the possibility of doing some 
mapping work that ... could still be of value in our traditional breeding programme 
... we don't have any real concerns that we're missing out on opportunities as a 
result of this policy. (Innovation spokesperson D) 
The nature of kiwifruit industry research and production is then implicitly 
represented as innovative without the need to use new GM technologies. For 
example: 
There is a lot that hasn't yet been explored in terms of standard ways of breeding the 
product ... and so one has got to question whether the additional speed is really 
going to provide the additional value relative to the risk that it brings with it ... 
there is huge progress being made at the moment on- a range of fronts that will add 
value by up to ten years ahead of anything we can do with genetic modifications. 
(Innovation spokesperson D) 
Here, the main advantage of GM is represented as one of short time frames for 
commercial development; yet, this is represented as able to be matched by traditional 
breeding methods. 
Indeed, consistent with the industry emphasis on market concerns, the 
importance of being perceived to be innovative by customers is interestingly evident 
in the media statement on GM. Rather than using GM to appear innovative, the 
KiwiGreen production system is positioned as innovative because it remains ahead of 
competitor industry systems. It is described as, "more than just using natural 
technology options. It means staying ahead of the ball game and making our systems 
more transparent for customers" (Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999). Yet, the coupling of 
"natural" and "technology" indicates a need for the industry to be perceived as 
technologically sophisticated. Much of the international consumer resistance to GM 
results from social movements such as environmentalism, but the kiwifruit industry 
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also identifies with other primary producer industries in New Zealand. The kiwifruit 
industry must thus acknowledge and manage diverse viewpoints, including both 
environmental discourses and those of science and technological determinism. 
The Innovation team position on science and technology is somewhat 
paradoxical; it is comfortable with GM science but cautious about the outcomes of 
GM technologies. However, its support for, and interest in, research is clearly 
evident with the first sentences in the Kiwijlier article: "ZESPRI is committed to a 
high technology future. Currently about 20% of our annual investment in Innovation 
projects goes into new cultivar development" (ZESPRI Innovation, 2001, p. 4). 
However, this research is still justified in terms of the consumer, as providing 
"factual information ... important for allowing consumers to make informed choice 
in the future" (ZESPRI Innovation, 2001, p. 4). There is a reference to consumer 
concerns that the new cultivar ZESPRI Gold might be GM, and the evident relief 
when they were reassured that it was produced by "entirely natural plant breeding" 
(ZESPRI Innovation, 2001, p. 4). This first paragraph then aims to reassure growers 
that industry values are unchanged, as is the industry position on GM, at the same 
time positioning innovation in terms of the technology associated with 'natural' 
production and breeding systems. 
The article in the Kiwiflier further reflects the tensions being managed in the 
kiwifruit industry position in relation to science and technology when it indicates 
support for diverse aspects of potential Government policy: "We support the 
Government's position in seeking a balance between the needs of both sides in the 
GM debate and acknowledge its desire to preserve scientific opportunities" (ZESPRI 
Innovation, 2001, p. 4). Support is indicated for controlled laboratory research but 
also for the two year moratorium on applications for commercial field trials. It is 
evident that in managing the need to be seen as both innovative and responsive to 
market concerns, the kiwifruit industry represents its ongoing practices as innovative, 
rather than embarking on GM research and development. 
The kiwifruit industry has a clear policy not to produce GM fruit at the 
current time and argues that the commercial release of GM products in New Zealand 
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would be likely to alienate international kiwifruit markets. The industry policy is thus 
rhetorically constructed in terms that are market-driven. The policy focuses on the 
uncertainties (and therefore risks) associated with current GM knowledge. Yet, the 
policy constructs GM technologies as likely to be perceived as safe in the future in 
the light of further research and the implementation of labelling. The major 
explanations for this policy are given in terms of the economic benefits to the 
industry (and therefore to New Zealand) and the need to be seen as having 
environmental integrity, as well as taking responsible action that reduces uncertainty 
and respects diverse perspectives of the issues. 
In contrast, the dairy industry policy on GM, while again being market-
driven, takes the position that New Zealand should embark on the rapid adoption of 
GM to ensure that it maintains its position as a world leader in primary export 
products. The following section of this chapter examines the rhetorical construction 
of the dairy industry GM policy. 
The Dairy Industry Policy on GM 
This section identifies the documents that were analysed, before exploring in 
more depth how the dairy industry position on GM was expressed arid explained as 
the policy was established. 
Documents Selected for Analysis 
The documents analysed were written for a variety of audiences over the time 
frame of this research. The major document(s) analysed is the comprehensive set of 
submissions made by the NZDB to the Royal Commission. This was also made on 
behalf of New Zealand Dairy Research Institute, Livestock Corporation Limited, 
Dairying Research Corporation, and ViaLactia Biosciences New Zealand Limited. 
This lengthy, highly detailed submission comprises 89 pages in the main document 
with further witness briefs from Juliet MacLean, a dairy farmer and Nuffield scholar, 
and John Y eabsley, a senior fellow of the New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research. In addition, the NZDB made legal and concluding submissions 
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(documents of 11 and 13 pages respectively) in conjunction with the New Zealand 
Cooperative Dairy company. (The New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Company 
initially made a short, separate submission but, in this document, referred 
substantively to the NZDB submission.) 
As for the kiwifruit industry, the primary audience for submissions was the 
commissioners, but since all submissions were publicly available on the 
Commission's website, the larger audiences were New Zealand citizens and 
consumers, and potentially international audiences, markets, and customers 
interested in the dairy industry policy on GM. 
Three information booklets are also analysed. The first of these was produced 
by the NZDB in 2000, and was specifically written for dairy industry personnel, for 
example, those marketing New Zealand dairy products in international markets. 
Many of these personnel were involved in discussions with customers about dairy 
industry policies; the booklet was to ensure that they had access to general 
information about biotechnology and was entitled What is biotechnology? Biotech 
brief. with a further subtitle: Winning worldwide. 
The second information booklet was again produced by the NZDB, but was 
written specifically for, and mailed to, all dairy farmers. It was produced in April, 
2000 and was entitled Biotechnology: Why we 're investing in research. 
The third information booklet was written by dairy farmer Juliet Maclean, 
following her Nuffield scholarship in 2000. The theme of her study was, ''The threats 
and opportunities that agricultural biotechnology will pose for New Zealand 
agriculture" (Maclean, 2000, p.l). This research was funded by Meat New Zealand, 
the NZDB, Pipfruit Growers New Zealand Inc., ZESPRI International Ltd., 
McKenzie Charitable Foundation, and Federated Farmers of New Zealand. The 
booklet was written to address a concern that farmers' lack of understanding of 
agricultural biotechnology could be to New Zealand's detriment. It was entitled A 
brief guide to understanding biotechnology in New Zealand farming, and aimed at a 
wide audience of primary producers, not just at dairy farmers. However, this booklet 
was widely referred to in research interviews with dairy industry members. 
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Two media statements made by Fonterra are also analysed. The first, titled 
"Statement on Genetic Modification", was made on 14 September, 2001 in the 
interim after the report of the Royal Commission and before the announcement of 
Government policy on GM, and the second, titled "GM Decision", was made on 30 
October, 2001 in response to the announcement of Government policy. 
The Fonterra 2001/2002 Annual Report, the New Zealand Milk Products and 
Fonterra websites, and a speech made by Craig Norgate, first CEO of Fonterra, are 
also referred to in the following chapters. Although the overall GM policy is 
consistent throughout these documents, the rhetorical strategies change, with 
different priorities emphasised for the different target audiences. 
The Market Context of the Policy: Remaining Competitive 
The dairy industry positioning on GM is expressed and explained as being 
driven by the market, and in this respect it is similar to that of the kiwifruit industry. 
However, the kiwifruit industry is primarily concerned about the values and attitudes 
of their customers and consumers in Europe and Japan, who are GM risk-averse. In 
contrast, although the dairy industry state that they will never use GM in ways that 
are not acceptable to their customers (ViaLactia spokesperson), such concerns are 
not foregrounded in their arguments. 
Both industries are market-driven in the sense that the rationality of the 
market is of prime concern; for both industries economic viability and the dollar 
return for shareholders is of primary importance. However, the social meanings 
implicit in the rhetorical construction of the dairy industry GM policy, and the 
supporting arguments, indicate a different market context from that of the kiwifruit 
industry. This positioning is derived from different organisational values and values-
related tensions that underlie the policy. Particular aspects of the identity of the dairy 
industry determine which market and other factors are accorded a priority in strategic 
decision making. 
From the outset, the NZDB argues in its submission to the Royal Commission 
that New Zealand needs to maintain the competitiveness of its primary industries in 
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the global marketplace, in order to maintain its living standards. The dairy industry 
justifies its position on GM arguing, as ZESPRI did in their submission to the Royal 
Commission, that the industry success is important economically to New Zealand, 
because of New Zealand's economic dependence on primary industries involving 
farming, fishing, forestry, and horticulture. This positions the industry in terms of its 
global identity, as striving for the public good of New Zealand rather than the private 
good of shareholders. GM is then articulated with the future economic success of the 
dairy industry, as a means of remaining competitive. This argument, like the ZESPRI 
arguments, draws on neo-liberal free-market discourses that are consistent with 
current New Zealand Government policy, and are based on the claim that 
competition encourages innovation and technological development, leading to 
efficiencies of production (Dalziel, 2003; Devine, 1998, 2001; Kelsey, 1997; Scott, 
1997). 
Fonterra's media statement on 14 September 2001 equally emphasises the 
need to be competitive: 
The reality every New Zealander should understand is that our economy is 
overwhelmingly dependent on biological products, including dairy products, meat, 
wool, fish, and fruit and vegetables. Maintaining and enhancing New Zealanders' 
living standards depends on the country maintaining and enhancing competitiveness 
of these key industries. (Fonterra, 2001, September 14) 
The prioritisation of "living standards" as evidence of success and well-being, rather 
than, for ~xample, care for the environment or educational standards and knowledge 
acquisition, highlights the economic perspective that is privileged in the dairy 
industry GM positioning. 
The executive summary of the NZDB submission articulates GM with 
economic success by rhetorically constructing GM as essential to continuing success 
as a "world competitive sector," to maintain and "enhance" the economic status quo 
and current living standards; it also positions GM as desirable, by suggesting that 
this provides an "opportunity to lead the world" (NZDB, 2000a, Executive summary, 
p. 2). The industry drive to compete as a global player in world dairy markets is also 
evident in CEO Craig Norgate's speech to the Fonterra Annual Meeting in 2002: 
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Globalisation and industry consolidation is leading to the emergence of a handful of 
key dairy players that will increasingly shape the global arena. It will be increasingly 
important to be part of that influential group. (Norgate, September 12, 2002) 
Within a market rationality, then, the dairy industry's GM positioning foregrounds 
New Zealand's identity as an innovative and competitive knowledge economy 
(Growing an innovative New Zealand, 2002), rather than, like the kiwifruit industry, 
foregrounding individual consumer choice. In addition, it foregrounds the dairy 
industry as a major player in promoting this New Zealand identity in global markets. 
Globalisation creates an opportunity for re-branding national identity to distinguish 
local products in competitive global markets by adding a focus on knowledge, 
prosperity, and innovation-on the human capital of New Zealand as well as its 
untouched environment (True, 2003). 
The following edited quotation from the NZDB submission executive 
summary demonstrates the connections created by the sequencing of the NZDB 
arguments: 
New Zealand's economy is overwhelmingly dependent on biological products ... 
The New Zealand dairy industry is the largest and most important of these industries 
... The world is in a biotechnological revolution. Genetic modification ("GM") is an 
integral part of that. The pace of change is rapid and accelerating ... GM is in 
widespread use overseas ... The biotechnological revolution is an important part of 
the knowledge economy, a concept to which New Zealand is committed ... The 
New Zealand dairy industry has advantages which give it the opportunity to lead the 
world ... New Zealand should ensure that responsible use of GM is permitted ... 
It should allow the New Zealand dairy industry to be a leader, not a follower, in 
biotechnological developments and the responsible use of GM. (NZDB, 2000a, 
Executive summary, p. 2) 
This rhetoric of urgency as evidenced by the words "revolution," "rapid," and 
"accelerating," is maintained by the continued emphasis on the need to be 
competitive within international dairy markets represented in the submission. The 
need for a commitment to GM is is accentuated by the construction of biotechnology 
and GM as a "revolution" with an accelerating pace of change. This is articulated 
positively with New Zealand's commitment to a knowledge economy. In contrast, 
Rifkin (1999) constructed the biotechnology 'revolution' negatively: 
The biotech revolution is, after all, the ultimate consumer playground, offering us 
the freedom to recast our own biological endowment and the rest of nature to suit 
whatever whim might move us. (p. 224) 
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Rifkin' s representation of biotechnology as a "whim" suggests that the consequences 
have been considered too lightly. 
Yet, the use of GM technologies, the dairy industry argues, can speed up the 
timeframes for research which may foster more rapid changes in dairy production 
than other techniques would allow, for example at the level of animal breeding, plant 
development for improved fodder, and microbial development for new value-added 
products like functional foods and nutraceuticals. The use of the metaphor of a 'race' 
with competitors adds persuasive immediacy to the dairy industry argument: 
The New Zealand dairy industry is in a never-ending race with its competitors to 
maintain and enhance its competitive advantage. The New Zealand economy will 
suffer if there is any significant erosion in its competitive advantage. Such an 
erosion will occur quickly if the ability of the New Zealand dairy industry to 
compete in the biotechnology race is hindered through an inability to research and 
use GM. [emphasis added] (NZDB, 2000a, Section 57.2, p. 68) 
Again, failure to compete in this 'race' is articulated with a negative impact on the 
New Zealand economy, a benefit likely to be valued by the recipients of the 
submission, the Royal Commission, and implicitly the New Zealand Government 
who set up the Commission. However, the metaphor of a 'race' is linked with other 
benefits in other documents, depending on the intended audience. 
The explicit emphasis of the NZDB booklet aimed at farmers, as in the 
submission, is on the need to remain competitive at an industry level. From the 
outset, the need to compete is again positioned as urgent and a race; for example in 
the Foreword by the Chairman of the NZDB, the use of the words "dare" and "first" 
both imply urgency: 
Developments in biotechnology are moving so fast that we dare not be left behind 
by our competitors. Potentially biotechnology offers us, and our competitors, the 
opportunity to make quantum leaps in productivity. The.first to make new 
discoveries has the opportunity to patent them and gain the full benefits. (NZDB, 
2001c, p. 1, emphasis added) 
In this instance, the 'race' is positioned as providing increases in farm productivity, 
of particular relevance to the farmer audience. 
In 2003, the 'race' was further positioned as benefitting global consumers. 
The following statement appeared on every page of the Fonterra website: "In milk, 
we have a unique raw material. We seek to lead the race to develop its nutritional 
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potential by meeting the needs of an increasingly health-conscious world" (Fonterra, 
2003). Here, the metaphor of a 'race' is positioned as bringing health benefits, likely 
to have appeal for the wider audiences of the website. This reference to "the race" is 
repeated in the Annual Report for 2001/2002, and in more detail in Craig N orgate' s 
(first CEO of Fonterra) speech to the World Dairy summit: 
But there is a new race on-a race to unlock the hidden potential of milk that new 
science is bringing into focus. All of us are in the race and we are all striving to win 
it. There are riches for the first to unlock the value, and commercialise it, and bring 
new products to the market, which line up alongside consumers' desires for healthier 
nutrition. We all have a collective interest in the race, to ensure that dairy products 
are positioned as healthy products for the world, not simply a staple of life. (Norgate, 
October 29, 2001) 
On this occasion, the altruistic benefits of improved global health from GM are 
paradoxically juxtaposed with the self-interest of the financial benefits expected to 
accrue from GM for the industry shareholders, the readers of the Annual Report, and 
the conference attendees. 
The booklet produced for NZDB personnel, such as marketers, also 
demonstrates the centrality of competition to dairy industry positioning on GM, and 
to the industry identity in the global dairy marketplace, through the subtitle, Winning 
Worldwide. As Cheney and Tompkins (1988) suggested, the titles of texts can 
demonstrate the priorities accorded to particular discourses. Rather than simply being 
an information booklet as implied by the main title, What is Biotechnology? Biotech 
Brief, this sub-title positions biotechnology-and GM-as winning, with the 
implication that without biotechnology and GM the industry will lose. However, the 
majority of this booklet's substantive content focuses on explaining GM science, 
aimed at educating marketers, who deal with customer concerns. This focus 
implicitly assumes that an understanding of the science of GM will facilitate a 
supportive stance, which can be transferred to customers and consumers. A similar 
position is taken by Dutton (1999), Glick (1997), Johnstone (1999), and Wansink and 
Kim (2001). 
However, there is no mention of the specific arguments for the need to be 
competitive put forward in the submission-benefits for the industry economically, 
or for New Zealand economically, and benefits in terms of research and intellectual 
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property ownership. Instead, the headings, "Perceived benefits" and "Perceived 
concerns," highlight benefits and concerns seen by customers and consumers, with 
the benefits always privileged by being listed first, despite the fact that the research 
discussing the relative importance of risks and benefits to attitudes towards GM is 
inconclusive (Prewer, Howard & Shepherd, 1995, 1996; Gaskell, Allum, Wagner, 
Kronberger, Torgersen, Hampel & Bardes, 2004; Moon & Balasubramanian, 2001, 
2003; Rowe, 2004). Interestingly, the booklet assumes that positive impacts will 
result from GM by constructing concerns as "arguments put forward by opponents 
[of GM]" (NZDB, 2001b, p. 10). 
In this booklet primarily for marketers, in contrast to other dairy industry 
documents, the benefits and concerns listed are in terms relevant for producers and 
consumers rather than those prioritised by the dairy industry. The headings are 
"Environmental", "Consumer/food safety", "Economic and commercial", and 
"Ethical". Yet, environmental and food safety issues (highlighted by the kiwifruit 
industry) are not addressed significantly in other dairy industry documents related to 
GM. They are not prioritised in the overall dairy industry GM positioning, and, 
although the economic rationality of the market is privileged, the political rationality 
of consumer choice is not. However, even in this NZDB booklet for marketers, the 
benefits listed under "Economic and commercial" relate to dairy production 
outcomes: improvements in crop yield and quality, reduced production costs, and a 
more targeted, less time-consuming approach to breeding, rather than consumer 
benefits, industry returns, or economic benefits for New Zealand. 
Under three of the four "Perceived concerns" headings, concerns are listed 
with a degree of scepticism as the concerns of only some people, for example: 
Some argue that the giant multinationals and farmers in the developed world may 
exploit the benefits of biotechnology at the expense of producers in developing 
countries. (NZDB, 2001b, p. 11, emphasis added) 
In contrast, the language used for "Perceived benefits" uses active verbs which imply 
certainty: "Biotechnology enables high yielding disease/insect resistant crops to be 
produced" and "Biotechnology will allow the production of foods containing reduced 
levels or absence of allergenic proteins" (NZDB, 2001b, p. 10). In only two out of 
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the ten benefits listed are words used indicating uncertainty such as 'may' or 'could'. 
However, in all eight of the concerns listed, the concerns are qualified by the terms 
'may', 'could', or 'some people'. The end result is a document that privileges GM 
benefits and thus intends to persuade as well as inform. 
The dairy industry case-that it needs to be competitive with other dairy 
producers-depends on the support of industry marketers, who need to interpret the 
GM policy accurately to customers in sensitive markets. Being competitive is 
articulated in this booklet with an industry identity where industry personnel 
understand and support the benefits of GM at the level of industry production, and 
represent this position credibly to customers. 
The market rationality for the dairy industry positioning on GM is thus 
underpinned by the need to be competitive in global dairy markets. GM is 
represented as crucial in the 'race' to gain competitive advantage in the international 
marketplace. It is linked with economic, producer, and health benefits, depending on 
the intended audience. Interestingly, the GM research literature has not explored GM 
issues in terms of competition, perhaps because the focus tends to be on functionally-
oriented, public perceptions of GM, rather than on critically-oriented, corporate 
positioning on GM. 
Constructing an Identity of Business Credibility and Authority 
In various documents, specific identities are rhetorically constructed for 
farmers, as well as for the dairy industry as a whole, which emphasise the business 
credibility of the industry, and position the industry as having an authoritative voice 
in the GM debate in New Zealand. 
The perceived benefits and concerns in relation to biotechnology and GM are 
again outlined in the NZDB booklet for dairy farmers. However, the benefits as 
outlined are not specifically tailored to farmers at a production level, as might be 
expected, since production benefits were initially promoted more than consumer 
benefits by companies such as Monsanto (Krueger, 2001). Farmer benefits such as 
the reduced use of pesticides and chemicals, or improved milk yields are not 
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explored in detail; instead benefits are firstly addressed at an industry and market 
level. In this 15 page booklet, 2 pages are devoted to defining the international 
marketplace, 2 pages identify competitors, and 2 further pages indicate the likely 
financial investment and gains in biotechnology research. 
This highlights the business credibility of the industry and positions farmers 
primarily as businessmen, rather than as agricultural experts, with their most 
important consideration being the farm gate return-the dollar return that they 
receive as shareholders in the dairy industry. It emphasises the corporate identity of 
the industry. Within only two pages of "Potential Benefits", one full page is devoted 
to health benefits, and the other lists on-farm production benefits amongst other more 
general consumer benefits, in the briefest of bulleted lists. 
In its conclusion, the booklet positions the use of biotechnology not only in 
terms of the need for competition to maintain the status quo, but in terms of the need 
for competition to survive; the viability of the dairy industry is articulated with 
choosing to invest in biotechnology/GM. The booklet thus appeals to dairy farmers 
to support biotechnology/GM in terms of their business identity as shareholder 
decision makers within the dairy industry. 
The third booklet, written by Juliet Maclean for a wide audience of primary 
producers, addressed in the booklet generically as 'farmers', sets out to be 
persuasive, but privileges a different identity for primary producers. It ambivalently 
constructs them simultaneously as needing to be informed about new 
biotechnologies, and as agricultural experts with some authority. The use of the 
second person and words like "must", "never", and "important" give the arguments 
an imperative tone, suggesting the audience needs direction: 
My challenge to farmers is this. You must understand the issues if you are going to 
make the best decisions. You would never build a new dairy yard or set of cattle 
yards without doing your homework first. You would not change the breed of your 
herd or flock or the composition of your share portfolio based on a weekend article 
in the local tabloid! This is important! We must not let vocal minorities who know 
nothing about agriculture plot our destiny based on their emotion. (Maclean, 2001, p. 
15) 
Yet, the first person pronouns "we" and "our" are inclusive, constructing the author 
and farmers as agricultural experts in opposition to lay minorities. Juliet Maclean 
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derives some authority as an informed dairy farmer from being a Nuffield Scholar, 
but she also positions farmers as needing information, as in danger of reacting 
emotively. Farmers are implicitly positioned as needing to be responsible, like the 
majority of expert farmers, and contrasted with radical uninformed minorities, 
whose arguments are represented as subversive by the term "plot" and whose 
emotion~.! reactions are positioned as invalid. Other pro-GM interest groups, for 
example, the Life Sciences Network (LSN) in their submission to the Royal 
Commission, frequently dismiss anti-GM activists' arguments as emotive. Yet, as 
Motion and Weaver (2005a) have pointed out, the LSN uses equally emotive terms 
in its own discursive positioning of GM. 
In the detail of the NZDB submission, the identity of the dairy industry is 
again constructed as one of authority by virtue of its business and production 
credibility. The industry is represented as unique in that it is currently the most 
efficient dairy industry globally, with production methods, such as the year-round 
availability of pasture, contributing to the lowest production costs for commodity 
milk products like milk powders, despite the distance of New Zealand from its major 
markets (Yeabsley, 2000). The industry is also positioned as unique in terms of the 
existing intellectual property associated with the bovine genome, justifiably since 
New Zealand is a world leader in bovine genomic information (ViaLactia, 2005). 
However, these very unique features, Yeabsley (2000) argues, mean that New 
Zealand has to match the research of other countries: 
We are unlikely to be able to rely on other countries to do the relevant research and 
then become an efficient follower, because the local dairy industry is unique in terms 
of climate, soils, and herd makeup so that offshore innovations may be irrelevant to 
our needs. Indeed, we typically have to match rather than duplicate foreign 
advances. (p. 3) 
The dairy industry is paradoxically positioned in terms of competitor industries as 
needing to be the same as other global dairy producers, to compete equally on the 
same terms with regard to GM, and to be different, in order to remain competitive. 
Yeabsley (2000) further suggests that the New Zealand dairy industry has 
developed a unique cluster of groups of industry personnel and well developed 
supporting activities. This positioning as unique lends credence to the stated 
191 
aspiration to remain a world leader in the global dairy industry. Other biotechnology 
companies have equally been found to be concerned with their corporate reputation, 
since source credibility has been found to be important in determining consumer trust 
in GM (Prewer, Howard, Hedderley & Shepherd, 1999; James, 2003; Priest, 2001), 
and several studies recommend strategies for reputation management (Grupp & 
Gaines-Ross, 2002; Gurau & McLaren, 2003; Moon & Piper, 2001). 
The identification with, and expectation of, a role of leadership also lends an 
imperative tone of moral authority to the NZDB submission; for example, the use of 
the word "should" in conjunction with "responsible" in the last sections of the 
executive summary: "New Zealand should ensure that responsible use of GM is 
permitted" (NZDB, 2000a, Executive summary, S6). In this sentence, "New 
Zealand," rather than the commissioners, is constructed as the audience for the 
expected action. The dairy industry thus recognises that the Royal Commission's 
recommendations will determine Government public policy on GM and the 
submission implicitly exhorts the Government to take morally responsible action by 
supporting GM. There is an assumption that the dairy industry voice is powerful and 
likely to be influential. 
Fonterra's media statement on September 14, 2001, after the Royal 
Commission's report, but before the Government's response, reiterates many of the 
arguments and much of the language used in the submission. The word "must" again 
constructs the commercial use of GM as a moral imperative: 
Fonterra must be allowed to conduct research in New Zealand in a responsible 
manner. We simply must have the ability to make sensible choices about the 
commercial application of genetically-modified organisms in the future. (Fonterra, 
2001, September 14) 
The terms "responsible" and "sensible" additionally position both GM research and 
commercial production of GM as a normalised ethical discourse in New Zealand. In 
this way, as Motion and Weaver (2005a) suggested, the discursive construction of 
GM can be used to establish a "regime of truth" (Foucault, 1991, p. 74) in a struggle 
for legitimation and power. 
A struggle for power is similarly evident in both the NZDB submission and 
the Fonterra media statement of September 14, 2001, when the dairy industry 
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threatened to move its research offshore if the voluntary moratorium on applications 
for the commercial release of GMOs were continued. This threat is constructed as a 
loss to the knowledge society, and therefore to Government strategy (see Growing an 
Innovative New Zealand, 2002; O'Sullivan, 2001), in an attempt to sway 
Government policy: 
Should the moratorium be extended, it would be impossible for us to remain 
competitive with developments in genetic modification without moving our research 
operations offshore. A move overseas would have a negative impact on our business. 
Worse it would have an even more negative impact on New Zealand's scientific 
community as our scientists led their junior colleagues and students offshore. If the 
concept of a Knowledge Society is to have meaning in a New Zealand context, it 
must include biotechnology in all its forms. (Fonterra, 2001, September 14) 
The dairy industry is implicitly accorded significant status in this quote, by the 
assumption that the loss of dairy industry scientists would be a considerable loss to 
the New Zealand scientific community, and to New Zealand's international identity 
and credibility. In this instance, the role of science and specifically "biotechnology in 
all its forms"-including GM-is privileged as the priority for economic 
development. However, such commercial GM research and development agendas for 
governments and scientific institutions have fuelled significant distrust from the 
general public (Henderson & Weaver, 2003; James, 2003). 
The second media release issued by the NZDB, after the announcement of 
Government policy on GM, implicitly constructs GM as based on "sound science," 
and constructs technical assessments of risk as "common sense." It identifies the two 
year moratorium on applications for the commercial release of GMOs as a limitation, 
not favoured by the industry: 
The policy does include restrictions and conditions that appear to go beyond what 
c.in be justified by sound science and common sense assessments of risk. We believe 
that we can live with them, bearing in mind that they will make us less competitive 
in this crucial area than we could be. (Fonterra, 2001, October 30) 
A reluctant approval is evident in the statement: "Fonterra Co-operative Group says 
it can live with the policy announced by the New Zealand Government today on 
research into genetic modification" (Fonterra, 2001, October 30, emphasis added). 
The media release additionally represents GM as essential to the future of science, 
the industry, and New Zealand, and by linking these three elements constructs a 
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powerful role for the dairy industry: "Science can go on in New Zealand and that's 
good for our company and better for New Zealand" (Fonterra, 2001, October 30). 
Previous threats to take research offshore were therefore not implemented. 
The dairy industry GM position thus relies heavily on a market rationality 
articulated with its business and scientific credibility as a powerful industry leader. 
To manage the contested nature of GM, however, the industry uses ambiguous terms 
which are explored in the next section. 
Ambiguous Terms and Dynamic Tensions: Biotechnology, and GM 
The dairy industry places explicit emphasis on the importance of considering 
GM issues from a science perspective. This is not unexpected given that New 
Zealand primary industries are supported by substantial scientific research. For 
example, the dairy industry is supported by the Crown Research Institute, 
AgResearch, as well as dedicated dairy science research facilities owned by the 
industry such as Dexcel, the Fonterra Research Centre, and ViaLactia Biosciences. In 
the submission, in Section B (a), and in the three booklets analysed in this study, 
definitions of biotechnology and explanations of the scientific processes involved in 
various types of genetic technologies are explained in detail. The NZDB submission 
refers to the Independent Biotechnology Advisory Council groupings that define new 
and potential biotechnologies, providing some measure of independent credibility as 
justification for the scientific explanations of GM. 
However, there are tensions in the dairy industry positioning of GM and 
biotechnology. GM is portrayed both as reassuringly familiar-an inevitable 
progression from traditional practices-and as innovative, an exciting new 
opportunity-a scientific revolution. Implicitly, the identity of the dairy industry 
itself is then similarly positioned as both familiar and innovative. 
The NZDB submission, for example, begins by defining biotechnology as the 
context of GM: ''To deal adequately with the issues relating to GM, it is necessary to 
view GM in its proper context. That context is that it is a part of the wider science 
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referred to as biotechnology" (NZDB, 2000a, Section 10.1, p. 13). 'Biotechnology' is 
defined as: 
... the set of techniques which use living organisms, including plants, animals and 
micro-organisms, to make biological products or to research the basis of disease and 
assist in the development of non-biological products. (NZDB, 2000a, Section B (a), 
10.2) 
The NZDB submission then positions GM as no different from other biotechnologies 
by reassuring the reader that biotechnology and its application to food has been 
around for thousands of years. GM is then implicitly aligned, for example, with 
familiar technologies such as bread, beer, and wine making, and milk pasteurisation, 
and "practised traditional plant and animal breeding techniques" (NZDB, 2000a, 
Section B (a), 10.3). 
However, on other occasions the dairy industry conflates the term 
biotechnology with GM, representing 'biotechnology,' not just GM, as a 'revolution' 
and therefore radically different from the past, as described previously. Other 
literature also demonstrates that definitions of biotechnology are contested. 
Biotechnology-and GM-are similarly constructed as a seamless continuum of 
biotechnological change (Aldridge, 1996; Connor, 2000) or as a dramatically new 
(good or bad) technology (Davis, 1991; Ho, 1999; Reiss & Straughan, 1996; Rifkin, 
1999). 
In an explanation of "new and potential" biotechnologies in the NZDB 
submission (NZDB, 2000a, Section B (a), 10.4), GM is positioned as playing a 
central role, and it is these aspects of biotechnology for which the dairy industry 
argues. The research carried out by the New Zealand Dairy Research Institute, 
Livestock Improvement Corporation Limited, the Dairying Research Corporation, 
and ViaLactia Biosciences (NZ) Limited, all subsidiaries of the NZDB, is explained 
in some detail. All of this research could be said to comprise biotechnology in the 
light of the earlier NZDB definition of biotechnology, yet ViaLactia is the only one 
of these research arms which is referred to as a biotechnology company, and is the 
only one involved in GM research (although, collaborative projects have since been 
developed between ViaLactia and Livestock Improvement). 
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GM, then, is equated directly with the new biotechnology revolution by the 
NZDB, despite the care taken previously in establishing that biotechnology is 
nothing new and involves successful, tried and true agricultural technologies in long 
term use in New Zealand. This somewhat ambiguous construction of biotechnology 
is confusing, since both meanings are given validity in different contexts (see 
Empson, 1961, for a discussion of different constructions of ambiguity), highlighting 
the fact that meanings associated with GM are still contested. This is a strategic use 
of ambiguity, described similarly by Eisenberg (1984), Conrad and Mclntush (2003), 
Conrad and Poole (2002), and Leitch and Davenport (2002) as a way of managing 
multiple or conflicting organisational meanings. For the dairy industry, strategic 
ambiguity in relation to biotechnology allows it to position persuasive arguments 
differently for different audiences in its attempts to gain support for its GM policy. 
The booklet designed primarily for dairy industry marketers sets out to 
"provide basic explanations of key terms and issues associated with biotechnology" 
(NZDB, 2000b, p. 2). It positions biotechnology as "nothing new" (NZDB, 2000b, p. 
4), and as a continuum of practices, with GM positioned at the most recent end of 
that continuum: "Modem biotechnology is a progression from age-old practices such 
as cheesemaking, brewing, and selective breeding" (NZDB, 2000b, p. 3). By 
association with familiar and accepted biotechnologies, GM is rhetorically presented 
in a way chat is reassuring to the marketers, whose task is to reassure international 
customers of the safety and benefits of GM products. However, in the introduction, 
biotechnology is again conflated with GM, by constructing biotechnology as 
controversial: "[The booklet] describes the latest developments in the field; [and] 
summarises the most commonly-voiced arguments for and against biotechnology" 
(NZDB, 2000b, p. 2). Indeed, the definitions and explanations of key terms in the 
booklet are persuasive. For example: 
Genetic modification (GM) enables the genetic material of cells to be altered so that 
they can produce new substances, perform new functions or perform existing 
functions better or differently. (NZDB, 2000b, p. 3-6) 
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In following text, this booklet focuses specifically on the advantages of GM, 
positioning them as "better", "modem", "exciting", "challenging", "more precise", 
"dependable", or "fastest". 
The booklet written by Juliet Maclean also uses terms in ambiguous ways. 
Maclean similarly positions biotechnology as both "not new" and "new": 
"Biotech!1ology itself is not new but for many farmers it is a new way of thinking"; 
and as a "revolution" but with ambiguous benefits: ''The biotechnology revolution 
offers us options for a healthy farming future" (Maclean, 2001, p. 3). It is unclear 
whether "healthy" refers to economic profits, physical health benefits for animals, 
product outcomes with human health benefits, or a healthy environment. This 
rhetorical ambiguity forces the reader to make the interpretation. 'Biotechnology' is 
also first positioned reassuringly as part of familiar, established New Zealand 
farming practice: 
Biotechnology is already part of life in New Zealand. Much of the knowledge and 
technology that our primary industries use to produce, farm, harvest and process our 
products comes from biotechnology. (Maclean, 2001, p. 7) 
Yet, later the term 'biotechnology' is conflated specifically with GM in the context 
of its contested safety, for example: 
Research shows biotech crops are safe to feed livestock and have no impact on the 
resulting milk, meat or eggs ... Biotechnology is already huge! 2001- 56 million 
hectares in GM crops globally." (Maclean, 2001, p. 8) 
The figures demonstrating the extent to which GM has been adopted are intended to 
further reassure farmers that the widespread use of 'new biotechnology' is an 
indication of its safety. 
In contrast, the NZDB booklet aimed specifically at dairy farmers gives no 
initial definition of biotechnology, and no initial references are made to a continuum 
of technologies involving earlier traditional practices. From the outset, biotechnology 
is conflated with genetic technologies, yet only one of these is specifically identified 
as "gene modification". Five levels of 'biotechnology' are described: gene selection, 
altering genes within species (gene modification), moving genes within species 
(isogenics), moving genes between species (transgenics), and cloning. This 
distinction between different types of genetic technology seems designed to position 
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the outcomes positively. Under each heading, the explanation of the process is given 
in the context of its application in the dairy industry, and in two cases this is followed 
by an example of how this technology might be beneficial to human health: in the 
reduction of breast and prostate cancer, and in improving cardiac health (NZDB, 
2000b, pp. 8-10). GM benefits are then presented in terms of both self-interest, for 
farmers, and altruism, for public health. 
There are some discrepancies then both between documents and within 
documents in the ways in which biotechnology and GM are presented by the dairy 
industry. 'Biotechnology' is used strategically and ambiguously in place of 'GM' as 
a less controversial term to simultaneously position the dairy industry as both 
familiar and traditional, and innovative and competitive. The term 'biotechnology' is 
used to articulate GM (and by association, the dairy industry) with less controversial 
agricultural technologies to facilitate stakeholder identification with reassuringly 
familiar and traditional aspects of the dairy industry. This exists in tension, however, 
with the representation of 'biotechnology' and 'GM' as revolutionary. Depending on 
the stakeholders targeted, different identities for the dairy industry, and different 
constructions of GM, are foregrounded. 
If language is viewed as symbolic action and having a constitutive role in 
ordering our world (Burke, 1966, 1973; Cheney, 1991; Heracleous 2004), then the 
social construction of particular meanings through language can provide an 
indication of the intentions of the social actor. The resulting rhetoric is an attempt by 
the rhetor to appeal to others to identify with these particular meanings. 
Organisational rhetoric then involves the management of multiple identifications 
(Cheney, 1991) and, as Eisenberg (1984), Conrad and Mclntush (2003), and Leitch 
and Davenport (2002) argued, strategic ambiguity in this instance is an attempt to 
manage conflicting meanings about GM, and multiple identities for the dairy 
industry, to attain multiple and conflicting goals. The dairy industry rhetoric involves 
strategic communication designed to foster multiple interpretations of messages 
about GM to manage the contested nature of the associated science and technology, 
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and to achieve a correspondence between industry intentions and the interpretations 
of stakeholders. 
In contrast, the dairy industry rhetorical positioning on GM draws on specific 
discourses of science which inform particular prescriptive understandings of risk 
assessment and risk management. 
The Rationality of Science and Understandings of Risk 
As Simon (1976) argued, it is difficult to separate facts from values; 
organisational values provide the frame of reference for decision premises, and the 
contexts for decisions can change as discursive conditions change. The rationality or 
'logic of action' (Karpik, 1978) for decision-making conferred by the symbolic 
systems privileged by an organisation will determine the processes of decision-
making, the means by which decisions are implemented, and the ends or goals which 
are envisaged (Albrow, 1987; Hindess, 1987; Simon, 1976). When organisations 
attempt to separate moral values from rationality, they take an instrumental approach 
to decision-making which emphasises the logic of prediction and control-a 
purposive rationality (Giddens, 1972). Western societies, for example, tend to 
privilege technical, functional, individualist rationalities (Cheney, Christensen, Zorn 
& Ganesh. 2004 ). 
Edelman (1995) argued that the values associated with particular goals are 
then assumed; the particular rationality favoured is used to suggest that there are 
unambiguous or uncontested goals, when in fact the claims presented are designed to 
perpetuate particular perspectives, and maintain the power of an elite group. Indeed 
Douglas (1986) suggested that institutions to a large extent determine how we think, 
our know ledge, and our conceptions of what is 'natural,' in the sense of what is 
justice, what is rational, what we choose to focus on, and what we consider to be 
reasonable and logical. Rationality is then culturally determined (Cheney, 
Christensen, Zorn & Ganesh, 2004; Douglas, 1986). This means that we may not be 
convinced by any form of reasoned argument if it is counter to the ways in which our 
major institutions have classified or recognised knowledge for us. 
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A particular science rationality as a logic for decision making is evident in 
dairy industry positioning on GM. As discussed in Chapter Three, technical/scientific 
perspectives have been extensively critiqued for assuming that science is neutral, and 
failing to recognise that scientific discourses are themselves political in a debate 
sometimes termed 'the science wars' (Brown, 2001; Kitcher, 2001; Latour, 1993, 
2004; Nelkin, 1984, 1995; Segerstrale, 2000; Wa Mwachofi, 1998). Brown (2001) 
noted that it is the objectivity of science that is contested; in contrast to social 
constructionist or postmodern science perspectives, technical science perspectives 
assume that facts about reality can be objectively deduced from empirical evidence. 
Technical science perspectives are privileged by the dairy industry in their 
GM positioning. Environmental and ecological discourses that highlight ethical, 
cultural, and social issues (see, for example, Bookchin, 1995; Jagtenberg & McKie, 
1997; Latour, 2004; Merchant, 1992, 2003) are not significantly represented; 
although, such acknowledgement of other perspectives would better reflect New 
Zealand's complex cultural identity. Indeed, there is little recognition that the 
uncertainties and risks associated with GM are legitimately contested even at a 
scientific level, as found by Scott and Carr (2003). 
The sections in the NZDB submission which relate to Evidence and Level of 
Uncertainty (Section B (b)) and to Risks and Benefits of Use or Avoidance (Section 
B (c)), dismiss ethical, cultural, and political concerns specifically because they are 
not scientifically based. For example: 
Many of the alleged uncertainties of GM which are often raised by opponents of GM 
are not soundly based upon science. Rather, much of the opposition to GM in 
agriculture springs from a complex mix of cultural, ethical and political concerns. 
[emphasis added] (NZDB, 2000a, Section B, (b), 16.1, p. 24) 
Such concerns are positioned as distorting the issues, for example, "Cultural, ethical 
and other concerns should be recognised, but not allowed to distort the risk 
assessment process" (NZDB, 2000a, Section B, (c), p. 25). This is consistent with 
continuing attempts to keep science and political society separate, a position which is 
critiqued by Latour (2004). This privileging of scientific perspectives thus constructs 
legitimate decision-making about GM as controlled by science experts and science 
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institutions, and marginalises the values of all other interest groups. It begs the 
question, what process should be assigned to address such concerns? Interestingly, 
Harvey (2004) suggested that technical and political or ethical issues should be 
separated but concurrent in GM decision-making, to avoid other groups being out-
manoeuvred by scientists. 
The New Zealand Government established a Bioethics Council (Toi te 
Taiao) in December 2002 to advise on cultural, ethical, and social issues associated 
with biotechnology but this has no decision-making powers. This continued 
separation of technical and socio-political issues associated with GM is increasingly 
problematic in New Zealand, a bi-cultural nation. ERMA is the regulatory agency 
designated to make decisions about applications for the commercial release of GMOs 
but has been extensively critiqued for failing to address Maori and other cultural 
perspectives of risk (Roberts, Benton, Satterfield & Benton, 2004). 
As Wynne (1992) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) pointed out, social 
meanings about risk result from cultural and organisational biases. A number of 
adjectives describing the assessment of risk and uncertainty in the NZDB submission 
assume the legitimacy of a technical science perspective; for example: 
The proper approach to the uncertainties involved in any new technology or 
scientific discovery is to research the possible known consequences, and to assess 
the risk of possible unforeseen consequences, by proper scientific methodology ... 
the risks need to be properly assessed and managed. (NZDB, 2000a, Section 16.3, p. 
24, emphasis added) 
Here, the use of the word "proper" relies on the underlying scientific assumptions 
made by the NZDB for an understanding of the judgement intended. 
In a more detailed discussion of risk assessment, the NZDB submission 
identifies 'proper' scientific principles as scientific method involving the replicability 
of results, and publication by peer review, leading to the quantification of benefits 
and risks. This again draws on scientific discourses that privilege technical 
assessments of risk (Burke, 2004; Tait, 2001; Wilkins, 2001). However, Adam, Beck 
and van Loon (2000), Beck (1992), Ho (1999), and Perrow (1984) suggested that 
modem risk involves uncertainty in a way that requires us to reflexively address 
cultural and ethical concerns, because a logic of control can no longer be applied in a 
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post-indt.strial society, when outcomes cannot be envisaged or predicted, and it is 
unlikely that results will be consistently replicable or quantifiable. The implications 
of this are considerable. For example, lay publics increasingly critique the 
assessments of risk privileged by technical experts (Beck, 1992), and it becomes 
impossible to insure against GM risks (see New Zealand Law Commission, 2002; 
Berry, 2003) with consequent issues of liability for compensation if damage does 
occur. 
When other scientific or non-scientific approaches to GM are mentioned in 
dairy industry documents, they are frequently dismissed as myth or referred to as not 
being 's0~.md science.' In the GM media statement issued in September 2001, 
Fonterra makes no attempt to discuss or explain the scientific processes and risks 
involved in such technologies. However, words which again have ambiguous 
meanings, like "responsible," "soundly-based" and "realistic" indicate, as in the 
submission, that a technical/scientific perspective is taken-for-granted. For example: 
We must ensure that the responsible use of genetic modification is permitted ... The 
regulatory systems need to recognise soundly-based public concerns, manage risks, 
and be realistic, cost-effective and timely. (Fonterra, 2001, September 14, emphasis 
added) 
In addition, this comment implies that regulatory systems (such as ERMA) should be 
based on scientific risk assessments, to avoid expensive and time-consuming public 
hearings which add to the costs of scientific research and development. Similar 
concerns have been voiced by other New Zealand scientists and resulted in at least 
one project being taken off-shore (Beston, 2001). 
Similar assumptions are also quite explicit in the second media statement 
issued after the extension of the moratorium, commenting that "restrictions on 
commercial release are not scientifically justified" (Fonterra, 2001, October 30). This 
perspective implies that science needs less regulation than that preferred by the 
public and Government, that science-based research can be assumed to be 
responsible and self-monitoring, that public fears are irrational and unfounded. It is 
again consistent with a neo-liberal/public choice approach to the role of the State in 
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public policy decision-making, which argues for business/scientific autonomy, with 
no regulation by government (Dalziel, 2003; Kelsey, 1996; Tenbensel, 2003). 
The NZDB submission argues for an objective, science-based assessment of 
the risks, but in the same section paradoxically acknowledges that there may be "bias 
arising from the source of funding, the interests of the researcher, and other factors" 
(NZDB, 2000a, Section B, (c), 17.4, p. 26), which must equally affect science-based 
assessments. A number of different factors are acknowledged to affect the perception 
of risk; for example: 
Whether the risks affect children or adults; whether they are accepted voluntarily or 
imposed ... These sometimes unstated perceptions are allowed to influence the 
perception of risk, so as to make an objective, science-based assessment more 
difficult, if not impossible. (NZDB, 2000a, Section B, ( c ), 17 .6, p. 26) 
Surprisingly, this seems to negate the privileging of objective scientific perspectives. 
This ambivalence in the submission, regarding which science and which scientists 
are privileged to properly assess GM risks, indicates that the dairy industry is aware 
of the contested nature of risk assessment and risk management. Yet, the continued 
assumption that pro-GM scientists with technical science perspectives should be 
privileged simultaneously denies the political nature of their own rhetoric. As Aune 
(2001) commented, this is typical of realist rhetoric drawing on public choice theory, 
like, for example, that associated with neo-liberal free-market rationality. 
The information booklet for primary producers by Maclean, however, 
privileges a pro-GM deterministic scientific perspective, which assumes positive 
outcomes for GM unequivocally. (For other examples of GM determinism, see 
Davis, 1991; Enriquez & Goldberg, 2000; Mannion, 1999; Oram, 2000). For 
example, under the heading Applications of this Science, Maclean talks about 
"exciting possibilities" and "will revolutionise the efficiency and accuracy of our 
herd and sire replacement policy" (Maclean, 2001, p. 7). Under the heading 
Consumer Acceptance, resistance to GM is marginalised by discounting both the 
research quoted and consumer concerns as the result of unreliable and emotional 
reporting: 
It is difficult to accurately gauge levels of consumer concern as research results and 
media coverage are frequently biased and taken out of context. Vocal minorities with 
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various political and personal agendas often evoke public fear by using emotional 
rather than scientifically backed arguments. (Maclean, 2001, p. 10) 
Maclean again implicitly assumes that scientific arguments have no political or 
personal agendas behind them and are never biased, taken out of context, or based on 
emotional arguments. However, recent research clearly demonstrates such bias and, 
as discussed previously, indicates that the use of such emotional rhetoric by the 
science community itself has become a standard persuasive tactic in the 
biotechnology debate (Motion & Weaver, 2005a). Maclean constructs the debate as a 
contest for the support of consumers rather than a scientific debate: 
It is important to understand that retailers and lobbyists acting to prevent the use of 
blutech crops in animal feeds are doing so as a response to perceived consumer 
resistance rather than assessments of sound scientific evidence. (Maclean, 2001, p. 
11) 
As discussed above, it is evident that the dairy industry privileges technical/scientific 
perspectives of GM and assumes that if their audiences and publics had more 
scientific information, and understood the science, they would support GM. This 
draws on a 'deficit model' of scientific understanding that assumes lay publics do not 
understand the scientific 'facts' (see Irwin & Wynne, 1996). As discussed 
previously, this belief is not supported by current research, which indicates that 
attitudes to science, biotechnology, or GM are more likely to be influenced by the 
level of t~ust which publics place in science, than by the level of understanding or 
knowledge (Prewer, Howard, Hedderley & Shepherd, 1999; Irani, Sinclair & 
O'Malley, 2002; James, 2003; Hornig-Priest, 1995, 2001; Wynne, 1992, 1996). 
The scientific rationality evident in the dairy industry GM rhetoric thus has 
an assumed legitimacy that reflects Western conceptualisations of science and 
technology. As Latour (2004) argued, the hegemony of science is represented as 
being beyond critique, and as Cheney (2004) has commented in relation to the free-
market, in this sense, science can be considered to be amoral, to be the guardian of its 
own ethical standards. This means that the dairy industry uses a technical/scientific 
rationality in an attempt to legitimate its policy on GM by linking it with the existing 
assumed legitimacy of Western science. The industry thus attempts to construct its 
GM policy as value-free and beyond critique. 
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The market and scientific rationalities drawn on by the dairy industry are 
used to justify why New Zealand should support GM. The NZDB submission also 
argues how the policy should be implemented, including extensive discussion of the 
preferred supporting legislation and regulatory environment. 
Legislation and the Regulatory Environment: The Need for Control 
The NZDB submission focuses considerable attention on the regulation of 
new biotechnologies, but the regulatory environment is barely mentioned in the other 
documents analysed. This indicates that arguments related to this particular issue are 
strategically aimed at policy makers-the Commissioners who will make 
recommendations to the Government, and the Government itself. The NZDB 
submission is positioned as an expert opinion on legislative and regulatory issues 
associated with GM. 
The NZDB consistently represents GM risks as able to be managed through 
legislation and regulation. As discussed in the previous section, this reflects a 
technical approach to risk assessment (Burke, 2004; Tait, 2001; Wilkins, 2001) and 
an understanding of the natural world as predictable, and able to be controlled 
(Giddens, 1972; Latour, 2004). However, rather than presenting extensive arguments 
that represent GM risk as minimal, or GM practices as safe, the NZDB highlights the 
potential negative outcomes of making the regulatory environment more stringent. 
The NZDB therefore avoids going 'head-to-head' with those arguing against GM by 
avoiding defining the specific nature and scope of the risks involved. It marginalises 
GM risks simply by omitting their detailed discussion. 
The NZDB firstly argues that New Zealand legislation cannot afford to be 
different from that of other countries, if the dairy industry identity as a global dairy 
producer is to be retained. A particularly stringent regulatory system, it is argued, 
would further disadvantage the New Zealand dairy industry, and the nation itself, in 
its bid to compete in global markets. GM risks, and public concerns about risk, are 
briefly acknowledged, but risk is given an economic context as an "opportunity 
cost": 
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The regulatory systems in place to address these concerns and risks need to be 
appropriate, timely and cost-effective, recognising particularly the opportunity costs 
which will be imposed by a regulatory system which is out of line with those of 
comparable countries. (NZDB, 2000a, Section S7, p. 3) 
"Appropriate" in this context is represented as not risking the loss of economic 
opportunities considered to be potential outcomes of GM. The terms "timely" and 
cost-effective" are consistent with rational choice theory (Albrow, 1987; Aune, 
2001), and highlight the industry's neo-liberal perspective, emphasising efficiency as 
the means to successful participation in a free-market. In the closing submissions, 
this argument is made particularly forcefully in quite threatening terms: 
The agricultural industries are virtually unanimous in predicting very large 
opportunity costs if there is put in place a regulatory regime for GMOs which unduly 
restricts the use of GMOs in agriculture. It is submitted that New Zealand would 
ignore those predictions at its peril. (NZDB, 2000a, Closing submission Section 
3.14, p. 11) 
Here, the disadvantages to the dairy industry are represented as dire disadvantages to 
New Zealand. 
The case for being comparable to other nations is given further weight by 
arguments that position New Zealand as having international legal obligations in 
terms of its membership of the WTO and existing food regulatory authorities such as 
FSANZ. The NZDB argues that New Zealand cannot afford to breach WTO trade 
agreements by being seen to create barriers to trade. A similar argument advanced by 
the USA in response to the cautious stance on GM taken by New Zealand and the 
European Community has created considerable controversy (Beston, 2003; James, 
2000). It seems that there may be ongoing international debate regarding the 
incompatibility of agreements such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
recommending, for example, the 'precautionary principle,' with other economic 
agreements such as those instituted by the WTO (see Muller, 2004). 
The NZDB makes no references to other United Nations agreements where 
New Zealand's credibility and international reputation might be considered to be at 
risk if it pursues GM, such as those concerning the rights of indigenous peoples and 
environmental issues, for example, the Mataatua Declaration (Commission on 
Human Rights, 1993) and the Cartagena Protocol (Convention on Biological 
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Diversity, 2000). The dairy industry's and New Zealand's identity as an economic 
trading partner is privileged over its identity as a participant in international debate 
on human rights issues or environmental issues of global concern. 
In the NZDB submission, other organisations' investigations and reports on 
GM issues are selectively quoted in support of arguments in favour of GM. A report 
by the US Congress Committee on Science (2000) in relation to plant biotechnology 
is extensively quoted, yet the 'precautionary principle' advocated by the United 
Nations Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) is authoritatively 
challenged and reinterpreted: 
This principle is sometimes misapplied as imposing an onus on those conducting an 
activity to negative the possibility of a serious threat, that is, to prove affirmatively 
that the activity is not harmful. The latter approach is wrong. Before the 
precautionary principle can be invoked, there must be some proper scientific 
evidence of a threat which meets the definition in Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NZDB, 2000a, Sections 64.20, 64.21, p. 81) 
Here, the use of the word "wrong" is particularly prescriptive. The NZDB thus 
constructs risk assessment within a scientific and legislative framework, and favours 
a selective regulatory approach to decision making about GM. 
The NZDB also argues that New Zealand's membership of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and its credibility in the context of international food 
regulations might be undermined if the New Zealand Government does not explicitly 
endorse its participation in such international forums by maintaining a regulatory 
environment similar to that of other participating countries. For example, the NZDB 
submission comments: 
New Zealand has considerable influence, directly and indirectly, on both the policies 
that apply internationally to food trade and the content of international standards. 
N~w Zealand's success and reputation as an exporter and its level of influence 
internationally in regulatory matters belie its size. (NZDB, 2000a, Section 55.1, p. 
66) 
This implies that if New Zealand does not adopt the NZDB's recommendations on 
legislation and regulatory systems, it will be risking its international credibility both 
as a regulator and as a trading nation. 
The extent of the NZDB's preoccupation with GM legislation and regulatory 
systems is further evident in a separate legal submission made to the Royal 
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Commission, which repeated the arguments in the main submission, but in more 
detail. In addition, four full pages of Yeabsley' s (2000) witness brief are devoted to 
explaining the fundamental principles on which a successful regulatory regime 
should be based. His recommendations focus on the different types of regulation 
needed for different objectives and he clearly separates "technical/scientific issues, 
environmental issues, cultural and ethical issues, other social issues, and economic 
issues" (Yeabsley, 2000, p. 23). He acknowledges that environmental, cultural and 
ethical, and other social issues require wide public participation, but he makes no 
attempt to specify the processes for discussing these. Y eabsley presents an economic 
rationality as the most appropriate underpinning for the regulatory framework. His 
credibility and authority as an expert witness rely on his position as an economist, 
and his detailed discussion focuses on a cost/benefit analysis in economic terms. 
Yeabsley's (2000) witness brief, the NZDB main submission, and the NZDB 
legal submission privilege linked technical/scientific and economic issues. Their 
position is itself prescriptive; yet, it represents a prescriptive approach to legislation 
as inappropriate and excessive. It suggests such an approach will close off future 
options, and may not develop fast enough to keep pace with technological 
developments. For example: 
R~ulation which focuses on clearly identifying standards to be met or outcomes to 
be achieved, with the methods of achieving this remaining flexible, to be tailored to 
particular circumstance. This would seem appropriate in the biotechnology context, 
as a prescriptive approach risks closing off some options, and also risks irrelevancy 
over time as technology evolves faster than the regulatory environment. (Yeabsley, 
2000, 91, p. 24) 
GM outcomes are again assumed to be positive, to be uncontested. Yet, interestingly, 
the ability to keep pace with change may be equally difficult in a technical or 
regulatory approach to risk management. Conversely, it might be argued that a 
prescriptive approach ensures that the full implication of technological developments 
is debated in terms that include environmental, social, cultural, and ethical issues, 
and their associated value systems. 
The dairy industry arguments appear to acknowledge such issues, but 
simultaneously marginalise them by privileging objective science over subjective 
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concerns, and denying the right of non-science groups to a significant voice in the 
regulatory process; for example: 
It is clear that cultural and ethical concerns are legitimately and strongly held by 
many people. The regulatory process for GMOs must address these concerns, in 
order to enjoy the level of public confidence which is necessary for any regulatory 
regime. However, they should not be given disproportionate weight ... cultural and 
ethical concerns are essentially subjective, while scientific risks are to a large extent 
objective ... scientific risks need to be addressed objectively, and managed by a 
regulatory process which does not require public input on a case by case basis. 
(NZDB, 2000a, Section 64, p. 83) 
Given such recommendations, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is public concern 
about the economic, capitalist agendas of science/business interest groups in New 
Zealand (Henderson & Weaver, 2003; James, 2003) and internationally (Krimsky, 
2003). 
Interestingly, debate about the appropriate means of controlling GM research 
and commercial development first occurred soon after the discovery of the nature of 
DNA by Crick and Watson. The Asilomar Conference in 1975 proposed an 
international moratorium on the new technology for a period of two years while these 
same issues were debated. Following the discussion, the US National Institutes of 
Health published a document called Guidelines for Recombinant DNA which remains 
the base document for the regulation of molecular biology and GM in most countries. 
However, in the USA, such regulation has never been incorporated into 
statute, so these remain merely guidelines that are followed by funding agencies. The 
resulting free-market approach results in a purely outcome-based regulatory 
environment in the USA, so that scientists are given much more freedom to 
determine for themselves what scientific and technological research is undertaken, 
and the conditions under which development occurs. In the USA, it is only when 
technologies reach the point of being released commercially that regulations are 
imposed. 
Other countries, for example in Europe, have a more cautious and more 
prescriptive approach, with legislation controlling the conditions of the research 
environment, controlling the process of the research from the point of application, 
through development, to the final outcome. This may explain why, as other research 
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has shown, the US public appears to be more accepting of GM technologies (see 
Anderson & Jackson, 2003; Moon & Balasubramanian, 2001; Tait, 2001). 
In the USA, ongoing opportunity for public involvement in debating research 
issues occurs at the level of each research institution and the research does not 
become more widely publicised until outcomes have eventuated (personal 
conversation, Paul Atkinson, Research Director, AgResearch, January 23, 2003). The 
US public now has a tradition of some 30 years of being less involved in discussion 
about wider environmental, cultural, ethical, and social issues associated with new 
technologies at a national level than, for example, their European counterparts. 
Certainly, in New Zealand there is a strong preference expressed by many research 
scientists for a regulatory environment similar to that in the USA which gives 
scientists more control over the research environment up until the stage of release 
(personal conversation, Paul Atkinson, Research Director, AgResearch, January 23, 
2003). 
The legislative and regulatory issues discussed at such length in the NWB 
submission are mentioned little in the other dairy industry documents analysed. In 
general, however, the position expressed is consistent with that in the submission. 
The NWB booklet for farmers has a page headed "Safety Assurance" (NZDB, 
2000b, p. 13) which refers to ERMA and the Royal Commission as being authorities 
that have been set up to manage food safety and consumer concerns, respectively 
(although arguably this was not the function of the Royal Commission). The NWB 
booklet for dairy industry marketing and operational personnel simply has a page on 
"Labelling of genetically modified foods" (NZDB, 2000a, p. 9) which describes the 
three categories for GM foods which have been included in labelling regimes that 
have been set up in various countries. In each case, the reference to legislation and 
regulation is mentioned only in the context of the interest of the likely target 
audience. It is designed to pre-empt possible questions from those audiences, rather 
than being an integral part of the position expressed on GM. 
In its submission to the Royal Commission, the NWB also argues in detail 
against an extension of the voluntary moratorium on the release and field testing of 
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GMOs, against the introduction of labelling of GM foods, and argues that existing 
liability laws are adequate. The NZDB consistently represents GM risks as able to be 
managed through legislation and regulation. It constructs risk assessment within a 
scientific and legislative framework, and favours a selective regulatory approach to 
decision making about GM. It privileges objective science over subjective moral and 
ethical concerns about risk, and denies the right of non-science groups to a 
significant voice in the regulatory process. Very specific positions are thus identified 
on the future legislative and regulatory operating environment for GM, reflecting the 
private interests of the dairy industry. 
In the next section, it is evident that the dairy industry positioning of 
consumer concerns is somewhat ambivalent, and that dairy industry interests again 
tend to be privileged. 
The Positioning of General Consumer and Specific Maori Concerns 
In contrast to the kiwifruit industry, the market focus of the dairy industry 
highlights the significance of the corporate identity and corporate reputation of the 
industry in relation to GM issues, as opposed to the brand identity perceived by 
consumers. The focus is less on GM products, than on GM capability. 
Little effort is made to counter consumer concerns directly, and consumer 
issues are not addressed in detail in dairy industry documents commenting on GM. 
This is despite the prevalence of pro-GM discourses which argue that GM will feed 
the world's hungry (Braun, 2002; Conway & Toeniessen, 1999; Johnston, 1999; 
Nash, 2000; Paarlberg, 2000), provide medical benefits (Berridge, 2000; Braun, 
2002; Elliot, 2000; Katan & de Roos, 2004 ), and result in lower use of pesticides and 
longer shelf-life for foods (Conner, 2000; Conway & Toeniessen, 1999; Hazelhurst, 
2003; Krueger, 2001; Watson, 2000). Health benefits, are mentioned but not 
prioritised as arguments in favour of ongoing GM research and development. 
Similarly, issues of food safety, which, as discussed previously, are a prime public 
concern in New Zealand and internationally, are rarely mentioned. They are simply 
assumed to be negligible and manageable. 
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Where they are represented, consumer issues are discussed from the 
perspective of the dairy industry. For example, the labelling of GM foods is 
dismissed as unnecessary, probably because the introduction of extensive labelling 
regulations by New Zealand, or by countries to whom New Zealand exports, might 
result in considerable costs for the industry. 
In the NZDB booklet aimed at dairy industry marketers and operational 
personnel, however, consumer concerns about food safety and the environment are 
acknowledged, since this booklet is intended to assist marketers to allay the fears of 
consumers and customers about GM. On this occasion, consumer concerns are given 
status even when they are not scientifically-based concerns: 
Because biotechnology is dealing with basic processes of life, it raises fundamental 
ethical concerns ... Even when it may appear there is no scientific or factual basis 
for such concerns, they cannot be ignored ... a rigorous approach to food safety 
issues---coupled with a real commitment to environmental and social 
responsibility-is required if the potential benefits of biotechnology are to be 
realised. (NZDB, 2001b, p. 4) 
The references to "a rigorous approach to food safety" and "environmental and social 
responsibility" indicate awareness of the risk and sustainability discourses 
underpinning consumer concerns. It is strategically important that marketing 
personnel, who deal directly with customers and consumers, accept such concerns, 
and then give assurances of the safety of GM, to accurately and reassuringly handle 
consumer questions about dairy industry policy. 
In contrast, Maclean's booklet for farmers gives a wide-ranging overview of 
multiple GM issues, including consumer acceptance of GM. In this respect, it is less 
strategically targeted at particular audiences than the dairy industry's own 
documents. For example, Maclean defines consumer acceptance as influenced by 
"perception of risks and benefits, level of knowledge, and trust" (Maclean, 2001, p. 
10). She acknowledges that consumers do not see benefits to themselves in data 
showing savings to farmers and profits for multinationals. She argues that "Biotech 
crops" will be safe to use as feed for livestock, that there are no "detrimental 
impacts" (Maclean, 2001, p. 11), but does not list any actual advantages to either 
farmers or consumers. 
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Maclean' s concluding remark demonstrates that she is responding to 
consumer concerns, but at a level that belittles consumers' understanding about GM: 
"Your roast Tegel chicken will be absolutely no different whether it has had a 
genetically enhanced diet or not" (Maclean, 2001, p. 11). In fact, since December 
2001, in response to consumer concerns, Tegel has publicly stated that none of its 
products are GM, and neither are they fed GM feed products (Tegel Limited, 2005). 
Yet, Maclean recognises the ultimate buying power of the consumer: "The 
consumer ultimately is the King," and calls for dialogue about GM: 
To reach their potential, new biotech innovations must be accepted by each link in 
the food production chain. Open, accurate dialogue between all parties will help 
correct misinformation, generate trust and encourage informed decision making 
based upon sound science rather than distortion. (Maclean, 2001, p. 10) 
However, the references to "correct misinformation," "sound science," and 
"distortion" are not consistent with current conceptualisations of dialogue (see Issacs, 
1999; Tannen, 1998), and again privilege science-based perspectives. 
Maori concerns about GM, like consumer concerns, are not foregrounded in 
dairy industry positioning on GM. Despite the fact that New Zealand is a bicultural 
nation, with the rights of both Maori and Pakeha (New Zealand Europeans) equal in 
law (Waitangi Tribunal, 2005), the dairy industry GM positioning makes only brief 
reference to Maori spiritual and cultural concerns, perhaps in token recognition of the 
need under law to acknowledge responsibilities with respect to the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The summary of the NZDB 's brief discussion in the submission reads: 
• The Crown's responsibilities under the Treaty are acknowledged in respect 
ofGM 
• Maori spiritual and cultural concerns over GM are entitled to equal weight 
with those of other groups in society. 
• There are no Treaty rights in respect of the genome or the germoplasm of 
any species. (NZDB, 2000a, Section B, (g), p.46) 
However, Pakeha values are by default privileged, since there is no recognition that 
Maori cultural values might require different consultation processes; these take 
considerable time, for example, and require extensive participation by each iwi 
(tribal group) (see, for example, Greensill, 1999). As in other sections of the dairy 
industry submission, the terms used assume a particular perspective. For example: 
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Vv hat is required of this Commission is to address the issue of what regulatory 
procedures and processes are necessary to ensure that due congnisance is taken of 
Treaty issues, and that there is appropriate consultation with Maori, when particular 
applications of GM technology are under consideration. It is important that the 
processes which are used to recognise and address Maori cultural issues do not 
create undue delay, cost, or uncertainty. (NZDB, 2000a, Section B, (g), 36.1, 36.2, 
p. 48, emphasis added) 
Here, the term "appropriate" implies that consultation with Maori should not impede 
an application for GM research in a way that might disadvantage the applicant, for 
example, the dairy industry. 
Unlike in the kiwifruit industry positioning on GM, issues of individual or 
consumer choice are rarely mentioned. In the closing submission to the Royal 
Commission, there is only a brief reference to individual choice, through comment 
that farmers have the right to farming practices involving GM, as well as organic 
farming practices: 
A regulatory regime which restricted the farming practices of the majority of farmers 
because of the needs of a small number of farmers is not, it is submitted, justified on 
public policy grounds. (NZDB, 2000a, Closing submission, p. 13) 
It is evident that the dairy industry positioning on GM does not foreground consumer 
or Maori issues. However, issues of consumer choice were emphasised more in the 
research interviews and focus groups conducted with dairy industry members in 
2002-2004, some time after the submissions to the Commission and the initial 
expression of the industry GM position. This suggests that, over the timeframe of this 
research, the dairy industry has had to give increasing weight to consumer concerns, 
and recognise that these have been vociferously debated in New Zealand (see, for 
example, Ashwell & Olsson, 2004; Henderson, 2005; Motion & Weaver, 2005a; 
Motion & Weaver, 2005b). The dairy industry position of support for GM is 
currently commonly predicated with the proviso that they would never proceed with 
commercial applications as long as these are of concern to consumers. 
The dairy industry GM policy argues that research and development of 
commercial GM products is crucial, both for the future economic success of New 
Zealand and the continuing success of the dairy industry as a global competitor in 
international markets. The GM policy is thus rhetorically constructed in terms that 
are market-driven. This positioning draws on technicaVscientific perspectives of risk 
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and favours a regulatory environment that selectively privileges the voices of 
scientific experts. It uses ambiguous representations of 'biotechnology' and 'GM' to 
position GM in ways that will be accepted by diverse stakeholders. In contrast to the 
kiwifruit industry, however, consumer perceptions of GM are somewhat 
marginalised, in the privileging of the corporate perspective of the dairy industry. 
Conclusion: Similarity and Diff ere nee in the Kiwifruit and Dairy 
Industry Policies on GM 
There are both similarities and differences in the kiwifruit and dairy industry 
positions on GM. Both industries are market-driven and privilege economic 
perspectives of GM issues, presenting the private benefits for the industry as in the 
public interest, in terms of the significant economic value which each industry 
contributes to the overall New Zealand economy. 
Edelman (1995) argued that words like 'public interest', 'rationality' and 
'efficiency' are not scientific or technical terms. They suggest that there is an 
unambiguous goal, when that is rarely the case. Such terms, Edelman commented, 
make controversial assumptions whose meanings change according to the values and 
ideologies of their users. This means that, particularly when decisions are contested 
or confused, policy is created "to transform ... self-serving inclinations into 
justifications imbued with patriotism, altruism, logic, or fashionable ideology 
(Edelman, 1995 p. 412). In this sense, 'in the public interest' may additionally mean 
a need for information and public knowledge (Edelman, 1995; Weaver & Motion, 
2002) or the means to voice public discontent (Rogers-Hayden & Hindmarsh, 2002). 
As Krimsky (2003) commented, a critical public interest perspective "requires 
people who are able and willing to speak out candidly and critically" (p. 224) about 
the environmental, political, economic, and socio-cultural impacts of the 
industrialisation of science. 
Within the market rhetoric of each industry, it is clear that different market 
rationalities are constructed, drawing on different discourses and different symbolic 
systems of values and value-premises which reflect particular aspects of each 
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industry's identity. As an established leader in international markets, the kiwifruit 
industry focus is to maintain this position, and to maintain the existing trust and 
allegiance conferred by their international customers and end-consumers. The 
strength of the kiwifruit industry has arguably been facilitated by the emergence of a 
single-desk approach to marketing kiwifruit, and the very successful strategies of the 
industry marketing organisation, ZESPRI International (Wehby, 2004). For these 
reasons, the market rationality associated with the kiwifruit industry GM positioning 
privileges the concerns of international customers and consumers, and the industry 
seeks to protect its brand identity. Since concerns draw significantly on risk 
discourses associated with the environment and food safety, these discourses are 
clearly evident within the rhetorical positioning of the industry. In fact as will be 
seen in Chapter Six, the brand identity for the kiwifruit industry is built strongly 
around environmental values associated with 'natural' and New Zealand's 'clean, 
green' image. 
In contrast, the New Zealand dairy industry, although a strong competitor in 
the global dairy industry, is increasingly threatened by other international dairy 
producers which are able to compete with New Zealand dairy products on the basis 
of price. The New Zealand dairy industry advantage has been based on efficiencies 
of production developed through sophisticated scientific breeding and pasture 
management and the efficient technical manufacture of commodity milk products. It 
is the technical basis for, and identity of, the industry which is threatened, its 
corporate reputation, and the importance of reputation to biotechnology companies 
has been recognised elsewhere (Grupp & Gaines-Ross, 2002; Gurau & McLaren, 
2003; Moon & Piper, 2001). The possibility that other nations might compete with 
the New Zealand dairy industry on the basis of new GM technologies results in a 
market rationality that draws on science and technology discourses favouring GM, 
and privileges its corporate identity as a producer in competition with other 
international dairy producers. 
Interestingly, the kiwifruit industry would entertain the possibility of using 
GM should consumer opinion change, and there is increasing evidence that the dairy 
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industry is unable to proceed with the adoption of GM at the pace it initially 
recommended. Recent research suggests that consumers are still risk-averse to GM 
products (Gaskell, Allum, Wagner, Kronberger, Torgersen, Hampel & Bardes, 2004; 
Rowe, 2004). So, on a pragmatic level, the two industries are equally reliant on 
consumer support. 
Significantly, the rhetorical positioning of the two industries highlights 
different perspectives of time; the kiwifruit industry advocates caution until research 
results are more understood-a consumer timeframe-while the dairy industry 
positions research and development timeframes as urgent and a 'race'-a production 
timeframe. ZESPRI Innovation claimed that GM represented no scientific advantage 
to the industry, in terms of new cultivars, because of the long-term, perennial nature 
of the crop; for example: 
You know, I can't see a benefit, because we are dealing with a perennial crop ... 
With a perennial crop it's a much more long-term changeover and you have to be far 
more conscious ... that any decision you make to change has a far greater impact. 
(Innovation spokesperson E) 
The perennial nature of kiwifruit production means there is considerable long-term 
financial investment in the kiwifruit vines, but this is comparable perhaps to that of 
investing in breeding superior dairy cattle. Yet, the timeframe suggested by the 
kiwifruit industry (personal conversation, Nigel Banks, ZESPRI Research director, 
August 30, 2002) to develop new research initiatives through traditional means-5-
15 years-is less than that suggested as the timeframe for GM research to impact 
commercially on the dairy industry-20 years (personal conversation, Kevin 
Marshall, CEO ViaLactia, September 6, 2002). Conventional breeding programmes 
and GM then are constructed by the kiwifruit industry and the dairy industry, 
respectively, as relatively similar long-term investments, yet the dairy industry 
rhetorically constructed the research timeframe as a race, emphasising the urgency of 
the timeframe as if it were of short duration, while the kiwifruit industry constructed 
the timeframe as long-term in its advocacy of caution. As Adam (1999) has 
commented, timescapes of risk are socially constructed. 
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These two industries also rhetorically position their respective GM policies 
for different target publics. Attitudes to GM in both New Zealand and the kiwifruit 
industry's main international markets are generally also cautious about GM. The 
kiwifruit industry rhetoric is then targeted particularly at Government stakeholders, 
and at pro-GM interest groups in New Zealand that might change public attitudes to 
be more in favour of GM, in an attempt to influence public policy. Current 
Government policy clearly privileges innovation and knowledge-based industries 
that creatively employ new technologies but must also politically reflect the electoral 
mandate. The dairy industry, however, cannot assume that stakeholders within New 
Zealand or its international markets hold positive attitudes towards GM. The dairy 
industry rhetoric is targeted at a wide range of stakeholders, including farmers, 
marketers, and the New Zealand public, as well as Government and regulatory 
agencies, both to persuade those who are against GM to change their position, and to 
reinforce the attitudes of those who are pro-GM. 
The kiwifruit industry acknowledges that there may be diverse viewpoints on 
GM, drawing on multiple value systems, and that its own policy and arguments are 
not the only valid positions. In contrast, the dairy industry is quite prescriptive, 
arguing that the only valid position is the perspective that they advocate. The 
kiwifruit industry demonstrates a position which is closer to the ecological rationality 
called for by Prasad and Elmes (2005) in relation to environmental issues, while the 
dairy industry position demonstrates an instrumental rationality drawing on 
discourses of the 'practical', typical of what these authors call 'environmental 
management'. 
The following chapter, Chapter Six, focuses on the values expressed in the 
industries' GM policies in terms of the interrelationships between the organisational 
identities and images held by industry stakeholders. 
218 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE INTERPLAY OF ORGANISATIONAL IDENTITY AND 
IMAGE EVIDENT IN INDUSTRY POLICY ON GENETIC 
MODIFICATION 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on aspects of organisational identity-the 
interrelationships between the organisational values and culture, identities, and 
images that are represented in the rhetorical positioning of the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries on GM. It discusses the range of different values and values-related 
tensions implicit in the industries' GM policies in terms of the organisational 
identities and images held by stakeholders and publics. 
The chapter analyses 'accounts' by industry members of the industry 
decisions and positions on GM. These are examples of retrospective comment by 
organisational participants involved in the industry, as they analyse decisions made 
on the basis of the premises for those decisions (see Tompkins & Cheney, 1983). The 
'accounts' were accessed in research interviews and focus groups with kiwifruit and 
dairy industry members involved in policy development, research, production, 
manufacture, and communication or marketing. The chapter also refers to the 
documents examined in Chapter Five; that is both documents expressing the 
industries' brand identity and documents explaining the policy on GM. This analysis 
involves considering the values and identities of different groups within each 
industry, and aspects of the wider affiliations held by these groups in terms of their 
identity as New Zealanders and the images held of New Zealand. It involves 
considering the values and images perceived to be held of the industry in the 
international marketplace, and the influences of Government policy on the 
construction of these identities and images. 
The primary focus in this study on identities underpins my interest in why the 
dairy industry and the kiwifruit industry, two seemingly similar industry 
organisations, developed different policies on GM. Both industries are largely 
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cooperatively owned; they are both primary export industries, which produce 
significant export income for New Zealand; and both dairy products and kiwifruit 
have a somewhat iconic status, being seen as representative symbols of New Zealand 
both nationally and internationally (see, for example, Tourism New Zealand, 2005). 
This focus on identities also underpins a second interest in whether groups within 
each industry represent GM policy consistently. The cooperative nature of the 
organisation of these two industries, and strong export focus, would suggest that 
there might be a high degree of consensus related to policy decision making, but the 
rhetorical positioning may be expressed and explained differently by specific groups 
in each industry reflecting different value-premises and rationalities. 
The analysis in this chapter builds on recent re-conceptualisations of 
organisational identity and image in organisational communication, marketing, and 
public relations literature (see, for example, Balmer, 2001; Cheney, 2004; Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001a; Christensen & Cheney, 2005). It explores the proposition that 
the engagement of organisations with key stakeholders, in relation to specific public 
issues that have broad socio-political implications, may demonstrate rationalities that 
are linked to multiple aspects of the organisation's identity. 
Organisational Identity and Image: A Process of Dynamic Adaptability 
The wide range of meanings associated with organisational identity and 
image has resulted in a confusing array of terminology, which has proved difficult to 
synthesise (see, for example, Balmer, 2001). This thesis takes the perspective that 
organisational identity and image are both dynamic and interrelated, allowing the 
organisation to be adaptive in times of intense change (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 
2004). Organisational identity is then both constitutive of organisational culture and 
image, and constituted by that culture and image (Hatch & Schultz, 2004). In this 
sense, organisations manage multiple identities (Cheney, 1991; Cheney, Christensen, 
Conrad, & Lair, 2004; Leitch & Motion, 1999; Scott, Corman & Cheney, 1998; 
Roper, 2005a). Social meanings associated with the identity and image of 
organisations can be said to be socially constructed, and a rhetorical and discursive 
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analysis of organisational communication adds to our understanding of these 
meanings. When organisational members collectively manage the identities and 
projected images of the organisation, they can be said to be strategically responsive 
(Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2004), and an organisation's strategic positioning on 
controversial socio-political issues draws on particular identities in the value-
premises for its decision-making and negotiation with the issues. This chapter thus 
considers the role of identity in the interrelationships between the values, identities, 
and rationalities in the kiwifruit and dairy industry organisational communication 
about GM. The following section in this chapter considers the management of 
organisational identity and image from the perspective of the kiwifruit industry. 
The Management of Organisational Identity and Image in the 
Kiwifruit Industry Positioning on GM 
This analysis focuses on the 'accounts' of members of the kiwifruit industry 
based on interviews with ZESPRI Innovation team leaders, ZESPRI International 
Communication spokespersons, technical advisers at packhouses/suppliers, and a 
spokesperson from Kiwifruit New Zealand; and four focus group discussions 
conducted with kiwifruit growers of ZESPRI Organic fruit, ZESPRI Gold fruit, and 
ZESPRI Green fruit; and growers based in Whangarei. Aspects of the kiwifruit 
industry identity and image represented on the ZESPRI brand video and ZESPRI 
System video, and on the ZESPRI website in 2001/2002 are also discussed. The 
relationships between the different industry groups provide some insights into why 
an integrated marketing identity has been important to the current success of the 
industry, and why the industry's GM policy is said to be market-driven. 
Interdependent Business Units: An Integrated Marketing Identity 
The kiwifruit industry has had a dynamic, adaptive identity (see Gioia, 
Schultz, & Corley, 2004; Hatch & Schultz, 2004) which has developed over the last 
15-20 years in response to a variety of historical contexts that have helped to shape 
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the industry culture (Wehby, 2004). One of the core industry values that underpins 
current strategies is the importance of international market perceptions-a common 
starting point (see van Riel, 1995) for a marketing identity. 
The industry's business focus and the importance of international market 
perceptions in determining the 'gate return' for growers are very evident in all 
communication. For example, the financial and market information that is the focus 
of the industry newsletter, Kiwijlier, was specifically valued by the organic growers' 
focus group participants and by two of the packhouse technical advisers. In line with 
this strong business focus, the accounts of all interviewees and focus group 
participants emphasised that the industry policy on GM is market driven. There was 
concern that any suggestion of industry involvement with GM would have a "serious 
impact on our sales" (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier C). The following 
reference to a "pragmatic marketing decision" summarises the feelings of 
participants well: 
The key driver in ZESPRI' s decision is in the acceptability or otherwise of the [GM] 
technology to our consumers ... it's a pragmatic marketing decision that our 
consumers don't want it, and if they have it they will be likely to buy less kiwifruit. 
(Innovation spokesperson D, emphasis added) 
Participants indicated a very high level of support for this instrumental marketing 
focus, which suggests identification with (Burke, 1973) the industry's marketing 
identity. The market approach to GM was universally known, understood, and 
supported by almost all participants in the research. For example, the GM policy was 
referred to as a "clear, strong message right from the start ... everybody knows what 
it is" (Respondent F, ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit focus group); and "the understanding 
was there from the beginning" (Respondent C, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus 
group). 
Growers indicated there was a culture of good industry communication, 
feedback, and consultation through newsletters, 'think tanks' and road shows. For 
example, "We have a very good system and it's getting better all the time with sub-
committees . . . [who] make recommendations ... to the board" (Respondent C, 
ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group); and "the flow of information is continually 
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pouring in" (Respondent A, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group). However, there 
was little Jonna[ consultation prior to the development of the GM policy, as will be 
further discussed in Chapter Seven. Of all the research participants, only one of the 
Innovation team and one Communication spokesperson were involved in early 
discussion and preparation of the policy. Industry members interviewed were 
confident, however, in the industry structure and leadership, and were happy to leave 
decision making on the issue of GM to the Boards of ZESPRI International and 
ZESPRI Innovation because of their expertise in marketing and science. The 
response of the growers to the ZESPRI policy was described, for example, as, 
"almost a 100% ... back ZESPRI in their calling for ... no support of GMO" 
(Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier A). The following comment is typical of the 
overall attitude of industry members: 
Basically you're the marketer; you're responsible for selling the fruit ... there was 
acceptance of the position that ZESPRI has adopted at this point. (Kiwifruit New 
Zealand spokesperson) · 
There was significant support for the ZESPRI leadership, organisational structures, 
and initiatives, with comments such as, "A very good team of expertise" 
(Respondent A, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group); "A proven track record" 
(Respondent F, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group); "Kiwifruit growers are 
effectively confident in the strength of their ZESPRI umbrella" (Technical adviser, 
packhouse/supplier A); and "ZESPRI has the systems in place and has the trust of its 
customers" (Respondent F, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group). 
As Simon (1976) commented, ethical judgements-which are relevant to the 
industry position on GM-require intermediate judgements that involve facts, and 
factual judgements need to be carried out from a position of trust that the ethical 
decisions will be upheld. Therefore, it is hard to separate policy, and ethical 
decisions, from administration, and their implementation. The kiwifruit industry 
members were able to trust their decision-makers to develop the GM policy because 
the organisation provided excellent channels of communication to facilitate the 
information flow leading to the decision. When organisational values become 
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internalised, individuals identify with the organisational values and these provide a 
frame of reference and the premises for organisational decisions (Simon, 1976). 
The strength of the support for the ZESPRI policy on GM suggested very 
clearly, then, the high level of trust placed by the industry groups interviewed in the 
effectiveness of the leadership and management by ZESPRI Group Limited. The 
industry has developed some elements of a hierarchical corporate organisation to 
manage marketing, research, and administration, but without losing the support and 
involvement of other significant industry groups: the growers and suppliers. All 
kiwifruit industry sectors, for example, work together to implement the ZESPRI 
System, which was highlighted in Chapter Five as contributing to the positioning and 
identity of the kiwifruit industry through environmentally-friendly pest management, 
and transparent production systems. 
The ZESPRI System: Integrated Production and its Impact on Identity 
The importance of the production process is evident in the fact that the 
integrated, industry-wide system was frequently referred to by name; it has been 
given its own identity within the ZESPRI corporate and branding identity. The 
different industry-wide systems that have been introduced by ZESPRI: the 
KiwiGreen pest management system, and subsequently Taste ZESPRI, and the wider 
ZESPRI System were described as 'excellent' in different interviews and focus 
groups. Comments from participants in the Whangarei, ZESPRI Organic, and 
ZESPRI Gold focus groups; and from two of the three packhouse technical advisers, 
demonstrated that participants were proud of, and identified with, the associated 
value systems and the role of the ZESPRI Group in implementing these. For 
example: 
In ZESPRI' s case, everything we do is based on the integrity of what we call the 
ZESPRI System, which is the integrated production and delivery system, which 
basically means that every single process, from the planting of the seeds through to 
the marketplace can be documented, and that's a rite of passage. (Communication 
spokesperson B) 
The phrase "rite of passage" additionally suggests an expectation that these values 
will be endorsed by all industry members; a goal to be aspired to by every industry 
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member. The distinctiveness of the industry organisation's values and practices then 
increased the industry members' support for, and identification with, the organisation 
(see Ashforth & Mae!, 2004). 
Participants rhetorically positioned the high quality production, packaging, 
and marketing systems in place within the industry as contributing to the industry's 
market advantage. For example: 
The fruit's in a sense incidental. It's the package that goes around the fruit-that's 
what sells it, and some of that's the perception of how it's grown, the information on 
its quality attributes-all of those sorts of things. (Innovation spokesperson E) 
However, although supportive of the ZESPRI System and of the marketing focus of 
the GM policy, all participants spoke of ZESPRI in the third person as if it were 
separate from them; although, ZESPRI is wholly owned by growers. Participants 
used the term 'ZESPRI' to refer to ZESPRI International and ZESPRI Innovation as 
the leadership, executive groups in a hierarchical corporate organisation, rather than 
using inclusive personal pronouns such as "our executive group" or "we" which 
might have been expected in a cooperatively owned industry. For example, "They've 
taken a pragmatic approach" (Respondent E, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group, 
emphasis added); "I support ZESPRI's stance" (Respondent C, ZESPRI Gold 
kiwifruit focus group). 
This suggests that the individuals interviewed also retained other identities, as 
part of other organisational affiliations held within the industry, for example, the 
grower group or packhouse group. In this sense, the industry is composed of 
multiple, loosely coupled, or fragmented identities (see Ashforth & Mael, 2004; 
Linstead & Grafton Small, 1992), yet the organisational rhetoric associated with the 
ZESPRI System establishes common values. It appears to facilitate the integration of 
different identities in the industry and to create a coordinated team approach to the 
production and marketing of kiwifruit. By establishing the common starting points 
(see van Riel, 1995) of the organisational identity, this rhetoric demonstrates one of 
the ways in which the industry manages multiple identities (see Cheney, 1991). 
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Distinct Industry Groups: Common and Diverse Values 
As Hatch and Schultz (2004) noted, the social meanings associated with 
identity are constitutive of both the organisational culture and image and constituted 
by that culture and image. However, if the constitution of organisational identity is 
considered to be dynamic (Gioia, Schultz, & Corley, 2004; Hatch & Schultz, 2004), 
other values and identities co-exist with, and contribute to, the kiwifruit industry's 
integrated, production- and marketing-focused identity. Although industry members' 
comments indicated wide support for the cooperative, integrated nature of the 
industry, three separate but integrated industry groups were identified in the 
reference below to a "triangle" (marketers, growers, and suppliers): 
That's why we talk in the industry about this triangle. And we are all interdependent 
and in order to get kiwifruit offshore and into our markets, we need our marketer 
single desk: ZESPRI. We need, obviously, the growers as the source of the product 
and we need the logistics that are supplied through this industry which is packing the 
fruit and getting it to the boats. (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier B) 
Growers were identified, for example, as "very, very pragmatic people" (Technical 
adviser, packhouse/supplier A), and despite the clear acknowledgement of the 
marketing justification for the ZESPRI position on GM, a variety of individual 
personal positions were also evident in the interviews and focus groups. This is 
suggestive of a wider range of group and individual values sourced from other 
affiliations. ZESPRI Organic growers, for example, used the pronoun "we" to clearly 
identify themselves as a separate group from other growers, with different concerns 
about GM: "Well, as a product group, of course, we have a vested interest in 
organics, so we could argue it philosophically" (Respondent A, ZESPRI Organic 
kiwifruit focus group). 
As might be expected, there was some individual variation in interviews and 
focus groups regarding the GM issues referred to, indicative of the wider values 
about GM held within the industry and New Zealand. One grower was particularly 
concerned that the introduction of GM to New Zealand might reduce biodiversity 
and add to the destruction of native flora and fauna. Although, this was not 
specifically mentioned by other participants, it reflects a common discourse about 
GM and the potential loss of biodiversity (see Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1998; Ho, 1999; 
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Jagtenberg & McK.ie, 1997; Shiva, 1997, 2000). In contrast, one grower in the 
ZESPRI Green focus group and one in the Whangarei focus group were strongly in 
favour of GM should the markets accept this, seeing GM as a "golden opportunity to 
... to splice a Bt1 gene in" (Respondent C, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group). 
Other growers in the Whangarei, ZESPRI Green, and ZESPRI Gold focus groups, 
although supportive of the ZESPRI policy, discussed the possible benefits of 
growing GM fruit to reduce the use of sprays and assist in pest management. 
Comments included, for example, "I think in the industry most people would be 
happy if they didn't have to spray" (Respondent B, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus 
group); and "Is it worth alienating 21 % of the market to stop two sprays a year or is 
it better to put the money into developing a safer spray?" (Respondent D, ZESPRI 
Green kiwifruit focus group). This was an instrumental recognition that current 
methods still rely on some chemical usage; it was related to a perceived possible 
reduction in workload, more reliable control of pest management, and consequently a 
more profitable return on the crop. 
There were hints in the ZESPRI Gold focus group and from one packhouse 
technical adviser of some tensions in the industry in relation to the marketing 
differentials and production needs of the three different fruit cultivars, and in relation 
to the possibility of future de-regulation of the industry. However, these were not 
discussed in relation to the GM policy or mentioned by any other participants. 
Interestingly, no participants spontaneously expressed concerns related to 
cultural, Maori, religious, or spiritual values, despite the fact that numerous other 
interest groups cautious about GM represented such concerns very strongly in their 
submissions to the Royal Commission (see Roberts, R. Benton, Satterfield, & N. 
1 Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) is a bacterium that is pathogenic to insects. It is found naturally in soils 
throughout the world. There are numerous races, or subspecies, of this bacterium that produce 
different proteins which act as toxins against specific classes of insects. 
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Benton, 2004). Yet in the research interviews and focus groups an opportunity was 
provided for a discussion of ethical and social values associated with GM. 
The perspectives of individual growers on GM were thus informed by a range 
of self-interested values that drew both on multiple GM discourses and on multiple 
aspects of their own identity as growers. Individual growers demonstrated a mix of 
the formal-that is instrumental or purposive-rationality, and substantive or value-
oriented rationality described by Giddens (1972) and Weber (1978). 
Yet, significantly, the integrated systems implemented by ZESPRI 
International and ZESPRI Innovation represent a number of core industry values, 
relevant to the GM positioning, which were endorsed by these seemingly disparate 
groups in the wider industry. These are an emphasis on natural production methods 
to produce a naturally healthy fruit, positioning of the industry as environmentally 
and socially responsible, and an emphasis on the integrity and transparency of the 
systems themselves. In the next section, these brand values are explored in more 
detail. 
ZESPRI Brand Values: The Interrelationships between Identity and Image 
The decision to move to single-desk kiwifruit marketing has enabled very 
high recognition of the ZESPRI brand internationally. The industry has developed a 
'monolithic' (Olins, 1989) name and visual brand identity for all three fruit cultivars, 
ZESPRI Green, ZESPRI Gold, and ZESPRI Organic, in a variety of international 
marketplaces, including Europe, Asia, and the United States. This identity uses 
particular brand values-common starting points (van Riel, 1995)-to present 
images of New Zealand kiwifruit, and New Zealand, which are perceived positively 
in these different markets. As Olins (2000) argued, a brand depends as much on 
brand values as on particular attributes of the products. 
The common starting points of integrity-the quality of the fruit and the 
transparency of the production systems; naturalness--environmentally sustainable 
production methods, and naturally good for health; and, to some extent, innovation-
novel and unique responsiveness-rhetorically position the kiwifruit industry. They 
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construct particular brand values with which diverse industry groups and 
stakeholders within New Zealand can identify. These common starting points and 
brand values also create the opportunity for stakeholders in differentiated 
international markets to identify with the industry through the social meanings 
associated with diverse images of the industry. These same brand values were also 
evident in the value-premises of the market and environmental rationalities expressed 
in the rhetorical positioning of the kiwifruit industry on GM, discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
Industry members identified ZESPRI' s dominance of the international 
kiwifruit market in association with the perceived success of these brand values; for 
example: 
ZESPRI really does all the advertising for kiwifruit in the world, selling kiwifruit ... 
and all the countries just really latch on to that promotional work. (Respondent D, 
ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group) 
Industry members rejected GM because they felt there was much to lose if the 
current basis for this industry success were to change, with comments such as: "We . 
. . put a lot of money into getting the brand name ... It's doing pretty well. Why 
mess it up" (Respondent C, Whangarei kiwifruit focus group); "All our markets are put at 
risk quite unnecessarily" (Respondent D, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group); 
and, "We've spent the last however many years building up the quality ... of our 
kiwifruit as against anybody else's and we're just going to blow it" (Respondent B, 
ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group). 
The success of the ZESPRI brand, and the values that underpin it, sustains an 
international image that relies on the reputation of the industry based on the quality 
of kiwifruit production. One of the ZESPRI International communication 
spokespersons positioned this reputation as a "corporate story" of "integrity". This 
spokesperson repeatedly associated the word "integrity" with phrases suggesting a 
reputation for trust and honesty, for example, "trustworthy to your customers", "the 
transparency of all your processes", and "you must do what you say". Integrity was 
also associated with "consistency" in the comment, "You must have consistency so 
wherever your product appears anywhere in the world the same support systems, the 
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same integrity quality assurance tracks back" (Communication spokesperson B). 
This is consistent with the findings of GM-specific research that highlighted the 
importance of trust and source credibility in determining attitudes to GM (Prewer, 
Howard, Hedderley & Shepherd, 1999; James, 2003; Hornig-Priest, 2001). 
The reputation of the industry is also based on values associated with the 
quality of the product: 
We've said we're not going to touch GE, GM products at all and that has to do with 
the integrity that we have a natural product that is great to eat and safe to eat and that 
until customers and consumers have the information they need to be confident that 
any genetic modification is safe, we can't be involved. (Communication 
spokesperson B) 
Here the common starting point of "integrity" is articulated simultaneously with 
products that are "natural," products that are "safe to eat," and products that are not 
GM. As discussed in Chapter Five, this rhetorical positioning of "integrity" draws on 
multiple discourses related to risk. These include environmental discourses that 
represent 'nature' as pure (Cronon, 1996; Reiss & Straughan, 1996; Worster, 1995), 
recent discourses related to food-safety scares in Europe (Adam, 1999, 2000b; 
Murcott, 2001), as well as public-choice/free-market discourses (Aune, 2001; 
Devine, 1998; Finn, 2003; Miller, 2003). One Innovation spokesperson used a 
similar rationality to comment on the mismatch of GM and health benefits: 
Many fruits and vegetables are marketed on the basis of their health claims ... and 
GM doesn't add to that story. (Innovation spokesperson B) 
This positioning constructs a complex identity for kiwifruit based on their health-
value and life-style attributes which provides rich social meanings that multiple 
stakeholders can identify with. It underlines the social and cultural construction of 
the discourses (see Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) drawn on by the kiwifruit industry 
in this positioning of kiwifruit. 
The rhetorical positioning of the three different kiwifruit cultivars is, 
however, differentiated within the common starting points described for the ZESPRI 
brand in terms of lifestyle values: 
We'll take all the attributes that belong to the ZESPRI brand and apply that to a new 
product and then build a positioning so ... we have ZESPRI Green which is about 
energy and zest and fit and fun for the family, Gold which is about indulging your 
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passions, indulging the moment, and Organic ... that's about our world, your 
lifestyle, your choice. (Communication spokesperson B) 
ZESPRI Intemational's marketing rhetoric in its GM policy draws on existing value-
systems within the industry, and is consistent with existing industry identities-there 
are shared zones of meaning (Heath, 1997) between multiple stakeholders. 
The Communication spokesperson additionally positioned the ZESPRI brand 
in terms of a "relationship" with consumers in a way that suggested that images of 
products and organisations are as much constructed by consumers as they are by the 
organisation: 
The role that we must play is developing a conversational relationship with them 
[consumers] so that your product and its attributes and its freshness and its 
naturalness and its natural energy-and it is about your wellbeing-actually means 
something to them. (Communication spokesperson B) 
This spokesperson's use of the word "conversational" implies that this relationship 
involves a dynamic interrelationship between identities and images, processes of 
mirroring, impression-building, cultural expression, and reflection as discussed by 
Hatch and Schultz (2004). The strategic, dynamic negotiation of identities and 
images is evident in this spokesperson's aim to "keep extending that resilience, that 
relevance and those relationships" to maintain the "robustness" of the brand. She 
indicated that the much-used ZESPRI strapline which positions kiwifruit as "putting 
life into life" (Communication spokesperson B) had been particularly successful. 
Interestingly, this Communication spokesperson referred to organic kiwifruit as now 
being "mainstream," that organic products are a "must-have" (Communication 
spokesperson B) rather than being valued because they earn a premium for growers. 
This suggests that environmental discourses underpinning organic production are 
becoming normalised within the countries which are the main kiwifruit markets, as 
borne out by recent research (see, for example, Tait, 2001). 
The juxtaposition of phrases and arrangement of words in the following 
quotation indicates the rhetorical articulations, implications, and transformations that 
encapsulate the strategic positioning of the ZESPRI brand, by this Communication 
specialist, as a "story:" 
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My strategy has always been to take the absolute strength of environmental integrity, 
sustainability, working in harmony, working with nature, best growers in the world, 
safe to eat, great to eat, naturally good for you body and soul, and remembering what 
we mean about 'putting life into life' and you have a huge story. (Communication 
spokesperson B) 
In this text, "environmental integrity" is articulated with discourses of sustainability 
and is exemplified by growers working "in harmony" with nature. Excellence is 
represented simultaneously in the reference to the world leadership of the industry as 
the "best in the world" and in the juxtaposition of "safe," "great to eat," (taste) and 
"good for you" (healthy). The phrases "naturally good for you body and soul" and 
"putting life into life" add an emotional fervour and passion to the brand, a rhetorical 
strategy that attempts to transform eating a simple fruit into a spiritual experience 
that consumers will seek to identify with. 
These value-premises and rationalities also draw on major discourses 
privileged internationally and in New Zealand, such as the importance of lifestyle to 
health. For example, on its website, the ubiquitous Coca Cola brand features the 
strapline, "The Coca Cola company exists to benefit and refresh everyone it 
touches," (Coca Cola, 2005). Like the ZESPRI brand identity, Coca Cola emphasise 
the brand values of consumer concerns, and the health-giving attributes and great 
taste of their products. 
Strong brand values are also clearly evident in the ZESPRI Brand video, the 
ZESPRI System video, on the ZESPRI website, and in the ZESPRI Media 
Information Kit. The ZESPRI Brand video was customised for the Japanese market, 
with subtitles in Japanese but no voice-over. It relies on images of people of all ages 
and races enjoying eating kiwifruit, and was obviously developed for diverse target 
publics. Such images allow multiple audiences to identify with the experience of 
eating the fruit. 
In contrast, the ZESPRI System video is aimed at customers-at global 
retailers and wholesalers of kiwifruit in international markets. It shows the growing 
conditions in New Zealand orchards, and depicts the climate, the environment, the 
expertise of the growers, and the 'high-tech' sy~tems involved in grading and 
packaging. The voice-over describes every step of the ZESPRI System and defines it 
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as a "benchmark for category excellence" (ZESPRI, 2003b ). It refers to a ZESPRI 
Promise: "To deliver fruit of superior flavour, texture, and size, packed with health-
giving vitamins and minerals, through an integrated system" (ZESPRI, 2003b). The 
emphasis is again on integrity and excellence; innovation, sophisticated logistics and 
technology; and the assurance of a natural product, in harmony with nature, as 
epitomised in the slogan, "ZESPRI kiwifruit puts life into life" (ZESPRI, 2003b). For 
industry stakeholders, the production process is as much a part of the identity and 
image of the industry as the product. 
Table 6. ZESPRI Brand Values and Systems 
ZESPRI System Overall integrating Overall values (CSPs) 
production system include integrity, natural, 
innovation. 
These are articulated with 
non-GM, natural 
environment, health, food 
safety, and lifestyle 
choices. 
KiwiGreen Integrated pest Unique system ensures 
management system environmental integrity 
and natural, high-quality 
fruit 
Taste ZESPRI Audit system for the Quality control system, 
production of fruit with provides consistently high:-
specific sugar content quality, natural fruit 
In 2001 and 2002, the ZESPRI website also featured the slogan, "It puts life 
into life" to depict the ZESPRI kiwifruit brand, and the themes of "integrity" and 
"natural" were again emphasised, with references to "safe to eat and grown 
naturally," "environmental integrity," and "a product that is naturally fresh and 
healthy" (ZESPRI, 2001a, 2002a). These brand values were further evident in the 
Annual Report of 2001 in imagery associated with the captions: "ZESPRI GREEN 
Kiwifruit - vitality", "ZESPRI GOLD Kiwifruit- pure pleasure", "ZESPRI 
ORGANIC Kiwifruit - our world, your lifestyle, your choice" (ZESPRI, 2001b). 
In 2002, the Annual Report used a similar brand identity but added the value 
of remaining an integrated industry. It cited the ZESPRI System as a means of 
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managing the integration of different groups within the industry and the international 
markets: ''The ZESPRI System provides the linkages that enable integration, 
innovation and reward to be achieved" (ZESPRI, 2002b ). 
The ZESPRI System was, then, clearly positioned as exemplifying the brand 
values, or common starting points, of the industry. It integrates the roles of multiple 
stakeholders-growers, suppliers, marketers, and customers-and provides a means 
by which stakeholders, both within the industry and in international markets, can 
identify with and enact these values. In this sense, the ZESPRI System, and the 
ZESPRI brand values are used as a means of managing multiple identities (see 
Cheney, 1991; Cheney & Christensen, 2001a) associated with the kiwifruit industry. 
Environmental Integrity and the Risks Associated with GM 
Industry participants echoed the brand values rhetorically evident in industry-
wide documents, similarly constructing environmental integrity, by privileging 
ecological values drawing on environmental and sustainability discourses. In four 
interviews and three focus groups, industry participants spoke of the importance of 
the integrated pest management system, KiwiGreen, or showed concern about 
protecting the environment. They identified with ZESPRI brand values, rhetorically 
positioning environmental integrity as minimal impact on the New Zealand 
environment. Growers were concerned about the need to use sprays and pesticides, 
and aware that these were harmful to the environment, but these traditional methods 
were still seen as less harmful than GM. There was little evidence of the 
technological determinism, described by Levidow (1998). For example: 
Ecologically, we're harming the environment [with sprays], which we want to do [to 
kill kiwifruit pests], no doubt about that, but we're not corrupting the DNA source 
from which everything is arising. (Respondent E, Whangerei kiwifruit focus group) 
Kiwifruit sprays were described as "soft chemicals" in the sense that they are 'soft' 
on-less harmful for-the environment: 
Kiwifruit's a little fortunate in that it's like a weed; it doesn't really have major pest 
problems. At the moment, they are controllable ... through the use of reasonably 
soft chemicals and not a lot of use. (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier A) 
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In the organic kiwifruit growers' focus group, concern for the environment was 
implicit rather than stated explicitly, perhaps because this focus group comprised 
organic growers who met together regularly, and could take their common organic 
perspective for granted. Yet, their detailed technical discussion of organic production 
indicated their environmental values. For example, when talking about the difference 
between organic growers' use of the bacterium Bt to control pests, and proposals to 
genetically engineer plants to include the Bt gene, participants drew on a GM 
discourse frequently discussed in anti-GM literature (see Ho, 1999; Law, 1999). For 
example, one participant commented: 
[In organic orchards] it's applied to a surface, in the atmosphere; it's in the sunlight 
and the weather and it breaks down. When it's inserted into the plant [GM], it's there 
in every cell; it's there through the roots; it's persistent; it's out to the soil. 
(Respondent E, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group) 
Technical advisers at packhouse/suppliers again demonstrated concern for the 
environment in discussion of technical aspects of crop management. For example, 
they were concerned about the "biological life of the soil" and its relationship to "an 
overall ecological balance" (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier B). 
Environmental integrity was linked to potential difficulties of controlling 
GMOs, and to previous problems encountered with the introduction of gorse, tobacco 
weed, and the stock root for tamarillos to New Zealand, which ended up growing 
uncontrollably in the wild. Again, similar concerns have been expressed by publics 
in other research findings (see Henderson & Weaver, 2003). For example: 
I just think of the natural New Zealand fauna. That can be destroyed like-because 
of an introduction of something that we do not know anything about ... and this is 
what worries me; that we're introducing something else [genetic modification] that 
we may not be able to control. (Respondent F, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group) 
Such concerns also draw strongly on ecological discourses (see, for example, 
Bookchin, 1995; Jagtenberg & McKie, 1997; Merchant, 1992, 2003; Plumwood, 
1993), and on risk discourses that suggest risk is increasingly unable to be quantified 
in time or space, in a post-industrial society (Adam, Beck & van Loon, 2000; Beck, 
1992, 2000; Lash, 2000). 
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Concerns were evident in the accounts of one of the Innovation team, one of 
the technical advisers in packhouse/suppliers, and all four growers' focus groups 
regarding the uncertain outcomes of GM in relation to the environment: the 
unpredictability of GM technologies, or that control of GM technologies depended 
on the effectiveness of regulatory and legal systems. As Douglas (1992), Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1982), and Perri 6 (2005) have found, individuals can feel powerless 
in the face of technology and regulatory systems which are seen as capricious. 
In addition, the science associated with GM was recognised as contested. For 
example, "Is the science that we're reading about on both sides, is it good science or 
not?" (Respondent E, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group). The word "good" 
implicitly recognises that science perspectives privilege particular value systems. 
This individual's comment is then consistent with Beck's (1992) argument that 
values and rationalities associated with scientific industrialisation are being 
increasingly questioned. As Brown (2001) and Segerstrale (2000) have pointed out, 
individuals are frequently polarised in their opinions and values, taking different 
'sides' in the 'science wars,' and from a sociology of science perspective, science is 
increasingly represented as 'political' rather than 'neutral' (Latour, 2004; Nelkin, 
1984). 
Focus group participants critiqued GM technologies, saying they lack 
"precision" (predictability and control) and represented them as a haphazard 
"unstable" process. For example: 
I don't like the term genetic engineering because that seems to suggest that there's a 
precision ... which isn't there. It's a bit more ... like staking a bit of glue of some 
sort over a thousand columns and just hurling them somewhere ... it's really hit and 
miss and most of them are misses. And the worry of that is that it's unstable. 
(Respondent D, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group) 
This participant's comment is suggestive of Perrow's (1984) and Wilkins' (2001) 
concerns about the inability to control the risk outcomes of complex, tightly-coupled 
systems. It echoes the concerns of Ho (1999), and contrasts strongly with the more 
technical rhetoric of scientists who construct GM as sophisticated and precise 
experimental techniques in highly controlled situations (see Latour, 2004). 
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GM was implicitly represented as changing nature in an 'explosive cocktail' 
that cannot be contained or controlled. The metaphor of being unable to 'close the 
gate' on GM is a common representation of risk by the general public (as Henderson 
& Weaver, 2003, also reported); for example: 
It's a gate that you can't close once you have opened it ... I think that we should not 
tamper in that area [GM] because it's - why are we doing it? (Technical adviser, 
packhouse/supplier A) 
The term "tamper" suggests an ethical concern, constructing GM as wrongful 
meddling in something that should be sacrosanct, and draws on a discourse of nature 
as sacred (Cronon, 1996). The unpredictability of GM was also represented as "fear 
of the unknown" (Respondent E, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group), as, "You 
can't go back" (Respondent B, Whangarei kiwifruit focus group), and "putting 
something out into the environment that you can't stop" (Respondent A, ZESPRI 
Gold kiwifruit focus group). These representations of GM are an interesting contrast 
to the positive representation of the 'soft' pest management control system (the 
K.iwiGreen system) as 'managing nature' with minimal harm to the environment, 
expressed particularly in the ZESPRI documents discussed in Chapter Five. 
The possibility that future commercial production of GM might impact 
adversely on the environment, reflects similar concerns internationally about the 
potential destruction of the 'natural' environment by GM food production (Allen, 
2000; Ho, 1999; Rifkin, 1999). This draws on a discourse that suggests disaster 
occurs when 'nature' is destroyed by corrupt worldliness (see Douglas & Wildavsky, 
1982). Given the market focus of the kiwifruit industry, these environmental values 
expressed by participants were also linked with the rhetoric of business sustainability 
in ways that add to evidence that this term is contested. 
Images of Sustainability and New Zealand's Environment 
As Peterson (1997) has argued, the term 'sustainability' is increasingly used 
to describe practices said to have ecological integrity. However, the use of the term 
can suggest either anthropocentric definitions which privilege instrumental values, 
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using the environment for human purposes; or ecocentric definitions which privilege 
ecological values, where 'nature' is considered valuable for itself. 
'Sustainability' and 'sustainable development' are then contested terms with 
a range of definitions from "optimum levels of exploitation" to "management 
practices that will not degrade the environment" (Peterson, 1997, p. 16; see also 
Allen, 2004; Hajer, 1997; Hediger, 1999; Moser & Miller, 2001). Often different 
time considerations are built into definitions; for example, short-term economic gains 
or the long-term viability of a resource. Sustainable can also mean "a system's 
abilities to resist or recover from disturbances, stresses, and shocks" or "its ability to 
produce goods" (Peterson, 1997, p. 16). Peterson argued that sustainability is in 
danger of becoming a self-legitimating metadiscourse that endorses its own 
discursive practices; she critiqued the modernist discourse that sees humans pitting 
themselves against nature in an effort to control it, and warned against the 
assumption that technology can fix anything. 
Although ZESPRI is a member of the Sustainability Business Network-an 
organisation prioritising 'strong' sustainability (see Allen, 2004)-interview and 
focus group participants did not always prioritise this perspective. They represented 
sustainability in terms of both the 'strong' ecological values, and the 'weak' 
instrumental business values referred to by Peterson (1997). One of the ZESPRI 
communication spokespersons credited kiwifruit growers with ecological values in 
terms of their identification with the land. For example: 
The land is what supports us. The growers who tend that land, love their land ... 
why would you do anything to introduce a foreign body to the land or do anything 
that may harm it? ... It's very much about respect for the land. They want nothing 
that is going to hurt them. (Communication spokesperson B) 
However, the proviso ''They want nothing that is going to hurt them" adds an 
instrumental perspective which betrays ambivalence-a respect for the land itself, 
but also for the economic returns that it brings. 
Additionally, environmental integrity was carefully positioned as a deliberate 
marketing strategy for the kiwifruit industry, to avoid being associated with images 
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of radical environmentalism by articulating 'environmental integrity' with 'natural'; 
for example: 
We are very careful how we use 'environmental integrity' because you must be 
really careful ... not to sound like you're a 1970s bleating Green, because it's not 
credible. Clean and green to whom? So what we try and do is talk about 
'naturalness'. (Communication spokesperson B) 
This comment again indicates an instrumental, self-interested business rationality. 
One Innovation team member spoke of the ZESPRI environmental policy as a 
"commitment," clearly indicating that many of the industry members identify 
strongly with values associated with 'strong' environmental sustainability, but at the 
same time he acknowledged that this 'commitment' is deliberately used as a 
marketing strategy. He described ZESPRI's environmental policy as being: 
To move towards practices which have less and less impact on the environment, so 
we look to move towards softer control options or more managed control options ... 
but it also becomes part of the marketing strategy as well, you know proving our 
clean, green image. (Innovation spokesperson E) 
This comment indicates the importance that ZESPRI puts on responding to the 
images held of the industry by stakeholders in international markets, as opposed to 
validation of industry practices from within New Zealand. Although growers may 
genuinely identify strongly with the environmental values and lifestyle afforded by 
practising horticulture in New Zealand, imagery associated with 'clean, green' New 
Zealand was also valued. The overriding value was acknowledged to be economic, 
and was described as "survival" in a business sense: 
Whilst in a sense the New Zealand lifestyle is important, it's-for the majority of 
primary sectors-when it comes to actually making a decision about what they will 
or won't do, it's a secondary consideration. That's survival. (Innovation 
spokesperson E, emphasis added) 
Environmental values-and sustainability-were, in this sense, also constructed in 
terms of business sustainability. The identity of growers as environmentalists thus 
exists in tension with their identity as business managers. 
Auditing systems imposed on the kiwifruit industry by international markets 
(through agreements such as EureGap certification) were acknowledged as driving 
the implementation of environmental sustainability policies by two of the Innovation 
team and one of the Communication spokespersons. Sustainable practices were an 
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environmental management requirement for business success in international 
markets, as much as grower-motivated practices. Participants in the Whangarei 
growers' focus group and the ZESPRI Green growers' focus group, for example, 
were concerned about the extent of the compliance demands made by international 
markets in Europe and Japan, and perceived these as excessive in terms of meeting 
environmental standards. As one Technical adviser commented: 
Japan thoroughly scrutinise our fruit in a way that is perceived by our growers as 
being a form of trade barrier ... smaller packhouses just will not be able to install 
the [track and trace] technology. (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier B) 
There are some tensions then in the environmental and business/market rationalities 
used by different industry members, and these rationalities are aligned with the 
multiple identities held by industry members; some groups identify particularly 
strongly with environmental values (for example, organic growers) and are more 
genuinely concerned about looking after the land, other growers identify more 
strongly with business values and are more pragmatically concerned with various 
realities of production. These tensions clearly demonstrate the contested nature of the 
term 'sustainability' (Elkington 2001a, 2001b; Hajer, 1997; Hediger, 1999; Moser & 
Miller, 2001). 
Identity and the Value of New Zealand's 'Clean, Green' Image 
New Zealand's geographic isolation has resulted in the iconic representation 
of New Zealand as unpolluted and under-populated; a pristine, pastoral paradise; and 
a safe haven from the rest of the world (see, for example, Mitchell, 1972). However, 
this 'clean, green' image has also been critiqued as a myth (Brown, 1997; Henderson 
2005; True 2003; Weaver, 2001), and the value of this image to New Zealand trade 
has been the subject of a Ministry for the Environment report (BERIJ AERU, 2003) 
with contested findings ("GE release will lift earnings", 2003; Knight, Holdsworth & 
Mather, 2003). New Zealand's location is then often seen as a trade a{ivantage but its 
isolation from the rest of the world is also constructed as an obstacle to trade. Three 
organic growers and a Communication spokesperson commented on New Zealand's 
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unique geographical location and its distance from its major markets as an additional 
barrier not faced by other countries competing in the same markets. 
However, references to New Zealand's 'clean, green' environment were used 
on the ZESPRI website in 2001 and 2002 specifically to enhance the brand values, 
by coupling the growing conditions for kiwifruit with this identity for New Zealand: 
The clean, green country, pure water and clean air make New Zealand the perfect 
environment for growing kiwifruit. (ZESPRI, 2001a) 
This New Zealand identity has been highly successful in marketing the country as a 
tourism destination with the campaign "100% pure New Zealand" (Tourism New 
Zealand, 2005), and in marketing other New Zealand branded products, such as 
apples and wine. It is continually articulated both in ZESPRI documents, and by 
industry members, with the ZESPRI brand values. 
The importance of New Zealand's 'clean, green' image to the kiwifruit 
industry was highlighted in the accounts of members of all four focus groups, all 
three packhouse technical advisers, and by two members of the Innovation team, as 
well as by both Communication spokespersons. The incompatibility of 'clean' and 
'green' with GM was made quite emphatically; for example: 
We will not be growing any genetically modified kiwifruit; we won't be sourcing 
any genetically modified kiwifruit. The 'clean, green' image is fundamental to the 
success of our industry. (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier B) 
New Zealand's reputation for an unpolluted environment was positioned as being a 
unique advantage in comparison to competitors in the international marketplace, with 
GM likely to "tarnish" that reputation (Innovation spokesperson C). At times, 
industry members' comments indicated a pride in New Zealand which suggested a 
strong identification with this imagery as New Zealanders: 
Well, isn't our 'clean, green' image more important to us, and the fact that all of a 
sudden now we're going to be genetically modifying everything we grow, that we 
produce here. Why? Just so we can foot it with the United States. Big deal! 
(Respondent A, Whangarei kiwifruit focus group) 
This sarcastic reference to being able to "foot it with the United States" draws on 
other occasions when New Zealand, as a small country, has stood up to the might of 
larger countries on a political level. It capitalises on images of New Zealand as a 
'David' taking on 'Goliath' used to represent the New Zealand stance on nuclear 
241 
power, and the Springboks' rugby tour in the 1980s (see Foote, 1999; Lange, 1990; 
White, 1998). Such comparisons have been frequently drawn by others in the New 
Zealand debate about GM (see, for example, Henderson & Weaver, 2003; 
· Henderson, 2005). 
In this sense, industry members identified themselves as environmentally 
conscious citizens of New Zealand, taking actions that confirm the reality of these 
environmental values: 
But the perception of 'clean and green' is not about particularly being GE; it's about 
everything, the holistic 'clean and green' view that we don't have polluted rivers, we 
don't look at the orchard and see plastic bags blowing around, and that we have done 
a great deal in terms of the environment to try and keep it at least as pristine as it was 
15 years ago. (Communication spokesperson A) 
New Zealand's unpolluted environment was also represented as the antithesis of the 
"pollution problems," "overcrowding," and "problems with water" associated with 
European contexts (Innovation spokesperson E). The reality of this New Zealand 
identity was linked with the ZESPRI brand identity and specifically valued as a 
marketing asset, not only for the kiwifruit industry, but for New Zealand as a whole. 
The interview and focus group participants identified with other primary industries, 
suggesting that these industries provided the historical basis for this 'clean, green' 
image, having created the agricultural lifestyle upon which images of an unpolluted, 
pastoral paradise were first constructed: 
We're actually not just talking about the image of kiwifruit. We're talking about the 
image that New Zealand has sold for trade and what sells a lot of our fruit, and I 
think ... the primary industries, they still make most of the money in this country 
(Respondent A, ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit focus group) 
The kiwifruit industry is thus positioned as not only benefiting from the 'clean, 
green' image, but as assisting in the creation of an identity for New Zealand, from 
which other industries such as tourism also benefit. The use of the name 'kiwifruit,' 
for example, links the fruit to another national icon, the 'kiwi,' a bird unique to New 
Zealand. Efforts towards national branding of products can now be seen in many 
countries in other continents; such as Africa, in attempts to market local rice crops 
(Yamoah, 2005), and in Norway, in attempts to market fish to Asia (Kleppe, Iversen 
& Stensaker, 2002). 
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This image of the New Zealand environment was then seen in ambivalent 
terms as both a reality and a construction. It was also recognised as a fragile 
perception: 
We can't get a perception of being more 'clean, green' but sure as heck we can lose 
that image of being 'clean.' (Innovation spokesperson E) 
This participant expressed concern that pollution caused by New Zealand dairy 
industry effluents has "tarnished" New Zealand's image. 
Other participants in the interviews and focus groups contested the reality of 
New Zealand's unpolluted environment. The 'clean, green' image was described as 
simply an overseas perception: a "group marketing tool" (Respondent C, ZESPRI 
Green kiwifruit focus group), as "very valuable" (Respondent E, ZESPRI Green 
kiwifruit focus group), and as something to "capitalise" on (Respondent A, ZESPRI 
Green kiwifruit focus group). There is certainly evidence to suggest that New 
Zealand might not be as clean and green as the image suggests ("Polluters pay heavy 
price," 2004; Taylor, 2002). As one spokesperson commented: 
If you actually look at New Zealand per capita, sort of C02 emissions and all those 
sorts of things, we're as bad as the worst. But we have managed to sell a lot of 
product on a 'clean, green' image. (Innovation spokesperson C) 
At the level of New Zealand's identity, as well as at the level of an industry identity, 
there is some tension then between the intrinsic environmental values and the 
extrinsic financial opportunities afforded by New Zealand's 'clean, green' image. 
The perceived images associated with both New Zealand and the kiwifruit industry 
when 'mirrored' back to the industry organisation help dynamically shape the 
identity of the industry. In this sense, aspects of image and culture both constitute 
and are constituted by the organisational identity (Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2004; 
Hatch & Schultz, 2004). 
The value to the kiwifruit industry of safeguarding New Zealand's clean, 
green image formed one of the main arguments in ZESPRI' s submission to the Royal 
Commission. One of the Communication spokespersons identified tying the ZESPRI 
brand to a national image as a way of garnering loyalty from within the industry, but 
also as a marketing risk, when that image cannot be controlled by the industry: 
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Innovation is seen as important to the overall positioning of the industry in the 
international marketplace. However, rather than representing the use of GM 
technologies as innovative, as in the dairy industry and other primary industries, the 
only explicit reference to innovation in statements describing the GM policy 
describes the natural production system, Kiwi Green, as "staying ahead of the ball 
game" (Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999). Being innovative in this text refers to the 
quality controls implemented by ZESPRI which depend on environmental values at 
odds with those associated with GM discourses. 
Both the ZESPRI System marketing video and comments made by both 
Communication spokespersons reinforce the articulation of 'unique' with 'natural' as 
the result of innovative marketing strategies. They indicate that bringing overseas 
customers onto New Zealand orchards, to pick and taste fruit for themselves, and to 
experience the unique growing conditions is an important marketing tactic in terms 
of creating customer identification with the product as unique and natural: 
We bring around three or four hundred customers down each year, that's about half a 
billion dollars' worth of business, so that they can actually pick the kiwifruit that 
might end on their retailers' shelf and they can see at first hand what it's like. You 
know if you think of a Japanese or a Belgian who's picking with this like twist to the 
wrist, and they pluck a gold kiwifruit, fresh from the vine, and you say, "Oh no, no 
eat it - it's fine." "Is there sprays?" "No just eat it." What do you think? I mean that 
is magic. (Communication spokesperson B) 
The kiwifruit industry thus illustrates the dynamic adaptability discussed by Gioia, 
Schultz, and Corley (2004). In these terms, organisational identity is an adaptive 
process that underpins the development of images, which are interpreted by target 
publics, and when fed back to the organisation may change the organisational 
members' perceptions of their own identity. Innovation, then, is defined in terms of 
being uniquely responsive to the desired images of food products held by 
international markets, and the perception that natural production methods are a 
unique pc,int of difference. 
"Naturally Good for You" and the Health Industry 
The phrase "naturally good for you" additionally positions the ZESPRI brand 
in terms of the health benefits of eating a 'natural' fruit. On the ZESPRI website, the 
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The growers and the whole ZESPRI group are very innovative and very quick to 
respond to market, you know, what the market is saying; realising that if we don't, 
we won't stay ahead. (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier A) 
This complex identity for growers is also constructed on the ZESPRI website by 
connecting the kiwifruit industry with current images of New Zealanders as 
enterprising business and marketing pioneers. In 2001 and 2002, the first page of the 
ZESPRI website positioned ZESPRI in relation to New Zealand's reputation for 
outdoor adventure, and renown for starting the craze of bungy jumping. For example: 
New Zealand is renowned for its "go get 'em" attitude. Who else would think to tie 
themselves to a bridge with a large rubber band and jump, just for the fun of it? 
When a New Zealander did this, it started the worldwide craze of bungy jumping. 
It's that sort of enthusiasm and attitude that you can share when you eat another of 
our famous exports, ZESPRI New Zealand kiwifruit. (ZESPRI, 2001a, 2002a) 
ZESPRI is linked with well-known New Zealander, A. J. Hackett, to imply that 
ZESPRI is unique and innovative, leading the world in enthusiasm and innovation in 
the kiwifruit marketplace. Through identifying with this image, ZESPRI customers 
are encouraged to identify with trying something new and different-kiwifruit. The 
identity of the industry as unique, as both pioneering and innovative, both constitutes 
and is constituted by concepts of innovation that are part of the identity of the 
industry members as New Zealanders, and part of the perceived image of New 
Zealand, and New Zealand products, internationally. 
Industry members' accounts additionally represented the kiwifruit industry as 
unique in terms of being a world leader, and therefore innovative. For example, 
"Other countries want to tag in on the New Zealand price. They want to latch in on 
the tail of New Zealand, to hold their returns up" (Respondent E, ZESPRI Organic 
kiwifruit focus group). Similarly, in the 2002 Annual Report, under the heading 
"Strategy for Sustained Success," innovation is again one of the strategies 
highlighted, but specifically in a competitive marketing context. Reference is made 
to the importance of the brand and industry reputation: 
The innovations that are implemented add value to our competitive position by 
ensuring that we maintain the ZESPRI brand and service reputation for delivery of 
consistent quality kiwifruit, regardless of variety. (ZESPRI, 2002b, p. 27) 
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It's a suicide leap if you think your country of origin sells. An example is in Japan 
they have this water called Kiwi Blue and it was contaminated-yeah, you might 
have a dud New Zealand exporter. You don't risk your reputation on the basis of 
non-professional delivery. (Communication spokesperson B) 
To offset this risk, now that the brand status is high, ZESPRI is aiming at year-round 
marketing by growing kiwifruit off-shore in the United States, Italy, and Japan under 
the ZESPRI production system and brand. As one participant commented: 
We could lose our 'clean and green' image tomorrow, but if we're out of season, 
fresh, get to market on time, good quality, we've probably still got markets. 
(Respondent G, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group) 
This is evidence not only of innovative marketing but of a move to safeguard the 
ZESPRI brand against the possible commercial release of GM in New Zealand, by 
progressively disassociating the brand with its country of origin. If New Zealand 
introduces commercial production of GM foods, the 'clean, green' image of New 
Zealand may be less valuable to the ZESPRI brand. 
New Zealand's environmental image is important to the kiwifruit industry not 
only for its intrinsic value but also in terms of its articulation with food safety and the 
implication of food safety in terms of health. The brand values associated with 
environmental integrity, and quality production through the ZESPRI System draw on 
discourses linking the natural environment and safe food production practices with 
the maintenance and enhancement of good health, for example, discourses 
surrounding food scares in Europe (see, for example, Adam, 2000b ). 
The identity of the kiwifruit industry as innovative thus relies on a social 
reductionist definition of technology. This means that users decide how and to what 
extent technology will be used, and being healthy is linked with the tasks and duties 
of being a responsible citizen (Beck-Gemsheim, 2000). In contrast, competing social 
constructions of the term 'technology' in Western cultures are typically examples of 
technological determinism (Levidow, 1998) and position GM as one of the latest, 
inevitable 'cutting edge' developments (Enriquez & Goldberg, 2000; Mannion, 1999; 
Oram, 2000). 
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Innovation and "Naturally Good for You" - New Zealand Pioneers 
The kiwifruit industry defines innovative in terms of being unique and 
pioneering, as being uniquely responsive to the benefits and limitations of New 
Zealand's geographical location and isolation from international markets. This 
identity is constructed by connecting the kiwifruit industry with historical images of 
New Zealanders as pioneers. 
On the ZESPRI website in 2002, under the heading, "A Tradition of Passion, 
Innovation and Excellence", innovation is positioned as being part of New Zealand's 
heritage, "built by inspired growers ... ZESPRI also inherited the pioneering spirit" 
(ZESPRI, 2002b). The juxtaposition of the four words in this heading links 
"innovation" with exceptional kiwifruit growers, people of passion. At the same 
time, it emphasises that kiwifruit production methods are based on tradition, which in 
the days of the pioneers was linked with a national identity and image of New 
Zealand as a land of 'milk and honey', a pastoral paradise (Belich, 2001; Brown, 
1997; Mitchell, 1972). These early New Zealanders had to be innovative; as pioneers 
they were breaking new ground both in the literal sense of developing agriculture and 
horticulture, and in the metaphorical sense of finding ways to build a lifestyle with 
the minimum of resources. New Zealand kiwifruit are thus positioned as 
simultaneously traditional and innovative, in the sense of being "naturally good for 
you" (a frequently used phrase in all marketing material)--the outcome of pioneering 
primary production techniques. Since the major target markets for these messages are 
kiwifruit markets in Europe and Japan, newly farmed, pastoral New Zealand is 
implicitly contrasted with these historically older, industrialised nations. The 
accounts of industry members similarly identified growers as being innovative 
"pioneers" in terms of horticultural production: 
The growers are wonderful early adopters, you know, they have always been 
innovative; they've always been pioneers. (Communication spokesperson B) 
However, growers were also seen as innovative in terms of marketing and business 
opportunities: 
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brand is developed through using extensive cameo pages of different consumer 
audiences enjoying the three varieties of kiwifruit: Gold, Green, and Organic. The 
emphasis is continually on the integrity and safety of the production, and the natural, 
healthy attributes of the raw fruit: 
Bursting with life ... Maximise your energy ... When you're working out or 
working late, how do you replace all the energy you've lost ... How about ZESPRI 
GREEN kiwifruit? ... Stress free Naturally ... Research carried out by Rutgers 
University found ZESPRI GREEN Kiwifruit ranked high in anti-oxidant levels. 
These antioxidants have anti-cancer and anti-inflammatory qualities, they protect 
against heart disease and even protect the retina of the eye. ( edited quotes, ZESPRI, 
2001a, 2002a) 
These representations of kiwifruit rely on positioning the fruit as naturally healthy, 
not only safe to eat but positively beneficial for health. As such, they tap into 
"health" as a major value, and "nature" as an emerging value in international markets 
(Beck-Gernsheim, 2000, Reisner, 2001), facilitating the identification of 
international market audiences with the ZESPRI brand. 
The social construction of 'nature' in the industry rhetoric is continually that 
of nature as "moral imperative"-the way nature ought to be (Cronon, 1996, p. 36). 
The 'natural' way of doing things presupposes that there is no other justifiable way. 
This stems from the period of the Enlightenment in Western thought and treats nature 
a little like a religious dogma, as sacred. As Cronon (1996) commented, often ideal 
nature is a pristine wilderness, or a pastoral paradise: if we see "Nature as Eden", 
human actions have resulted in the environmental degradation of the original pristine 
nature (p. 36). 
Two of the Innovation team members, one of the Communication 
spokespersons, and three of the focus groups specifically made references to the 
heath-giving properties of kiwifruit, and positioned these as incompatible with GM. 
For example: 
They promote this zest for life, this fitness ... and maintaining health through eating 
natural kiwifruit. So you can see where the conflict comes in when we start talking 
about genetic modification when you're given this natural healthy way ... of 
keeping your health by eating kiwifruit. (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier C) 
Industry members represented the value of kiwifruit in the international marketplace 
as derived from its positioning as a luxury, ready-to-eat, export product, describing it, 
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for example, as "top of the range," and suggesting that "staple" foods like corn might 
gain more advantage from being GM (Respondent E, Whangarei kiwifruit focus 
group). 
ZESPRI additionally deliberately builds on the ZESPRI organisational image 
in the marketplace by articulating kiwifruit with the identities of growers, 
capitalising on both the organisational culture and New Zealand culture. The 
Communication spokesperson responsible for the brand strategy described this in 
detail: 
So what we try and do is talk about naturalness. We use our growers as super stars, 
we use real people; you know, this is an annual report admittedly but if you go 
through the web you will see that we always show people eating. We always have 
food because it is safe to eat. We always have lovely young people, this is a 
Japanese film star; they're healthy; they live our brand. The orchards are beautiful, 
this is one of our lovely organic growers who makes his own compost and he's just 
told me he's found another way of doing it, so it's even better, but it's all about 
sharing, caring, relationships and honesty; and we don't lecture. It's like the health 
story or the nutrition story that goes with ZESPRI, we break it down into lifestyles, 
into age groups, into audiences. (Communication spokesperson B) 
The emphasis on deliberately developing multiple relationships with customers and 
consumers is indicative of the multiple identities and images managed in kiwifruit 
industry communication with both internal and external stakeholders. 
In sum, the kiwifruit industry is positioned as unique, a world leader that has 
successfully established a niche market for kiwifruit, and this success underpins the 
strong market focus for the industry's GM policy. The industry is highly integrated, 
with industry members demonstrating universal support for the GM positioning, 
despite their varied individual and group values in relation to GM. This integration 
and the development of sophisticated production systems are highlighted by industry 
members as demonstrating the integrity crucial to the industry's market success. 
ZESPRI emphasises the unique quality and health-giving attributes of the kiwifruit, 
and the unique quality of the natural production methods. Kiwifruit growers are 
positioned as innovative pioneers, and the industry is positioned as environmentally 
aware, by drawing on images of New Zealand's unique environment. This iconic 
national identity underpins the complex brand identity constructed for the industry, 
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the growers, the production methods and the product, an identity positioned by the 
industry as incompatible with GM. 
The next section in this chapter considers the management of organisational 
identity and image in relation to the dairy industry positioning on GM. The section 
begins by identifying the industry groups with whom individual interviews and focus 
group discussions were conducted, as described in detail in Chapter Four. 
The Management of Organisational Identity and Image in the Dairy 
Industry Positioning on GM 
The dairy industry in New Zealand underwent significant restructuring during 
the timeframe of this research, as described in Chapter Two. In 2000, at the 
commencement of the research, the NZDB was the marketing authority for four 
different dairy companies. However, in 2001 the two largest dairy companies, Kiwi 
Cooperative Dairies Ltd. and New Zealand Cooperative Dairy Company Ltd. merged 
with the NZDB to form Fonterra Cooperative Group Limited. All of the subsidiary 
companies of the individual groups that merged, including dairy research facilities 
and manufacturing plants, are now part of Fonterra. 
The following analysis of the dairy industry identity and image is based on 
interviews conducted with industry members from ViaLactia, the research 
organisation formed to focus on biotechnology research, and from the 
NZDB/Fonterra. These industry employees worked in communication, media 
relations, operations, marketing, and legal areas. Separate interviews were also 
conducted with representatives of dairy factory management, and the New Zealand 
Dairy Workers' Union. Four focus group discussions were conducted with organic 
dairy farmers, smaller dairy farms, larger dairy farms, and with sharemilkers, as 
described in detail in Chapter Four. The analysis also includes discussion of 
NZDB/Fonterra websites and annual reports. Industry members' 'accounts' provide 
insights into how the industry operates, why it has become such a successful global 
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dairy industry, and why the industry GM policy is thought to be crucial to the 
industry's ongoing success. 
Competition in the International Marketplace and Perspectives of Risk 
One of the major differences between the kiwifruit industry and the dairy 
industry is the different market.access enjoyed by each industry. As outlined in 
Chapter Two, the dairy industry has very limited access to the lucrative markets of 
Europe, iapan, and the United States because of trade barriers which limit the 
quantity of dairy imports to these countries. Only small quantities of branded New 
Zealand products such as milk, yoghurt, and cheese can be exported from New 
Zealand to these markets, and the majority of New Zealand's dairy income comes 
from the sale of commodity products such as milk powders to markets in Latin 
America and South East Asia. These commodity products compete largely on the 
basis of price, and rely on New Zealand's history of efficiency in the dairy industry, 
and extremely low-cost milk production, to survive in the international dairy 
marketplace. 
The strategic importance of maintaining these markets was perceived to be 
paramount by industry members. A market rationality was given for GM research 
and development, based on the need to compete in international markets, by seven 
out of nine dairy industry personnel, and in three out of the four focus groups held 
with farmers. For example: 
Genetic modification has got a lot of potential in terms of delivering possible 
benefits ... we saw our competitors operating in the same sort of areas, so people 
such as Arla and Nestle ... and I mean they're big competitors of ours and once 
competitors start to look, then in some ways you're too late. (NZDB/Fonterra 
marketing spokesperson) 
Global interconnectedness makes image and reputation an important part of 
competitive advantage (True, 2003) and for the dairy industry, image and reputation 
was represented as being competitive with regard to GM. 
Consequently, the strategic use of GM was positioned as essential, and was 
frequently a~sociated with the need to maintain and enhance the efficiency of the 
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industry-the basis for the competitive advantage-as described clearly in this 
colourful comment: 
The industry's success was always and still is built on its sole advantage over all of 
its competition globally, which is that it can produce the raw material of the 
business-milk-more efficiently, at a lower cost than anybody else ... and that 
basically was because the 'moos' can live outside all year round and nobody has to 
build a shed for them ... Suddenly, it becomes potentially possible to breed animals 
which don't need to go in sheds, grass which grows happily in snowy conditions and 
then you can work out many of the other opportunities. So, we lose our advantage 
then potentially, or we enhance and reinforce our advantage also by producing better 
grasses and better clovers and better fodder at lower cost and diddly-do. So, risks 
huge, rewards huge, an option for putting your head in the sand ... none, really. 
(NZDB media spokesperson) 
This positioning privileges managerialist discourses of pragmatism that focus on an 
instrumental rationality based on economic utilitarianism (Prasad & Elmes, in press). 
Such managerialist discourses emphasise growth, productivity, quality, and 
continuous improvement in a fiercely competitive, market-driven environment, and, 
it is argued, prioritise profit at the expense of other values (Capelli, Bassi, Katz, 
Knoke, Osterman, & Useem, 1997; Henderson, 2003). The continuing efficiency of 
dairy industry production, and thus retaining a competitive advantage in the 
international marketplace, was linked with researching and developing GM products. 
As Levidow (1998) suggested, talking about the efficiency of biotechnology 
reduces it to a discussion of attributes and outcomes that commoditises nature in 
terms of quantifiable outputs (ends), through the use of a neutral technical tool 
(process). Technology is then constructed as value-free, separated from the means of 
production and social purposes. 
The identity of the dairy industry as a global competitor in international dairy 
markets, and the specific attributes of that identity as a producer of low-cost 
commodity products, with a very limited value-added product range, set the base for 
the industry position on GM. Participants in the individual focus groups and 
interviews were strongly aware that this industry identity underpins the whole 
operation of the industry. For example: "If they can find ways of enhancing just even 
a commodity, straight away they command a premium price" (Respondent E, Larger 
farms focus group). The industry identity was seen as necessarily dynamic, 
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responding to external change to remain competitive in the global marketplace, and if 
necessary using GM. For example: 
If we see farmers in other parts of the world getting an edge over us because of GE, 
if we are not using it, you can bet your boots farmers in New Zealand are going to 
squeal pretty smartly. (Respondent B, Smaller farms focus group) 
Not pursuing GM research and product development was then seen throughout the 
industry as a risk, an opportunity cost, rather than benefits of GM being seen per se 
as the main driver of the GM and biotechnology policy. As Gioia, Schultz and 
Corley, (2004) argued, the dynamic instability of identity can be an adaptive 
response to a changing competitive environment. 
However, industry members also identified risks in pursuing GM. For 
example, the spokesperson from ViaLactia positioned the "deliberate" investment of 
150 million dollars in GM research and development as a significant financial risk, 
which might have uncertain outcomes both in terms of developing a viable product 
and in terms of establishing viable markets for those products: 
Now the upside is huge, but there's a risk (a) that we won't be successful in our 
science; (b) that the consumer will not want genetic modification. (ViaLactia 
spokesperson) 
The financial risk of investing in GM research was seen to be worthwhile because 
the New Zealand dairy industry was positioned as uniquely able to compete 
successfully in global markets. This was attributed to its history of successfully 
managed integrated dairy production "from grass seed right through to the consumer 
in the supermarket," and because of its planned integrated approach to GM research 
and development at multiple related levels- "across three platforms ... cows, 
pasture and bacteria"-that is animal breeding and management, feed management, 
and pasture management (ViaLactia spokesperson). 
Interestingly, the dairy industry is described here as an "integrated" industry 
because it focuses on every level of dairy production and supply from the level of 
seed/pasture through to manufacture and marketing of milk products. This 
description has marked similarity with descriptions of the kiwifruit industry as 
"integrated," explored earlier in this chapter. This may be explained by the fact that 
both industries are largely cooperatively owned by the primary producers 
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themselves; although, the integrated nature of the dairy industry was not as 
prominent in the rhetorical positioning of the GM policy or brand identity. The 
similarities and differences between the two industries will be discussed more fully 
in the final section of this chapter. 
Six of the industry managers and participants in two of the focus groups also 
commented on the risk that consumers would not choose GM products, and on the 
importance of acknowledging consumer concerns. In fact, as explained in Chapter 
Five, more weight was given to such concerns in the interviews and focus groups-
which were conducted for this research between 2002 and 2004-than was 
acknowledged in the submission to the Royal Commission and other positioning 
documents produced by the NZDB in 2000 and 2001. For example, this was 
acknowledged by the ViaLactia spokesperson: 
It allowed us to use genetic modification if that is what we wanted to do. But the 
strap line that we used was preserve the opportunity and we knew at that time that 
there was no way that we would be ready to do genetic modification for a decade 
and even then it would be by way of field trial, not commercial. ... We are always 
committed to our consumer and we will never do anything that will cause a 
difficulty for our consumer, whether it's the person who's eating our consumer 
products or the purchaser of our ingredients, and we constantly say it even today ... 
"We will not use GM unless it's acceptable to the consumer." (ViaLactia 
spokesperson, original emphasis) 
Consumer concerns were similarly acknowledged by the communication 
spokesperson primarily concerned with industry stakeholders as "paramount," such 
that, "The industry needs to be acutely sensitive to consumer perceptions and it's 
critical to maintain the confidence of our customers" (NZDB/Fonterra 
communication spokesperson). Concerns were also acknowledged by the media 
spokesperson: 
The message out of the market place, from the marketers, is for heaven sakes keep 
your heads down and don't talk about this subject [GM] and be careful in all you do, 
not to 'queer' our pitch. (NZDB media spokesperson) 
Although there was always awareness that the development of GM products was a 
risk to dairy markets, at the time the GM policy was developed this was expected to 
be short-lived. If increased information about GM was given to consumers and 
stakeholders, it was expected that attitudes might quickly become more favourable. 
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In fact, it seems likely that risk-averse consumers are becoming more entrenched in 
their attitudes to GM (Gaskell, Allum & Stares, 2003; Grunert, Bredahl, & 
Scholderer, 2003; Reisner, 2001; Shanahan, Scheufele, & Lee, 2001), particularly in 
relation to foods (Gaskell, Allum, Bauer, Jackson, Howard & Lindsey, 2003). 
Industry members commented that little consumer perception research had been 
conducted, but that, for example: 
It was probable in the fullness of time it [GM] would be much more widely accepted 
at least in various forms ... we expected consumer resistance, if it was there at all, 
to drop away.(NZDB media spokesperson) 
However, the marketing spokesperson indicated that since the Royal Commission 
further consumer perception research has been completed, and the position has 
changed: 
We won't release any genetically altered product into the food chain unless there's a 
clear demand from consumers. And of course there's not a clear demand now and I 
can't imagine that there will be for a long time to come yet. (NZDB/Fonterra 
marketing spokesperson) 
Although the competitive marketplace for dairy products was still the rationale given 
for GM, at the time of the interviews and focus groups with dairy industry 
members-after the report of the Royal Commission and the Government 
response-the urgency of the dairy industry rhetoric disappeared. Significantly, 
unlike in the documents analysed in Chapter Five, there was no emphasis on the 
research and development of biotechnology or GM being a race. This was perhaps 
also because the Commissioners' report and Government policy confirmed that GM 
research and production could proceed, albeit with caution. 
Interestingly, the dairy industry's GM position was modified strongly in the 
interviews with comments on the need for 'caution'-a word much used in the 
Report of the Royal Commission and repeated in Government policy statements-for 
the preservation of opportunity, but with commercial development predicated by 
consumer acceptance of the new technology. Arguably, the dairy industry chose to 
align its rhetorical positioning on GM more closely with that of the Government to 
ensure both Government and popular support for future dairy industry research and 
development. Perhaps because of the size of the dairy industry in New Zealand and 
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world markets, and because of its existing sphere of influence with policy-making 
institutions, the NZDB/Fonterra assumed that they could also respond to consumer 
concerns by re-positioning those concerns, rather than modifying the preferred policy 
on GM. In the context of its GM policy, the identity of the dairy industry as a strong 
competitor in the global marketplace thus exists in tension with its positioning as 
responsive to customer concerns. 
Industry Stakeholder Identities and Rhetorical Understandings of Risk 
Despite the single focus of the dairy industry GM policy, farmers in all of the 
focus groups held varying attitudes towards GM, and were as likely to acknowledge 
a wide range of possible risks as international consumers. The New Zealand general 
public has been similarly found to acknowledge varied concerns (Cook, Fairweather, 
& Campbell, 2003; Gamble & Gunson, 2002; Henderson & Weaver, 2003). As a 
producer group, there was no clear indication that farmers identified themselves 
strongly in favour of, or against, GM per se. As in the kiwifruit industry, comments 
included concerns about the control of GM. For example: 
The scary part about it is what I said. Where's it going to end? You know, how far 
are we going to go with it and who's going to control it and who is going to play 
God with it? (Respondent C, Larger farms focus group) 
The phrase "who is going to play God" identifies the inequities that might eventuate 
if particular interest groups use GM to meet their own agendas. As in the kiwifruit 
industry, concern about the control of GM suggests that individuals felt unable to 
take action because they lacked power over the processes and practices associated 
with GM. This is consistent with theories emphasising the social and cultural 
construction of risk (Douglas 1992; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; 6, 2005). 
Other farmers had concerns about the agendas of multinational biotechnology 
companies, describing these as "blackmail," and about the patenting of GMOs 
(Respondent C, Organic farms focus group). Again, such concerns about the business 
agendas of multinational organisations, and the possible impacts of GM both 
economically and culturally through the establishment of patents, echo common GM 
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discourses (see, for example, Hindmarsh & Hindmarsh, 2002; Krimsky, 2003; 
Kurian & Munshi, 2003; Muller, 2004; Shiva, 1997). 
As for kiwifruit growers, uncertainty about the long term environmental 
impacts of GM was expressed in all focus groups, with references to the effects of 
DDT, gorse, and blackberries, such as, "Some of these things that we're talking 
[about] just keep going. There's no end" (Respondent A, Organic farms focus 
group), and "How can you stop it" (Respondent C, Smaller farms focus group). Such 
discourses of uncertainty associated with GM risks are typical of the 'risk society' 
identified by Beck (1992), which, he argued, is emerging because industrialisation 
creates more and more risks that cannot be quantified in space or time (see also, 
Adam, Beck & van Loon, 2000; Lash, 2000). Such uncertainty then results from the 
questioning of prevailing conventions of rationality. Environmental impacts are 
particularly important to farmers, since residues in soils can prevent the use of land 
for agriculture and impact on the economic viability of their farms. 
As might be expected, organic farmers were particularly concerned about GM 
risks associated with the environment, but they were also concerned-"it scares the 
hell out of me"-about "the impact of ... adding viruses and the antibiotics and what 
have you ... to our food chain" (Respondent B, Organic farms focus group). 
Such concerns about the risks associated with using anti-biotic markers and viruses 
in GM research are well-reported in the GM literature (see, for example, Ho, 1999; 
Rifkin, 1999). 
At the same time, farmers in all focus groups except the organic farmers' 
group, could see a number of potential benefits resulting from GM. These included 
industry-specific benefits, such as "growing heavier crops or having bigger cows," 
but also health benefits, such as possible treatments for multiple sclerosis, 
particularly if there was a personal interest: "If you had a child with multiple 
sclerosis your attitude would change I think" (Respondent A, Larger farms focus 
group). This focus on the health benefits of GM reflects current Western discourses 
which privilege health values (see Beck-Gernsheim, 2000; Reisner, 2001), indicative 
of a substantive, outcome-oriented, value-based rationality (Giddens, 1972; Weber, 
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1978). However, other farmers' comments also indicated pragmatic, means-oriented, 
instrumental rationalities focusing self-interestedly on farming production, even 
though such benefits were not highlighted particularly in the NZDB documents 
designed for farmers. As in the kiwifruit industry, the possible management of pests 
and diseases, "where we would use less sprays ... or less insecticides" (Respondent 
B, Smaller farms focus group), was represented as a possible benefit of GM. Such 
personal motivations are evidence of the 'bounded rationality' described by (Simon, 
1976); that is the ability to focus only on decisions that are available to the decision-
maker given the constraints of previous kn?wledge and experience. 
However, farmers also endorsed the instrumental market rationality evident 
in dairy industry documents; for example: 
Those sort of efficiencies [potentially from GM] are what has kept New Zealand 
farming at the forefront of the world for returns and we can't ever afford to not be up 
with the play. We've got to be that far ahead of the rest of the world, always be 
converting grass to dollars, because that's what we do; and we've got to be at the top 
because we are the only unsubsidised country in the world. (Respondent C, 
Sharemilkers focus group) 
In one focus group, the dairy industry was implicitly linked with New Zealanders' 
identity as a "small country" of "risk takers": "We've actually developed and 
researched a lot of things that the world has benefited from" (Respondent A, Larger 
farms focus group). This is reminiscent of the alignment of the kiwifruit industry 
brand identity with bungy jumping and images of New Zealanders as innovative 
pioneers. It demonstrates that dairy farmers drew on similar imagery to link the dairy 
industry ~dentity with their own identity as New Zealanders. Farmers thus drew on 
multiple value-premises in their accounts of dairy industry positioning on GM 
evaluating different outcomes, for example, weighing up the possible "detrimental 
effects in the future" and ensuring that the processes used are "tried and true first" 
(Respondent E, Smaller farms focus group). 
The spokesperson from the Dairy Workers' Union similarly represented 
multiple possible risks and benefits in relation to GM. However, as might be 
expected from a union representative, he was concerned primarily about the health 
and employment issues which might arise for dairy industry workers from GM 
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research and development: "At the end of the day I think it pulls down to our basic 
responsibility in the terms of health of our members" (Dairy Workers' Union 
spokesperson). 
The booklets explaining GM policy to dairy industry stakeholders, analysed 
in Chapter Five, were clearly produced by the NZDB/Fonterra executive group 
because of the need to allay concerns such as those articulated above by the union 
spokesperson, and to convince farmers, workers, and marketers within the dairy 
industry-internal stakeholders-of the value of GM research and development. In 
contrast, the interviewees who were part of that executive group-NZDB and 
Fonterra managers-made no comment about any risks associated with GM, other 
than the financial ones discussed earlier in this section; their support for the industry 
GM policy was unanimous. As a distinct industry group, the accounts of industry 
managers reflected their professional backgrounds (largely scientific and technical), 
and their identification with instrumental technical/scientific, or economic 
perspectives of GM. Two of the industry managers commented emphatically on the 
safety of GM. One interviewee clearly privileged such a technical rationality for GM, 
with the comment, "a marvellous potential-I mean it's a technology." 
(NZDB/Fonterra legal spokesperson). This comment additionally implies that such a 
technical rationality is 'normal' and draws on discourses of technological 
determinism that assume the benefits of technologies such as GM (see Levidow, 
1998). The comment of the ViaLactia spokesperson was equally emphatic: "When 
somebody says to me, 'Are you sure that this particular genetic modification will not 
have an adverse affect?' I am as sure as I am that that building will be there 
tomorrow morning" (ViaLactia spokesperson). In conceiving of safety purely in 
terms of a technical/scientific rationality, these managers excluded social or cultural 
risks, or possible ecological risks to the environment, which were considered to be 
dependent on social, cultural, and political values at odds with the objectivity of 
science. This position denied the possibility that science itself might be socially 
constructed (see Brown, 2001; Latour, 2004; Segerstrale, 2000). 
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The specialist functional industry groups, for example, farmers, 
manufacturing, technical, marketing, and research, then expressed somewhat distinct 
identities, separate areas of interest, and interlinked but separate rationalities in 
relation to GM policy. As Scott, Corman & Cheney (1998) suggested, individuals 
may hold multiple identities in an organisation depending on the different 
organisational roles they undertake, involving multiple processes of identification 
with organisational values and the premises for decision-making. However, although 
they acknowledged that dairy industry marketers and some farmers held concerns 
about the risks associated with GM, dairy industry managers never expressed 
concerns about GM per se. The safety of GM was assumed in the eyes of dairy 
industry management, and the rationality supporting this was normalised-assumed 
to be the only valid perspective. 
At an operational level, the dairy industry participates in a world that is no 
longer 'GE free,' and the global identity of the New Zealand dairy industry was 
represented as demanding that it respond to GM initiatives taken by other countries 
in the global marketplace. It was evident in the analysis of the dairy industry 
positioning documents on GM in Chapter Five that the industry was particularly 
concerned to ensure that the legislative and regulatory environment was favourable 
for GM research and development. However, for operations, technical, marketing, 
and legal managers in the dairy industry, the regulatory environment surrounding 
GM was also a significant management issue. 
Regulation and Certification: Auditing Technical Operations 
As in the NZDB submission to the Royal Commission, the legal and 
regulatory framework for GM research and development was a major focus in 
interviews with legal and technical dairy industry spokespersons. Because the New 
Zealand dairy industry is a global industry, both New Zealand and international 
regulations impact on the research, development, and manufacture of milk-related 
products. The dairy industry expected that because of its global status, industry 
knowledge, and experience in managing international regulations, recommendations 
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about regulations impacting on dairy industry production would be taken seriously 
by the Government (and the Royal Commission). For example in relation to 
environmental risk management in New Zealand, the legal spokesperson, who had 
co-ordinated the NZDB submission, commented that New Zealand's environmental 
risk management system was "rigorous" and, in fact, "too restrictive," causing 
"barriers." She added, "We ... could see areas where there needed to be some 
amendments and changes, and those have occurred" (NZDB/Fonterra legal 
spokesperson), indicating that the expectation of influencing Government was 
successful. 
In relation to international food safety regulations, this expectation that the 
dairy industry would be influential in determining the scope and direction of future 
regulatory systems was justified by references to the "expense" of being "exposed" if 
a regulatory system were developed that effectively "sets up some sort of trade 
barrier." This spokesperson emphasised: 
There's a tremendous amount of knowledge that we can piggyback on if we work 
with other regulators and other regulatory systems ... trying to bring that knowledge 
and experience to the Commission was important to us. (NZDB/Fonterra legal 
spokesperson) 
As indicated in Chapter Five in the analysis of the NZDB submission, at an executive 
level the New Zealand dairy industry has an identity as an international leader in the 
area of food regulation. The dairy industry role in the development of New Zealand 
Food Safety Authority regulations was described as "proactive"; for example: 
You know we're involved and working quite closely with the New Zealand Food 
Safety Authority, not just on genetic modification but a whole raft of things. So we 
work very closely with them to make sure that they are aligning in their 
requirements with our importing countries and also that any monitoring or 
certification or audit type activities are practical ones and meaningful. 
(NZDB/Fonterra technical spokesperson) 
Here, it is evident that this proactive role involved powerful lobbying strategies in 
the interests of the industry. 
As a manufacturing industry, the dairy industry had experience of working 
with GM products and processes prior to the Royal Commission, through both 
sourcing other products to be combined with milk, and guaranteeing the composition 
of its own products for supply to others. It has two manufacturing arms: New 
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Zealand Milk which produces the branded products that go into New Zealand, 
Australian, and some European and US markets; and New Zealand Milk Products, 
which produces milk powders, and ingredients such as casein for incorporation into 
milk and non-milk products, sold largely within Latin America and South East Asia. 
The industry therefore has to audit all its manufacturing processes to ensure that the 
products are acceptable in diverse markets. This includes being able to specify the 
technical GM status2 of ingredients, processes, and products, which has clearly 
become a management issue for the industry. 
Although, as discussed in Chapter Five, it was evident that the dairy industry 
favours minimum regulation of research and development of new GM processes and 
products, robust, clearly articulated regulatory systems surrounding the auditing and 
detection of GM are supported by the industry. In regard to GM, the technical 
spokesperson explained that: 
There's a number of layers that you can go to, to identify whether a product has been 
exposed to or has ... been processed with or has even come from other products that 
may have been genetically modified ... you can keep going down to the nth degree 
and there's times when you want to do that and there's times when having a broad 
brush approach is okay. (NZDB/Fonterra technical spokesperson) 
The dairy industry needs clear systems regulating the importing of GMOs to New 
Zealand to ensure these are consistent with the regulatory systems they have to abide 
by, imposed by countries importing New Zealand milk products. The dairy industry 
thus frames the GM regulatory environment in terms of its importance at a 
technical(operational level as well as at a research and development level. This 
reflects its identity as a manufacturing industry, and is consistent with its 
construction of GM risks as purely technical. 
Levidow (1998) referred to a regulatory perspective of GM/biotechnology as 
"biotechnologising regulation" (p. 220)-meaning that regulatory policy is 
2 The GM status of a product can be assessed at four different levels: contains GMOs, PCR 
(Polymerase Chain Reaction) negative-tested (a specific test to look for specific genetically 
modified material), identity-preserved, and no GMO association. 
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developed to support specific biotechnology values. He commented that in the 
United Kingdom regulation is essentially a means of protecting biotechnology 
research and development; it marginalises the perspectives of other potential experts, 
and limits definitions of risk. In contrast, in Denmark biotechnology regulation is 
linked with sustainable agriculture (Levidow, 1998). 
The accounts of the industry managers indicate an instrumental, technical 
focus. This suggests that both the process and products of GM, and the resulting 
compliance issues, can be managed "in the same way" as any other manufacturing 
constraints-for example, the production of kosher halal food (NZDB/Fonterra 
technical spokesperson). In this sense, policies and practices associated with GM are 
represented as being part of the normal operational context of the dairy industry-
just the way things are-a social construction of the risk environment (see Cronon, 
1996; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This operational focus on regulations and 
controls supports the industry identity as an efficient, well-regulated industry, 
focusing on technical issues as opposed to cultural and social ones; it sets up the 
expectation that any new technology or particular auditing requirement can be 
similarly managed. However, the emerging status of the international regulatory 
systems clearly creates some difficulties, as can be seen in the following comment: 
I guess the issue, if there was compliance required, is that there are different testing 
standards as well around the world. So ... if we decided to go GM-free ... we 
might set up regimes that meet our standard, which presumably would be linked to 
an international standard. But customers invariably have developed their own test 
methods and while some of them might go, GM is a relatively new discipline and 
they may be relying on international standards, they may not. (Dairy factory 
manager) 
The values held by dairy industry management in relation to GM underpin both the 
industry's manufacturing identity and its technical rationality. This rationality 
constructs GM risks simply as technical compliance issues, and is informed by 
technical/scientific and risk discourses that construct risk and 'nature' as able to be 
managed and controlled. 
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Ethical, Cultural and Social Issues 
Consistent with the privileging of these scientific and risk discourses, 
scientific facts were represented by the legal spokesperson as indicating the 'true' 
safety of GM, able to be isolated from social and cultural values: 
We recognised the extremely difficult areas of social, cultural, and Maori issues 
particularly, and acknowledged them, but we were very keen to try and ensure that 
some of those, in quotation, "values" issues were kept quite separate from the safety 
and risk issues ... And they just can't be handled in the same way - the risk, the true 
safety and risk to the environment. (NZDB/Fonterra legal spokesperson, emphasis 
added) 
This comment again fails to recognise the contested nature of scientific 'truth' (see 
Brown, 2001; Scott & Carr, 2003; Segerstrale, 2000) or that science is inevitably 
political (Horlick-Jones, 2005; Latour, 2004; Nelkin, 1984). It represents science as 
objective, value-free, and apolitical. 
Only two dairy industry managers mentioned ethical issues, and it was 
assumed in both cases that such issues could be addressed by arguments using the 
instrumental rationality of the free-market. For example: 
Obviously 'consumers' is a big bundle of everything including the ethical, cultural 
and social issues, and so there's no way that we would do something that would 
upset our consumers. If we did we are out of business. (ViaLactia spokesperson) 
This rationality draws on neo-liberal public choice theory which constructs the 
market as amoral, and decision-making as an individual choice. Yet, this approach 
fails to recognise the hegemonic nature of the market and the resultant 
marginalisation of particular groups and values (see Cheney, 2004; Moloney, 2003; 
Roper, 2003; Tenbensel, 2003). This means that in the case of GM, the particular 
market perspectives of powerful corporate businesses regarding the benefits and risks 
of GM products may be normalised; for example, the assumption that GM products 
will provide the means to feed the world's hungry peoples with little or no attached 
risk. In this instance, the perspectives of the cultural groups intended as recipients of 
GM products may be marginalised; for example the right of these groups to maintain 
their own agricultural traditions may be ignored. 
In contrast, farmers were much more prepared to take seriously the ethical 
and cultural issues underlying GM policies, and drew on socio-political discourses 
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about GM, such as those discussed by Shiva (1997, 2000) in relation to the potential 
loss of biodiversity, and the marginalisation of other cultural groups. For example: 
So you might say okay, well this particular genetic modification of a crop is going to 
produce this amazing abundance of food, but within five years all the hundreds of 
seeds that have been saved ... in the seed banks of the poor of the world is lost. 
Well you know you've got a gain and a loss. You've got to decide if that loss is 
worth more or more valuable than the gain you've made over there. (Respondent C, 
Larger farms focus group) 
This was an interesting contrast to the general rhetoric of the industry documents and 
that of many of the industry personnel, which constructed ethical or cultural concerns 
and values as being able to be separated from technical concerns. Decisions can be 
made on several levels depending on the specific identification and specific industry 
group or value-premise that takes precedence at any one time. For example, a 
personal identification could override an organisational one and an organisational 
decision could override a socially desirable one or vice versa. So decisions may be 
'correct' for different reasons, as a result of different rationalities and identifications 
(Simon, 1976). 
The most prevalent value-premises and rationalities underpinning the dairy 
industry's rhetorical positioning on GM reflect the corporate identity of the industry. 
They highlight instrumental technical rationalities for GM which marginalise the 
wider ethical, cultural, and social values held by their industry stakeholders. The 
marketing and technical focus of the dairy industry GM policy was less clearly 
articulated with common industry-wide values and strategies, and the diverse values 
and identities demonstrated by specific industry stakeholder groups, than in the 
kiwifruit industry. This resulted in less consistency in dairy industry members' 
identification with the GM policy. In the farmer focus groups, there was varied 
discussion related to the particular perspectives able to be taken on GM, and farmer 
groups identified more strongly with the historical cooperative identity of the dairy 
industry as discussed in the next section. 
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Organisational Contrasts: A Corporate/Cooperative Industry 
Many of the groups within the dairy industry have a distinct and independent 
identity; they experience a hierarchical relationship with the executive management 
group, yet this is a cooperatively owned enterprise. Such groups move in and out of 
relationships as internal and external stakeholders with the larger industry 
organisation (see Cheney & Christensen, 2001a); for example, farmers are both 
owner/shareholders of Fonterra, producers/suppliers of milk to Fonterra, and 
consumers of dairy products themselves, reacting to Fonterra policy on GM. They 
have had to contend with changes to the industry organisation as a result of the 
increasing market orientation demanded of the industry by virtue of its involvement 
in global dairy markets. Both Cheney (1991) and Doolin (2002) have argued that one 
impact of market discourses on organisations has been the need for organisational 
members to re-negotiate their organisational or professional identities. In the dairy 
industry, this has meant that the experience of farmers is at times marginalised by the 
consequent privileging of the marketing initiatives formulated by the executive of the 
industry organisation. 
Farmers own 100% of the shares in Fonterra, yet on a practical level their 
concerns end at the farm gate when their milk is collected for sale or manufacture 
into other products. In the larger farms focus group, there was some discussion about 
possible private agendas for research and new technologies, and regret that 
competition rather than cooperation is the current likely basis for decision-making. 
Competition was felt to be less in the industry interest and likely to result in less 
"concern for the environment and other people" (Respondent C, Larger farms focus 
group). Another respondent also commented, for example: 
The unfortunate change is that historically when we as a community found a good 
crop you shared it around. Now you patent it and protect it from someone else so 
it's that kind of greed factor which is making that negative I think. (Respondent A, 
Larger farms focus group) 
However, such private commercial agendas were interestingly rationalised by these 
farmers in terms of "progress" (Respondent A, Larger farms focus group), and a 
belief that the research and development of new technologies inevitably leads to 
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improvements in lifestyle, a form of technological determinism (see Chapman, 2004; 
Levidow, 1998) 
Organic farmers represented technical perspectives of science-"things that 
are in a box," and "isolated"- as driving GM research, rather than the organic or 
ecological perspective which they favoured. By implication, they identified 
themselves as fanning experts: organic farmers who were different from Fonterra, a 
business organisation with a pro-GM perspective of science For example: 
I think too we're back to the-I don't want to say ignorance but the lack of 
knowledge by our scientists about the whole process on the farm and all the life on 
the farm, the biological life on the farm .... [Scientists] think that ... that isolated 
area will affect that and only affect that but it's the whole thing that affects things. 
It's the biological life plus all those things in boxes that work together to get the 
production on a farm. (Respondent C, Organic farms focus group) 
They believed that the private agendas of corporate business were driving the 
direction of GM research through the allocation of considerable funding, a public 
concern identified in other research findings (Henderson & Weaver, 2003; Krimsky, 
2003). In this focus group, farmers identified a trend for farms to become larger in 
size, and for "factory f arming"-increasing specialisation of farm production 
(Respondent C, Organic farms focus group). They were less able to work with an 
overview, with a 'big picture' of the dynamics of farming, and felt they were losing 
the knowledge associated with "traditional" methods of farming practice: 
We see the farmers looking for something that they are told will fix that problem 
instantly ... because it's easiest and the quickest, instead of going out and using 
their own eyes and ears and things and taking their staff with them to educate them 
about the different stages of development on the farm. (Respondent C, Organic 
farms focus group) 
Some regret, then, was expressed in the organic farms focus group for the loss of 
traditional, cooperative dairy farming practices. As owners they used small-scale, 
cooperative methods in contrast to the global corporate identity of the industry in the 
competitive international marketplace. 
Because of the size of the producer group-nearly 14,000 farmers-decision 
making and communication between farmers and the executive/corporate 
management group is of necessity managed by processes of representation and 
delegation. Much of the consultation that occurs with farmers thus takes place at the 
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level of the Shareholders' Council, where 48 representatives of dairy farm owners 
meet regularly with corporate dairy industry managers. 
In some instances, it was evident that despite being shareholders/owners, 
farmers felt that information about GM from the NZDB and Fonterra management 
groups had been scant. The organic farmers and sharemilkers referred to the level of 
information provided as "just about like a taboo subject," (Respondent B, Organic 
farms focus group), and "Fonterra don't actually spit a lot of information eh!" 
(Respondent D, Sharemilkers focus group). A more detailed comment indicated: 
Basically they-in a couple of their publications they had a couple of brief outlines 
on, or media releases about their research arm, other than that we've asked for as I 
said their policy on GE, which I think we got about twelve or eighteen months ago. 
Other than that they haven't-they've kept very quiet on that issue. (Respondent D, 
Organic farms focus group) 
Farmers in the larger farms focus group felt that the industry was well supplied with 
information. This was generally given high "credibility" simply because it came 
from industry sources that were trusted because of the cooperative nature of the 
ownership (Respondent E, Larger farms focus group). However, it was evident that 
farmers had little involvement in policy decision making. In the smaller farms focus 
group, the farmers identified different possible rationalities for decision making 
about GM, such as, "Do you make an emotional decision, political decision or one 
based on science?" (Respondent B, Smaller farms focus group). This uncertainty 
indicated that they had not themselves been part of the dairy industry decision-
making on GM policy. 
Farmers clearly identified themselves, as milk producers, as most concerned 
about the success of their own farm as a business and their dollar return, and as 
separate from the decision-making management and marketing groups in the 
industry. On some occasions, for example, they felt they were not consulted, or that 
they "have no say in what goes on in the company" (Respondent B, Sharemilkers 
focus group). Others were frequently content to leave the decision to the marketers or 
executive groups in the industry; however, one participant was more self-critical: 
I think a lot of us think, "Well, somebody above us is going to make a decision and 
we'll farm in the way that we are told to" .... So we don't educate ourselves 
268 
enough about the topics, somebody else is going to make the decision for us. 
(Respondent D, Smaller farms focus group) 
Another participant suggested that farmers would become more "political", more 
involved in decisions if they felt policies were "wrong" (Respondent C, Sharemilkers 
focus group). At the same time, there was a level of trust in the Shareholder Council 
system and a belief that Councillors did consult with farmers: 
If for example there was something that really sent, you know, alarm bells off, the 
Shareholder Council would have then gone back to shareholders with that. 
(Respondent G, Larger farms focus group) 
Farmers evidently also valued the numerous farmer networks and informal 
discussions felt to be typical of rural communities, over "a few beers," or the 
"grapevine," and "word of mouth" (Respondent E, Organic farms focus group). 
Yet, farmers were very aware that, as a large corporate organisation, the dairy 
industry holds "political clout" as a lobby group, and individuals have no such power 
(Respondent F, Larger farms focus group). They were also aware that this political 
power exists because the industry is a world player in international markets, and 
contributes significantly to the New Zealand economy: "If we were only one percent 
of the economy, we still wouldn't have the power that we've got now" (Respondent 
A, Larger farms focus group). 
Farmers thus saw both advantages and disadvantages in the duality of their 
identity as cooperative farmers and shareholders of a corporate industry organisation. 
However, overall, the prevailing dairy industry values and rationalities which 
underpinned its formal rhetorical positioning on GM reflected the corporate identity 
of the industry organisation, rather than the diverse values and cooperative identity at 
times espoused by individual farmers. The dairy industry appears more fragmented 
than the kiwifruit industry, in line with the diverse nature of its organisational 
structure, its products, and its brands. 
New Zealand Dairy Industry Brand Values 
Despite the emphasis on a market rationality for GM policy, based on the 
competitive nature of New Zealand's global dairy markets, industry members made 
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little reference to a particular brand identity for the industry. Within the two main 
product sectors, New Zealand Milk and New Zealand Milk Products (NZMP) 
multiple products are marketed under a variety of brand names, and the imagery 
associated with these brands is at times inconsistent with the industry identity 
privileged in its GM positioning. It would seem that the 'integration' of the industry, 
referred to by the ViaLactia spokesperson, is limited to the hierarchical structure 
connecting industry stakeholder groups. A brand identity was not articulated strongly 
with the GM positioning, as in the kiwifruit industry. Similarly to the kiwifruit 
industry, however, the NZ Milk branding philosophy was described as: 
A logo and branding philosophy based upon energy, freshness, vitality and a clean, 
green country. Its brand positioning is based on consumer preference for New 
Zealand milk products because they embody all the pure, fresh, natural values of 
New Zealand. (NZDB submission, 2000, 62.2, p. 73) 
On the New Zealand Milk website, the stylised visual representation of the brand 
identity of this sector is based on three factors, which are defined on the website as: 
(i) the sun-to indicate forward thinking and the future, (ii) the land-to indicate the 
green New Zealand landscape, strength, pride, and determination, and (iii) the 
water-to indicate action and momentum, energy and good health. This website 
emphasises the nutritional qualities of milk, and the New Zealand dairy industry's 
unique difference in terms of the New Zealand environment: 
New Zealand milk comes from the best country in the world for dairy products ... 
New Zealand is renowned as a clean, green country. With clean air, pasture and 
water, it's the ideal environment for dairy products. (New Zealand Milk, 2001) 
A number of different brand names for New Zealand milk products including 
Anchor, Mainland, Femleaf, Anmum, Anlene, and Andec draw on such images of 
the unpolluted New Zealand environment to create an identity for the industry. 
Yet, no inconsistency was seen by the dairy industry between the use of GM 
and their brand identity, drawing on a 'clean, green' New Zealand identity. 
Interestingly the 'strap line' used by the dairy industry for consumer goods is 
"Nutrition for Life." This is very similar to that used by the kiwifruit industry, 
"Putting Life into Life," despite the difference in their GM positioning. Unlike in the 
kiwifruit industry, however, New Zealand imagery played little role in the 
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development of GM policy. Indeed, in the research interviews and focus groups, only 
one industry member (a marketing specialist) actually made explicit references to 
aspects of brand identity. 
This marketing specialist identified that there might indeed be particular 
consumer 'sensitivity' to GM issues in relation to dairy products, because of the 
perception that concepts of 'trust' and 'purity' might be incompatible with GM. The 
marketing spokesperson commented that the consumer goods section of the industry 
is deliberately positioned to build on the trust associated with mothers' milk: 
Dairy seems purer, closer to milk coming out of mothers, those sorts of things ... 
there's many, many photos of young children having dairy products and mothers sort 
of cuddling children just to sort of position itself around that whole trust in milk and 
degree of trust in mothers (NZDB/Fonterra marketing spokesperson) 
Interestingly, the same association between the purity of mother's milk and GM was 
articulated by the activist group MAdGE in New Zealand to argue against the 
commercial release of GM. 
For NZMP (ingredients) as in the kiwifruit industry, New Zealand's 
reputation as 'clean and green' was again articulated with 'purity' in the sector 
branding. For example: 
New Zealand has got a very strong reputation, I mean 'clean, green' is the cliche you 
hear all the time, but I mean that really is the way that people perceive New Zealand 
... there's always subtle links between the purity of the food that we supply ... and 
its New Zealand origin. (NZDB/Fonterra marketing spokesperson, emphasis added) 
As this spokesperson emphasised, New Zealand's image as having an unpolluted 
environment and high water quality, for example, is particularly important to the 
positioning of the New Zealand dairy industry overseas. When images of New 
Zealand are used in marketing dairy products, cows are always pictured on green 
grass to identify the milk products with this unpolluted pastoral environment. 
It is perhaps surprising then that the dairy industry's submission to the Royal 
Commission, other documents referring to policy on biotechnology and GM, and 
other industry members' accounts rarely refer to New Zealand imagery in any detail. 
In the submission there is simply a brief statement that New Zealand's 'clean, green' 
image is important: 
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NZDB does not believe research into GM, or responsibly regulated 
commercialisation of GM products, will harm New Zealand's image. (NZDB, 
2000a, Section 21.3, p. 34) 
The explicit message is thus that GM will not impact on the existing identity of New 
Zealand or of the dairy industry. 
The only specific mention of GM in any of the Annual reports and speeches 
or on the websites is a brief statement in the Annual Report for 2001/2002 under the 
heading ViaLactia. In this instance, the dairy industry responded to increasing 
sensitivity surrounding the term 'GM.' The following comment focuses on the broad 
applications of the term 'biotechnology,' and reassuringly represents GM as only one 
example of this technology: 
Biotechnology is the tool that allows us to examine and modify biological systems, 
either using natural means or more advanced tools, including the responsible use of 
genetic modification. (Fonterra, 2001/2002, p. 33) 
The contrasting of the terms "natural" and "more advanced," and the use of the word 
"responsible" is, however, a rhetorical strategy consistent with the phrasing of GM 
policy developed by the NZDB in its submission to the Royal Commission. GM is 
positioned as preferable to 'natural' technologies because it is more advanced, an 
indication of progress, in contrast to references to biotechnology being a continuum 
and GM being no different from earlier natural breeding methods, as discussed in 
Chapter Five. Unlike in the kiwifruit industry, the industry values highlighted in the 
GM positioning are thus held in tension with brand values relying on images of New 
Zealand as a natural, 'clean, green' environment. The consistent use of the term 
'natural' is thus problematic for the dairy industry in their brand positioning and 
positioning on GM. 
The dairy industry GM positioning was driven at a corporate level by 
privileging the technical and financial affairs of the industry and marginalising the 
concerns and values of grassroots farmers and consumers. The policy makers 
constructed this technical and economic rationality as 'normal,' and therefore the 
'right' perspective, framed by specific discourses of science and technology. As 
Wynne (1992) argued, looking at risks as 'acceptable' in a technical sense can be 
seen as "a self-delusory discourse that [allowed] such institutions to avoid the 
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ambiguities and social risks of negotiating the conditions of acceptability case by 
case" (p. 280). The industry personnel responsible for constructing the GM policy 
firmly believed that GM represented absolutely no risk to the environment or food 
products. They argued that an effective regulatory system would control GM 
processes and products such that images of an unpolluted, 'clean, green' New 
Zealand could be maintained, and they believed that the existing brand identity 
would not be affected by the future branding of any GM products. 
It is evident from the accounts of these different groups within the dairy 
industry that different GM perspectives existed at the time the policy was developed. 
These reflected the multiple identities-identifications made on the basis of the 
particular roles and values held by industry members (see Scott, Corman, & Cheney, 
1998; Wynne, 1992, 1996)-co-existing within the industry. The concerns of farmers 
and marketers within the industry about GM were therefore deliberately addressed by 
the management groups with very pro-active biotechnology communication 
strategies, as will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
Consumer attitudes to GM are also dependent on value systems which 
include a range of attitudes and images associated with the environment, pollution, 
purity, and 'natural' as well as on rational choice based on cost-benefit analysis 
issues such as price (see, for example, Gamble & Gunson, 2002; Knight, Holdsworth 
& Mather, 2003; Rowe, 2004; Uzogara, 2000). However, dairy industry policy 
makers privileged the global, competitive identity of the dairy industry and the 
industry's technical/scientific identity as 'cutting-edge' research and development-
focused. Such assumptions meant that, initially, consumer perceptions were 
constructed as ill-informed-a 'deficit model' of understanding science and 
technology (see Gregory, 2003; Michael, 1996; Hornig-Priest, 2001). Policy makers 
did not believe that consumer concerns about GM would persist. 
In the final section of this chapter, the different GM positions negotiated by 
the kiwifruit and dairy industries are contrasted and compared in terms of different 
aspects of each industry identity, and aspects of New Zealand's identity. 
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Conclusion: Different Voices and Different Identities in the Kiwifruit 
and Dairy Industries 
Cooperative or Corporate Industries? 
It is clear that the kiwifruit industry is a more integrated, cooperatively-run 
enterpris~ than the dairy industry. The kiwifruit industry has constructed a strong 
cooperative identity, as evidenced in both the industry documents and the accounts of 
industry members, which relies heavily on concepts of integration. The focus on 
integration is evident in the development and enactment of the ZESPRI System, and 
to a lesser extent the Kiwi Green pest management system and Taste ZESPRI, which 
provide the industry members with a means of sensemaking (see Weick, 1979, 1995, 
2001)-both a conceptual 'umbrella' of values and a pragmatic means of organising. 
Kiwifruit industry stakeholders represent the industry as having excellent 
communication practices, with different industry groups able to participate in 
conversations at a variety of levels of formality, from written communication, to 
face-to-face formal and informal meetings. Consultation is expected and enacted, and 
when this does not take place, the considerable trust built up within the industry 
ensures that the rationale for this strategy is widely understood and supported. As 
Hatch and Schultz (2004 ), and Scott, Corman, & Cheney (1998) suggested, the 
organisational rhetoric is both constituted by and constitutes this identity and the 
consequent processes of organising. 
The kiwifruit industry, then, has constructed a complex identity as a 
successful organisational hybrid-a cooperative within which specialised industry 
groups can have independent functions but still retain a sense of collective identity. 
The high degree of involvement of all industry members, regardless of their 
specialised group membership, is evident. For example, kiwifruit growers can track 
their fruit right through the production process, with regular information being fed 
back to the grower regarding, for example, the relative size of the fruit, its sugar 
content, and the number of rejected fruit. Kiwifruit from an individual grower can in 
fact be tracked if necessary right to the marketplace. Growers get individualised 
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financial returns, based on the size and quality of their fruit (personal conversation, 
Julie Lankshear, kiwifruit grower, April 8, 2005). As a result, all industry members 
are very much in touch with every aspect of the production and supply process, and 
motivated to remain so, and they feel very involved in the industry. 
In contrast, the dairy industry, although cooperatively owned like the 
kiwifruit industry, demonstrates a far more hierarchical organisational identity. Dairy 
farmers sell their raw milk to Fonterra, but their involvement with that milk literally 
'ends at the farm gate.' Farmers then get no individual feedback about the destination 
of their milk; it is consolidated in the milk tankers into a single supply, for which 
they are paid an equal return (although a premium is now paid for organic milk). 
This contrast in the level of industry involvement was identified by one of the 
kiwifruit growers as linked to the higher use of mechanisation in the dairy industry 
and was seen as relevant to the different industry positions on GM: 
I think a lot of the genetic modification in this country is the result of more 
mechanisation with our productivity and therefore we are less hands-on, and there's 
[kiwifruit] growers in orchards who are more aware of what goes on because most of 
us or all of us do the pruning and are actually interactive with our product. But I 
find you look at the scale of dairy farming now and how much more technically 
advanced, that is how much more bigger scale it is-there's less hands-on, walking 
in the pasture, getting dirty. (Whangarei kiwifruit grower) 
The size of the dairy farmer base is much larger-nearly 14,000 farmer shareholders 
compared to 2,500 kiwifruit owner-orchardists-and, although there are extensive 
communication systems to communicate with these farmers, there is more distance 
between the individual farmers and the executive group of Fonterra, than between 
kiwifruit growers and the ZESPRI Group. Although farmers do feel they have 
information and have a voice, the greatest involvement in industry consultation 
resides with the Shareholder Council. The dairy industry, as evidenced by the 
rhetoric of its documents, and by the comments of industry members, is a more 
corporate-run organisation than the kiwifruit industry. 
Different Markets, Different Products 
One dairy industry spokesperson suggested that the major difference between 
the dairy industry and the kiwifruit industry GM policies might result from the 
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Additionally, there is no evidence that other countries which grow kiwifruit 
are likely to try to bring a GM kiwifruit to market in the foreseeable future. There is, 
however, evidence that the New Zealand dairy industry's main competitors, Arla and 
Nestle, are already researching and developing milk products in ways that use GM 
technologies to reduce the costs of their products. 
This kiwifruit industry member's comment clearly identified these 
differences between the two industries: 
What you've actually got is ... two commercial organisations who can see benefits 
in both directions. For us there is a benefit in not adopting, or there is no benefit in 
adopting ... and there are potential risks in adopting. Whereas with Fonterra ... 
there's huge potential gains ... Ours is a luxury item and theirs is a commodity 
product and that's the difference, so in a sense ours is already differentiated whereas 
they're trying to differentiate. (Innovation team member, E) 
ZESPRI draws on a national identity constructed for New Zealand which is "already 
differentiated"-the imagery associated with a clean and green, unpolluted 
environment. The comment that the dairy industry are "trying to differentiate" 
implicitly refers to the competition they face in the global marketplace-competition 
that New Zealand also faces in trying to be seen as an innovative, technologically 
sophisticated nation that competes economically in world markets. 
Competing Identities for New Zealand 
Both the strategic branding of the kiwifruit industry, and its GM policy, draw 
on values similar to those underpinning the '100% Pure' tourism identity for New 
Zealand. Risks associated with GM are identified as the loss of kiwifruit markets, 
and are implicitly constructed as the loss of environmental quality and integrity, the 
loss of 'natural' goodness, and the loss of hard work built on traditional, pioneering 
values associated with developing the land in innovative ways. The 'natural' 
environment is constructed as sacred, life-giving, and healthy, to be minimally 
violated. 
In contrast, for the dairy industry, the risk is also the loss of markets, but in 
this case the loss of future markets, the loss of opportunity, of being competitive in 
global dairy markets. The risks to be taken in terms of GM are seen in terms of short 
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time frames for opportunity and gain; they draw on an identity for New Zealand, 
presented similarly in the Government's Growth and Innovation Framework 
(Growing an innovative New Zealand, 2002), of being at the forefront of global 
innovation and cutting edge technology. 'Nature', in this sense, can be changed, 
controlled, and commodified (see Desmond, 1995: Dickens, 1996; Merchant, 2000). 
Interestingly, the Foreword of the New Zealand Biotechnology Strategy 
rhetorically positions this strategy as a way in which these competing New Zealand 
identities, or brands, can work together, combining values associated with traditional 
agricultural practices, with technology, cutting-edge research, competitive time-
frames, and preserving environmental values: 
New Zealand is a country built on an exceptional ability to add values to natural 
products by applying biological knowledge. We are fortunate in possessing an 
equable climate, but we are even more fortunate to possess the know-how to make 
optimum use of it. And we have been doing it for decades -milk products, kiwifruit 
and pine trees are just a few examples. More recently, New Zealand researchers have 
been involved in the creation of world-class human health, pharmaceutical and 
environmental research, all of which involve biotechnology ... Developments in 
biotechnology move swiftly. We will need to work hard to keep abreast because 
those developments will bring great opportunities. They can also carry risks. It is 
important that a balanced approach to biotechnology is taken so that our economic, 
social, environmental and cultural values are given equal consideration. That is why 
we have developed this strategy ... While biotechnology is much more than genetic 
modification this strategy is about preserving opportunities. (Ministry of Research, 
Science and Technology, 2002) 
This strategy underpins current New Zealand Government policy on GM and 
biotechnology. It is both the result of considerable debate on the public policy, and 
the subject of ongoing debate. Arguably, the seemingly opposing submissions of 
both the kiwifruit industry and the dairy industry to the Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification are reflected in this Government strategy. Although, the 
explicit focus of the strategy is on developing biotechnology (and GM), the 
references to "preserving opportunities," "natural products," "risks," and the need to 
consider "social, environmental and cultural values" implicitly represents the 
Government strategy as a cautious approach in an attempt to appease all parties in 
the debate. The market rationalities of the kiwifruit and dairy industry are combined 
to create a duality of approaches to biotechnology which draw on multiple identities 
for New Zealand. These approaches draw on different, sometimes competing 
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discourses and rationalities that reflect the ongoing tensions that need to be managed 
in negotiating with the practices of GM. 
The next chapter, Chapter Seven, focuses on the engagement of both 
industries in the wider debate about GM within New Zealand. 
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difference in market access (NZDB/Fonterra marketing spokesperson). The kiwifruit 
industry has access to lucrative European (and US) markets, while the dairy industry 
is denied access to these markets for the majority of its products because of the trade 
subsidy and protection policies of these countries. Despite the fact that all of these 
countries are WTO members, free-trade is not a reality for the dairy industry. The 
most successful markets for the dairy industry are therefore in Latin America and 
South East Asia where the demand is for inexpensive commodity products that 
provide a lower return per milk solid than value-added products would gain in luxury 
markets. 
The difference in GM policy between the two industries is also, therefore, to 
some extent the result of the difference in product. Kiwifruit are a raw, luxury 
product, while the dairy industry sells little raw milk or fresh products outside the 
domestic market. The level of technology required to process milk into the 
ingredients and other products which are eventually sent to international markets is 
much greater than the grading, packaging, and distribution required for kiwifruit. 
Such differences in product were identified by individual kiwifruit growers to 
be related to consumer perceptions and the readiness with which foods may be 
identified as GM. Kiwifruit were represented as a "ready-to-eat product" as opposed 
to the dairy industry manufacturing process where the products "just become an 
ingredient in something else which is an ingredient in something else, a long way 
from the final product" (ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit grower). 
The discourses and identities drawn on by kiwifruit and dairy industry 
members to rhetorically position both the industry and the policies on GM thus to a 
large extent determine the rationalities used for the justification of the GM policy. In 
the kiwifruit industry, raw fruit is articulated with natural products and processes, as 
a result of sustainable practices that draw strongly on environmentalist values. In the 
dairy industry, manufactured products are articulated with technologically complex 
processes, which rely on the support of extensive regulatory systems and draw 
strongly on technical/ scientific and economic values. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ISSUES MANAGEMENT AND RATIONALITY: THE 
ENGAGEMENT OF THE DAIRY AND KIWIFRUIT 
INDUSTRIES WITH KEY STAKEHOLDER GROUPS 
Introduction 
The GM debate in New Zealand is an example of a highly contested public 
policy issue that organisations seek to manage in an attempt to influence public 
opinion and public policy in ways that will be favourable for their own organisations. 
This chapter examines the kiwifruit and dairy industries' communication with key 
stakeholders from the perspective of issues management, and in terms of the values, 
rationalities, and assumptions evident in the industries' communication. 
Because GM issues are important to the dairy and kiwifruit industries' 
successful business operations in international markets, each industry, by virtue of its 
identity as a primary export industry, negotiates its engagement with key 
stakeholders in terms of an overarching market rationality. This means that the 
economic outcomes of developing GM products for an international market are 
prioritised. However, this market rationality exists in tension with other rationalities 
linked to additional aspects of each industry's identity. These rationalities draw on a 
range of discourses to manage the legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1977) between 
stakeholders' expectations and the industries' policies and performance. 
The key stakeholders include the industry members, whose support for the 
GM policy is necessary to facilitate its implementation; customers and consumers in 
international markets, whose continuing business is sought; and the New Zealand 
Government, whose policies, legislation, and regulatory frameworks set the context 
for the implementation of industry policy on GM. The key stakeholders additionally 
include interest groups engaged in the wider public debate in New Zealand, which 
also seek to influence public policy, for example, Greenpeace, the 'GE-Free' 
coalition, and the Life Sciences Network; and the New Zealand electorate, whose 
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support for particular policy initiatives gives social and political legitimation to 
Government policy and legislation. 
This chapter draws on the 'accounts' of industry members in interviews and 
focus groups to critically examine the kiwifruit and dairy industries' communication 
strategies and practices, as they engage in debate about GM and seek to influence 
that debate. The chapter examines the priorities accorded to particular perspectives, 
how these priorities are justified, and the discourses that underpin each industry 
organisation's strategic decision-making. It explores further the proposition first 
introduced in Chapter Six, that the engagement of organisations with key 
stakeholders, in relation to specific public issues that have broad socio-political 
implications, will demonstrate rationalities that are linked to multiple aspects of the 
organisation's identity. 
The chapter is organised into three sections. The first two industry sections 
discuss how the organisational culture and identity of each organisation has 
facilitated or constrained specific communication strategies with industry members, 
to manage GM issues. The second two industry sections discuss the rationalities used 
by each industry organisation to establish zones of meaning (Heath, 1997) with 
stakeholders and engage with key interest groups. The final section of the chapter 
explores the political nature of both industries' engagement with public policy 
decision-making in New Zealand. 
Identity, Participation, and the Framing of Strategy: Industry Voices 
In primary industries, it might be expected that the producer groups-the 
dairy farmers and kiwifruit growers-would see GM as a highly relevant current 
issue (see Crable & Vibbert, 1985). For example, they might have concerns about the 
possible risks and benefits of GM to the environment, by virtue of their involvement 
with the land, as well as concerns about the attitudes of their markets towards GM 
products. 
Recent research argues for a dialogic approach to public policy issues 
management to increase shared understanding of the parties involved (see Heath, 
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2001; Leitch & Neilson, 2001; Murphy, 1996; Murphy & Dee, 1992; Taylor, Kent & 
White, 2001). However, organisations rarely engage in dialogue that is free of 
strategic intent or that seeks to collaboratively negotiate change (Crable & Vibbert, 
1985; Roper, 2005b). Indeed, they attempt to actively influence cultural values 
(Vibbert & Bostdorff, 1993). 
In industries that are almost wholly owned by growers/farmers, a less 
hierarchical structure to the industry organisation than in other large corporate 
industries might also be expected. These producer groups might be involved in 
policy decision-making about GM and participate actively in communication about 
related issues. However, as Cheney's (1999) study of the changes in worker 
participation and values in the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain would suggest, the 
increasing external pressures on the kiwifruit and dairy industries as they compete in 
global markets may also mean that market relations are prioritised over other values, 
in deciding GM policy. 
An organisation's issues management rhetoric may then reflect and impact 
upon not only on specific bounded messages to external publics but also on daily 
organisational working life. As Cheney and Lair (2005) argued, rhetoric plays a part 
in persuasion and identification at multiple levels in organisations, in the processes of 
organising, as well as in issues management. An organisation's rhetorical and 
discursive strategies will demonstrate a range of priorities and rationalities, which 
represent key value-premises and assumptions, as they make decisions about policies 
and negotiate with stakeholders. Yet, the role of values in organisational decision-
making is problematic (Conrad, 1993). As Conrad argued, individual, organisational, 
and societal values mutually influence each other, and may be markedly and 
uncritically aligned. However, they may equally be so differentiated that 
organisations mobilise a range of strategies to manage the resulting issues. 
Organisations may use processes of collective and retrospective sensemaking 
which purposively reduce equivocality and ambiguity in the organisational 
environment (Weick, 1979), and rationalise their strategic positioning, often 
retrospectively, to reconcile ambivalences created by the management of multiple 
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priorities (Conrad & Mclntush, 2003). Such bounded rationalities (Simon, 1976) will 
additionally be influenced by the organisational structure, and preferred means of 
decision-making (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), and by the current discourses 
legitimated by major institutions (Douglas, 1986). 
Participation and Tactics of 'Silence' in the Kiwifruit Industry 
ZESPRI's issue management strategy in relation to GM was to minimise any 
possibility that their international markets might link the industry with GM practices 
or products, to avoid the possibility that these markets would reject New Zealand 
kiwifruit. ZESPRI chose deliberate tactics of 'silence,' rather than engaging 
significantly in debate about GM in New Zealand, or even within the industry. 
Kiwifruit growers did perceive GM to be an issue in terms of their identity as 
growers and the practical production of their crop, and were aware of the GM issues 
in kiwifruit markets, but they did not initiate debate about GM at an industry-wide 
level, or actively debate ZESPRI's GM policy. Individual growers identified with, 
and endorsed, the industry's GM position that not only responded to the concerns of 
international markets, but favoured environmental management practices that 
minimised environmental impacts. 
In only two focus groups was there an ambivalent voice about how GM 
policy was decided. One participant was concerned that, "We weren't asked, were 
we?" (Respondent D, Whangerei kiwifruit focus group). A second grower was 
concerned there had been no opportunity to present an alternative point of view. 
However, this grower was still very positive about industry communication at a 
general level. His concern about the development of GM policy seemed to be an 
isolated occurrence: 
I've got to compliment ZESPRI ... about the way they form these 'think' tanks' on 
most subjects, and they have a very good consultation process but .... the CEO has 
come out in print ... with a [GM] policy that's obviously come only from the 
Board; it's never been circulated or discussed amongst growers ... we're very much 
being told what's happening. There's been no asking. (Respondent C, ZESPRI 
Green kiwifruit focus group) 
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Despite their lack of involvement in GM policy discussions, industry members' 
accounts represented communication practices as consistent with the cooperative 
basis for the industry. This included a very high level of interactive, two-way 
communication and evidence of the participatory decision-making described by 
Cheney (1999), and Stohl and Cheney (2001). Industry members represented such 
participation as common practice, and said priorities were decided by a "consultative 
process right through all levels of the industry" (Innovation spokesperson E). 
Industry groups were evidently quite outspoken in their comments on industry 
strategies. For example: 
Over the two years of the moratorium and prior to it there's never been any debate in 
terms of ZESPRI's position [on GM] and it's quite a vocal industry, the kiwi fruit 
industry, and if there is opposition in any way to what ZESPRI's suggesting it's 
very, very loudly debated on a number of forums ... there is a large support for 
ZESPRI's stance [on GM]. (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier C) 
Widespread support for the GM policy evidently negated the need for debate. 
Participants in all focus groups and all three technical advisers commented 
positively on the multiple channels of communication available to industry members, 
referring to "heaps of discussion," (Respondent B, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus 
group), "the most amazing industry for transfer of knowledge," (Technical adviser at 
packhouse/supplier B), and "quality" information, (Respondent B, ZESPRI Organic 
kiwifruit focus group). This feeling is summed up well by the following comment: 
The kiwifruit industry is unique in its make up; the transfer of information is very 
open by a number of different channels ... both ways, from ZESPRI to growers and 
from growers to ZESPRI. (Respondent A, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group) 
Kiwifruit industry members then viewed communication processes within the 
industry as two-way and symmetrical. Although often somewhat idealistic, this is 
suggested as being best practice public relations (compare Cheney & Christensen, 
2001a; Grunig, 2001; Tilson & Stacks, 1997). 
ZESPRI executive groups provided information for the wider industry, for 
example through newsletters, and invited feedback, for example through forums: 
We run everything through audiences; the mechanisms we use will suit both the time 
and the audience and the frequency ... we probably over-communicate to the 
industry. (Communication spokesperson B) 
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However, the rhetorical construction of communication 'to' the industry, rather than 
dialogue 'with' the industry, suggests that communication was frequently initiated by 
executive management, and might, in fact, frequently be asymmetrical. 
Interestingly, the lack of industry-wide consultation on GM policy was 
rationalised, and endorsed, by industry members as a deliberate issues management 
strategy by ZESPRI executive groups. In their accounts, industry members in three 
of the grower focus groups, a technical adviser in a packhouse/supplier, and three 
members of the Innovation team, happily justified the absence of industry 
consultation, recognising why ZESPRI wanted minimum discussion about GM. This 
is typical of the retrospective sensemaking described by Weick (1979, 1995, 2001). 
Participants in focus groups and interviews saw this 'silence' as "a smart 
marketing move," (Respondent E, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group), about a 
sensitive issue, because any discussion might be picked up by media, wrongly 
perceived by international markets to be an indication that New Zealand kiwifruit are 
produced using GM technology, and "have serious impact on our sales," (Technical 
adviser, packhouse/supplier C). Any communication about GM was constructed as "a 
huge perception risk," (Respondent F, ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit focus group), that 
might draw attention, destroy the image of the industry, and involved "playing big 
games," (Innovation spokesperson E).The reference to "big games" particularly 
indicates awareness of the strategic global nature of kiwifruit industry 
communication about GM. 
Participants identified the somewhat emotive nature of the likely international 
response in their representation of GM communication as "tricky," and one 
participant commented, "If you start talking about it, you're sort of hexed" 
(Respondent D, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group). Another participant referred 
to ZESPRI as "keeping quiet about it," and described reporters as "wide-eyed," 
likely to pick up on any hint of controversy (Respondent F, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit 
focus group), demonstrating awareness of news values (Galtung & Ruge, 1973) and 
the possible role of media as risk amplifiers or risk minimisers (Palfreman, 2001). 
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ZESPRI International was viewed by other industry members as correctly 
assessing that dialogue within the industry about GM would actually be disruptive in 
marketing terms. Industry members were prepared to accept this bounded rationality 
(see Simon, 1976); that is a rationality based on previous investment in an activity, 
and forfeit their preferred active voice in industry decision-making in recognition of 
the importance of a wider issues management communication strategy of silence. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the preferred stance of the ZESPRI executive groups was 
for a "simple statement" which did not open up the ZESPRI GM position for debate 
(Innovation spokesperson D). This was a response to the values demonstrated by 
international markets, and avoided alienating international stakeholders. 
One Communication spokesperson indicated that ZESPRI deliberately 
engaged in a minimum of communication about GM in the international marketplace 
because translations can be problematic, sometimes resulting in the opposite 
rhetorical positioning from that originally intended: 
If you think about the risk of a global marketer communicating worldwide, 
translations are a nightmare and something like 'GE free' in English-the mere 
mention of GE or GM can actually sometimes work the reverse for you. 
(Communication spokesperson B) 
Yet, although GM issues management involved less rather than more 
communication, this communication spokesperson indicated the existence of 
extensive other communication programmes with customers and consumers. For 
example: 
We run PR programmes, consumer programmes, customer relationships are worked 
on account management and it's personal, that's the biggest strength ... we run 
specific stakeholder programmes, we run issues programmes where need be ... And 
you know we make it as easy as possible to be approachable, contactable and of 
service. (Communication spokesperson B) 
However, the ZESPRI position on GM did not involve an extensive proactive public 
communication campaign, as other industries and government institutions have 
attempted (see Henderson, 2005; Motion & Weaver, 2005; Murphy & Dee, 1992; 
Weaver & Motion, 2002) because the policy did not represent any change in current 
practices. 
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The policy not to develop GM food products was communicated to external 
publics more as a short-lived crisis management strategy following concerns that 
ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit had been genetically modified, as explained in Chapter Five. 
As Conrad and Mclntush (2003) suggested, organisations may find it threatening to 
negotiate policy development in public, and sometimes keeping issues off the public 
policy agenda is as important to the organisation as getting them implemented. 
The ZESPRI strategy is evidence that the industry is actively managing GM 
issues by continually adapting the industry practices and identity (see Gioia, Schultz 
& Corley, 2004) to harmonise with the expectations and values of all stakeholders 
(see Cheney & Vibbert, 1987; Heath, 1997). Industry members rhetorically 
constructed the industry as actively building a culture of participation in decision-
making within the industry through the excellence of their interactive 
communication. The level of associated trust allowed them to rationalise the lack of 
consultation about GM policy, and gave ZESPRI executive management the luxury 
of not communicating on this specific issue. 
Unlike in Cheney's (1999) account of the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain, 
the market rationality of the kiwifruit industry that underpinned its GM position did 
not threaten the industry members' perceptions of their overall participation in 
decision-making; the market justification for the GM policy did not result in the 
marginalisation of these organisational values. 
In contrast, the dairy industry decision to proceed with research and 
development in the areas of biotechnology and GM represented a change in strategy 
which meant they had to ensure that this policy was endorsed by industry 
stakeholders (see Crable & Vibbert, 1985). As Cheney and Vibbert (1987) pointed 
out, increasingly organisations have recognised the importance of their 
communication with employees who then may present the 'face' of the organisation 
through their own contact with other key stakeholders. 
The next section discusses the specific strategies adopted by the NZDB to 
generate wide industry support for investment in GM technologies. 
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Bringing Stakeholders 'On Board': Issues Management Strategies and Tactics in 
the Dairy Industry 
In contrast to kiwifruit industry strategies, the dairy industry marketing 
organisation, the NZDB, chose to pursue pro-active communication strategies to 
ensure that industry stakeholders were persuaded about the benefits of GM for the 
industry. Two distinct projects were developed, the 'Marketing Biotechnology 
Taskforce' and the 'GM Issues Operational Team.' The projects were given specific 
names, and specific staff members were designated responsibilities within each 
project, indicating their strategic importance to the industry positioning on 
biotechnology and GM. As Cheney and Tompkins (1988) have pointed out, names 
and titles often indicate the priorities for action identified by an organisation. That is 
they are condensed symbols that attempt to represent the core values underpinning 
the activity. 
The Marketing Biotechnology Taskforce. 
The Marketing Biotechnology Taskforce (MBT) was set up in 1999 
following a consultants' report by McKenzie, McKenzie & Co. recommending 
research and development into biotechnology, and the consequent setting up of 
ViaLactia, a dedicated research company for biotechnology and GM research. The 
overall aim of the MBT was to manage communication and policy development in 
relation to biotechnology, and particular taskforce members were assigned 
responsibility for communication with specific target groups: 
We needed to work out how we were going to manage the communication of that 
aspect of it [biotechnology] ... So there were several groups that were identified 
that we needed to involve and they were the legislators, regulators, the marketers, 
producers, shareholders, and the press. (NZDB/Fonterra communication 
spokesperson) 
The NZDB legal specialist had particular responsibility for the preparation of the 
submission to the Royal Commission and played a role in communication with 
legislators and regulators. Communication with other stakeholders and publics 
external to the industry, through the media, was less pro-active, and was delegated 
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considerably to the Life Sciences Network (LSN)1 (Motion & Weaver, 2005). 
The strategies and tactics adopted in communication with legislators, regulators, and 
the LSN will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The MBT project manager was appointed particularly because of her 
science/marketing background in technical product development: "They wanted 
somebody who actually understood a little bit about how to interpret what was going 
on in order to pull together the sort of information that we needed" (NZDB/Fonterra 
communication spokesperson). From the outset, then, specific scientific/technical 
and marketing perspectives of GM were privileged by the NZDB; the MBT initially 
reported to the NZDB marketing team; although, it now reports to the Fonterra 
corporate strategy team. 
The overall brief of the MBT was described as: 
[To] spearhead the biotechnology communication in the marketing organisations ... 
We added in looking at competitor activity, conducting research regarding the 
attitude of our marketers towards biotechnology, and holding workshops within the 
development sections of the organisation. (NZDB/Fonterra communication 
spokesperson) 
The tactics developed by this taskforce to communicate withfanners and marketers 
in the dairy industry involved surveying them to check their understanding of and 
attitudes to biotechnology, then providing them with information about 
biotechnology issues relevant to the industry, then resurveying the groups to see if 
their understanding and attitudes had changed. Different booklets were written 
1 The Life Sciences Network (LSN), formed in 1999, represented 22 industry, research, and scientific 
groups actively in favour of significant investment in GM in New Zealand. The aims of the group 
were to exchange information, discuss common challenges, participate in public debate, and positively 
influence public policy (Life Sciences Network, 2001). The LSN made a lengthy submission to the 
Royal Commission and issued media releases on every aspect of GM, both international and national. 
It maintained a particularly comprehensive GM website that included copies of media releases and 
reports from a wide range of other sources as well as their own. Since the lifting of the moratorium on 
applications for the commercial release of GM in New Zealand, the network has disbanded. 
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specifically for farmer and marketer groups within the industry, as discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
The information provided was thus expected to change perceptions in the 
operating environment (Sethi, 1977), to increase these industry members' 
identification with and support for the proposed biotechnology initiatives. The MBT 
provided information, while monitoring stakeholder understanding and attitudes 
through feedback processes-that is the emphasis was on two-way asymmetrical 
communication (Grunig, 2001; Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002). The persuasive 
intent of the project is evident in the description of its overall aim as to achieve "buy-
in" and to "educate," (NZDB/Fonterra communication spokesperson) such that 
industry stakeholders would identify positively with this new initiative. 
Dairy industry management communication about GM was positioned as 
needing to be objective and balanced, but a further reference to "educating" 
marketers by the ViaLactia spokesperson suggests that the MBT considered there 
was a correct view of GM which others should be persuaded to adopt. However, this 
spokesperson acknowledged that increased knowledge does not necessarily change 
an individual's belief: 
Now I'm not a believer of the proposition that if you educate the people more that 
problems will go away ... There's some recent work which has shown that the more 
people know, the more they doubt because they've realised some of the questions 
that they didn't know ... If you fundamentally mistrust the source of the 
information you could be quoting the most absolute black and white truth and it still 
wouldn't be believed. (ViaLactia spokesperson) 
The belief that people need to "trust" sources of information about GM is consistent 
with other research findings (Prewer, Howard, Hedderley & Shepherd, 1999; James, 
2003; Hornig-Priest, 2001; Wynne, 1992., 1996), but the ViaLactia spokesperson 
rhetorically constructed such trust in terms of encouraging "sensible" viewpoints 
through providing "authoritative" statements, which demonstrated an expectation 
that the MBT information would be trusted. This was somewhat at odds with the 
generally dialogic approach to debate implied by his concern for "respecting others' 
point of view" (ViaLactia spokesperson). 
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The tactics developed by the MBT to respond to market concerns about GM 
attempted to change the perceptions of stakeholders and consumers, to allay their 
fears about GM, and align their attitudes with the pro-GM industry biotechnology 
strategy. This would again reduce the legitimacy gap (see Sethi, 1977) between the 
industry biotechnology policy and customer and consumer expectations surrounding 
product development. The early expectation of the NZDB was that customer and 
consumer concerns about GM would be short-lived, that such concerns would be 
allayed if the context and direction of proposed GM research and development was 
accurately portrayed by marketing staff, and understood. If stakeholders within the 
dairy industry could be convinced of the worth of the GM policy, then it was 
expected that through them, customers and consumers would be convinced. This 
tactic can then be said to represent a rhetorical struggle over meanings (Kuhn, 1997). 
The pro-active nature of this strategy is evident in the following excerpt from 
an industry document quoted during an industry manager's account in a research 
interview: 
To facilitate the link between the direction of our research and the views of our 
customers and consumers the MBT has been set up. It's been formed to spearhead 
biotechnology communication globally to the marketing organisations, acting as a 
communications conduit between the marketing company, biotechnology company, 
and sales and marketing staff, being NZMP and New Zealand Milk .... We'll also 
provide input around biotech policies and protocols, and information to assist tactics 
at a sales level. (NZDB/Fonterra communication spokesperson) 
However, the MBT also recognised that the industry would have to respond to 
customers and consumers; for example: 
Success of the MBT will depend on the ability with which the team can act and 
make decisions which accurately portray the contexts in which ourselves and 
marketing staff work. (NZDB/Fonterra communication spokesperson) 
This suggests an awareness that an organisation's publics may also define the issues 
(see Crable & Vibbert, 1985). 
The MBT' s first step was to survey marketing staff to check their 
understanding of biotechnology. This was followed by presentations to staff in 
marketing, manufacturing, and operational groups, and the booklet, What is 
Biotechnology? Biotech Brief, was sent to all staff globally. This document was 
described by the communication spokesperson as an "information" bulletin: a 
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"balanced" document that was not "biased" in any way. Its intent to persuade, 
however, is evident. A second survey was sent out after this document, and the word 
"improved" in the following account betrays the persuasive intent: 
We surveyed where people were at. We put out this information bulletin and then 
we resurveyed to see if their understanding had improved. (NZDB/Fonterra 
communication spokesperson, emphasis added) 
This tactic then draws on a 'deficit' model of scientific understanding, an approach 
shared by Rabino (1994), Wohl (1998), and Wansink and Kim (2001). This presumes 
that the understanding of lay publics will increase if they are provided with further 
information about a scientific issue. However, Wynne (1992, 1996) critiqued this 
model, arguing that lay publics have their own understandings of scientific issues 
which are equally valid and are marginalised by the privileging of particular 
scientific perspectives. 
The resurveys of marketing staff, which involved self-assessments by the 
marketers, indicated that both their awareness of biotechnology and their 
understanding of GM had increased. They acknowledged that they now had enough 
information to respond to customer queries and were more positive about the 
potential benefits of GM to the industry. However, marketers were still cautious 
about the possible impact of GM on the reputation of the company, and on the 
product image, and were cautious about consuming GM food themselves. In social 
and political terms, the MBT communication tactics were not wholly effective in 
achieving attitude change in marketing staff. These staff continued to draw on, and 
identify with other value systems, rather than accepting the sensemaking and 
rationalities of the MBT. 
Farmers were also surveyed before receiving information about 
biotechnology. Farmers owned 100% of the shares in the earlier dairy industry 
cooperatives, and since the dairy industry merger now own 100% of Fonterra. The 35 
million dollars per year to be invested in biotechnology, which represented an 
increase in research and development spending of more than 50%, was farmers' 
money and their risk. It was paramount that the dairy industry had 
farmer/shareholder support for biotechnology policy. This is indicated by the 
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representation of the communication as "We very actively talked to our farmers ... 
We needed to take our farmers along with us ... We knew we had to do some work," 
and representation of the policy on GM as "an extremely brave decision" and 
"stepping into the unknown" (ViaLactia spokesperson). 
Different booklets were sent out to farmers from those used with marketers, 
and were the basis for presentations and discussions coordinated by ViaLactia, 
involving both farmer focus groups throughout New Zealand and speaking at farmer 
conferences. The ViaLactia spokesperson commented that farmers needed to be 
'straightened out' about various issues from time to time: 
We talk to them [farmers] about it [GM], they know what's going on out at the 
public, and you know every now and again we've got to go and straighten them out 
because they get some strange ideas about what we're doing and what we're not 
doing. (ViaLactia spokesperson) 
This suggested that NZDB/Fonterra constructs dairy management as 'experts' 
conveying information to 'uninformed' farmers, that although there are opportunities 
for farmers' feedback and discussion particularly at the Shareholder Council level, 
communication is most often only in one direction. This is evidence of the dairy 
industry hierarchical organisational structure and decision-making, and marginalises 
the farmers' own expertise as producers. A similar attitude was reported by Wynne 
(1996), after the Chernobyl disaster in the UK in 1986, when scientific 'experts' 
failed to acknowledge farmer's knowledge and experience. 
The ViaLactia spokesperson indicated that farmer attitudes changed to be 
more supportive of the industry GM policy after the focus group discussions in 2000, 
in contrast to some "very negative sentiments" apparent in surveys undertaken in 
1999. This was despite the fact, as he commented, that other organisations' research 
still reported concerns in rural New Zealand about GM, particularly with respect to 
food, and a preference amongst farmers for organic methods over GM technologies 
(Cook & Fairweather, 2003). 
Although there was a degree of consultation involved with industry 
stakeholders as the dairy industry policy on biotechnology/GM was being developed, 
the strategy was described as a "high level" NZDB initiative which was aimed at 
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providing "clarity", both about GM and the NZDB/Fonterra position, as part of an 
"education programme" (NZDB/Fonterra marketing spokesperson). Farmers and 
sales and marketing staff were viewed as needing to be persuaded of the benefits of 
GM. They were not expected to participate cooperatively in decision-making but 
were represented as employees in a hierarchical organisation. This is consistent with 
Douglas and Wildavsky's (1982) discussion of hierarchical organisational structures 
and decision-making that has bounded rationality. It is also consistent with Cheney's 
(1999) findings that marketisation increasingly privileges the role of an executive 
group in decision-making, by marginalising other social values in favour of a market 
rationality. 
The GM Issues Operational Team. 
At the time the MBT was set up, the NZDB realised that marketers and 
operational staff, for example, in dairy factories, were already dealing with customer 
and consumer concerns about GM on an everyday basis. The management of such 
daily operations was not an objective of the MBT, so a second project team was 
established called the GM Issues Operational Team (GIOT) to provide marketers and 
technical staff with specific information appropriate for sharing with customers and 
addressing consumer concerns about GM issues. This was described as: 
An operational team which would . . . manage all the issues relating to ingredients 
specs, customer specs, marketing specs, what the factories did, how they managed 
their processes in order to achieve a certain level of confidence in the final product. 
(NZDB/Fonterra communication spokesperson) 
The MBT and the GIOT were described as "cross-functional teams" working to 
communicate with both internal, and through them external, stakeholders, a process 
described by the NZDB/Fonterra marketing spokesperson as "gathering information" 
and "feeding information" in a way that again implied an asymmetrical although 
two-way approach to communication. 
As the operations spokesperson explained, even before the biotechnology 
strategy was developed, there was some confusion as staff at different levels in 
different dairy companies responded to customer queries about GM. Systems of 
integrated communication were needed to cope with the demands of working with 
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GM, in terms of responding to customer/consumer attitudes, but also to meet the 
changing international GM regulatory environment for customers and suppliers. In 
this sense, the issues management communication was reactive as well as proactive. 
It had a pragmatic managerialist focus on efficiency and operational outcomes (see 
Capelli, Bassi & Katz, et al., 1997; Deetz, 1995; Hammer, 1999), rather than on 
market concerns about GM. 
Operations staff realised that marketing staff were not the only ones with 
insufficient knowledge in relation to GM issues; there were operational concerns as 
well as marketing concerns. Understanding of GM issues in relation to the supply 
and use of ingredients in dairy manufacturing processes, and the interaction with 
suppliers, was described as "piecemeal," (NZDB/Fonterra operations spokesperson). 
As a result, the GIOT set up a centralised database of ingredients and suppliers, that 
could be updated and provide a more integrated approach to working with suppliers. 
This gave some "measure of confidence" to both technical staff within the dairy 
industry and their suppliers and customers (NZDB/Fonterra operations 
spokesperson). The manufacturing identity of this technical sector of the dairy 
industry resulted in the prioritisation of technical issues, and contributed to the 
technical and scientific rationality for GM decision-making and policy evident in 
other dairy industry communication about GM. 
After the merger, Fonterra facilitated more effective coordination of 
communication strategies and tactics in relation to GM. As operations staff dealt with 
queries, they realised they had to re-assess the ways in which GM already impacted 
on the industry. For example, a number of the ingredients used in the manufacture of 
milk-related products were already produced using GM. Such manufacturing 
processes had earlier been introduced without question, but now needed to be 
transparently audited to meet new regulatory demands from global markets. As the 
operations spokesperson explained, there was significant technical confusion in the 
global dairy industry, not just in New Zealand: 
Well, initially, when the GM argument first hit nobody really realised that citric acid 
... has for quite a long time been made using a microbe that was GM modified .... 
We've used FPC [fermentation-produced chymosin] rennet ... long before it 
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became an issue .... So we really needed to know exactly ... where was GM then 
used in the first place .... We knew internally [that] we weren't actually using any 
GM process ... but what the ingredients contained and what processes they used, we 
didn't know. (NZDB/Fonterra operations spokesperson) 
As this spokesperson commented, the terminology associated with GM was 
inconsistent within New Zealand, and with international suppliers, and this created 
difficulties in establishing whether particular ingredients were GM free: 
The difficulty that we faced for quite a period of time was in terminology and so ... 
people would send out a questionnaire to the supplier saying, "Is your product GM 
free?" ... Then you read the responses and they actually didn't make any sense at 
all. (NZDB/Fonterra operations spokesperson) 
The New Zealand dairy industry was concerned at the time of the Royal Commission 
that the Commission's recommendations might impact on the regulatory 
environment which affected the current operating environment for the manufacture 
of dairy products, which to some extent already involved separately sourced GM 
ingredients, not just thefature research and development which might involve GM. 
There was an indication from this technical spokesperson that the auditing processes 
had to be managed to satisfy both customers concerned about the use of GM in the 
manufacturing process and those who accepted GM in the interests of keeping costs 
down: 
We have some customers would like us to use cheaper ingredients that are 
genetically modified and so . . . if we did that we. would satisfy that customer but 
then what would it do in terms of us being able to use that plant for our other 
customers? (NZDB/Fonterra technical spokesperson) 
However, the trend expressed by this spokesperson suggested that global customers 
were becoming increasingly demanding with respect to guarantees that dairy 
products are GM free: 
I think if this gets more and more extreme which it appears to be doing-where 
people are demanding absolute certainty around lack of GM contact-we will need 
to go back to our shareholders as farmers within the cooperative and start applying 
some rules and policies there that can allow us to put hand on heart all the way 
through the chain. (NZDB/Fonterra technical spokesperson) 
This comment acknowledges that the GIOT was an issues management strategy 
which was originally developed with an instrumental rationality. Yet, the dairy 
industry operational participation in the global manufacture and supply of ingredients 
and milk products meant that the industry also had to respond to the value-systems 
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and discourses influencing other suppliers and markets. The manufacturing identity 
of the industry was thus linked to the technical rationality behind its GM positioning, 
but so were the values it engaged with through its marketing identity, and aim of 
remaining a world leader in competitive international dairy markets. The ongoing 
negotiation of rationalities involved in this issues management (Heath, 1997), and the 
dynamic adaptability (Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2004) required of the industry 
identity were then linked in the industry's complex communication environment. 
This linking of identity and rationality suggests that the prioritisation of 
particular rationalities is in itself a value-judgement, linked to an organisation's 
identity, as well as drawing on specific discourses in the wider organisational 
environment. Tait (2001) argued that even supposedly interest-based representations 
of risk are based on value judgements, such as the privileging of scientific 
rationalities and marginalisation of other cultural values; although, she did not link 
such value-based rationalities to a discussion of identity. The complexity of the 
linking of interest-based and identity-based responses in this instance also suggests 
that Davenport and Leitch's (2004) attempts to distinguish such responses is 
unrealistic. 
The existence of such distinct groups-farmers, ingredients suppliers, 
manufacturers, and marketers, as well as the technical and research groups-is an 
indication of the size and complexity of the dairy industry in New Zealand. 
Maintaining integrated communication with such a range of organisational 
stakeholders is particularly complex and involves management of the multiple 
identifications of stakeholder groups with various functional value-premises within 
an organisation (see Cheney, 1991). In the New Zealand dairy industry, this is 
achieved through a hierarchical industry organisational structure. In Douglas and 
Wildavsky's (1982) terms, the dairy industry's view of GM issues is typical of a 
blend of hierarchical and individualist institutional styles of thinking and decision-
making. Douglas and Wildavsky suggested that organisational decision making by 
hierarchies often limits the framework for decisions, and tends to work with known 
processes within existing frameworks of operation-a very bounded rationality. 
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Changes made may be incremental, according to what is feasible in the timeframe 
and circumstances, and the organisation maintains complex traditions and 
regulations. 
The following table situates the logics of participation drawn on by the 
kiwifruit and dairy industries as they managed the implications of their GM 
positioning for industry members. 
Table 5. Logics of Industry Member Participation 
Industry Logic of Tactics Objective 
structure Participation 
Cooperative Full dialogue Open consultation Recognise di verse 
(kiwifruit industry) allows for the and participatory value systems. 
possibility of decision-making Foster 
change in policy identification of 
members with 
shared values to 
ensure support for 
developing policies 
Cooperative Minimal 'Silence' - relies Maintain trust and 
operating as a information given on existing trust in support of 
hierarchy when policy management and a members for 
(kiwifruit industry represents no positive developing policies 
GM policy change in industry communication while keeping 
development) practices and there climate controversial issues 
are existing shared off the public 
values agenda 
Hierarchy Persuasive One-way Ensure members 
(dairy industry) communication information to adopt new values 
campaigns foster 'improve' linked to 
industry members' understanding. developing policies 
support for Surveys to check 
changing policies change in attitudes 
of members 
Individualist Current market Kiwifruit industry Manage multiple 
(aspects of both values determine responded to values and 
kiwifruit and dairy future decisions. consumer identities to ensure 
industry) concerns. endorsement of 
GM policy by all 
stakeholders. 
Cost-benefit Dairy industry Persuade all 
analysis privileged privileged stakeholders to 
with opportunistic technical risk adopt preferred 
time-frames. management. GM policy. 
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However, the dairy industry, as well as being a typical hierarchically-
organised industry, is at the same time somewhat individualist (see Douglas & 
Wildavsky, 1982), given its endorsement of free-market values. It trusts technical 
and quantitative analysis, and has short-term, opportunistic, and future-oriented time 
frames, reacting strongly to trends such as those presented by GM. 
Issues management strategies involving GM in the dairy industry thus 
deliberately set out to convince industry stakeholders of the benefits of 
biotechnology/GM using an instrumental technical rationality that privileged the 
voices of industry executive groups as experts. This was held in tension with a 
market rationality that privileged the identity of the industry (and the 
farmer/producers) as a competitor in the global dairy marketplace; yet, needed to 
respond to the value systems of international consumers. Dairy industry practice is 
also constrained by the perspectives and voices of dairy customers and consumers 
and the values of the international markets. 
Issues management strategies in the kiwifruit industry displayed similar 
tensions. The customary cooperative decision-making practices within the industry 
were overlaid, in the instance of GM policy development, with the expert voices of 
ZESPRI International (marketing) and ZESPRI Innovation (science). The industry 
policy on GM, control of how the industry is positioned in the market place, and 
communication about GM issues were thus constructed by the industry operating as a 
hierarchical organisation. More often, ZESPRI took an individualistic approach to 
decision making. It privileged the voices of customers and the policy was justified by 
a market rationality that drew on neo-liberal discourses of public choice and rational 
choice. In so doing, the kiwifruit industry privileged the GM concerns of those 
markets, which drew on the sectarian values (see Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) of 
environmental and social movements. In this sense both the kiwifruit and the dairy 
industries were engaged in communication that was inherently political and drew on 
the power constituted by the institutional identities of the industries, and their 
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associated values and rationalities, in their engagement with key industry 
stakeholders. 
Rationality and Values: Industry Communication with Key Interest 
Groups 
This section considers the engagement of the kiwifruit and dairy industries 
with key interest groups in the struggle to influence public policy about GM. It 
considers the implicit values and assumptions in their communication practices, and 
how the rationalities for each industry position are communicated and privileged. 
As Kuhn (1997) suggested, a rhetorical perspective of issues management 
allows an examination of the process of influence-the struggle over meanings. In 
issues management campaigns, organisations may deliberately omit or misrepresent 
information (Baker & Martinson, 2001; Edgett, 2002; Fitzpatrick & Gauthier, 2001; 
Nelson, 1994), or may fail to see that their communication is self-referential-as a 
result of auto-communication-defining the publics they wish to communicate with 
and the messages they would like to hear in the terms of those that support their own 
strategic planning initiatives (Christensen & Askegaard, 2001; Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001a). 
Rationality and Self-interest: Avoidance Strategies in the Kiwifruit Industry 
This section discusses ZESPRI' s tactics of engagement with key interest 
groups and the tensions exhibited in both the market and scientific rationalities 
underpinning the industry's GM policy. 
Tactics of Engagement with Key Interest Groups. 
ZESPRI chose to further limit communication in relation to GM, by engaging 
with key interest groups only on very specific aspects of the issues. The accounts of 
Communication spokespersons and Innovation team interviewees indicate that GM 
communication was not only limited within the industry, with the media, and with 
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international markets, but that ZESPRI deliberately chose an issues management 
strategy of limited involvement in the wider public debate in New Zealand. The 
kiwifruit industry submission to the Royal Commission was seen as the most 
important public forum, and once the industry GM position had been clearly 
explained in the submission, the strategy was to keep "as low a profile as possible" 
because the attempt to influence the Royal Commission was viewed as successful. 
The need for a cautious approach to GM was recognised by Government, and the 
moratorium on applications for the commercial release of GMOs was extended for a 
further two years (Innovation spokesperson D). 
No further public communication or active political alignment with key 
interest groups was initiated. This 'non-aligned' position demonstrated a purposive 
instrumental rationality (see Giddens, 1972, Simon, 1976) aimed at maintaining the 
industry integrity within international markets. For example: 
ZESPRI chose a non-aligned position ... They did not want to be part of anybody's 
lobby group ... They had a market position, and that was important to them and to 
their shareholders, and it didn't actually matter to them if they were the only person 
who said that ... They didn't lobby anybody else to join them, and they did not join 
in any other alliances ... We just made our submission, said, "Here it is". Nothing 
else was done. (Innovation spokesperson B) 
This deliberate curtailment of kiwifruit industry communication represented a very 
careful issues management strategy that attempted to be apolitical, and suggests that 
the industry wanted its specific position to be heard unequivocally, without being 
compromised by other perspectives. 
The kiwifruit industry chose not to engage directly in public debate with 
other more combative interest groups, for example the LSN, whose communication 
practices they saw as unethical: 
We don't want a high profile on this, we have representation on the appropriate 
forums, but we are not going get into a debate with Francis Wevers [Executive 
Director for the LSN]. You know, Life Sciences are absolutely to us unethical. They 
have said some appalling things ... we are not going to be drawn into public 
debates. (Communication spokesperson B) 
The LSN' s attempts to influence public policy by attacking the stance of other 
groups arguing against GM, such as the 'GE-Free' coalition and MAdGE, on an 
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individual basis were considered to be unethical; although, this practice is recognised 
as common, and acceptable, issues management practice (Heath, 1997). 
Members of the kiwifruit industry specifically criticised the public relations 
communication of key interest groups about GM for being emotional, for 
misrepresentation, and for using information selectively (see Baker & Martinson, 
2001; Edgett, 2002; Fitzpatrick & Gauthier, 2001; Nelson, 1994), with the intent of 
manipulating public opinion on GM. For example, the LSN were criticised for using 
"spin" and "lies": 
You've got something say like Life Sciences; it has so much money and it's 
spinning. We don't need a spin. Just give us some facts .... Give us everything 
from the business case through, but it needs to be done without lies. 
(Communication spokesperson B) 
The LSN's communication was described as "despicable," the behaviour of 
"supposed scientists" was described as "scaremongering" (Innovation spokesperson 
E), and activist groups were criticised for being ill-informed. The general feeling of 
kiwifruit industry spokespersons regarding the emotive polarisation of arguments for 
and against GM by key interest groups in the debate about GM in New Zealand is 
evident in the following comment: 
I admire the resolve of people like MAdGE2 which unfortunately to me is looking 
like a ladies' lunch-a-lot club, with people with too much money and little dress 
sense, and I don't think they're adding to the debate because what they're doing is in 
their ignorance, they're slamming anything that is in-organic, well get a life, you 
know you can't export, you can't put anything into a retailer unless it actually meets 
2 MAdGE was set up by Alannah Currie, former member of the 80s band 'The Thompson Twins,' in 
2002. This activist group aimed to gain the support of New Zealand mothers to prevent the 
commercial release of GM. MAdGE lobbied Government, and organised events involving high profile 
New Zealand 'stars' in music and television in a deliberate bid to gain media attention, and to raise 
public awareness about GM issues. MAdGE presented a legal case against an AgResearch project, 
aimed at introducing human genes into dairy cows, to create GM milk for medical purposes. 
MAdGE campaigns will be long remembered for their flamboyance. They included controversial 
billboards in Auckland and Wellington of a naked woman with four breasts-depicting a 'human 
cow,' and a group of women removing their tops in a Parliamentary sitting to reveal pink bras. 
Internationally renowned fashion designers Karen Walker, Marilyn Sainty, World, and Zambesi 
designed T-shirts in support of the campaign. 
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certain standards. I mean it's equally as bad as the scientist saying, "It's fine." 
(Communication spokesperson B) 
However, the tone of this comment about MAdGE, although not a public statement, 
is as emotive and derogatory.as the communication that this spokesperson is 
criticising; for example in the sexist phrases "ladies' lunch-a-lot club," and the 
reference to "little dress sense." 
ZESPRI then avoided confronting key interest groups to avoid engaging in a 
debate which was seen as unethical, emotive, and 'scaremongering.' Yet, this non-
aligned position does not indicate the intent to work positively towards harmony, the 
preferred issues management strategy advocated by Heath (1997). 
ZESPRI' s unwillingness to engage in confrontational debate with other 
interest groups is, however, consistent with the recognition, and acceptance, of 
diverse viewpoints on GM expressed in the Kiwifruit Journal by ZESPRI 
spokesperson Jane Lancaster. This stance is also consistent with ZESPRI's 
demonstrated preference for two-way communication, consultation, and dialogue 
with industry members, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter. The 
industry avoided engaging in substantive debate about the risks, benefits, outcomes, 
and values associated with GM on broad terms in the New Zealand political context, 
on the grounds that the debate was unethical, that it was not a process of dialogue 
(Isaacs, 1999; Tannen, 1998). Despite increasing calls in the research literature for 
public dialogue about GM (Braun, 2002; Ellahi, 1994; Gregory, 2003; Nelson, 2001; 
Reiss & Straughan, 1996), ZESPRI paradoxically saw dialogue about GM as 
impossible, and saw debate as a risk to the continued positive perception of the 
industry in international markets. 
This issues management strategy is then not so much about the GM issue, as 
a deliberate tactic to safeguard ZESPRI' s own corporate identity and reputation. 
ZESPRI's preference for 'ethical' communication practice is consistent with its 
rhetorical construction of the industry identity as an industry with integrity and 
demonstrates the extent to which the organisation's identity itself is at issue in 
communicating with stakeholders (see Cheney & Christensen, 2001a; True, 2003). In 
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this respect, in an effort to retain their image of integrity, the ZESPRI Group 
deliberately avoided becoming embroiled in the mutual criticism evident in 
communication by other GM interest groups. 
Tensions in the Legitimating Market Rationality. 
ZESPRI' s market rationality for its GM policy had wide support within the 
industry. It recognised consumer concerns about food safety, and was based on 
environmental values; there were some specific common zones of meaning (Heath, 
1997) within the industry. However, ZESPRI made no assumptions that these 
collective industry values represented the full, diverse range of individual values held 
by industry members. Paradoxically, one Innovation team member who had been 
directly involved in recommending the industry position on GM, and believed there 
was an industry mandate for the policy, clearly did not believe there was a mandate 
for lobbying for this policy through the media: 
Well ZESPRI represents-have got a diverse range of growers. There are some who 
are organic growers and there are some who are not, so you can't be in a position of 
actively using the media to lobby because ... there will be within that group of 
people a diversity of views. (Innovation spokesperson B) 
This suggests that this industry spokesperson separated the industry position, what 
was beneficial for the wider industry at an international level, from the individual 
positions that might be taken by industry stakeholders, what was seen as beneficial or 
representing value systems at a more personal level. In this sense the market 
rationality privileging kiwifruit consumers was echoed by a public choice rationality 
that constructed individual industry members/New Zealanders as having the right to 
an individual stance on GM. 
Lobbying for public opinion to support the ZESPRI position was represented 
by this ZESPRI spokesperson as being overtly politically aligned with key (anti-GM) 
interest groups in the debate, whose rationalities and value-premises might not be 
entirely consistent with the diversity of those of the kiwifruit industry. This was 
constructed as risking the alienation of kiwifruit industry stakeholders through the 
creation of competing zones of meaning, and the alignment of value systems that 
might not be shared by the wider industry. It was thought to risk understanding of the 
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ZESPRI position on GM, the ZESPRI corporate identity, and individual industry 
member identities. For example, many kiwifruit industry stakeholders are business 
investors, and deliberate alignment of the kiwifruit industry with radical anti-GM 
groups might impact on the credibility of these business people with other business 
groups who take a different position on GM. Yet other kiwifruit industry 
stakeholders, such as organic growers, might identify strongly with radical anti-GM 
environmental groups. 
Anti-GM interest groups, such as the 'GE-Free' 3 coalition and Greenpeace, 
which have a similar position to the kiwifruit industry on GM, often seek to represent 
consumers and also represent a rationality of the marketplace (see Henderson, 2005; 
Motion & Weaver, 2005). However, the rhetorical position of these anti-GM interest 
groups is underpinned by the values and social norms associated with environmental 
social movements, and they attempt to influence the values that underpin market 
consumption, rather than endorsing the individualistic approach of the free-market. 
No key interest groups share all zones of meaning or core values with the 
kiwifruit industry; the zones of meaning of some interest groups overlap, and some 
compete. By focusing on a purely market rationality and avoiding debate ZESPRI 
attempted to manage the multiple identities and identifications of industry 
stakeholders (see Cheney, 1991; Cheney & Christensen, 2001a). 
3 The 'GE--Free' coalition comprised nine environmental interest groups who joined together after the 
Royal Commission's report in July 2001. The members included Biodynamic Gardening and Farming 
Association of New Zealand, Bio-Gro, GE Free New Zealand in food and environment (Rage), 
Greenpeace NZ, Green Party, Jews for GE-Free food, Pesticide Action Network NZ, Safe Food 
Campaign, and Soil and Health Association of New Zealand (NZ). All of these groups, except Jews 
for GE-Free food, made submissions to the Royal Commission. The GE-Free coalition established 
regional contacts in ten different geographic regions of New Zealand, and co-ordinated national 
initiatives with Greenpeace and extensive local action. One of the strengths of this coalition was the 
diverse representation of separate groups, at local grassroots levels. Together, these groups were able 
to effectively use existing networks to mobilise support for joint action. 
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The market rationality of the kiwifruit industry position specifically reflected 
the current free-market, individualist, normalised discourse at the time of the Royal 
Commission (see Devine, 1998, 2001; Kelsey, 1997; Miller, 2003). The kiwifruit 
industry arguments thus had a legitimacy, which was likely to have influence, both 
on the Commission and on wider audiences in New Zealand. However, business 
groups, which share the market perspective of the kiwifruit industry on other issues, 
are largely pro-GM. They argue that producers will benefit from GM (Stevenson, 
2002), that food production involving GM is little different from current food 
production methods (Saul, 2002, July 16) and that New Zealand will "fall behind the 
rest of the world if commercial production involving GM does not go ahead" 
(Riordan, 2002, March 6, p. El). 
It is evident then that although the positioning of New Zealand interest 
groups and industries on GM may be consistent at a macro level through the use of a 
similar market rationality, this rationality may draw on multiple perspectives that 
actually exist in tension at the micro level. At the micro level of the specific 
organisation or industry, or at the level of particular industry groups or individual 
industry members, complex multiple identities and values systems are represented. 
Public choice and rational choice theorists would argue that this very complexity is 
the reason why there should be a minimum of government regulation. They argue 
that Government should intervene less in the management of public policy, leaving 
ordinary citizens and consumers to make decisions for themselves (see Dalziel, 
2003). They suggest that the market should decide issues such as GM, rather than 
trying to create a complex government-regulated public policy. However, such 
theorists have been critiqued for failing to account for the formation of social norms, 
and collectivities (see Aune, 2001; Moloney, 2003). Individuals or industry groups 
may identify with, for example, social movements such as environmentalism, and 
key interest groups in the GM debate in New Zealand such as the 'GE-Free' coalition 
and MAdGE that demonstrate altruistic concerns for health and the environment. 
Tensions in the kiwifruit industry members' endorsement of free-market 
perspectives are apparent historically, as well as in their GM stance. Paradoxically, 
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participants wanted little government or "political interference" in the affairs of 
business, a very free-market/public choice perspective (Dalziel, 2003) as indicated 
by the following comment: 
We certainly do not need political interference into the way we run our business, 
whether it's on orchard, at supply level, or at ZESPRI ... if we did want political 
interference we would go and ask them for it. We don't want them imposing it on us. 
(Respondent F, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group) 
Yet, historically, the kiwifruit industry fought a long battle with the politically neo-
liberal Government in the early 1990s, resisting Government interference in the way 
they ran their business, but in fact arguing for the right to 'single-desk marketing', to 
a regulated industry which ran counter to the neo-liberal free-market political and 
economic climate at the time, which favoured de-regulation of industry. This 
experience perhaps explains the paradoxical positioning of many industry members 
in relation to free-market Government and business agendas. 
Tensions in the Legitimating Scientific Rationality. 
The kiwifruit industry has links with other key interest groups in the GM 
debate in terms of its science perspectives. Yet, common science perspectives do not 
necessarily mean that other values are shared, and common values do not necessarily 
mean that science perspectives are shared. Although anti-GM interest groups share 
environmental concerns with the kiwifruit industry, they assert that GM foods have 
not been scientifically tested as safe; for example, Greenpeace4 publishes a True 
Food Guide enabling consumers to check which supermarket brands are GE-free 
(Greenpeace, 2005). The kiwifruit industry position is slightly different: that there is 
no scientific evidence GM foods are unsafe, but that it is important to pay attention 
to market perceptions that this may be so. This demonstrates a less radical anti-GM 
4 Greenpeace New Zealand campaigned actively against the commercial release of GM. It aimed to 
increase public awareness and support through its website, magazine, media releases, and lobbying of 
Government. It made a submission to the Royal Commission, and produces a consumer guide to GE-
free food in supermarkets. Greenpeace joined the 'GE-Free' coalition and MAdGE in high profile 
campaigns involving sending pre-printed postcards to Members of Parliament, purchasing T-shirts, 
joining marches, signing petitions, and registering private homes as GE-free zones. 
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stance on the possible scientific rationalities for GM. The zones of meaning (Heath, 
1997) of these anti-GM interest groups then overlap those of the kiwifruit industry, 
for example in relation to concern for the environment, but do not share all of the 
same common starting points (van Riel, 1995) for the scientific rationalities that 
underpin beliefs about the safety of GM foods. 
Anti-GM interest groups, such as MAdGE, are frequently represented in the 
media as radical activists and as anti-science, or anti-technology; although, in reality 
these interest groups are supportive of genomic and genetic science in laboratory 
containment. It is the release of GMOs into the environment that they are concerned 
about. MAdGE's billboard depicting a woman with four breasts was cited in the 
media as an example of "unscientific claims," for example, by the vice-chancellor of 
Victoria University, Dr Stuart Mccutcheon (Collins, 2003, October 14). As an 
industry with a high degree of science-based research and development, the kiwifruit 
industry recognises that the science associated with GM is contested (see Brown, 
2001; Segerstrale, 2000) but is clearly not against GM per se, or laboratory-based 
research, and not anti-technology. For example: 
ZESPRI is not anti-technology ... The only other lobby groups that have really taken 
positions of caution [on GM] have probably been more extreme in the political 
sense. (Innovation spokesperson B) 
The kiwifruit industry, then, did not wish to be aligned with more radical activist 
groups that were portrayed as being anti-science or anti-technology; 
However, the ZESPRI stance was different from the majority of other 
(science-based) primary industry groups in New Zealand, particularly at the time of 
the Royal Commission. The kiwifruit industry was the only primary industry group 
making a submission advocating that New Zealand did not proceed with commercial 
production of GM foods and crops. Although, interestingly, the apple and pear 
industry, and the viticulture industry have indicated support for the ZESPRI position 
since the Royal Commission (Collins, 2003, August 26; "Wineries to join GM-free 
campaign", 2003), and the Kiwifruit New Zealand spokesperson commented that the 
New Zealand Fruitgrowers' Federation changed its original stance on GM in 
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response to the advocacy of the kiwifruit industry (Clements, 2003; Silcock & 
Clements, 2001). 
ZESPRI' s stance on GM was also different from that of other scientific 
research groups which are largely pro-GM and frequently argue that environmental 
and food safety concerns are unsubstantiated (personal conversation, Gavin Ross, 
Business Development Leader for Research, HortResearch, February 18, 2003). The 
discrepancies between the GM stance of the kiwifruit industry and that of 
HortResearch5 required active issues management, since the kiwifruit industry works 
closely with HortResearch on a day-to-day basis. For example, the research carried 
out by HortResearch for the kiwifruit industry that resulted in the development of 
ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit did not involve GM (Webby, 2004, p. 148). Yet, two 
ZESPRI scientists criticised HortResearch for "looking for a little piece of fame," 
(Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier A) by following funding opportunities for 
research that were not necessarily the best research avenues for the kiwifruit 
industry. As this interviewee commented: 
I think that money is muddying the scientific waters a little bit ... and GMO is such 
a trendy thing and probably one of the areas that has taken some of that funding. 
(Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier A) 
HortResearch's submission to the Royal Commission supported commercial GM 
production of crops and foods; although, it identified consumer resistance to GM, 
5 HortResearch is a commercially-focused Crown Research Institute focusing on horticultural 
research, and particularly technologies associated with plant genomics to produce new fruit varieties. 
This research is expected to have applications across all major crop plants, worldwide, as well as in 
other "emerging high value sectors such as nutraceuticals and health" (HortResearch, 2001). 
HortResearch made a submission to the Royal Commission arguing for continuing research and 
commercial development in GM. It has conducted extensive research in conjunction with the kiwifruit 
industry, including the development of Hort16A, marketed as ZESPRI Gold kiwifruit; and Actinidia 
arguta, marketed as Kiwiberries-neither of these are GM products. Its research on disease control 
and pest management for kiwifruit has contributed to the development of the KiwiGreen integrated 
pest and disease management programme. 
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and, like kiwifruit industry members, commented that annual GM crops might be 
easier to manage than perennial ones. "Closing the door" on GM was represented as 
having a "detrimental effect" on "the reputation, standard and existence of NZ' s 
scientific community," "the ability to protect the intellectual property in NZ's 
products," and "ultimately the NZ economy as a whole" (HortResearch, 2000, 
Executive Summary, point 3). Unlike ZESPRI, HortResearch were members of the 
LSN, lobbying in favour of the commercial development of GM. 
The kiwifruit industry, as an industry with a significant research and technical 
science base, thus found it difficult to rationalise its GM stance to the New Zealand 
scientific community. There were some early assumptions in media reports that the 
kiwifruit industry was involved in commercial applications for GM research like 
other science-based industries ("Claims 'put kiwifruit exports at risk"', 1999; 
"Menace in the miracle", 1999; "Public's right to know", 1999), which were 
corrected by the media release, entitled Kiwifruit New Zealand says no to GM 
(Kiwifruit New Zealand, 1999). 
However, the prevalent scientific voice in the public debate at the time of the 
Royal Commission, and up until the lifting of the moratorium, in October 2003, was 
that of pro-GM interest groups, including large industry and research organisations 
whose scientific rationality was further legitimated by virtue of their economic 
importance to New Zealand. The influence of these groups-including most of the 
primary industries in New Zealand, the major Crown Research Institutes, and two 
Universities, all members of the LSN-thus resulted in a process that can be 
described as discursive closure (see Deetz & Kersten, 1983, p. 153). This put 
"political and ideological limits" (see Mumby, 2000, p. 72) on dialogue about GM. 
The exclusively scientific/technical rationality of the pro-GM interest groups is, 
however, increasingly questioned by members of the New Zealand general public 
who see scientists being influenced by commercial business agendas of self-interest 
(Henderson & Weaver, 2003). 
In contrast, the arguments of environmental scientists, which are more 
compatible with the kiwifruit industry position on GM, are frequently used by radical 
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activist groups, yet these arguments are often constructed by corporate businesses as 
irresponsible (Napp, 2001) in strategies described by Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1998) as 
"brownlash," a reaction to increasing public expectations for the 'greening' of 
corporate businesses. Although cautious about GM, the kiwifruit industry is 
concerned to maintain an identity that focuses on integrity and carefully controlled 
production methods, and is wary about being aligned with radical environmentalists, 
and scientific interest groups that are seen as irresponsible by the wider scientific 
community. 
The ZESPRI position then was both different from, and similar to other 
groups that expressed concerns about GM in the public debate, and shared some 
zones of meaning but not others with those groups who were pro-GM. Because of 
this paradoxical position, ZESPRI' s choice was to keep their message on GM simple, 
to avoid getting involved in debates about the science of GM and the wider risk 
discourse. They did not attempt to set the agenda for the issues through public 
discourse (Crable & Vibbert, 1985). 
Additional Tensions: Agendas of Self-interest and the Public Good. 
Kiwifruit industry members in all focus groups and two of the technical 
advisers from packhouse/suppliers were concerned about possible agendas of 
scientific, commercial, and Government self-interest. 
Industry members identified the contested meanings in scientific rhetoric, 
referring to "so-called scientific proclamations that ... in any way, shape or form 
pretend to ... control nature," and the way in which "evidence can get you know 
twisted and turned" (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier A). In recognising that 
science is contested, one participant was wary of believing any scientist: 
The scientists are against scientists now, so who's saying who and what; why 
believe any of them? (Respondent C, Whangarei kiwifruit focus group) 
Industry members wanted to be able to "trust" scientists (Respondent B, ZESPRI 
Gold kiwifruit focus group), but only two industry members specifically made 
comments demonstrating that trust. As has been noted in other research, trust in 
scientific institutions is an important factor in determining favourable attitudes to 
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science and biotechnology (see Blaine & Powell, 2001; James, 2003; Moon & 
Balasubramanian, 2001; Hornig-Priest, 2001; Wynne, 1996). 
Kiwifruit industry members also represented business agendas as 
exploitation: "I feel that we have been used by big companies overseas to 
experiment" (Respondent F, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus group); as compromising 
scientific integrity: "Commercial interests have pushed it [GM] ... faster than it 
should scientifically progress (Respondent C, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus 
group); and as greedy: "My perception is that's motivated by the multi-nationals, the 
greed factor, control . . They want more money" (Respondent C, Whangarei 
kiwifruit focus group). The benefits of GM were constructed as likely to accrue to 
"rich Western companies," rather than to the people or environment where 
development occurs (Respondent D, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group). Such 
references draw on GM discourses that critique the political and social impacts of 
GM and the marginalisation of minority social and cultural groups (Glasner & 
Rothman, 2001; Hindmarsh & Hindmarsh, 2002; Ho, 1999; Shiva, 1997, 2000). 
There was equal concern about Government agendas for GM, despite 
Government's generally neo-liberal, free-market policies. Industry members were 
distrustful of Government "spin" about GM, thought to be "driven by a narrow range 
of values," (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier B), and felt that neither politicians 
nor big companies could be trusted (Respondent A, ZESPRI Green kiwifruit focus 
group). It was felt that Government should take a cautious approach rather than 
considering research and development of GM as a "race," as in the dairy industry 
(Respondent C, Whangarei kiwifruit focus group). 
Paradoxically, then, kiwifruit industry members represented their own 
position on GM, and their own industry identity, in opposition to that of other 
groups' self-interest. Although the kiwifruit industry members' endorsement of a 
market rationality for the industry policy on GM implicitly recognised business self-
interest was the driver of their own industry policy, only one industry member 
explicitly recognised that financial returns are also driving the kiwifruit position: 
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Now, you might say this is money driving us. Yes, it is; I'll be right up front. It is 
money driving it, because if you don't get money you can't produce the crop. 
(Respondent A, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group) 
Kiwifruit industry members' failure to identify their own position on GM as self-
interested gives credence to Cheney's (2004) assertion that the market is increasingly 
seen as amoral in practice while being sanctified as a whole in an a priori fashion. 
This further demonstrates that the kiwifruit industry's rationale for its GM position 
had become part of the industry discourse to the extent that it became self-enhancing, 
auto-communication, as conceptualised by Cheney and Christensen (2001a). 
The substantive content of ZESPRI's submission to the Royal Commission, 
other articles, and positioning statements on GM refer to specific facts, information, 
and arguments specifically in terms of the market for kiwifruit. This issues 
management positioning attempts to use only the rationality of the marketplace in 
justifying its position on GM, and could be said to be omitting aspects of the bigger 
picture (for tactical reasons) in overall debate over public policy-to be self-
interested. Yet, industry members frequently acknowledged other values that 
contributed to their very specific stance. Their accounts expressed a number of core 
values: a concern for environmental integrity, a concern that other peoples' diverse 
values should be engaged and respected, a concern for the public good (in terms of 
the economic benefits to be accrued by not pursuing GM technologies, and for safe 
and healthy food), and a concern that information should be transparent, for ethical 
communication practice. The recognition that other interest groups have valid 
arguments, values, and interests that must be considered in the development of public 
policy on GM would also suggest a pluralist approach; that kiwifruit industry 
members wanted to create dialogue and negotiate understanding. Yet, they defined 
the terms of their own dialogue about GM very specifically by choosing not to 
engage in public debate. 
The kiwifruit industry, thus demonstrates strategic ambiguity (Conrad & 
Mclntush, 2003; Eisenberg, 1984; Leitch & Davenport, 2002) in its GM positioning. 
There are tensions between its identity as a science-based industry like other primary 
industries in New Zealand, and its alignment with the value-premises of 
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environmental science endorsed by other GM interest groups cautious about GM. 
There are similar tensions between its business identity as a primary producer and its 
alignment with value-premises privileging consumer choice associated with an 
individualist, free-market rationality. There are tensions between self-interest, and 
concern for the public good. Yet, the kiwifruit industry position on GM is at times 
reflexive and aims for transparency and integrity; the organisation appears to be 
reflexive about its own identity and to understand its operating environment (Cheney 
& Christensen, 2001a). Kiwifruit industry members recognised that their interests 
might not be influential in determining public policy; they accepted other viewpoints 
were valid and might have equal influence. 
In contrast, the dairy industry took a technicaVscientific approach to 
communication about GM that specifically separated out communication about social 
and cultural values from scientific arguments in favour of GM. Notwithstanding this 
approach, the industry spokespersons were concerned that their communication 
should be transparent and to some extent again limited their engagement in the public 
debate about GM. 
Building Goodwill, the Use of a 'Front Group', and the Role of Experts: Dairy 
Industry Engagement with Key Interest Groups 
In this section, the dairy industry's attempts to build goodwill, its choice of an 
industry 'front group' to manage communication with the general public, and its 
privileging of the 'expert' status of science and legal perspectives are examined. 
Persuasion and Building Goodwill through Transparent Communication. 
The dairy industry, like the kiwifruit industry, had to manage a number of 
tensions in its communication about GM that indicate the interrelationships between 
industry identities and rationalities. As discussed in the previous section, dairy 
industry communication about GM was deliberately strategic; it was intended to 
persuade stakeholders such as farmers and marketers to support the industry GM 
position, but at the same time it was intended to reassure customers, consumers, 
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manufacturing, and operations staff, and to build support through creating goodwill. 
A comment by the media spokesperson indicated the strategic intent to both persuade 
and establish goodwill: 
I started to form a [media] position [about GM], when asked about the industry's 
attitude . . . that was truthful, which was plausible, which sounded common sense .. 
That was to say - we see great potential in this technology. (NZDB media 
spokesperson) 
A "plausible" GM position was thought to ensure its acceptance by intended 
audiences, yet a position that "sounded common sense" is indicative of the 
organisation's attempt persuade, to legitimate particular value-premises (see Cheney 
& Frenette, 1993), in this case about GM technology. 
Industry spokespersons represented their communication practices as clear 
and transparent to gain support, for example, from international customers: 
From our customers' point of view we like to be very transparent about what we're 
doing ... because we don't want to be in a situation where we over-promise in terms 
of our capability to determine to the absolute degree whether some of our ingredients 
have been exposed to GM organisms. (NZDB/Fonterra operations spokesperson) 
Transparent communication was both practical and expedient. Yet, the industry 
always intended to influence stakeholders and interest groups. Dairy industry 
marketers were expected to reassure international customers in ways that "resonate 
best" that the industry position was a "cautious" one (NZDB/Fonterra marketing 
spokesperson); although, in other industry documents the emphasis was on the race 
to develop GM technology. 
Dairy industry manufacturers were equally concerned to reassure staff 
through transparent communication processes: 
So we're at pains to ensure that if our staff want to know about our policies on 
genetically modified foods then they've got access to those, that they understand the 
position that we've taken ... They may not necessarily personally agree or disagree 
with it, but ... at least ... it's transparent. (NZDB/Fonterra operations 
spokesperson) 
Perhaps surprisingly, given this desire for transparency and goodwill, there was no 
suggestion that alternative staff viewpoints would be accommodated or lead to a 
change in the industry position: 
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I think the main thing is that they know what the organisation that they belong to is 
doing and they can choose ... [to] stay with that organisation or, if they are violently 
opposed, they can go. (NZDB/Fonterra operations spokesperson) 
This acceptance that staff opposed to GM might leave the industry organisation 
represented the NZDB/Fonterra GM position as the only rationality consistent with 
the dairy industry identity. Industry members were expected to identify with this 
expert perspective. 
The NZDB/Fonterra also recognised that staff were involved in local 
communities, and that their support would maintain local goodwill, and manage the 
industry reputation: 
We have people in the community where our factories operate who are concerned 
about the issue, and we have farmers who are around us, in our environment, who 
are concerned as well. So we have to have a communications vehicle that reaches 
those people, because ... the worst thing you ever want to have is ... some rumour 
starting from one of our staff. (NZDB/Fonterra operations spokesperson) 
These are actions intended to pro-actively shape the public policy discourse 
environment (Cheney & Frenette, 1993; Crable& Vibbert, 1985). Yet, interestingly, 
none of these issues management communication strategies was positioned as 
lobbying in favour of GM technologies; their instrumental rationality was positioned 
as pragmatic and operational in approach. 
Three of the dairy industry managers commented specifically that the 
NZDB/Fonterra chose not to communicate proactively with the New Zealand general 
public because their main markets are in fact international. Communication with 
publics within New Zealand was selective, concerned more about maintaining the 
identity of the industry and the goodwill of stakeholders, rather than proactively 
attempting to influence public opinion about GM. Public opinion was thought to be 
hard to influence directly; industry perspectives would be assumed to be biased, and 
this might then undermine the dairy industry positioning on GM: 
If we were seen to be going out and educating consumers, probably the first reaction 
would be oh they're biased. (NZDB/Fonterra communication spokesperson) 
The preference of the dairy industry was, like the kiwifruit industry, to avoid direct 
engagement in the public debate, and to avoid confrontation with anti-GM activist 
groups. 
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The Role of an Expert Industry 'Front Group.' 
The dairy industry chose to leave the 'education' of the New Zealand public, 
and engagement with anti-GM interest groups to a 'front group': the LSN. As Rowell 
(1996) noted, front groups are set up by businesses, and given names that convey no 
allegiance to any specific organisation or perspective. They act as spokespersons for 
business perspectives in an attempt to convince publics of the need for the preferred 
action or legislation which is pro-business. As the ViaLactia spokesperson 
commented: 
We did not see it our role to educate the public in biotechnology ... Now what we 
did do though was to invest in the Life Sciences Network who we knew were going 
to do that. (ViaLactia spokesperson) 
The NZDB/Fonterra was concerned it would be seen as self-interested if it lobbied 
the public directly. Cheney and Christensen (2001b) pointed out that a proactive 
approach to issues management can potentially precipitate "the very situations that 
organizations seek to escape" (p. 171). In this case, given the generally cautious view 
taken by the New Zealand public over GM issues, proactive involvement in the New 
Zealand-wide GM debate was seen as potentially alienating the public rather than 
gaining its support. The dairy industry preference was for intra-organisational and 
inter-organisational public relations/issues management, such as involvement in the 
LSN, to coordinate their strategies with other like-minded interest groups (see 
Cheney & Christensen, 2001b). 
The NZDB/Fonterra was equally cautious about engaging with the arguments 
of activists. For example: 
Tell an agricultural story (because it's an agricultural story not just a dairy industry 
story). Focus on legislators, regulators, farmers, and marketers. Get the facts out but 
do not go head to head with activists. Be absolutely honest. (ViaLactia 
spokesperson) 
Evidently, this spokesperson considered that an "agricultural story" would be based 
on values held in common with legislators, regulators, farmers, and marketers, such 
that these groups would be more likely to identify with the dairy industry's rhetoric 
and discursive positioning. However, this spokesperson's assumption that such a 
story would deliver "facts" that were "absolutely honest" fails to recognise the ways 
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in which particular identities and rationalities can be used to socially construct one 
particular strategic position as more worthwhile than another (see Cheney & 
Christensen, 2001b). 
The media spokesperson also had a surprisingly reactive rather than proactive 
approach to the media: 
We didn't go out there in a structured way to get stories into the paper, but it didn't 
matter. I've always believed that there's much to be taken from using natural 
momentum in communications. (NZDB media spokesperson) 
"Natural momentum" in this case, would come from being associated with media 
stories drawing on similar values and rationalities to those underpinning dairy 
industry policy. This spokesperson again indicated that the dairy industry position on 
GM could be represented by the LSN, without compromising the industry identity. 
The industry did not want to appear biased and one-sided by being identified as an 
extremist lobby group in heated political debate: 
I think it was shrewd for the dairy industry to have been ... connected but not 
instantly associated within the public mind with ... that lobby group [LSN] ... It 
appears to be ... closed-minded ... campaigning down this route and not listening . 
. . not as balanced as the dairy industry needed to appear to its various stakeholders. 
(NZDB media spokesperson) 
The LSN was much more combative in its approach to GM issues and engagement 
with activist groups than the dairy industry was prepared to be, describing public 
debate about GM as a "battle" (personal conversation, William Rolleston, 
Chairperson, Life Sciences Network, September 16, 2002), and specifically stating in 
their submission, "We believe a decision which withholds the application of 
biotechnology is not only ethically and morally unjustified but wrong" (Life Sciences 
Network, 2000, Section B (c) (i)). Heath (1997) suggested that the 'combative 
attitude' typical of the LSN is a 
... rhetorical stance [that] implies the company is correct, protesters are wrong, and 
through punishment, the public can be bludgeoned to understand and accept the 
difference .... This adversarial, or win-loss , posture occurs when the sides presume 
to have an exclusive grasp of the truth and want to silence their opponents or bait 
them into making statements that key segments of the public will find offensive. 
(Heath, 1997, p. 157) 
This adversarial attitude is clearly evident in the emotive rhetoric of the LSN 
submission to the Royal Commission: 
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In our view a decision to wilfully stop or even slow down the pursuit of knowledge 
in this or any other scientific endeavour imposes a penalty on generations yet to 
come which cannot be ethically or morally sustained [emphasis added]. (Life 
Sciences Network, 2000, Section A (1)). 
The dairy industry chose not to risk the possibility of alienating key publics directly, 
and the use of a front group supported its strongly pro-GM stance, but protected the 
industry identity from being seen as extremist. 
However, the dairy industry media spokesperson admitted that he was 
criticised by the LSN for not proactively communicating with wider publics to lobby 
for the industry's pro-GM position. He commented that at this time he was actually 
involved in crisis management over the controversial proposed dairy industry 
'merger' which resulted in the formation of Fonterra: 
We ... were fighting a tooth and nail battle ... politically right through the period of 
the debate, the Royal Commission and so on. The priority was to get Fonterra over 
the line and it damn near didn't get there. My major task assignment was to stop the . 
. . vessel from sinking and to have Life Sciences out there ... was very 
advantageous ... but I understand from within Life Science there was some 
criticism about the effort ... that I, at least, didn't put into it. (NZDB media 
spokesperson) 
The dair!' industry then, at the time of the most intense debate about GM issues in 
New Zealand was managing its changing industry identity as the merger of the 
NZDB, the New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi Cooperative Dairies into the new 
industry organisation, Fonterra, was negotiated. 
Perhaps again out of a concern to avoid becoming involved in controversial 
debate, AgResearch6 was never mentioned in either NZDB/Fonterra formal industry 
6 AgResearch is a Crown Research Institute involved in agricultural research and commercial product 
development, in three key areas: "Creating new biotechnology-based food industries; 'clean, green' 
food industries; [and] a healthy, safe environment" (AgResearch, 2002). This includes genetics, new 
food and pharmaceutical-related industries; food safety and food processing technologies; biocontrol 
of animal parasites, and pasture pests and diseases, in research centres in Hamilton, Palmerston North, 
Mosgiel, Lincoln, and Upper Hutt. AgResearch made a submission to the Royal Commission arguing 
for continuing research and commercial development of GM. Its most controversial research has been 
aimed at inserting human genes into dairy cows to produce milk products to be used for medical 
purposes. 
319 
documents referring to GM policy or comments by interviewees and focus group 
members. The industry organisation could little afford to become publicly embroiled 
in an intense debate about GM which might polarise stakeholder opinions in a way 
that adversely impacted on the management of the merger. The industry relied on the 
minimum of public statements about GM, to manage GM issues in the face of the 
crisis management strategies needed to negotiate the merger. 
The Expert Management of Risk. 
The dairy industry also avoided becoming involved in public debate about 
GM because industry managers believed that decisions about GM were best left to 
'experts.' This was consistent with their separation of technical and scientific risk 
assessment, as the realm of technical experts, from the cultural and social values 
associated with GM. The legal spokesperson commented that the NZDB submission 
to the Royal Commission was about "giving a story to the rest of New Zealand via 
the Royal Commission." The term 'story' implies a creative tale designed to 
convince an uninformed public. Interestingly, this spokesperson represented the 
Royal Commission as a "quasi-legal" process, the realm of legal experts. She 
suggested that the New Zealand public had been extremely lucky to be involved in 
the Royal Commission process, which she described as "extraordinary" because it 
was "so laid back" (NZDB/Fonterra legal spokesperson). 
This spokesperson again emphasised the need for a case-by-case assessment 
of GM research and development, based on scientific principles, as the best, and 
only, way to proceed. That is-the technical, regulatory, and legislative control of 
GM was preferable to extending the moratorium on applications for GM commercial 
developments, even thought the currently incomplete understanding of GM 
technology was acknowledged: 
We were very keen to ensure that people understood why the case-by-case 
assessment was better ... A ban is a very, very blunt instrument ... and I mean 
you're dealing with a technology that is ... different, it's changing, it's new ... you 
can have principles applying, and processes and procedures, but at the end of the 
day, until you have a build-up of understanding of the technology, it has to be dealt 
with by a regulatory authority. (NZDB/Fonterra legal spokesperson) 
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Interestingly, this privileging of 'experts' and regulatory processes, relies on a 
technical rationality which argues that risks are calculable and can be managed by 
regulation (Burke, 2004; Tait, 2001; Wilkins, 2001). This is at odds with the de-
regulation of science and industry favoured by a free-market rationality, and is 
evidence of the tensions in the dairy industry management of multiple identities and 
rationalities. Science-based industries, as at the Asilomar conference in 1975, 
frequently argue that government regulation of research and development should be 
minimal (see, for example, Rabino, 1994). Yet, in this instance, regulation was 
represented as an expedient alternative to a complete ban on GM research and 
development; it also suited the industry need to provide transparent auditing 
procedures of their manufacturing processes to international customers. 
Primary industry experts in New Zealand have power by virtue of the 
economic assets that they manage, since the financial returns from primary industries 
benefit the New Zealand economy. In both the kiwifruit and the dairy industry 
members' accounts, there was evidence that they used this power to lobby 
extensively with Government and legislators for their respective positions on GM. 
However, organic groups within both the kiwifruit and dairy industries argued 
against commercial development of GM, and played a more active role in the debate 
than other producer groups. The limited participation of both the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries in the wider public debate about GM is explored in the next section of this 
chapter. 
Organic Activist Groups and Lobbying: Influencing GM Public Policy 
Neither the dairy industry nor the kiwifruit industry undertook deliberate 
campaigns to influence public opinion in New Zealand directly, for example with 
specific media campaigns, unlike other interest groups, such as the 'GE-Free' 
coalition (see Henderson, 2005) or Greenpeace (see Motion & Weaver, 2005b), but 
within each industry, particular individuals and industry groups were actively 
involved in lobbying-within the industry, within local communities, or at a 
government or regulatory level. 
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Governments do not decide public policy in isolation (Heath, 1997); in 
Western democracies, their dependence on public opinion for a favourable political 
climate for re-election means that increasingly public policy is decided by a process 
of public debate. As Conrad and Mclntush (2003) noted, the policy agenda may be 
contested; interest groups may both raise policy issues in the public domain, or 
attempt to redirect them. In the case of GM, the issues were firmly on the policy 
agenda at the time of the Royal Commission, and contested from a variety of 
perspectives; although, since the lifting of the moratorium on applications for 
commercial release of GMOs, the issues have faded considerably from public view. 
Rhetoric imposes limits on people's interpretations of reality, their 
individualised worldviews, through the use of specific "terministic screens"-that is 
terms that act like filters to create a basis for identification (Burke, 1966, p. 44). If 
such meanings, about, for example, science and economics, are 'taken-for-granted', 
the interests of particular groups may be privileged in ways which marginalise other 
choices. These groups and the resulting normalised discourse then have power, and 
issues are seen as instrumental rather than social or values-based (see Cheney & 
Frenette, 1993; Deetz & Kersten, 1983; Foucault, 1988; Mumby, 2000). For 
example, the market, from a public choice theory perspective, is seen as amoral-
that is exempt from moral judgement-as natural, or the best, or to be preserved, and 
is unquestioned as an indication of public good (Cheney, 2004). 
Yet, as Beck (1992) has argued, in a 'risk society,' the values and rationalities 
associated with scientific industrialisation are increasingly questioned; for example, 
the risks associated with GM, which are global, largely invisible, and possibly 
irreversible. Old models of political consultation and the role of experts are 
problematic because the interplay between opinions only hardens the divisions and 
conflicts. Beck (1994) suggested that groups for whom decisions are relevant must 
be able to participate in decision making, not just experts, and this may require that 
new processes of dialogue and decision making must be agreed on and sanctioned. In 
the meantime, interest groups frequently rely on activism and lobbying as strategies 
to influence policy debate. 
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Evidence of Activism in the Kiwifruit Industry 
There was strong evidence in the accounts of organic kiwifruit growers that 
they (and the industry generally) had a history of being politically active. At a time 
when neo-liberal policies resulted in the de-regulation of many industries in New 
Zealand, the kiwifruit industry took on a political battle to preserve the single-desk 
marketing which had resulted in significant industry growth (Wehby, 2004). Organic 
growers linked this political action with current debate about GM, as a time when 
participants identified so strongly with the industry position that this took precedence 
over any conflicting national or international commitments. One participant clearly 
lobbied actively, and successfully, against his wider political affiliations in support of 
this campaign: 
I was involved with the National Party at the time that they were in government as 
local branch chairman and in the interests of the industry I had to lobby hard within 
the party against their proposed deregulation and we rallied an enormous force 
within the local branch to oppose this crazy logic. (Respondent A, ZESPRI Organic 
kiwifruit focus group) 
A second participant commented that growers would "stand fast" on single desk 
marketing even in the face of opposition from the WTO, who see such stances as a 
"trade barrier" (Respondent F, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus group). This 
participant articulated the strength of feeling about de-regulation of the industry that 
had previously generated substantial activism and direct engagement with politicians. 
He commented that, "Growers opened up their cheque books and just said no," and 
that "busioads of people going to Wellington to talk to politicians" demonstrated the 
strength of growers' activism (Respondent F, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus 
group). The coordination of such 'grassroots' activism requires extensive networking 
(see Henderson, 2005), and is also evidence of the effectiveness of kiwifruit industry 
communication practices, and the collective identification of individual growers with 
the cooperative industry. 
The organic growers' comments about Government policy on GM, in the 
context of the above comments, indicate the potential to be politically active, and 
indeed a certain relishing of the "battle" involved: 
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If you're asking where to from here, we may have lost the battle [over GM] but I 
don't think we've lost the war. (Respondent F, ZESPRI Organic kiwifruit focus 
group) 
Two of the packhouse/suppliers' technical spokespersons held similar strong 
feelings. One described the Chairman of the Kiwfruit Marketing Board at the time of 
previous political battles as "pretty astute," and his involvement as "ferocious 
discussions down in parliament" (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier A). This 
participant was confident that industry leaders were particularly skillful in lobbying 
Government, and had the support of growers: 
They [kiwifruit growers] pull no punches and they are not too interested in frills ... 
Kiwifruit growers would just come in behind ZESPRI' s wing. (Technical adviser, 
packhouse/supplier A) 
A second technical spokesperson would have liked ZESPRI, as an expert industry 
voice, to take more of a lead politically in voicing the concerns of those cautious 
about proceeding with GM at a commercial level. She commented: 
When it really does strike home that we are allowing GE crops in New Zealand and 
hey down the track Japan is saying right we took five million trays but look honestly 
fellows we just don't want them any more, that's when the boots will really start sort 
of hitting the floor. (Technical adviser, packhouse/supplier B) 
The phrase "the boots will really start sort of hitting the floor" suggests that a more 
political ZESPRI stance on GM would have the active support of industry members. 
This spokesperson was also prepared to take an active individual role in the debate: 
Even if I'm not out there advocating with my chief executive that this is an issue that 
we've got to have in everybody's faces ... ifl need to trigger anything I will, and 
I'm sitting in a position where if I need to I can. (Technical adviser, 
packhouse/supplier B) 
These kiwifruit industry members' accounts indicate that some industry groups were 
potentially prepared to lobby Government directly, if commercial development of 
GM thre~tened their own interests. The combative stance evident in the rhetorical 
positioning of ZESPRI's GM positioning as a 'battle' and the level of action 
envisaged in these accounts is, however, somewhat at odds with the pluralistic 
perspective on GM taken by other industry members, and the wider tactics of 
'silence' adopted by ZESPRI management. 
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Organic kiwifruit growers were the most politically active group in the 
kiwifruit industry. They had the most of all the industry groups to lose, since their 
certification as organic growers could be threatened by contamination with GM 
crops, and as a minority group were used to representing their perspective to 
mainstream industry groups. Similarly, in the dairy industry, the organic farmers 
were the group actively involved in debate about GM both within the industry and at 
a local community level. 
Evidence of Activism in the Dairy Industry 
Like organic kiwifruit growers, organic farmers campaigned against the use 
of GM in agriculture, and in favour of organic farming methods, demonstrating that 
their identity as organic producers was stronger than their identification with the 
dairy industry. 
Organic farmers organised meetings about GM in their local communities, 
but commented that rural communities were entrenched in their pro-GM beliefs, 
possibly because they are traditionally National Party voters and endorse the 
National Party pro-GM position. Rural communities frequently assumed organic 
farmers were politically aligned with the Green Party, and did not listen to organic 
farmers' arguments about GM because the farmers were thought to be activists. Even 
when organic farmers "tried to be very professional" in their approach, they "found it 
very difficult to even try and get a different perspective over to the community" 
(Respondent C, Organic farms focus group). GM issues were represented by these 
participants as involving a conflict of political identities as much as a substantive 
argument. 
The organic farmers' focus group members aligned themselves with the 'GE-
Free' coalition campaign tactics in calling for local councils to establish their region 
as a GE-free zone. The creation of GE-free zones and the lobbying of local councils 
were particularly effective tactics in the 'GE-Free' campaign (see Henderson, 2005). 
Although, in this case, this tactic was unsuccessful, other tactics within local 
communities were more effective: 
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They [local council] certainly wrote quite a reasonable letter to the Government and 
copies went to all the key ministers etc supporting our stance on keeping the 
moratorium on, so we did have a small victory with the Council even if we didn't 
have it with the wider community (Respondent D, Organic farms focus group) 
Organic dairy farmers provided ongoing information and support in relation to 
organic farming to other dairy farmer groups, and relied on personal interaction with 
other farmers rather than, for example, attempting to change attitudes through mass 
media information campaigns (see Ledingham, 1993). They had an active lobby 
group, the Organic Dairy Producers' Group, promoting organic farming methods 
through "organising workshops and discussion groups"; for example: 
As we get more farmers looking at our systems they will realise that they will learn 
more about 'nature', etc, and realise that it is actually probably easier to work with 
'nature' than try and change it. (Respondent D, Organic farms focus group) 
This comment demonstrates an ecological view of 'nature' as an integrated system 
(see Cronon, 1996; Mcnaghten & Urry, 1998; Merchant, 1992) and, in the context of 
this focus group discussion, implicitly constructs GM as not working with 'nature'. 
Organic farmers saw the co-existence of organic farming and GM as 
problematic, and evidence for the viability of the co-existence of GM and non-GM 
primary production has been contested. For example, co-existence is supported by 
Federated Farmers, but challenged by the 'GE-Free' coalition, and was the subject of 
a Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) report (MAF, 2003). Organic farmers' 
aim was primarily to change farming methods to include organic practices, rather 
than trying specifically to influence farmers' position on GM; In this sense the 
organic farmers' activism was driven by a principled value-based rationality rather 
than a purposive instrumental rationality, as distinguished by Weber (1978) and 
Giddens (1972). 
Interestingly, the spokesperson from ViaLactia emphasised at the time of the 
research interview, in 2002, that while there might be good reasons for organic 
farming from a production perspective, there was no evidence of an international 
market for organic dairy produce: 
In most parts of the world, farmers are now moving out of organic dairy production 
because the premiums are no longer there. So to say turn New Zealand into organic 
by 2020 ... wonderful idea and might have some very good spin-offs in terms of the 
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way in which we farm but we won't sell that product as organic. (ViaLactia 
spokesperson) 
This spokesperson agreed that the future for organic farming was contested (see 
Campbell & Ritchie, 2002; Chamberlain, 2001; Cook & Fairweather, 2003) but 
strongly defended the dairy industry expert opinion that there was no market for 
organic farming: 
We're the biggest marketer of dairy products in the world. We do know our market . 
. . We studied organics, we knew what the market dynamics were. (ViaLactia 
spokesperson) 
Yet, by 2003, the marketing spokesperson commented that one reason why Fonterra 
had chosen to develop a small organic sector within the dairy industry was because it 
was a good public relations tactic to offset concerns about the dairy industry's pro-
GM position: 
I don't think that the emphasis on organics necessarily goes hand in hand with the 
GM position, but. .. it's linked in the media and it's linked by Fonterra's PR people . 
. . if there's fuzziness around the fact that there is some GM or GE type activities 
going on within Fonterra, then that can be offset I guess by the so- called positive 
images that organics would have . . . So from a PR communications point of view 
there is benefit in publicising the organics work that's going on. (NZDB/Fonterra 
marketing spokesperson) 
The same marketing spokesperson acknowledged that there was a growing market 
for organic products: 
In terms of the reasons why you actually do the organics work, that's got nothing to 
do with the GM position at all. That's arisen because there is a niche, that we can 
make quite good money out of, that is growing quite quickly ... we've got maybe 
25 farms right now and we're going to later need 160. (NZDB/Fonterra marketing 
spokesperson) 
Indeed, recent media reports indicate a continuing "push" for more organic dairy 
production (Sheriff, 2005). This change in the NZDB/Fonterra's positioning on 
organics indicates that the activist tactics of New Zealand organic farmers, together 
with the growing preference of international and New Zealand consumers for organic 
produce (see Campbell & /Ritchie, 2002), was very effective. Although the 
international market for organic dairy products may be small, the development of 
organic products is in part a deliberate strategic move by the dairy industry to placate 
New Zealand and international publics which were uncertain about the benefits of 
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GM, and to create a more positive identification by these publics with the dairy 
industry, and its positioning on GM. 
The marketing spokesperson (interviewed in September 2003, a year after the 
interview with the ViaLactia spokesperson) suggested that there has been a shift in 
emphasis in the industry positioning on GM. Instead of the development of GM 
products per se, the emphasis is now on understanding the role of genes in providing 
particular nutritional benefits that might lead to the development of specialised 
value-added products: 
ViaLactia, that's the company that was set up to do the GM work, has moved far 
more in gene identification. So they're not using GM techniques any more but 
they're identifying the genes that are responsible for the particular expression ... 
Most of our research ... will be focused on nutritional ... benefits that we can 
derive from dairy products. (NZDB/Fonterra marketing spokesperson) 
Such a change in positioning is consistent with the need to move away from a 
dependence on low-cost commodity products, and reflects the current privileging of 
health discourses internationally, and the values being promoted for specialised 
nutritionally-dense foods (see Katan & de Roos, 2004). 
Organic groups in both the kiwifruit and dairy industries are 'activist'-that 
is they are actively engaged in contesting mainstream farming practices-and both 
the New Zealand public and international consumers are perceived as supporting 
organics. Managing the relationship with internal and external stakeholders, then, 
involves each industry in managing its identity in association with organics. Overall, 
however, both the dairy industry and the kiwifruit industry avoided taking an active 
position in the New Zealand public debate about GM, despite the preparedness of 
individual industry members to do so. Political activism was generally associated by 
both kiwifruit and dairy industry members with being radical; that is extreme and 
emotional, and therefore not credible for a large corporate industry organisation. 
Perhaps significantly, public relations literature has tended to position corporate 
public relations as countering grassroots activism (see L. A. Grunig, 1992; Heath, 
2001; Smith & Ferguson, 2001). This instrumental perspective privileges the 
legitimacy of corporate and supposedly 'apolitical' discourses, and implies that best 
practice lobbying is to use 'insider' tactics of influence with governments and key 
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interest groups, rather than risking the loss of that legitimacy by 'active' engagement 
in public debate. 
Evidence of Lobbying in the Dairy Industry 
Directing all public relations activity through a corporate communication 
spokesperson is common issues management practice, particularly in the 
development of issues management campaigns that take a 'propaganda' approach, 
and attempt to influence public opinion or the discourse environment directly (see 
Crable & Vibbert, 1983; Livesey, 2002; Pratt, 2001; Tilson & Stacks, 1997). 
However, issue management can also be conducted through 'insider' lobbying, 
where the emphasis is on negotiation, on developing a relationship with key 
individuals or groups in government and government-run institutions in an attempt to 
influence policy decision-makers directly (see Coombs, 2001; Ginzel, Kramer & 
Sutton, 2004; Murphy, 1996; Taylor, Vasquez & Doorley, 2003; Vasquez, 1996). 
Unlike the deliberate, proactive communication campaign aimed at farmers 
and marketers within the industry, the NZDB/Fonterra chose not to initiate 
engagement in public debate about GM, but did take full advantage of opportunities 
to lobby other interest groups, if invited to do so: 
In terms of the public we decided not to be proactive but if Simon Collins [New 
Zealand Herald reporter] wants to talk to us we'll talk to him ... and we make no 
hesitation to write articles in magazines or journals that will be available to the 
general public ... We'll go and talk in schools about what we're doing. We'll go 
and talk to groups, Rotary groups, we'll absolutely do that, but we weren't actively 
looking for those opportunities. (ViaLactia spokesperson) 
As well as strategic use of media, "one-on-one type meetings" with "government" 
and "officials" were preferred (NZDB/Fonterra marketing spokesperson). For 
example: 
We invited all politicians to come and talk to us either here or at the Dairy Board or 
we will go to them ... we arranged meetings with the various caucuses, or at least 
the agricultural or the science and education caucuses. (ViaLactia spokesperson) 
Additionally, there was deliberate engagement with legislators in relation to GM 
issues, "We try to proactively inform the legislators about what we're doing and 
what biotechnology is all about" (ViaLactia spokesperson). The lobbying of 
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legislators was frequently managed by the legal spokesperson, and it was clear that 
this was ongoing practice. The NZDB/Fonterra's preference was for industry 
specialists to engage directly in lobbying their specialist counterparts in Government 
and government institutions, rather than directing all public relations activity through 
a corporate communication spokesperson. 
In farmer focus groups, farmers expressed confidence that dairy industry 
experts would lobby at a political level on their behalf. The Shareholder Council 
evidently took an intermediary role in conveying individual farmer opinions to dairy 
management groups and advising on the status of industry submissions to 
Governm~nt, and farmers had significant trust in the dairy industry record of 
powerful lobbying: 
If Fonterra had something they could sell of GE they would be putting a hell of a lot 
of pressure on the Government to change their thinking and that's my impression of 
how a lot of decisions get made. (Respondent E, Smaller farms focus group) 
This comment implies that the dairy industry expects to have significant influence on 
Government policy. 
The strong alignment of dairy industry positioning on GM with preferred 
Government policy makes it particularly likely that the dairy industry lobbying on 
GM policies will be successful. The industry lobbying of Government draws on 
market and scientific discourses that privilege the knowledge of economic and 
technical experts. These discourses are currently those favoured by the Labour 
Government whose Growth and Innovation Framework focuses on economic and 
technical goals for New Zealand as a 'Knowledge Economy,' and includes 
prioritising developments in biotechnology and GM. In contrast, the kiwifruit 
industry had to work harder to demonstrate the threats to New Zealand's brand 
identity as 'clean' and 'green' and to present a viable alternative viewpoint on GM. 
Evidence of Lobbying in the Kiwifruit Industry 
Although the kiwifruit industry avoided being aligned with other interest 
groups and took no part in lobbying for public opinion in debate about GM, there is 
an indication that, as in the dairy industry, extensive lobbying went on behind the 
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scenes, out of the media. ZESPRI ensured that the kiwifruit industry GM position 
was clearly represented to Government and on relevant technical, regulatory, and 
advisory boards. One communication spokesperson constructed kiwifruit industry 
communication as developing a "constructive relationship" with the Government. 
She commented: 
They're a critical stake holder, so we make a point of ensuring that they are 
informed ... We do fairly regular updates to the House particularly on performance. 
(Communication spokesperson B) 
This represented the lobbying of Government as a strategy aimed at providing 
information and developing relationships, and some relationships were identified as 
"very close," particularly those with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
(Communication spokesperson A). Interestingly, though, such relationships were not 
represented as lobbying: 
It's been our position not to actively lobby. We don't like lobbying. Our feedback 
is that the ministers and the ministerial staff don't like it. What they ask us to do is 
to formally keep them in touch with what the feeling is in the industry-not how our 
boards might feel but what is the grower feeling ... We prefer to be able to have the 
lines in communication with the officials in the departments actually open. 
(Communication spokesperson A) 
Lobbying, this spokesperson suggested, resulted in 'closing off' communication, and 
was identified as unproductive. Her emphasis on a dialogic relationship is consistent 
with recent conceptualisations of issues management practice (see Coombs, 2001; 
Ginzel, Kramer & Sutton, 2004; Murphy, 1996; Taylor, Vasquez & Doorley, 2003; 
Vasquez, 1996), rather than on traditional models of issues management that 
emphasise persuasive influence. She implied that it was unrealistic to try to change 
Government attitudes through overtly persuasive tactics, that it was more important 
to exchange information that might be mutually beneficial. 
Policy bids but no surprises from either side if we can avoid it. And what we expect 
from that relationship is a similar flow of information ... And that way you can all 
do what you need to do and if you're caught out and you knew it was going to 
happen then that's your own fault. You can't expect to try and change them. 
(Communication spokesperson B) 
The industry/Government relationship is thus represented as an interactive dialogue 
with attempts to appreciate different perspectives on specific issues (see Roper, 
2005b) rather than as 'zero-sum' games of strategy (Murphy & Dee, 1992). This 
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perhaps identifies the challenges faced by the kiwifruit industry in trying to align 
their GM policies with those of Government, but is also consistent with the wider 
industry culture supporting diversity and recognising the plural perspectives of 
stakeholders. 
A second, more junior Communication spokesperson did, in contrast, refer to 
engagement with policy-making and advisory groups as active lobbying: 
What we do is we've already made it very clear what our stand is and we participate 
on a number of levels and a number of those advisory bodies or policy making 
bodies and, if we need to, we lobby very, very hard. (Communication spokesperson 
A) 
This was again qualified, though, as involving "discretion," with the stated outcome 
of creating a "dialogue" and having "your position known" (Communication 
spokesperson B).This construction of 'best practice' issues management is 
consistent with Heath's representation of issues management as dialogic ( 1997), and 
as a rhetorical dialectic: "The good organization communicating well" (2001, p. 31). 
However, despite engaging in deliberate strategic lobbying at a Government 
level, all of the ZESPRI Innovation team, one of the communication spokespersons, 
and some of the kiwifruit growers indicated that public policy decisions should be 
made by the New Zealand electorate, by citizens, rather than by experts. The 
preferred political stance was therefore inclusive and democratic, even if the outcome 
might not be ideal for the industry. For example: 
From time to time we may not be happy with the outcome but we have to be 
involved in the process; there is a democracy still but most people don't know how 
to engage in that process. (Communication spokesperson B) 
Industry members frequently identified the multiple discourses, perspectives, and 
value-systems underpinning particular rationalities for GM. These were described, 
for example, as a "huge diversity of opinions": 
... a wide range of views ... from a technical, scientific area ... from a 
commercial perspective and ... cultural and social and environmental concerns. 
(Innovation spokesperson A) 
This participant valued the role of the Royal Commission in providing the 
opportunity for "different people ... to be involved in the debate" (Innovation 
spokesperson A). 
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However, the Royal Commission has been critiqued, with the suggestion that 
the ways in which it was set up, the processes involved in the collection of 
submissions, and the context of the analysis all reflected modernist world views and 
as such marginalised environmental groups' submissions (Rogers-Hayden, 2004; 
Rogers-Hayden & Hindmarsh, 2002). Hajer (1997) has also pointed out the 
advantages, in terms of status and credibility, and the disadvantages, in terms of 
restriction of dialogue, of quasi-legal forums like the New Zealand Royal 
Commission as a means of "societal enquiry" (p. 288). 
One kiwifruit industry spokesperson identified the need for a forum where 
views with different values can be expressed; he represented GM issues as "almost a 
religious debate ... because it is based on belief rather than necessarily on fact" 
(Innovation spokesperson E).Another Innovation scientist clearly had a social 
constructionist perspective of science, seeing scientific knowledge as contested: 
Biological systems are never about black and white, they're about shades of grey 
and to have scientists on both sides and people claiming to be using scientific 
argument to say that there is a black and a white or a right or a wrong, is just to my 
way of thinking, just crazy. (Innovation spokesperson E) 
The issues surrounding GM were then implicitly represented by kiwifruit industry 
members as inherently political or ethical (see Latour, 2004; Nelkin, 1984), in 
contrast to the dominant technical/scientific perspective amongst dairy industry 
members. 
The dilemma for the kiwifruit industry is that active lobbying for 
environmental perspectives has frequently resulted in organisations being branded 
left-wing politically, and anti-capitalist, stances likely to alienate stakeholders and 
interest groups that the kiwifruit industry is keen to influence. For example, Dick 
Hubbard, founder of the New Zealand Businesses for Social Responsibility, was 
subjected in 1998 to quite personal attacks by Roger Kerr and the Business 
Roundtable, and accused of attacking the integrity of major businesses in New 
Zealand and of taking a leftist, anti-capitalist stance (Allen, 2004). ZESPRI 
attempted to align the kiwifruit industry position on GM with Government policy by 
drawing on free-market discourses to present a rationality based on the importance of 
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the New Zealand 'clean, green' brand identity to its economic prosperity. This 
prioritised the values associated with the Government's '100% Pure' campaign, a 
tourism brand identity which has been particularly successful for New Zealand 
economically. For example, tourism recently overtook the dairy industry as being the 
largest export-earning industry in New Zealand (Tourism Research Council, 2004). 
Kiwifruit industry members demonstrated a range of diverse positions about 
public policy decision-making on GM. These included a preparedness to be 
politically active at a grassroots industry level, and a history of overt political 
lobbying. Yet management demonstrated a preference for developing mutually 
beneficial relationships with Government and regulatory bodies. Industry members 
also believed that New Zealand citizens should contribute to public policy decisions 
about GM, and should respond to the preferences of international customers. 
In contrast, dairy industry representations of lobbying and decision-making 
processes consistently privileged the voices of experts, and positioned the dairy 
industry as an authoritative voice which expected to exert considerable influence on 
Government policy. 
Conclusion: Industry Engagement with Stakeholders and Influences 
on Public Policy 
The Kiwifruit Industry: Tactics of Silence Exist in Tension with Consultative 
Decision-making and Pluralist Perspectives 
The kiwifruit industry represents its avoidance of engagement with 
stakeholders on issues related to GM as preserving the integriry of the industry 
identity, in that the industry position on GM is concerned to protect the multiple 
identities which might be adversely impacted by association with GM in New 
Zealand. As discussed in Chapter Five, the industry has an identity as part of a New 
Zealand which is 'clean, green', unpolluted, and 'pure' --environmental integrity. It 
has an identity as a global market leader in kiwifruit exports, as a successful 
business, rather than as an activist organisation---commercial integrity. The industry 
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relies on the identity associated with its product: the quality, taste, and health-giving 
properties of a luxury raw fruit-the integrity associated with a high-quality product. 
The industry also depends on a complex identity in terms of production; with 
processes that are environmentally friendly, efficient, transparent in meeting audit 
requirements, and sophisticated technologically (although not GM)-integrity 
associated with high-quality systems. Finally, the industry highlights an identity 
which respects individual diversity, at the level of the grower, the supplier, the 
customer, and the consumer-an integrity of respect for individual values systems. 
The kiwifruit industry issues management tactics of 'silence' have resulted in 
the successful management of multiple, diverse values, rationalities, and identities. 
The strategic decision to position the industry policy on GM only in terms of the 
commercial, business identity of the industry in the international marketplace 
effectively unites the industry by drawing on the common value most universally 
identified with by the industry stakeholders. This simultaneously protects the 
dynamic, complex identities and values represented in the industry, by minimising 
the tensions between rationalities drawing on multiple value-premises. The single 
marketing focus of the kiwifruit industry positioning manages tensions associated 
with rationalities drawing on market, science, environmental, social, and political 
discourses by constructing GM policy as based on the common values of respect and 
integrity. These abstract values have sufficient strategic ambiguity (see Eisenberg, 
1984) to be endorsed by the majority of industry stakeholders. 
The level of trust in the industry management and decision-making processes, 
built up through the consistent use of highly interactive and consultative 
communication structures within the industry, enabled the decision on GM policy to 
be made at an executive level with the support of industry stakeholders, despite 
ZESPRI's tactics of 'silence.' The wide acknowledgement of, and support for, 
diverse values were seen as important at the level of industry decision-making, as 
well as at the level of public policy decision-making about GM. For this reason, the 
kiwifruit industry saw its own positioning on GM as contributing to, rather than 
seeking to dominate wider debate in New Zealand. 
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The Dairy Industry: 'United We Stand' - a Position Privileging the Role of 
Experts 
The dairy industry was managing the merger of the various cooperative dairy 
groups into the new corporate organisation, Fonterra, during the period leading up to 
and immediately after the Royal Commission. It was thus concerned to protect the 
identity of the industry as credible and coherent among New Zealand stakeholders, 
rather than 'fighting fires' on too many fronts. At the same time it was important that 
the dairy industry was positioned as a global leader, and seen to embrace GM, in its 
bid to set up the new single cooperative organisation. There was very strong 
lobbying within the industry by industry executives (both on issues related to GM 
and on the worth of the merger), to try to ensure the industry did not end up 
fragmented, and would emerge as a continuing global force. 
There was less active lobbying of the New Zealand public in relation to GM; 
this could safely be left to the expertise of the LSN, since the creation of a united 
group representing industry and science perspectives resulted in a powerful resource 
base with considerable potential influence on public opinion and public policy. 
However, the dairy industry membership of this group clearly privileged the business 
and technical/scientific perspectives of GM evident in the industry rhetoric. The 
dairy industry did not itself need to seek popular support for its GM policy, since it 
felt it could also rely on having influence on public policy through having the ear of 
Government. 
The hierarchical nature of the dairy industry structure means that the 
corporate executive group is much more distant from the level of the owner/producer 
than in the kiwifruit industry, despite the cooperative ownership. Dairy farmers' 
collective industry identity more resembles that of shareholder status in a corporate 
entity than a cooperative in terms of decision-making, and farmers are indeed 
referred to as shareholders on the Fonterra website. Dairy industry policy is 
developed and implemented with some consultation and feedback from producer 
groups, but is perceived by farmers to be driven by corporate expertise. The overall 
focus of the dairy industry positioning on GM draws on its corporate identity as a 
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global competitor in international dairy markets and prioritises pragmatic 
instrumental rationalities based on financial efficiency and the operational regulatory 
environment. 
The dairy industry expected that its expert voice would be persuasive and 
influence public policy decisions about GM. Despite believing that decisions about 
GM should be made solely on a technical basis, the dairy industry was highly 
political in actively lobbying to influence Government policy. The industry 
privileging of technical/scientific rationalities in this political context only reinforces 
the viewpoint that science is socially constructed, that values inevitably underpin 
scientific rhetoric even when it is represented as value-free. 
The tone of the dairy industry documents related to GM was overtly 
persuasive, and represented its GM position as both 'correct' and 'sensible.' The 
industry chose to engage in areas of the debate about GM that were wide-ranging, 
including the role of cultural and social values, which were represented as impeding 
research and development, and the regulatory framework, which was positioned as 
needing to be both minimal at the research and development level, and sufficiently 
prescriptive at an operational level. 
The dairy industry is still managing the tensions involved in being market 
responsive both in terms of consumer expectations and competitor positioning. 
Interestingly, it is now making an attempt to further manage its international industry 
identity, and public image in New Zealand, by growing organic markets. 
Both the kiwifruit industry and the dairy industry avoided engaging directly 
with the New Zealand general public on issues related to GM. For both industries, 
Government lobbying was the preferred form of action, yet this political action exists 
in tension with the preferred neo-liberal economic rationality of each industry. Each 
industry manages multiple identities to negotiate their relationships with the practices 
of GM and Government free-market policies, by privileging different aspects of the 
overall Government policy and New Zealand identity. They balance multiple 
industry voices and discourses in both New Zealand and in external markets. 
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This analysis of the kiwifruit and dairy industries' issues management 
communication about GM has demonstrated the preference of these corporate 
organisations to avoid open involvement in public debate about controversial socio-
political issues, in efforts to avoid confrontations which might threaten their 
preferred identity and image. However, such organisations take a political stance in 
attempting to influence the public policy agenda through insider lobbying of 
Government, and may attempt to directly influence the attitudes of specific 
stakeholder groups. The analysis demonstrates the complexity and strategic nature of 
the kiwifruit and dairy industries' issues management communication, and suggests 
that issues management may usefully be explored as the management of multiple 




In this concluding chapter, I review the research findings in the light of the 
aim of the thesis, and discuss both the practical and theoretical implications of the 
key findings. I acknowledge the difficulties I encountered in conducting the research, 
the implications of these difficulties, and what I might have done differently. I also 
discuss the implications of this study for future research and make some practical 
recommendations for organisations in their negotiation with controversial public 
issues. 
This thesis has examined how two, seemingly similar, large primary producer 
industries in New Zealand negotiated very different relationships with the 
controversial practice of GM, at a time of intense public debate about the issues. This 
was in an effort to maintain their dominance in export markets, at a time when GM 
foods were on the one hand regarded as a liability in the marketplace, and on the 
other hand offered the apparent potential for innovation and economic gain. The 
thesis has presented case studies of the kiwifruit industry, which argued that New 
Zealand should not proceed with commercial development of GM, and the dairy 
industry, which argued that there was some urgency for New Zealand industries to 
engage commercially with GM technologies. It has looked in detail at the 
communication practices of these two industries with the aim of understanding the 
values and values-related tensions evident in their organisational communication 
about GM. The analysis has demonstrated that the social meanings evident in each 
industry's strategic positioning on GM were underpinned by two very different sets 
of identity management communication practices, for example 'tactics of silence' in 
the kiwifruit industry as opposed to specific public relations campaigns in the dairy 
industry. Yet, these industries negotiated similar tensions in the rationalisation of 
their respective policies, for example each industry attempted to align itself with 
other business groups while distancing itself from more radical groups taking similar 
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positions on GM, and each industry had to negotiate the tensions inherent in being 
perceived as both innovative and environmentally aware. 
The theoretical framework for the research analysis has drawn on 
perspectives of identity and image, and organisational decision-making and 
rationality at the intersection of the diverse fields of organisational communication, 
public relations, and marketing. It has built on recent conceptualisations of 
communication as a "meta-concept" (Cheney & Christensen, 2001a, p. 239) to seek 
fresh understanding of the complex relationships between aspects of organisational 
identity and image management on multiple levels; both those traditionally seen as 
within the organisation, and those traditionally seen as external to the organisation. 
The Implications of the Study for the Case-study Industries 
The findings of this study indicate the complexity of the similarities and 
differences between the kiwifruit and dairy industries' positioning on GM; that it is 
too simplistic to describe the kiwifruit industry and dairy industry as representing 
opposing positions in the GM debate. At a time when successive New Zealand 
Governments have espoused neo-liberal free-market economic policies, both the 
kiwifruit and dairy industries represented their strategic positioning on GM as 
market-driven, and both industries argued their respective positions in terms of the 
benefits for New Zealand, rather than simply for the industry concerned. This 
emphasis constructed GM policy as implicating the iconic identity of New Zealand in 
international markets, and attempted to align industry policy with New Zealand 
economic policy. It thus reflected the dominant political discourse, and ensured that 
industry positions would be seriously considered by Government. On a pragmatic 
level, both industries were also equally reliant on international customer and 
consumer support in purchasing their products, and both faced increasing demands 
from GM risk-averse customers for compliance with demanding audit procedures. 
However, the kiwifruit industry sought to retain the trust of its international 
consumers, and its global leadership in the market. It represented its GM positioning 
in terms of its brand identity, which relied on both the luxury nature of the raw 
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product, ZESPRI kiwifruit, and the integrated pest management and production 
systems, the ZESPRI System. The kiwifruit industry highlighted consumer concerns 
about GM issues, and sought to influence the Royal Commission and the New 
Zealand Government directly, to ensure that there would be no change in the 
political environment that might change the current operating environment for the 
industry. 
In contrast, the dairy industry sought to assert its position in an increasingly 
competitive global market. It represented its positioning on GM in terms of 
protecting its corporate identity, which was particularly vulnerable throughout the 
timeframe of this study as the industry was re-structured. The industry represented its 
GM positioning as essential to its continuing participation, and potential role as a 
leader, in international dairy markets. The dairy industry thus needed stakeholder 
support at an international and national level, both for its GM positioning and for the 
credibility of the new industry merger. It highlighted producer concerns about GM 
issues, and directed particular communication campaigns at stakeholders, at 
Government, and through a 'front group' at the New Zealand electorate, to seek a 
change to a more supportive political environment for GM practices. 
In both formal and informal communication in the kiwifruit industry, diverse 
value systems and multiple viewpoints on GM were acknowledged as valid, and 
industry members generally accepted that they might not in the end influence the 
outcome of GM debate in New Zealand. This is consistent with the industry's 
individualistic market perspective: as suggested by rational choice theory (Aune, 
2001), consumers will decide whether to buy GM products on the basis of the costs 
and benefits of those products. It is also consistent with the industry's democratic 
perspective: as suggested by public choice theory (Aune, 2001; Devine, 1998), 
citizens decide as an electorate on the direction of New Zealand GM policy, on the 
basis of their individual perception of, and support for, the costs and benefits of the 
GM policies espoused by Government or other political parties. The kiwifruit 
industry communication with diverse stakeholders was represented in terms that 
suggested the importance of negotiating relationships. 
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The dairy industry, however, represented its own position on GM as 'correct', 
privileging the voices of technical, scientific, legal, and economic industry experts, 
and marginalising the voices of uninformed lay publics. In comparison to the 
kiwifruit industry, the dairy industry has additional operating concerns at a technical 
level in relation to GM. At a manufacturing level, the industry is required to audit 
both its sourcing of other ingredients and its own final products in terms of its GM 
practices. This study suggests that the representation of GM as the province of 
'experts' significantly influenced the communication practices of the dairy industry. 
Scientific discourses privileging technical assessments of risk underpinned all 
communication about GM, and represented social and cultural values as 'distorting' 
'true' understandings of the issues. From this perspective, only 'hard' evidence about 
GM, and the voices of experts who understood that evidence were acknowledged as 
valid. This prescriptive assumption that 'the industry knows best' is consistent with 
its neo-liberal preference for economic and political business autonomy, but at odds 
with neo-liberal market perspectives of individual choice. Where the kiwifruit 
industry sought to contribute to the debate, the dairy industry sought to dominate the 
debate. 
On a pragmatic communication level, the two industries' different strategic 
positions resulted in quite different communication tactics with key stakeholders. 
The kiwifruit industry attained the luxury of silence, of not communicating 
extensively about its GM policy with its growers and suppliers. The high level of 
trust engendered by the consultative practices evident in the cooperative industry 
structure ensured stakeholder support within the industry for the GM positioning, 
despite the lack of consultation on this particular issue. Industry members 
appreciated the sensitivity to GM in international markets that dictated this. 
The dairy industry equally demonstrated carefully controlled communication 
in relation to GM, but in this case, this involved deliberate, separately targeted 
communication campaigns. The dairy industry used a 'front group', the LSN, to 
ensure that its pro-GM positioning would influence the New Zealand electorate, 
while attempting to avoid direct involvement in public debate about GM, to protect 
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the somewhat controversial merger that created Fonterra from additional critical 
attention. Its two main campaigns, the MBT and the GIOT, directed respectively at 
marketers and farmers within the dairy industry, and at operational staff, specifically 
aimed to convince these stakeholder groups of the benefits of commercial 
development of GM products. The dairy industry is much larger than the kiwifruit 
industry and comprises more distinct industry sectors; for example, two 
manufacturing 'arms', New Zealand Milk and New Zealand Milk Products, farmers, 
the corporate administration, and research groups, such as ViaLactia. This diversity 
of function and product may be more easily managed through a hierarchical 
organisational structure and decision-making within the industry. 
Alongside the organisational communication differences that underpin the 
multiple identities and rationalities negotiated by the dairy and kiwifruit industries, 
there are some specific differences over which they have less control. The kiwifruit 
industry produces a luxury raw fruit that has access to highly lucrative European 
markets, whereas the dairy industry produces a commodity product that is 
differentiated by its efficient low-cost production, and gains access largely to 
markets that cannot afford luxury products, for example, in S.E. Asia and Latin 
America. Yet, each industry has the choice of an alternative: the kiwifruit industry 
could choose to develop GM products in an effort to further dominate the world 
market, particularly since no other countries are as yet involved in the development 
of GM fruit. The dairy industry could choose to develop a wider range of non-GM 
value-added products for which they might find more lucrative markets. This would 
enable them to differentiate themselves from competitors already engaged in GM 
research and development, and, in fact, the development of 'functional foods' and an 
organic product range suggests that this is now seriously being considered. Each 
industry thus demonstrates different "logics of action" (Karpik, 1978) and 
rationalities for their GM positioning as a result of the management of multiple 
identities related to their organisational practices, different industry products, and 
markets. 
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In each industry, for example, the cooperative owners of the industry, the 
growers and farmers, are positioned differently in terms of the tensions associated 
with their own role in the industry and an industry identity as 'innovative'. In the 
kiwifruit industry, on the ZESPRI website, and in the recent centennial edition of the 
Kiwifruit Journal, images of growers as 'innovative pioneers' are constructed using 
profiles of individual growers, and international customers are invited to New 
Zealand to visit growers on their orchards. Individual growers are thus consistently 
represented as 'driving' the kiwifruit industry; it is the cooperative grower body, 
Kiwifruit New Zealand, which licences ZESPRI, the corporate marketing and 
development group. Growers additionally represented their own identity as 
consistent with the environmental values underpinning both the ZESPRI brand 
identity and their preferred industry identity for New Zealand. However, in the dairy 
industry, farmers indicated regret that the industry is becoming mechanised; that 
valuable traditional knowledge is being lost as farm production methods become 
increasingly specialised. The identity they construct for themselves is thus not 
entirely consistent with the implementation of innovative GM technology or the dairy 
industry preferred identity for New Zealand as an innovative 'knowledge economy'. 
Farmers are additionally referred to as shareholders, and the representation of the 
industry as a corporate organisation constructs the board of directors and corporate 
administration of the industry as 'driving' decision-making (Fonterra, 2004). 
On a practical level, this study has suggested that industry organisations can 
benefit from being reflexively aware of the value-premises inherent in their 
communication practices. Kiwifruit industry communication practices provide an 
example of how the values of diverse stakeholders can be successfully integrated by 
the dynamic management of multiple identities, such that the adaptive instability 
envisaged by Gioia, Schultz and Corley (2004) is a working reality. This enables 
more flexibility in managing the complex tensions involved in negotiating both 
multiple industry identities and the consequent multiple rationalities for their 
positions on controversial issues. The dairy industry, limited by its identity as a 
hierarchical organisational structure, and the somewhat intransigent privileging of 
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technical/scientific and economic perspectives within a market rationality for its GM 
positioning, has resisted adapting its preferred GM positioning to acknowledge and 
respond to the diverse values of stakeholders. In contrast, by highlighting particular 
social meanings associated with 'integrity,' the 'environment,' and 'innovation' 
within its market rationality for GM, the kiwifruit industry effectively represented its 
position on GM as a rational choice, fostering identification with this positioning by 
multiple industry stakeholders holding diverse values. It will be interesting to see if 
the kiwifruit industry can maintain this reflexivity and adaptability longer term in 
relation to issues associated with GM, and how the industry might resolve future 
tensions in its identity management practices. For example, if commercial 
development of GM foods in New Zealand becomes widespread then ZESPRI' s 
'tactics of silence' might be have to be abandoned and the kiwifruit industry might 
choose to enact an identity consistent with the potential for political activism 
demonstrated by industry members. 
Limitations of this Study 
The scope of this study was restricted to case studies of only two industries in 
New Zealand, but further research taking a similar critical-interpretive approach to 
understand the positioning of other interest groups on GM issues might provide 
additional insights that inform ongoing public policy development about GM. My 
original intention in this study, at the time that submissions were being made to the 
Royal Commission, was to explore the interaction of the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries with other interest groups in the New Zealand debate about GM in some 
detail. However, the limited engagement of these two industries in public debate 
about GM over the period of the study meant that many of the interviews that I 
conducted with spokespersons from other interest groups simply became useful 
background information for my understanding of the issues. As the study developed, 
I became more and more fascinated by the tensions evident in the complex 
interrelationships between aspects of the industries' identities and the rationalities 
they used to justify their positioning on GM. If I had appreciated this complexity 
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from the outset, it would have been interesting to interview both marketers and 
customers in the countries representing each industry's international markets. 
However, realistically, such international research would have stretched the financial 
resources of this doctoral study, and an extended study of these two industries 
remains to be completed. 
In retrospect, I also appreciate why my first contacts with dairy industry staff 
seemed to raise questions concerning the credibility of my status and research. From 
the outset, the framing of my primary research question, that aimed to understand the 
values and values-related tensions evident in industry communication about GM, 
gave a clear indication of my axiological premises, and my social constructionist 
approach. Given my findings, that the dairy industry privileged a technical/scientific 
perspective of GM issues that marginalised the role of social and cultural values in 
decision-making about the related public policy, their hesitation about being involved 
in the research is understandable, and I am grateful to the staff concerned for 
supporting this study. Consistent with my preferred reflexive poststructural approach 
to this study, I would like to have been more open about my personal stance on GM 
with the research participants. My attempts to be perceived as 'objective' were in the 
circumstances pragmatic, but I am as a result much more aware of the limits of 
interview and focus group methods in structuring the research context. 
An additional limitation in this study was the length of time taken to conduct 
all of the interviews and focus groups. Although this meant that the data was 
collected over a time period of intense debate about GM in New Zealand, which 
resulted in the establishment of a public policy direction, participants were 
commenting on events at different points in this period. Ideally, interviews and focus 
groups might have been conducted with all participant groups at the time of the 
Commission, again at the time of the announcement of Government policy, and 
again at the time of the lifting of the moratorium on applications for commercial 
trials of GMOs. However, the range of participants included in this study is also one 
of its strengths, and seasonal and international work commitments made access to 
these participants particularly difficult. 
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The Theoretical Implications of the Study 
This study has demonstrated that the ways in which organisations and interest 
groups negotiate with controversial socio-political issues, such as GM can usefully 
be understood from the perspective of identity management. It has examined 
organisational communication about GM issues from the reference points of values, 
identities, and rationalities, and highlighted the complex relationships between these 
foundational concepts. In contrast to Davenport and Leitch's (2004) 'Issue-Impact-
Action' model, which suggests that issues may generate stakeholder responses 
ranging from 'inaction' to 'interest-based action,' 'identity-based action,' and a 
combination of 'interest- and identity-based action,' this study suggests that attempts 
to separate 'interest-based' and 'identity-based' positioning strategies on 
controversial issues associated with GM are problematic. Both seemingly 'interest-
based' and 'identity-based' strategies continually draw on value-premises that 
frequently exist in tension. These tensions are implicitly and explicitly represented 
both in the management of multiple organisational identities and in the negotiation of 
multiple rationalities as organisations construct social meanings which make sense of 
their positioning on controversial public issues. 
The theoretical framework used in this study to examine the management of 
multiple identities in the kiwifruit and dairy industries thus demonstrates the 
complexity of the decision-making, strategic planning, and communication practices 
involved in the management of controversial public issues. The findings in this study 
are consistent with recent work suggesting that organisational identity and image are 
shaped by organisational communication, public relations, and marketing activities, 
requiring a conceptualisation of communication that transcends these theoretical 
barriers (Cheney and Christensen, 2001a). The study demonstrates that organisations 
manage the tensions involved in negotiating their relationships with multiple 
stakeholders through communication practices involving the management of multiple 
identities and images (Cheney, 1991; Cheney and Christensen, 2001a). As suggested 
by Hatch and Schultz (2004) and Gioia, Schultz & Corley (2004), organisational 
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identity is theorised in this study as dynamic: both continually constitutive of 
organisational culture and image, and constituted by that culture and image. 
The findings suggest that organisations rhetorically construct and enact their 
positions on controversial socio-political issues through managing the tensions 
involved in the identification of stakeholder groups with multiple, key strategic 
value-premises, in complex discursive environments. Organisations construct 
multiple rationalities for their actions, often retrospectively (see Conrad & Mclntush, 
2003), that frequently exist in tension as they struggle to balance conflicting value-
premises in their engagement with such issues on local, national, and global levels. 
For example, a high level of shared value-premises that supported both the 
market focus of the GM policy and the environmental concerns evident in wider 
industry practices were expressed within the kiwifruit industry. The positioning of 
the industry in terms of integrity; that is, the high quality of the kiwifruit, the 
excellence of the production systems, environmental integrity, and respect for others, 
ensured that the diverse groups within the industry identified with these value-
premises, and were perceived as integrated. If, as Christensen and Cheney (2005) 
suggested, 'integrated' is defined as uniting differences, the kiwifruit industry is an 
example of a highly integrated industry, with a unified brand identity. This 
integration afforded it the trust of its stakeholders, and certainly resulted, in this 
instance, in its attempt to control industry communication about GM. Yet, in contrast 
to Cheney and Christensen's (2005) argument that such integrated communication 
suggests increasing attempts to control both employees and external images by the 
organisation, the integrated but cooperative nature of the kiwifruit industry seemed 
to provide some measure of reflexivity, and a.flexibility of response: for example, the 
kiwifruit industry's preparedness to acknowledge and respond to diverse viewpoints, 
its consultative approach to decision-making, and its preparedness to alter its GM 
position should there be a change in consumer attitudes. In this respect, the kiwifruit 
industry appears to be reflexively aware of the implications of the 'risk society' 
theorised by Beck (1992), adapting its practices to manage emerging sub-
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rationalities, and widespread global resistance to an increasingly corporate, 
industrialised world. 
The dairy industry, however, while it seeks to be seen as an integrated 
industry, relied on corporate, hierarchically-organised communication and decision-
making practices in an effort to control its stakeholders and coordinate the distinct 
industry groups. It displayed the tendency toward auto-communication described by 
Christensen and Cheney (2000), Christensen and Askegaard (2001), and Cheney and 
Christensen (2001a), for example, privileging its own corporate perspective of GM 
over that of consumers. In contrast to the kiwifruit industry, the dairy industry 
appears still to be privileging the modernist technical perspectives that Beck (1992) 
suggested are increasingly problematic in a risk society. 
This study then suggests that an organisation or interest group's negotiation 
with controversial public issues involves the management of multiple organisational 
identities and images, that is the identification of multiple stakeholders with the key 
value-premises used to rationalise an organisation or interest group's strategic 
positioning on the issues. An understanding of an organisation's engagement with 
the practices of controversial socio-political issues is thus broadened by considering 
this engagement as an ongoing negotiation of relationships involving the use of 
strategic ambiguity (Conrad & Mclntush, 2003; Eisenberg, 1984; Motion & Weaver, 
2005b) and adaptive instability (Gioia, Schultz & Corley, 2004). Additionally, this 
study suggests that an organisation's negotiation with controversial socio-political 
public issues, such as GM, is most successfully enacted when the organisation is both 
reflexively aware of the tensions that this involves, and prepared to be flexible in its 
strategic response to the issues. 
Implications for Public Policy and Practice 
Of particular interest in these research findings is that despite the similarities 
in their own identities, as recognised at the outset of this study, each industry draws 
primarily on separate identities for New Zealand. Both the kiwifruit and dairy 
industries need to manage the tensions inherent in their desire to be seen as 
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simultaneously business-focused, technologically innovative, environmentally aware, 
and responsive to consumers. However, the kiwifruit industry privileges a 'clean and 
green' identity for New Zealand which draws on environmental discourses that 
resonate strongly with their environmentally-aware European and Japanese 
customers. The dairy industry, in contrast, draws strongly on discourses of 
technological determinism which suggest that technological innovation represents 
inevitable social progress. It privileges an identity for New Zealand as a 'knowledge 
economy' that resonates with business interest groups both nationally and 
internationally (Growing an innovative New Zealand, 2002). Interestingly, in 
deciding to cautiously continue development of commercial applications of GM, the 
New Zealand Government has tried to reconcile the positions of both industries and 
both discursive identities for New Zealand in its GM policy. 
Consistent with these contrasting positions, ZESPRI is a member of the 
Sustainable Business Network (SBN) in New Zealand, which comprises 
approximately 380 small businesses as well as large businesses. The SBN has a 
primarily environmental focus and puts environmental concerns as the outer 
overarching circle of three concentric circles, featuring environment, social, and 
economic concerns. In contrast, Fonterra is a member of the New Zealand Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (NZBCSD) which constructs the three 
concepts underpinning sustainability-social, economic, and environmental-as 
equal and overlapping. The NZBCSD currently only has 43 member companies, all 
members by invitation only, and is positioned as the voice of larger businesses in 
New Zealand. One of their objectives is to influence national policy development on 
sustainable development and their emphasis is on technological solutions to 
environmental and sustainability issues (see Allen, 2004). The struggle between the 
kiwifruit industry and dairy industry to influence the public policy environment in 
New Zealand in relation to GM perhaps is indicative of the political struggle between 
these two larger sustainability organisations as they seek to influence the political 
hegemony. 
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Interestingly, the kiwifruit industry decision to avoid engagement in the 
general public debate about GM issues in New Zealand means that they failed to take 
advantage of an opportunity to frame critical knowledge about GM, that is 
"knowledge that questions or resists legitimated or popular understandings" (Motion 
& Weaver, 2005b), leaving the way open for business interests like those of Fonterra 
and the NZBCSD members to maintain existing hegemonies. The knowledge of 
economic experts and scientific technical experts will continue to be privileged 
within current market and scientific discourses, rationalising the business agendas of 
influential companies, unless the critical knowledge of lay publics and other interest 
groups can gain sufficient credibility to influence communication practices and 
structures. Consumer groups' widespread rejection of GM foods (Gaskell, Allum & 
Stares, 2003) has demonstrated the potential power of other interest groups to 
influence business strategies. Continuing political engagement with GM issues may 
yet create opportunities for wider groups to be involved in public policy dialogue and 
decision making, and build positively on the initial public debate created as a result 
of the Royal Commission on GM. 
This study has demonstrated that a more complex understanding of the 
positioning of industries and interest groups in the GM debate in New Zealand, using 
the theoretical framework developed in this research, might demonstrate that other 
industries and interest groups at present expressing concerns about or support for 
particular aspects of public policy on GM are managing similar tensions to the 
kiwifruit and dairy industries. Industries such as tourism, wine, and apples, like the 
kiwifruit industry, explicitly celebrate a New Zealand identity drawing on a branding 
as 'natural' and '100% pure' in their marketing communication. Other industries and 
interest groups such as the forestry industry and the Crown Research Institute Crop 
and Food Research, like the dairy industry, explicitly represent the importance of 
New Zealand maintaining its OECD status as a technologically-skilled and 
knowledge-based economy (Growing an innovative New Zealand, 2002). However, 
given the complexity of the values-related tensions managed by the kiwifruit and 
dairy industries, I suggest that there are likely to be complex overlapping "zones of 
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meaning" (Heath, 1997) between all interest groups in New Zealand in relation to 
their positioning on GM that might usefully be better understood from the reference 
points of values, identity, and rationality. If further research can assist such interest 
groups, including, Government, to reflexively appreciate the tensions involved in 
strategic positioning on GM, then the constellations of identities and rationalities 
involved might indicate common value-premises which give a clearer direction for 
specific aspects of GM public policy. For example, to date, research exploring the 
implications of GM for New Zealand's 'clean, green' image has largely been from an 
economic perspective, which has failed to do justice to the complexity of the issues 
involved. 
Further research which highlights the values and values-related tensions 
implicitly and explicitly represented in communication about GM, using the 
theoretical framework developed in this study, might indicate that interest groups 
currently represented as polarised-for or against GM-display complex similarities 
and differences in their GM positioning. For example, organisations and interest 
groups currently represented as pro-GM might display specific tensions in their 
value-premises that indicate shared concerns with interest groups more cautious 
about particular aspects of GM and vice versa. A more reflexive awareness of these 
similarities and differences might alter the ongoing GM positioning of interest 
groups and facilitate identification with, and support for, particular directions for 
public policy on GM by multiple interest groups in New Zealand. At a national 
policy level, the contested nature of this dynamic public policy debate might then be 
less problematic. 
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APPENDIX ONE - TRIGGER QUESTIONS FOR SEMI-
STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
1. Tell me first about your role in your organisation. 
2. What does genetic engineering/genetic modification mean to you? 
3. What issues are you aware of in relation to genetic modification? 
4. How is genetic modification relevant to your organisation? 
5. How do you expect that genetic modification technologies will impact on your 
organisation in the future? (You may choose to answer this in relation to your 
own industry, other industries, or to yourself personally.) 
6. How would you describe your organisation's current strategic position in relation 
to genetically modified crops and foods? 
7. How does your organisation justify this position? 
8. How does your organisation consider ethical and social issues when deciding 
strategic policy in relation to genetic modification? 
9. What future direction would you prefer for your organisation in relation to the 
introduction of genetically modified crops and foods? 
10. How does your organisation communicate with you and other internal 
stakeholders about genetic modification? And with external stakeholders? And 
with the public? 
11. What communication strategies does your organisation use to involve you in 
decision-making about the use of genetic modification in the industry? And what 
communication strategies are used to involve external stakeholders in decision-
making about genetic modification? 
12. How do current government policies on genetic modification impact on your 
organisation? 
13. What direction would you like to see government policy take in the future in 
relation to genetic modification? 
14. How does current legislation related to genetic modification impact on your 
organisation both in New Zealand and overseas? 
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15. How do international agreements impact on your organisation - for example, 
TRIPPS agreement, Cartagena Protocol? 
16. How do you feel that the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification contributed 
to decision-making about genetic modification in New Zealand? How 
successfully did it consider ethical and social issues? 
17. What role, if any, did you play in the submission made on behalf of your 
organisation to the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification? 
18. How does your organisation attempt to provide information for the general 
public, or lobby the Government, and other interest groups about genetic 
modification issues? 
19. What issues related to genetic modification are especially relevant for New 
Zealand and New Zealanders? 
20. How would you like to "have your say"? How do you think individuals or groups 
should be involved in, or represented, in the debate about genetic modification? 
21. Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
22. Do you have any questions? 
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APPENDIX TWO - TRIGGER QUESTIONS FOR SEMI-
STRUCTURED FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS 
1. What issues are you aware of in relation to genetic modification? 
2. What does genetic engineering/genetic modification mean to you? 
3. How is genetic modification relevant to the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry/ 
you? 
4. How might genetic modification affect the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry/ you 
in the future? (You may choose to answer this in relation to your own industry, 
other industries, or to yourself personally.) 
5. How would you describe the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry's current position 
in relation to genetic modification (or the position of industry generally)? 
6. How do you think the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry justifies this? 
7. How does the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry consider moral and social issues 
in relation to genetic modification? 
8. What future direction would you prefer for the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry 
in relation to genetic modification? 
9. How does the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry communicate with you about 
genetic modification? And with the public? 
10. How does the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry involve you in decision-making 
about the use of genetic modification? And how does the industry involve the 
public in decision-making about genetic modification? 
11. How do current government policies on genetic modification impact on the 
kiwifruit industry/dairy industry/you, if at all? 
12. What direction would you like to see government policy take in the future in 
relation to genetic modification? 
13. How does current legislation related to genetic modification impact on the 
kiwifruit industry/dairy industry/you both in New Zealand and overseas? 
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14. How do international agreements affect the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry, if at 
all - for example, the TRIPPS agreement, Cartagena Protocol? 
15. How do you feel that the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification contributed 
to debate and decision-making about genetic modification in New Zealand? How 
successfully did it consider ethical and social issues? 
16. What role, if any, did you play in the submissions made to the Royal 
Commission on Genetic Modification? 
17. What occasions are you aware of when the kiwifruit industry/dairy industry/ or 
any other interest groups have attempted to provide information for the public, or 
lobby the Government, in relation to genetic modification? 
18. What issues related to genetic modification are especially relevant for New 
Zealand and New Zealanders? 
19. How would you like to "have your say"? How do you think individuals or groups 
should be involved in, or represented, in the debate about genetic modification? 
20. Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
21. Do you have any questions? 
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